Beijing Law Review
2013. Vol.4, No.4, 180-184
Published Online December 2013 in SciRes (
Open Access
Free or Limited Dismissal by Enterprise Owners in Germany
—A Classic and Authoritative Discussion
Jianhong Fan1, Qing Tian 2
1Faculty of Law, University of Macau, Macau, China
2School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau, China
Received September 20th, 2013; revised October 22nd, 2013; accepted November 19th, 2013
Copyright © 2013 Jianhong Fan, Qing Tian. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Com-
mons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original work is p roperly cited.
Multinational corporations pay great attention to the dismissal caused by enterprise owners (Arbeitge-
berkündigung), especially in the fierce competition of market economy. In fact, the limits of dismissal
rights of employers are also a key issue in human resources management. However, the importance of
solving this problem reasonably is beyond the law itself. Once the rationality of the premises that are
based on the legislation of dismissal limits is challenged, the solution drawn from deduction or induction
be- comes an issue of ambiguity. This paper will discuss the concept of “dismissal”, its differentiation
with other related concepts, and the concept of dismissal limits from the perspective of German law. The
study also discusses the following issue from the view upon legal theory: Are the dismissal’s “premises”
of leg- islation and judicatory rational? This study also sheds lights on the comparative law in some de-
veloping countries.
Keywords: Dismissal; Dismissal Limits; Labor Contract
A well-known economist from England once said: “Labor is
the mother of wealth, while land is the father of wealth” (Wil-
liam Petty, 1623-1678). Obviously, labor and land are very
important in the business life. Multinational corporations pay
great attention to the dismissal caused by enterprise owners
(Arbeitgeberkündigung), especially in the fierce competition of
market economy. In fact, the limits of dismissal rights of em-
ployers are also a key issue in human resources management. In
order to precisely discuss the above issue, a brief clarification
of the concept “dismissal” and its differentiation with other
related concepts will be made.
The Concept of Dismissal by Employer
The Definition of Dismissal
A dismissal is a unilateral declaration of will that requires
acceptance or approval. By this declaration, an employer (i.e.,
enterprise owner) terminates a legal labor relationship by dis-
missal regardless of whether the terms are announced in ad-
vance. According to the essence of the law, the dismissal right
is a non-independent (unselbstständig) and unilateral right of
formation (Gestaltungsrecht) (Plandt, 2003; Nikisch, Artur
1966; Molitor, 1955; Erman-Kühenhoff, 1981; Esser Josef &
Schmidt Eike, 1984; Molitor, 1951; Nickel Egbert, 1975)1.
Moreover, dismissal by an employer can be understood as an
act of disposition (Verfügungsgeschäft). However, this kind of
disposition is based on the condition that there is no more fu-
ture delivery obligation or right of claim according to the legal
labor relationship. Article 620 Section 2, Article 622 and Arti-
cle 626 of the German Civil Code provide the legal foundations
for dismissal2.
The Classification of Dismissal
Dismissals can theoretically be divided into two major cate-
gories: normal and special. There are other non-normal types of
dismissal, including partial (Teilkündigung) (Dornbusch, Fisch-
ermeier, Löwisch, 2013)3, alteration (Änderung kündigung)
(Löwisch, 2002; Dornbusch, Fischermeier, & Löwisch, 2013)4,
pre-prepared (Vorsorgliche Kündigung)5, pressure-type (Druck-
kündigung) (Löwisch, 2002)6 and suspicion (Verdachtkündig)
1Vgl. Plandt, Übbl 33 vor 104, Übertragung 413(5), Ausübg formfrei 31399
(17), Kommentar zum BGB, 72. Aufl., 2013; Hueck-Nipperdey, Lehrbuch
des Arbeitsrechts, § 56 I, S. 543, 1963; auch Nikisch, Arthur, Arbeitsrecht,
Bd. I, Allgemeine Lehren und Arbeitsvertragsrecht, 3. Aufl. Tübingen1966
§ 48 I 1, S. 687; Molitor, Kündigung des Arbeitsvertrags oder des Arbeits-
verhältnisses? in: RdA 1955, S. 41 ff.; Vgl. Erman-Kühenhoff, Handkom-
mentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Bd. 1, §§ 1-873, 7.aufl. 1981, Rn. 21
zu § 620 BGB; Esser, Josef/Schmidt, Eike, Schuldrecht, Bd. 1 AT, 6. Aufl.
1984, S. 288; Molitor, Die Kündigung, 2. Aufl. 1951, S. 2; Nickel, Egbert,
Abschied v on der fristl osen Kündigung, ArbuR 1975, 99.
2Die § 621, 627 BGB sollen hier nicht behandelt werden, da dort keine
Arbeitsverhältnisse geregelt sin d, die dem Künd igungsschutz unterliegen.
3Vgl. Fischermeier, § 623 BGB, Rn.2, in Dorn
Fachanwaltskommentar Arbeitsrecht, 5. Aufl., Luchterhand Verlag, 2013.
4Vgl. Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 6. Aufl., Werner Verlag 2002, Rn. 1273ff.,
1393ff.; Fischermeier, § 626 BGB, Rn.191f., in Dornbusch/Fischermeier/
Löwisch, Fachanwaltskommentar Arbeitsrecht, 5.Aufl., Luchterhand Ver-
lag, 2013.
