Psychology
2011. Vol.2, No.9, 917-924
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. DOI:10.4236/psych.2011.29138
Psychologists’ Diagnostic Processes during a
Diagnostic Interview
Marleen Groenier1, Vos R. J. Beerthuis2, Jules M. Pieters3, Cilia L. M Witteman4,
Jan A. Swinkels5
1Instructional Technology, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands;
2Psychiatry, GGZ inGeest, Amstelveen, The Netherlands;
3Curriculum Design & Educational Innovation, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands;
4Diagnostic Decision Making, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands;
5Adult Psychiatry, AMC de Meren, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: m.groenier@utwente.nl
Received September 20th, 2011; revised October 23rd, 20 11; accepted November 26th, 2011.
In mental health care, psychologists assess clients’ complaints, analyze underlying problems, and identify causes
for these problems, to make treatment decisions. We present a study on psychologists’ diagnostic processes, in
which a mixed-method approach was employed. We aimed to identify a common structure in the diagnostic
processes of different psychologists. We engaged an actor to simulate a client. Participants were asked to per-
form a diagnostic interview with this “client”. This interview was videotaped. Afterwards participants first wrote
a report and then were asked to review their considerations during the interview. We found that psychologists
were comprehensive in their diagnostic interviews. They addressed the client’s complaints, possible classifica-
tions, explanations, and treatments. They agreed about the classifications, more than about causal factors and
treatment options. The content of the considerations differed between the interviews and the reports written af-
terwards. We conclude that psychologists continuously shifted between diagnostic activities and revised their
decisions in line with the dynamics of the interview situation.
Keywords: Clinical Decision Making, Diagnostic Interview, Stimulat ed Recall, Simulated Patient
Introduction
Psychological assessment is a diagnostic decision making
process aimed at describing, classifying, explaining, predicting,
and often also changing the behavior of a client (Fernández-
Ballesteros, 1999). The result of the diagnostic process is an
integrated representation of a client’s complaints and problems
together with an explanation for the problems and a treatment
proposal (Nelson-Gray, 2003). Guidelines have been developed
to support psychologists in structured gathering and interpreting
diagnostic information (see e.g. Groth-Marnat, 2003; Nezu &
Nezu, 1995) to make sure that a thorough assessment is carried
out and correct diagnostic decisions are made to reach the most
adequate treatment proposal. Unfortunately, as Garb (1998)
concluded, reliability and validity of these diagnostic decisions
are low, although the final treatment proposals are often ade-
quate. An explanation is provided in studies showing that psy-
chologists do not always carry out all parts of the diagnostic
process appropriately, even when explicitly asked to do so
(Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998; Groenier, Pieters, Hulshof,
Wilhelm, & Witteman, 2008). In most of these studies assess-
ment situations were artificial, and it remains unclear whether
psychologists in actual practice would perform and report all
parts of the diagnostic process. The current study is aimed at
identifying common structures in psychologists’ diagnostic in-
formation gathering processes in an authentic assessment situa-
tion.
The diagnostic process involves using different instruments,
such as tests, interviews, and observations, as well as perform-
ing different diagnostic activities, such as diagnostic classifica-
tion and diagnostic formulation (Fernández-Ballesteros et al.,
2001). Diagnostic classification and diagnostic formulation are
essential in the diagnostic process and described in many pre-
scriptive diagnostic decision models (e.g. Nezu & Nezu, 1995;
De Bruyn, Ruijssenaars, Pamijer, & Van Aarle, 2003). These
models have been introduced to support psychologists in struc-
turing the diagnostic process. The underlying assumption is that
psychologists should adhere to a systematic inquiry method, by
generating and testing hypotheses, to obtain relevant knowledge
about a client (Haynes, Smith, & Hunsley, 2011). Also, these
prescriptive models require psychologists to perform a set of
distinct diagnostic activities in a specific sequence. Despite
differences between these models (e.g. see Groth-Marnat, 2003;
Nezu & Nezu, 1995), there are important commonalities in the
kind and order of the diagnostic activities.
First, the client’s complaints and referral question are identi-
fied and analyzed (referred to as Complaint Analysis). Second,
the severity of the client’s problems is assessed and the prob-
lems are grouped into a disorder (Diagnostic Classification).
