In choices under incomplete information on incumbents, consumers with stronger preferences are more likely to reinforce their prior choices with motivated reasoning. However, in situations where incomplete information is restricted only to the prior choice, consumers with stronger preferences are more likely to abandon, not reinforce, their prior choices due to cognitive dissonance. Here, we consider how cognitive ability and personality traits mediate such interplay between motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance. We set an experiment to show that consumers with a stronger System 2 are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning to reinforce the prior choice and thus suffer less cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance can, however, overcome motivated reasoning for those cognitively poor consumers who are more emotional, less humble, less extraverted and less conscientious.
Consumers often make choices between options with missing information and then come across second choices that have more complete information than that were presented in the prior choice [
However, it has been suggested recently [
Thus, the conventional wisdom has been reversed, and the issue of how preference strength affects consumers’ reactions to missing information on their prior choice is unsettled.
Two contrasting forces are at the heart of this debate: motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance. When consumers are strongly engaged in motivated reasoning, this can override the affective process guiding their abandonment of the incumbent. In such a situation, they are less likely to abandon their prior choice. The reverse occurs when motivated reasoning is weaker than the affective reaction leading to cognitive dissonance, where consumers are more likely to abandon their prior choice.
Here, we set an experiment similar to Study 1 of Irmak and colleagues [
The two-mind approach in cognitive psychology [
Differences in behavior can be predicted not only by cognitive ability and intelligence, but also by other Big Five personality traits: emotionality (E), extraversion (X), agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C) and openness to experience (O) [
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experiment and the methods used; Section 3 shows the results found; and Section 4 concludes this study.
We prepared three questionnaires to: 1) measure cognitive ability through the CRT; 2) evaluate personality traits through the brief HEXACO inventory (BHI); 3) examine the mediation of cognitive dissonance in the effect of preference strength on switching. Questionnaire 3 was similar to that in Study 1 of Irmak and coauthors. The three questionnaires were presented following the sequence 1, 2 and 3. The experimenter (M.R.) employed the app Eval & Go to distribute the questionnaires online and sent an invitation to initial volunteers via WhatsApp, Facebook and Skype. The initial volunteers came from Florianopolis, southern Brazil. Then, he asked the volunteers to resend the link to friends. The questionnaires were sent from March 20, 2018 to April 16, 2018. In total, 404 volunteers participated, but only 233 provided valid responses. The data set is available at Figshare (https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.7582019.v1). (Ethics and consent: This experiment is part of a larger project that is registered at Plataforma Brasil (Comissão Nacional de Ética em Pesquisa) under No. 64758617.2.0000.0121.)
The cognitive reflection test [
CRT
1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
_____ cents
[Correct response: 5; intuitive response: 10]
2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
_____ minutes
[Correct response: 5; intuitive response: 100]
3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take the patch to cover half the lake?
_____ days
[Correct response: 47; intuitive response: 24]
The experimenter instructed participants to respond to the three questions in less than 30 seconds. This assured him they made an automatic choice. The appEval & Go automatically switched to another screen after 30 seconds had passed. He also asked whether each participant already knew one or all of the three questions. Those who reported to know at least one of the questions were redirected by Eval & Go to an alternative CRT [
CRT (alternative questions)
1) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together?
_____ days.
[Correct response: 4; intuitive response: 9]
2) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class?
______ students.
[Correct response: 29; intuitive response: 30]
3) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80 and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made?
_____ dollars.
[Correct response: 20; intuitive response: 10]
As observed, we gauged the personality traits of the participants through the brief HEXACO inventory (BHI) [
BHI
1) I can look at a painting for a long time.
2) I make sure that things are in the right spot.
3) I remain unfriendly to someone who was mean to me.
4) Nobody likes talking to me.
5) I am afraid of feeling pain.
6) I find it difficult to lie.
7) I think science is boring.
8) I postpone complicated tasks as long as possible.
9) I often express criticism.
10) I easily approach strangers.
11) I worry less than others.
12) I would like to know how to make lots of money in a dishonest manner.
13) I have a lot of imagination.
14) I work very precisely.
15) I tend to quickly agree with others.
Personality trait | BHI item | Main characteristic | Likert scale | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Honesty-humility | 6 | Sincerity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
12* | Fairness | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
18* | Greed avoidance | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
24* | Modesty | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
Emotionality | 5 | Fearfulness | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
11* | Anxiety | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
17* | Dependence | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
23 | Sentimentality | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
Extraversion | 4* | Social self-esteem | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
10 | Social boldness | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
16 | Sociability | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
22* | Liveliness | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
Agreeableness | 3* | Forgiveness | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
9* | Gentleness | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
15 | Flexibility | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
21 | Patience | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
Conscientiousness | 2 | Organization | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
8* | Diligence | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
14 | Perfectionism | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
20* | Prudence | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
Openness to experience | 1 | Aesthetic appreciation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
7* | Inquisitiveness | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
13 | Creativity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
19 | Unconventionality | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
* Measured considering a reverse Likert scale. Source: [
16) I like to talk with others.
17) I can easily overcome difficulties on my own.
18) I want to be famous.
19) I like people with strange ideas.
20) I often do things without really thinking.
21) Even when I’m treated badly, I remain calm.
22) I am seldom cheerful.
23) I have to cry during sad or romantic movies.
24) I am entitled to special treatment.