5Vgl.:Fan, On Advanced Construction of Legislation Space by German
Judge-Discussion on Dismissals caused by Enterpriser, Macau University
(Chinese), P.5, footnote 18, 2008.
6Vgl. Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 6. Aufl., Werner Verlag 2002, Rn. 1260ff.
(Löwisch, 2002)7 dismissals.
The Similarities and Differences among Dismissals,
Revocations a nd Ch anges of Circumstanc e
1) Similarities
In labor law, as unilateral juristic actions that require ap-
proval, both dismissal and revocation can terminate a legal
labor relationship. A change of circumstance can also end a
labor relationship, and has the same effect as Article 346 of the
Civil Code8 unless the choice of contract modification is ac-
ceptable (zumutbar). In addition, special dismissal is similar to
revocation in that both require a reason. It would be meaning-
less to distinguish revocation from dismissal if the reason for
the former was to prevent employers from suffering future
damages (Ramm Thilo, 1955)9. It is less important logically to
identify the similarities between dismissal, revocation and
changes of circumstance, as they are all distinguishable from a
legal standpoint.
2) Main Distinctions
a) Distinctions in Premise
Based on Articles 119, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of the German
Civil Code, revocation requires a reason, and that reason should
exist when a contract is signed. According to the causes for
dismissal listed in Article 626 Section 1 of the Civil Code, the
reason for special dismissal appears in the contract duration
after the contract is signed (of course, the employee in a profes-
sional training relationship could be dismissed for reasons of
particular importance after the probatio nary pe riod. Please re fer
to §15 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 BBiG.) However, changes of circumstance
are based on a legal loophole and still require a reason. Unlike
revocation and dismissal, the reason for a change of circum-
stance usually does not arrive from the action of any contractual
party, but because either the parties lacked the foundation for a
labor relationship from the beginning or the foundation changed
or was lost in the duration of the relationship. In other words, a
fundamental barrier can arise between the la w a nd reality.
b) Distinction in Scope
Revocation refers only to the declaration of the will of one
contractual party (Willenserklärung). Its validity applies to an
entire contract through Article 142 of the Civil Code, i.e., the
entire contract is void ab initio. In contrast, dismissal refers to
the whole labor relationship, which it makes void (das ganz
Arbeitsverhältnis) when the dismissal comes into effect. A
change of circumstance represents a revocation of a contract or
dismissal caused by the changes to a situation (Palandt, 2013)10.
This principle touches merely on the foundation of a contrac-
tual relationship, a foundation built on constant changes in poli-
tics, economy, legislation and judicature. Under some condi-
tions, a change of circumstance could lead to the alteration
(Vertragsanpassung) or termination of a contract. Under labor
law, it leads to alteration dismissal (Änderungskündigung) or
special dismissal (ausserordentliche Kündigung). However, it is
a right of exception (Ausnahmerecht).
c) Distinctions in Legal Consequence
According to Article 142 of the Civil Code, a revocation de-
clares one’s will void, regardless of whether it has been sub-
mitted or has arrived. It also makes the contract void ab initio.
The relevant articles of the German Federal Dismissal Protec-
tion Statute don’t apply in cases of labor contract revocation.
On the contrary, dismissal does not make a contract void ab
initio, but makes it no longer effective when the dismissal
comes into force. While the Dismissal Protection Statute could
apply in the case of dismissal, employees other than pregnant
and lying-in women would not be absolutely protected in the
case of special dismissal.
If the declaration of will is revoked due to a mistake, trust
damage compensation (Schadensersatz) could be claimed ac-
cording to Article 122 of the Civil Code. For employees, this
trust damage compensation may include a charge for the loss of
work time, a charge for eviction or others11. If it accords with
the condition of Article 123 of the Civil Code (fraud or coer-
cion), the damage compensation could be dealt according to
culpa in contrahendo (Fan Jianhong, 2004)12, Article 823 of the
Civil Code and Articles 263 and 253 of the Criminal Law, in
addition to Article 826 of the Civil Code under some conditions
(Erman-Kuehenhoff, 1975)13. However, in principle, the com-
pensation caused by dismissal could only be claimed under
Article 123 of the Civil Code, and it rarely relates to other Civil
Code clauses (Of course, the compensation caused by a viola-
tion of a labor contract obligation is another matter.)
A change of circumstance would cause the alteration of a la-
bor contract. It would result in the termination of a contract if
the alteration was unacceptable (unzumutbar), and successive
problems would be resolved according to Article 346 of the
Civil Code. Since the concept of dismissal has been defined
clearly now, it’s necessary to further research on the social
limits implied in dismissal.
The Limits Implied in the Concept of Dismissal
As a non-independent right of formation, is dismissal totally
unlimited or limited? What is the proper intension, namely the
limits of dismissal? These questions require further discussion,
as they comprise the foundation for regulating dismissal-rele-
vant legal problems.