Third, possible explanations for the problems are generated and
tested, and the psychologist develops an integrated client model
(Diagnostic Formulation). Finally, based on the integrated
model a treatment is selected (Treatment Selection). These four
activities are performed iteratively throughout the diagnostic
process.
Client models may differ depending upon psychologists’
theoretical orientations (see Eells, 2007, for an overview). For
example, behavior therapy models emphasize relationships
between antecedents and consequences, cognitive therapy
models emphasize dysfunctional attitudes and thoughts, and
psychodynamic models emphasize core conflictual relation-
ships (cf. Persons, 1991). However, the main goal of diagnostic
formulation is the same in all models: to identify and analyze
M. GROENIER ET AL.
918
causal factors and mechanisms underlying client problems
(Haynes, Smith, & Hunsley, 2011; Westhoff, Hagemeister, &
Strobel, 2007).
In actual practice the information gathered is often incom-
plete and ambiguous, problems can be explained by multiple
causes (Haynes, Mumma, & Pinson, 2009), and the relation
between diagnosis and treatment is far from obvious (Lichten-
berg, 1997). Decision makers, i.c. psychologists, will then re-
sort to efficient strategies that limit the amount of processing
needed (Smith & Gilhooly, 2006; Garb, 2005; Gigerenzer,
2000). Indeed, earlier studies (e.g. Bus & Kruizenga, 1989;
Groenier et al., 2008) pointed out that psychologists did not
follow the resource-demanding formal rules of hypothesis gen-
eration and testing. They tended to rely on routine and to focus
on analyzing the client’s complaints and problems and selecting
a treatment method, rather than on generating and testing pos-
sible explanations for problems. These studies suggest that
psychologists’ diagnostic processes are adapted to the con-
straints of clinical practice rather than to the formal rules (cf.
also Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998). In this study we do not
aim to test whether heuristic processing or following rules is
the better process in terms of treatment utility, but we aim to
find the structure in psychologists’ diagnostic processes.
Previous studies have predominantly used written case de-
scriptions or required written case formulations (see also e.g.
Eells, Lombart, Kendjelic, Turner, & Lucas, 2005; Hillerbrand
& Claiborn, 1990) instead of more authentic assessment tasks,
as used in the current study where we engaged an actor to por-
tray a client. This is a major advantage of our study, since the
use of more authentic, ecologically valid assessment situations
can contribute to identifying and understanding diagnostic
processes in actual practice. Also, most studies have used only
one method to examine the diagnostic process, thereby limiting
comparability of results from studies using different methods, a
limitation we overcome by using different methods.
The Current Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate psychologists’ di-
agnostic activities in a authentic assessment situation represen-
tative of psychological practice, using a mixed-method ap-
proach. First (phase I), psychologists performed a diagnostic
interview with a simulated client. Second (phase II), they wrote
a report summarizing their findings. Third (phase III), we used
stimulated recall in which psychologists reviewed the videotape
of their diagnostic interview (cf. Kagan, Krathwohl, & Miller,
1963). The innovative design of the study allows us to study the
assessment process in three different ways, based on an authen-
tic diagnostic interview, the report, and the stimulated recall,
tracing the diagnostic activities of each participant. This design
is closely related to the approach suggested by Caspar (1997)
for studying psychologists’ diagnostic processes, combining
experimental and naturalistic research methods.
We expected that:
1) Psychologists would not perform all of the prescribed di-
agnostic activities described above during the diagnostic inter-
view (cf. Groenier et al., 2008);
2) Psychologists would reflect on all diagnostic activities in
the stimulated recall session, since they would post hoc attempt
to “fill the gaps of their developing theory” (Brammer, 1997: p.
345) about the client;
3) The report would be more concise than the stimulated re-
call, given its summarizing nature;
4) The contents of the report and stimulated recall would be
similar. Psychologists would describe their final decisions on
diagnostic classification, diagnostic formulation and treatment
selection in the written report, thereby discarding some of the
options they would have reflected on during the stimulated
recall.