The second column in
Questionnaire 3 sought to elicit the mediation of cognitive dissonance in the effect of preference strength on switching, by manipulating the preference strength [
Participants eventually chose one of the options: Laptop A or Laptop B. Then, an article (supposedly from PC Magazine) was presented on the weight of portable computers, explaining their relation with portability and presenting weight variation in current models (0.9 to 1.8 kg). The participants were then presented to the same set with the two options, which now contained additional weight information. Specifically, the weight for the option they had previously rejected was listed as 1.6 kg; however, this value was missing for the prior choice. After reading the article and obtaining the new information, participants choose again between the two options: Laptop A or Laptop B.
From the 233 participants, 22 knew the original CRT questionnaire [
As for the HEXACO personality traits,
Degree, % | H | E | X | A | C | O |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Low | 35.683 | 32.275 | 74.7174 | 89.3208 | 34.881 | 60.9142 |
High | 64.4150 | 67.8158 | 25.359 | 10.725 | 65.2152 | 39.191 |
Note: Subscripts show the number of respondents.
Then, we estimated the probability of abandonment of the prior choice by considering the mediating role of cognitive ability and personality. From the 233 participants, 224 picked Laptop A as their prior choice. Here, we considered only this subgroup of 224 participants, from which 94 switched to Laptop B. Thus, estimating the probability of abandonment of the prior choice here means switching from Laptop A to Laptop B.
Let S be a dummy variable that takes the value 0 or 1 to indicate how preference strength is expected to shift the outcome. The state of no switching from Laptop A is represented by S = 0, while S = 1 is the state of switching from Laptop A to Laptop B. To obtain a transition probability from State 0 to State 1, we first estimate the linear predictor of switching from Laptop A to Laptop B:
η = β 0 + β 1 S + β 2 CRT + β 3 H + β 4 E + β 5 X + β 6 A + β 7 C + β 8 O + ε ,
where ε is a random error. The transition probability from State 0 to State 1 can be estimated by a logistic model:
P ( η ) = exp η 1 + exp η .
Because variables agreeableness and openness to experience were statistically non-significant,
However, our approach shows the conditions in terms of cognitive ability and personality traits for Irmak and coauthors to have a point.
Using the results in
η = 13.2 − 0.6 S − 0.87 C R T − 1.02 H + 1.58 E − 1.48 X − 1.18 C .
This can be used to estimate the transition probability P ( η ) from State 0 (no switching from Laptop A) to State 1 (switching from Laptop A to Laptop B) for each individual participant in our experiment.
To evaluate the fit of our model to the data, we consider that if P ( η ) > 0.5 then one individual participant would switch from Laptop A to Laptop B; if P ( η ) < 0.5 she would not.
Variable | Estimate | Standard error | Z value | P (> | z | ) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Intercept | 14.2594 | 3.2192 | 4.430 | 9.44e-06*** |
S | −0.5946 | 0.1553 | −3.829 | 0.000129*** |
CRT | −0.8922 | 0.2101 | −4.246 | 2.18e-05*** |
H | −0.9522 | 0.3667 | −2.597 | 0.009403** |
E | 1.6039 | 0.4178 | 3.839 | 0.000123*** |
X | −1.3549 | 0.3691 | −3.671 | 0.000242*** |
A | −0.4163 | 0.4378 | −0.951 | 0.341657 |
C | −1.0759 | 0.4645 | −2.316 | 0.020544* |
O | −0.2641 | 0.3672 | −0.719 | 0.472025 |
*significance between 0.01 and 0.05, **significance between 0.001 and 0.01, ***significance < 0.001.
Variable | Estimate | Standard error | Z value | P (> | z | ) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Intercept | 13.1620 | 3.0532 | 4.311 | 1.63e-05*** |
S | −0.6027 | 0.1546 | −3.899 | 9.66e-05*** |
CRT | −0.8706 | 0.2077 | −4.191 | 2.78e-05*** |
H | −1.0212 | 0.3581 | −2.851 | 0.004354** |
E | 1.5784 | 0.4118 | 3.833 | 0.000126*** |
X | −1.4836 | 0.3505 | −4.233 | 2.31e-05*** |
C | −1.1763 | 0.4434 | −2.653 | 0.007981** |
**significance between 0.001 and 0.01, ***significance < 0.001.
State | 0 | 1 |
---|---|---|
0 | 0.4107 | 0.1696 |
1 | 0.1964 | 0.2232 |
It seemed to be established in the literature that in choices under incomplete information on incumbents, consumers with stronger preferences are more likely to reinforce their prior choice. However, it has been suggested more recently that in situations where incomplete information is restricted only to the prior choice, consumers with stronger preferences are more likely to abandon, not reinforce, their prior choice. Motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance can explain the contrasting results. The traditional result stands when motivated reasoning overcomes cognitive dissonance. The challenging result occurs when the reverse is true.
Here, we set an experiment to explicitly treat motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance. For this purpose, we consider gauges of cognitive ability and personality traits to mediate the debate. We argued that those with a stronger System 2 are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning to reinforce their prior choice and thus suffer less cognitive dissonance, a rationale that could not be dismissed in our study.
Our results showed that high preference strength is associated with low probability of switching from brand A to brand B. This replicated the traditional result: motivated reasoning overcame cognitive dissonance. Thus, we found that in choices under incomplete information on incumbents, consumers with stronger preferences are less likely to abandon their prior choice.
However, we also found that cognitive dissonance overcame motivated reasoning for those consumers with lower cognitive ability, and who are more emotional, less humble, less extraverted, and less conscientious. Consumers with such characteristics are more likely to abandon their prior choice, even if they also held stronger prior preferences on incumbents.
Financial support from CNPq and Capes is acknowledged.
The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.
Da Silva, S., Matsushita, R. and Ramos, M. (2019) Incomplete Information Choice on Incumbents, Cognitive Ability and Personality. Open Access Library Journal, 6: e5476. https://doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1105476