Method
Participants
Psychologists who were part of the active networks of the
first and second author were invited to participate. Participants
came from all over The Netherlands and included certified
clinical psychologists (n = 17), psychologists in training for
certification (n = 6) and psychology students who were doing
their final internship (n = 4). In total 27 psychologists partici-
pated, aged between 22 and 65 years (M = 44.9, SD = 14.3); 12
male (mean age = 54.9, SD = 6.5) and 15 female (mean age =
36.9, SD = 13.8). On average, the participants had 14.8 years of
work experience (SD = 12.8, Median = 12.0, range = 0 - 35
years). We found no significant effect of experience on the type
and sequence of decisions, therefore, this factor was excluded
from further analyses. Participants either worked in a mental
health care centre (74%) or in a private practice (26%), and
they mainly worked with adults (89%). Participants’ theoretical
backgrounds were diverse. The majority (56%) did not work
from any specific theoretical background. A previous study
(Groenier et al., 2008) showed that theoretical background,
together with other background variables, explained less than
10% of variance in activities psychologists would perform.
The Diagnostic Interview
All participants interviewed one and the same actor, who
portrayed the same client throughout. Participants were told
that they would either talk to an actor or to an actual patient. In
addition, the client role was based on a real client with a de-
pressive disorder without psychotic features, and adapted to the
actor’s personal situation. To ensure identical performance
across interviews, the actor received intensive training before
the experiment, reread the script each time prior to being seen
by a new participant, and was given feedback about the consis-
tency of his performance after each interview.
Procedure
Before starting the interview with the actor, participants re-
ceived information about the client’s name, gender, date of
birth, residence, reason for referral by the family doctor (de-
pressive and suicidal thoughts), the client’s occupation, psychi-
atric history (none), marital status (married), number of chil-
dren (two, a boy aged 16 and a girl aged 14), physical history
(recently diagnosed with arteriosclerosis), current medication
(no antidepressants), and the request from the family doctor for
assessment and further treatment. Participants were given the
instruction to “read the referral letter and interview the client as
you would do in your own practice”.
In phase I of the study, participants interviewed the simulated
client for at most thirty minutes. The interview was videotaped.
The participants were allowed to take notes during the inter-
view, which enhanced authenticity. In phase II, participants
wrote a report, and were required to give a diagnostic classifi-
cation (DSM-IV classification; APA, 2000), a diagnostic for-
mulation, and a treatment proposal. Phase II lasted a maximum
of 15 minutes. In phase III, the stimulated recall session, par-
M. GROENIER ET AL. 919
ticipants were instructed to watch the videotape of their diag-
nostic interview and to reflect on their own process by reporting
any thoughts they had had during the actual interview. Duration
varied from 30 to 90 minutes. The stimulated recall session
started with two standard questions from the experimenter: 1)
What did you think when you read the referral letter from the
family doctor, and 2) What did you think when you first saw
the client? Each time the participants indicated that they re-
membered a thought, the experimenter stopped the video and
the participant verbally reported it. When participants did not
report anything for more than two minutes, the experimenter
reminded them to verbalize their thoughts. The stimulated re-
call session was recorded on videotape.
Finally, participants answered questions about their back-
ground (gender, age, work experience, theoretical orientation,
work setting, and time spent on treating clients). Participants
received a gift, i.e. a game or a gift certificate, for their partici-
pation.
Coding
We developed one coding schema to assess the number of
questions, remarks, and reflections related to the diagnostic
activities during the diagnostic interviews and stimulated recall
sessions as well as evaluate the contents of the diagnostic ac-
tivities described in the reports. This coding schema was based
on the Diagnostic Cycle (DC; De Bruyn et al., 2003). We chose
the DC because it provides a complete and comprehensive in-
ventory of the diagnostic activities psychologists are expected
to perform. The schema consisted of five categories, described
below, and the first four correspond with the diagnostic activi-
ties that diagnostic decision models have in common: 1) Com-
plaint Analysis, 2) Diagnostic Classification, 3) Diagnostic
Formulation, 4) Treatment Selection, and 5) Other.
Complaint Analysis consisted of complaints reported by the
client, complaints and symptoms inferred by the participant
(such as symptoms of depression, libido, suicidal thoughts,
manic episodes, psychotic features, anxiety), and the client’s
verbal and non-verbal behavior.
Diagnostic Classification consisted of the type and severity
of the disorder (e.g. a DSM-IV classification), the client’s
awareness of an illness or a differential disorder.
Diagnostic Formulation consisted of potential stressors and
protective factors related to the client’s psychiatric history,
family, physical or social history, the client’s biography, per-
sonality or to biological/genetic factors. This category could
also consist of descriptions of a psychological, biological or
socio-cultural mechanism explaining (the development of) the
client’s disorder.
Treatment Selection consisted of the client’s or the partici-
pant’s expectations about treatment options, a future therapeutic
intervention, treatment methods and goals, suicide prevention,
the therapeutic intervention’s intensity, medication, the client’s
motivation for treatment, or performing therapeutic interven-
tions during the diagnostic interview.
The category Other consisted of utterances about the thera-
peutic relationship, the client’s personal details, reason for re-
ferral, substance abuse, duration of the interview, awareness of
the test situation, supportive remarks, further assessment, own
method of working, (counter) transference, and non-classifiable
remarks. Examples of each of the categories are described in
Appendix A.
Both the protocols of the diagnostic interviews with the actor
and of the stimulated recall sessions with the participants were
first divided into meaningful units and then coded into one of
the five ca tegories. We defined a meaningful unit as a sentence
or part of a sentence that expresses a single idea and receives
only one code. The computer program Sequence Viewer
(Dijkstra, 2002) was used to divide the diagnostic interviews
and stimulated recall sessions into meaning units and consecu-
tively assign them to one of the coding categories. A standard
coded diagnostic interview and a standard stimulated recall
protocol were created by the first and second author. These
were used to train coding assistants and to assess each coder’s
reliability afterwards.
The reports were already structured according to the catego-
ries Diagnostic Classification, Diagnostic Formulation and
Treatment Selection (see Method, Procedure). The categories
Complaint Analysis and Other were not used in the reports.
Reliability of the Coding
For the diagnostic interview, six independent coding assis-
tants (bachelor degree medical and psychology students) were
used. Coder’s reliability was assessed by Sequence Viewer’s
Delta (Dijkstra & Taris, 1995). This statistic calculates agree-
ment taking differences in the number of meaningful units
identified into account. An advantage of this statistic is thus
that reliability only needs to be calculated once, for the seg-
mentation and coding together instead of separately. Delta var-
ied from .75 to .85 and was considered satisfactory.
For the segmentation and coding of the stimulated recall ses-
sions, two independent coding assistants (bachelor degree psy-
chology students) and the first author were used. Reliability
varied from .75 to .90, which was quite satisfactory.
Analysis
Due to malfunctioning of the digital compact discs used to
record the diagnostic interviews, three of the diagnostic inter-
views and two of the stimulated recall sessions had to be re-
moved from further analysis. This resulted in 24 participants for
the diagnostic interview and 25 participants for the stimulated
recall.
The mean percentage of meaningful units for each diagnostic
activity was calculated both for the interview and for the recall.
To examine differences between the diagnostic interview and
the stimulated recall, we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon test.
For the diagnostic interview and the stimulated recall separately,
we examined differences in the percentages of each diagnostic
activity using Friedman tests. Wilcoxon tests were used to fol-
low up on significant findin gs. A Bonferroni procedure was used
to maintain an overall significance level of .05. Effect sizes
were measured using r (-scorenumber of observa tionsz; see
Field, 2000).
To compare the content of the diagnostic activities between
the report and the stimulated recall session, we counted the
number of participants who described (report) or reflected on
(stimulated recall session) a Diagnostic Classification (includ-
ing a differential diagnosis), Diagnostic Formulation (including
potential stressors and explanatory mechanisms), and Treat-
ment Selection (including treatment method and goal). A dif-
ferent measure was used compared to assessing the reliability
of coding to assess the agreement between the report and stimu-
lated recall because for this analysis we did not assess interrater
reliability. We calculated percentage agreement between the
content of the report and the stimulated recall as the number
agreed on divided by the number disagreed and agreed on taken
together.
M. GROENIER ET AL.
920
Results
The mean total number of meaningful units, a sentence or
part of a sentence that expresses a single idea (see Method),
was 195.2 (SD = 46.2, range = 109 - 290) for the diagnostic
interview and 96.44 (SD = 40.76, range = 29 - 192) for the
stimulated recall session. The mean percentages of meaningful
units for each diagnostic activity are described in Table 1 for
both the diagnostic interview and stimulated recall session.
Diagnostic Interview Compared with Stimulated
Recall Session
As can be seen in Table 1, there were differences in percent-
ages of meaningful units in the four diagnostic activities (Com-
plaint Analysis, Diagnostic Classification, Diagnostic Formula-
tion and Treatment Selection). For the stimulated recall session
the percentages of meaningful units were significantly higher
for the activities Complaint Analysis (z = –3.29, p < .001, r =
–.47), Diagnostic Classification (z = –3.10, p < .001, r = –.45)
and Treatment Selection (z = –2.66, p = < .001, r = –.38). The
percentage of meaningful units for Diagnostic Formulation was
significantly lower (z = –4.29, p < .001, r = –.62) for the stimu-
lated recall session. The percentage of meaningful units of the
category other (see Appendix A) did not differ significantly (r
= –.06).
Diagnostic Activities in the Diagnostic Interview
Complaint Analysis, Diagnostic Classification, Diagnostic
Formulation, and Treatment Selection differed from each other
in the mean percentage of meaningful units (χ2(4) = 84.879, N
= 24, p < .001). The diagnostic activities Complaint Analysis
and Diagnostic Formulation did not differ significantly from
each other (r = .03). Both activities differed significantly from
every other activity (all z < –3.702, all p < .001, all r < –.53).
All participants asked or remarked at least once about Com-
plaint Analysis, Diagnostic Formulation, and Treatment Selec-
tion. Out of 24 participants, 17 discussed the classification with
the client.
Diagnostic Activities in the Stimulated Recall Session
Complaint Analysis, Diagnostic Classification, Diagnostic
Formulation, and Treatment Selection differed from each other
in the mean percentage of meaningful units (χ2(4) = 83.322, N
= 25, p < .001). The diagnostic activity Complaint Analysis
differed significantly from every other type of activity (all z <
–3.589, all p < .001, all r < –.51). Diagnostic Formulation dif-
fered significantly from Diagnostic Classification (z = –.3.589,
p < .001, r = –.51), but not from Treatment Selection (r = –.28).
Treatment Selection did not differ significantly from Diagnostic
Classification ( r = –.19).
All participants reflected at least once on Complaint Analysis
and Diagnostic Formulation. Out of 25 participants, 21 and 22
participants reflected at least once on Diagnostic Classification
and Treatment Selection respectively.
Content of Diagnostic Activities: From Interview to
Report
Diagnostic Classification
Participants reflected on eight different Diagnostic Classifi-
cations for the client’s problems during the stimulated recall
sessions (range = 0 - 5) and described 10 DSM-IV Diagnostic
Classifications on Axis I and II in the reports (range = 0 - 3). In
Table 2 the content of these classifications and the numbers of
participants reflecting on or describing each classification are
displayed.
Most participants (84%) considered the same classification:
depression. Seven participants (28%) reflected on a differential
diagnosis (range = 0 - 4). Apart from depression, which was
always stated as being present by these participants, other clas-
sifications (psychosis, anxiety disorder, manic episode, person-
ality disorder, adjustment disorder, obsessive-compulsive dis-
order and dysthymic disorder) were considered as differential
diagnoses or were discarded during the interview. Percentage
agreement between the Diagnostic Classifications reflected on
during the stimulated recall sessions and those described in the
reports was 38%.
Diagnostic Formulation
Participants reflected on 11 different potential stressors and
13 different explanatory mechanisms during the stimulated
recall sessions. They described nine different potential stressors
and seven different explanatory mechanisms in the Diagnostic
Formulations (see Table 3).
Three participants did not reflect on the conflict at work or
the client’s physical illness. The majority of participants re-
flected on (stimulated recall session) and described (report)
more than one type of potential stressor (92%, range = 0 - 8,
and 80%, range = 0 - 3, respectively).
The minority of participants reflected on and described more
than one type of explanatory mechanism (24%, range = 0 - 4,
and 12%, range = 0 - 3, respectively).
Percentage agreement between the types of potential stress-
ors reflected on during the simulated recall sessions and de-
scribed in the written Diagnostic Formulations was 67%. Per-
centage agreement for the explanatory mechanisms was 11%.
Treatment Selection
Participants reflected on 13 different types of treatment
methods and/or goals during the stimulated recall sessions and
Table 1.
Mean percentage of meaningful units, Standard Deviations (SD) and 95% Confidence Interval (CI) for Each di-
agnostic activity and type of method.
Diagnostic Interview (n = 24) Stimulated R ecall Session (n = 25)
Diagnostic Activity Mean SD CI Mean SD CI
Complaint Analysis 25.3 7.8 22.0 - 28.632.5 6.5 29.8 - 35.2
Diagnostic Classification 1.6 1.6 0.8 - 2.2 4.8 4.3 3.0 - 6.6
Diagnostic Formulation 2 5.9 7.1 22.9 - 28.911.4 6.4 8.7 - 14.0
Treatm ent Selection 4.1 3.4 2.7 - 5.5 7.1 5.2 4.9 - 9.2
Other 43.2 9.0 39.4 - 47.044.2 12.1 39.2 - 49.2
M. GROENIER ET AL. 921
Table 2.
Content of diagnostic classifications reflected on (Stimulated recall
session) and described (Report).
Content of diagnostic cl assifications Stimulated
recall Report
Depression, depressive episode or depressed mood 21 20
Psychosis or psychotic features 3 10
Anxiety disorder 3
Manic episode 2
(Avoidant) personality disorder or traits 2 5
Adjustment disorder 1 4
Obsessive -compulsive disorder or f eatures 1 1
Dysthymic disorder 1
Axis II diagnosis delaye d 17
Problems a t work 2
Loneliness 1
Life phase pro blems 1
Post-traumatic stress disorder 1
described 14 different types of treatment goals and methods in
the treatment proposals of the reports (see Table 4).
Nine participants (36%) reflected on more than one type of
treatment method or treatment goal during the stimulated recall
session (range = 0 - 3). About half of the participants (56%)
described more than one type of treatment method in their re-
ports (range = 0 - 3), while only 22% described more than one
treatment goal (range = 0 - 3). The majority of participants
(70%) described antidepressant or antipsychotic medication in
the reports, while only two participants mentioned that topic
during the stimulated recall session. Also, participants more
often described specific therapies (such as cognitive-behavioral
therapy) in the reports, while treatment goals were more often
mentioned in the stimulated recall sessions. Percentage agree-
ment between the treatment methods and goals reflected on
during the stimulated recall sessions and those described in the
treatment proposals was 37%.
Conclusions and Discussion
The current study investigated psychologists’ diagnostic
processes during a diagnostic interview. Specifically, we aimed
to examine whether psychologists would explicitly focus on
identifying and classifying the client’s complaints, symptoms,
and problems during a diagnostic interview, while implicitly
reflecting on all diagnostic activities necessary to make treat-
ment decisions. Furthermore, we examined whether the content
of psychologists’ reports matches with the content of the activi-
ties considered during the interview. We found that psycholo-
gists perform and consider all diagnostic activities throughout
the diagnostic interview. Also, content of psychologists’ reports
was only partly similar to the content of diagnostic activities
considered during the interview with the simulated client.
Our results emphasize the adaptive nature of the diagnostic
decision making process in actual clinical practice as a con-
tinuous shifting between diagnostic decision activities. Psy cholo-
gists analyzed the client’s complaints and symptoms, consid-
ered possible classifications, started a diagnostic formulation,
and planned the treatment. They continuously reconsidered
Table 3.
Content of diagnostic formulations reflected on (Stimulated recall
session) and described (Report).
Content of diagnostic formulation Stimulated
recall Report
Potential stressors or predi sposing expe riences
Conflict or problems at work 15 15
Physical illness 15 21
Personality tra its 14 1
Genetic factors 11 7
Family o f or i gin and/or affective neglect in
childhood 9 2
Current role in own family 6 1
Experiences of loss 5
Upcoming surgery 5 4
Cycling accident 3 2
Relationship problems 3
Other neurological or physical conditions 2
Lack of social support 1
Explanatory mechanisms
Physical problems, head injury, or medication 9
Inefficient coping with quicker, younger colleague s
at work 3
Phase of life problems 3
Losing social support or not accepting social
support 2
Dysfunctional thoughts 2
Reactive to multiple curre n t, but unidentified,
stressors 2 2
Psychological conflict about father 1
Psychological conflict about male identi ty 2
Insecurity or fear about failing b od y 1 2
Burn-out 1
Relationship problems 1
Transgenerational problems 1
Emotion regula ti on 1
Setting high d emands for one self 3
(Avoidant) coping style 2
Reversal of caregiver’s role 1
Psychologic al “hurt ” 1
Fear of bec oming like hi s mother 1
these diagnostic activities throughout the whole process. Agree-
ment about possible explanations for the problems seemed to be
low and psychologists’ decisions described in the reports dif-
fered from their reflections on the diagnostic activities reflected
on while talking to a client.
Psychologists tended to agree with each other about diagnos-
tic classification, while agreement on diagnostic formulation
(su ch as explanatory mechanisms) and treatment options seemed
to be moderate to low. Diagnostic classifications, diagnostic
formulations, and treatment options considered during the in-
terview partly recurred in the reports, contrary to our expecta-
M. GROENIER ET AL.
922
Table 4.
Content of treatment selection reflected on (Stimulated recall session)
and described (Report).
Content of treatment methods and goa ls Stimulated
recall Report
Ask client about goals or expectations 6 3
Referral to psychiatrist 4 8
Antidepressant or antipsyc hotic medication 2 19
Strengthen clie nt’s own responsibility for solving
problems 2
Coping with s is ter’s de p ression 2
Strengthen role as a father 1
Consult others and/or explore other topics 1 11
Suicide contract or attend to suicide risk 1 8
Hospitalization 1
System or f amily therapy, (involve partner) 1 7
Crisis intervention 1
Change daily routine 1 2
Coping with life phase problems 1
Cognitive be h avioral therapy 8
Interpersonal therapy 2
Supportive therapy 2
Psychotherapy not otherwise spec i f ied 1
Perform relaxation or activation exercises 4
Attend to negative thoughts or feelings 3
tions. We found a larger number of diagnostic classifications
and treatment goals and methods in the report and a smaller
number of potential stressors and explanatory mechanisms
compared to the stimulated recall. A possible explanation for
the differences in the content could be that the report elicited a
different task expectation compared to the stimulated recall
session. Writing a report is a reflective task and psychologists
might make inferences based upon the information they have
gathered during the diagnostic interview. Also, it is commonly
used to communicate assessment findings to others, which re-
quires psychologists to make their considerations explicit in
terms that are commonly shared (such as DSM-IV classifica-
tions) and easily understandable.
The findings in this study confirm previous findings from a
study by Groenier et al. (2008), which showed that psycholo-
gists judge an analysis of the client’s complaints and symptoms
to be more important than diagnostic formulation. The prescrip-
tions of for example the Diagnostic Cycle (De Bruyn et al.,
2003) do not seem to be fully followed. An explanation for the
inconsistency between what psychologists do and what they
reflect back on could be that they iteratively gather information
for later use. Psychologists might return to previous diagnostic
activities later on in the diagnostic and treatment process for
various reasons, e.g. to verify information, gather more specific
information or adjust previous decisions. Another explanation
could be that they gather information routinely. Guidelines
prescribe which information should be collected, including
information relevant for diagnostic formulation.
Psychologists’ diagnostic processes seemed to be unstruc-
tured and deviate from prescriptions of diagnostic decision
models to some extent, however, the majority arrived at an
appropriate diagnosis and reasonably comprehensive treatment
plan. Most psychologists in the current study classified the
client’s problems as a depression. Alternative diagnostic classi-
fications did not seem to be discussed or considered very often
in any part of the interview. Considering few alternative diag-
nostic classifications is consistent with results from previous
studies on psychiatric diagnoses (Garb, 1998; Haverkamp,
1993). An explanation could be that psychologists “satisfice”
(Simon, 1957): as soon as they find a classification that suffi-
ciently describes the client’s condition and differentiates be-
tween treatments, they choose that classification and stop
searching. They then seem to gather more information relevant
to deciding between specific treatments. This can be inferred
from the remarks and considerations about treatment selection,
which psychologists already considered early on in the diag-
nostic process, during a first interview with the client.
Psychologists’ diagnostic processes in the current study show
commonalities in the type of diagnostic activities deliberately
performed and considered, despite differences in theoretical
orientation and experience. They did consider a wide range of
potential causal factors, explanatory mechanisms and treatment
options for the same client and agreed less with each other
about this kind of information than about the diagnostic classi-
fication. These results are in line with results from a study by
Müller (2011) on graphical representations of psychologists’
case formulations showing that psychologists consider multiple,
interrelated causes to explain a disorder. Furthermore, Kuyken
et al. (2005) found that reliability of diagnostic formulations
decreased when more theory-driven inferences were made.
Variations in judgments about treatment of depression have
been found in medical decision making as well (Smith, Gil-
hooly, & Walker, 2002). To cope with cognitive limitations in a
dynamic situation psychologists adapt their diagnostic proc-
esses in similar ways, they are boundedly rational (Gigerenzer,
2000).
In the current study, an authentic assessment situation was
used with a simulated client and time constraints to resemble
clinical practice as much as possible. This assessment situati on
closely resembles actual practice and can be regarded as exter-
nally or ecologically valid. With a simulated client, realistic
interaction is possible, non-verbal behavior can be observed
and a therapeutic relationship can be established, in contrast to
artificial task situations using written case descriptions. How-
ever, there are also some limitations to our methodology and
further studies may provide additional information. Although
stimulated recall is designed to measure psychologists’
thoughts at the time of the actual diagnostic interview, thoughts
after the fact may also be included. Therefore, the data are not
an actual reflection of what happened, but are used to assess
reflections on actions. We assumed that these reflections would
not have changed much from the diagnostic interview and
writing the report to the stimulated recall session, but they did
differ between the reports and the stimulated recall session.
This suggests that reflections might also have changed in be-
tween the diagnostic and stimulated recall session. However,
using alternative methods such as thinking aloud during the
task would have disrupted the authenticity of the interview.
The use of only one case describing a single disorder, de-
pression, limits generalization of the results to other disorders.
The time and labor intensive methods we used prohibited the
inclusion of more cases, but in future research, multiple cases
presenting different disorders could be used. The most impor-
tant question for future studies is the effect of deviating from
the prescribed guidelines for making diagnostic decisions on
M. GROENIER ET AL. 923
the quality of the decisions made and eventually on therapy
outcome.
Acknowledgements
The research project was partially supported by a grant from
the Stichting tot Steun VCVGZ (Foundation for Support,
Christian Union for Care of Mentally Ill). We would like to
thank our coding assistants, Anja Kuijer, Lotte Croese, Hilde
Mees, Milou Kievik, Marjon Stijntjes, Ludwig Fritzsch, Petra
Hagens, Helena Boering, and Gery Zoer for their hard work and
enthusiasm for this project. Also, we would like to thank Stasja
Draisma and Sander Overdevest for their time and support on
working with the Sequence Viewer program.
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924
Appendix A
Examples of the categories from the coding schema.
Diagnostic Interview Stimulate d Recall Sessio n Report
Complaint Analysis
“So you feel like you are an old man already?”
“You are going through some intense
experiences.”
“Do you fee l sad all day lo ng?”
“I noticed his date of birth.”
“He really looks depressed.”
“I should ask ab out his suicidal thoughts.” N/A
Diagnostic Classification
“Your depression can also b e seen as a n illness.”
“I am sure y ou are suffering from a depression.”
“He has be en depressed for about two months
now.”
“Possibly a personality d is order as well.”
“Depressi v e disorde r, severe.”
“Single depressive episode.”
“Depression w ith psychotic features.”
Diagnostic Formulation
“Did you ever experience a depressive episode
before?”
“Does depression run in the family?”
“Is the arteriosclerosis a hereditary condition?”
“Do you have any serious debts?”
“You mentioned sports means a lot to you.”
“What kind of education have you had ?”
“Are you usually an optimistic person?”
“To what extent did he get support from his
father when he was young?”
“He seems to have a hereditary defect.”
“I try to find out more about the supp ort he ge t s
from his family.”
“His sense of wor thlessness w as increased by his
own thoughts about the conflict at work.”
“I wondered whether his cycling accident
involved a head injury which might have caused
his mood change.”
“His depre s sion is a reaction to his loss of
health.”
“He has a p os it ive family history for depression.”
“Depressi on trigger ed by his problems at wo rk
and physical condition, possi bly complicated by
medication us e.”
“He feels a fraid about losing his health.”
“He experiences a lack of support.”
Treatment Selection
“Would you be wi l ling to take antidepre s s ants?”
“Depression can be treated.”
“His condition can certainly be treated.”
“I thought: I s hould offer him some future
prospects.”
“Refer to a psychiatrist.”
“Medication first, then cognitive-behavioral
therapy.”
Other
“I read in the referral lette r t hat you have t alked
to your physician.”
“We have only 5 minutes le ft .”
“I would refer him to a psychiatrist.”
“I usually start an interview with questions about
the referral letter.” N/A