Reasons for Unlimited Dismissal
1) Compulsory Appeal Function
An enterprise owner initiates dismissal as a necessary legal
means. It is a compulsory appeal of a legal guarantee (Max W,
1922)14 Without dismissal rights and corresponding laws, labor
contracts would not be labor contracts in the market economy
sense. The factors of production are divided into labor (Arbeit),
land (Boden) and capital (Kapital) in classical national eco-
nomics. Labor is always understood as a physical and mental
activity that achieves an economic goal15. The system of labor
usually contains four aspects: 1) the un-free system (Das Sys-
tem der Unfreiheit) 2) the system of the individual liberty (Das
System der individuellen Freiheit) 3) the system limited by
government authority (Das System der Gebundenheit an die
11Vgl. Grossmann/S chneider, A r beitsrecht, S. 81 ff.
12Fan, Jianhong , Culpa in Co ntrahendo in Macau Civil Co de, in: Jo urnal o
overseas legal studies, China Renda Social Sciences Information Center,
o.12, 12/2004, Beijing 2004;
13Erman-Kuehenhoff, Handkommentar zum BGB, Bd. I, 6. Aufl. Münster
1975, § 611 Rn. 95
14Vgl. Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, S. 399.
15Vgl. Kleines Lexikon Wirtschaft, Bonn 1991, S. 11.
7Vgl. Löwisch, Arbeitsrecht, 6.Aufl., Werner Verlag 2002, R n. 1259.
8End of the contract (ex nunc) or avoidance of contracht (ex tunc), vgl.
BGHZ NJW 1967, 721; 1958 , 785; JZ 1966, 409; WPM 1973, 752, 753.
9Vgl. Ramm, Thilo, Die Anfechtung des Arbeitsvertrags, zur Kritik und
eubegründung der Lehre vom Arbeitsverhältnis, 1955, S. 69 f.
10Palandt, § 242 Rn. 113-115(Begriff), Rn 116-12 (Abgrenzung), Kom-
mentar zum BGB, 72.Aufl., 20 13.
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Staatsgewalt) and 4) the system limited by corporation (Das
System der korporativen Gebundenheit). From an employer’s
perspective, dismissal is affected by the system of the indi-
vidual liberty and the system limited by corporation. Both the
labor and social systems are made more flexible by the dis-
missals (Kündigung) in labor and professional contracts16. In a
market economic system, such a function requires the effects of
both contracts and dismissals (Parsons, T. & Smelser, N.,
1957)17. This could enhance the privatization degree and com-
petitive capacity, and create more employment opportunities.
2) Self-Help Function
A dismissal represents the right of formation (right of possi-
bility/right of capacity), and could lead to the establishment,
alteration and termination of a legal relations hip by virtue o f the
obligee’s unilateral activity. It could also represent an inde-
pendent right of formation, such as the right to acquire (Aneig-
nungsrecht) and the un-independent right of formation. It
mostly represents the right of formation stemming from an
established contract, such as the right to fire, the revocation of a
declaration of will and termination (Rücktritt). In principle,
each party of a contract has the right of formation. Dismissal is
an act of disposition and is directly related to the survival of the
legal labor relationship. The extermination characteristic of the
law (Dieser rechtsvernichtende Charakter) acts as a kind of
self-help function (Selbsthilfefunktion). It is usually evidently
reflected when an employees is dismissed, as the obligee could
realize his wish through such a dismissal (Bötticher Eduard,
1964; Bötticher Eduard, 1963)18. However, it needs to be made
clear whether the employee and employer’s dismissals have the
same powerful self-help function19. Because the protection
principle stems from the “personal legal community” (“perso-
nenrechtlichen Gemeinschaft”) or “personal relationship”
(“Personenbezogenheit”) and from the social state principle
according to Article 20 of the Basic Law, the self-help function
of the employer’s dismissal is limited to some extent. This
point is discussed further later in this book. However, in a mar-
ket economy, an employer cannot give up this self-help instru-
ment, especially when the employer is placed in an insufferably
difficult position, such as when an employee does not behave
faithfully according to a contract or when the urgent needs of
an enterprise arise.
Reasons to Re str ict D ismi ssal
1) The Legal Labor Relationship
The legal labor relationsh ip co mpr is es four diffe rent aspects.
a) The Characteristic of Debt
The legislators of the Civil Code (Austauschverhältnis) once
considered the labor relationship as a relationship of debt ex-
change. The Civil Code’s legislative mode accommodates this
kind of understanding. Article 611 of the Civil Code is de-
signed according to a mode similar to that of Articles 433, 535,
581 and 631. All of these articles relate to Article 320 in the
system. If the labor contract (Arbeitsvertrag) is considered a
category of the contract of services (Dienstvertrag), then a con-
tinuous labor relationship (Dauerschuldverhältnis) (V. Gierke,
Otto, 1964)20 may be entitled to the exchange characteristic
(Austauschcharakter) (Nikisch Arthur, 1961; Müller Gerd,
1973)21. For instance, consider an employee who is traveling
abroad and returns to work 2 days late because of a strike hap-
pening at a foreign airport. According to Article 326 Section 1,
he would lose the claim for the 2 days of wages. Because the
exchange relationship is an important component of the legal
labor relationship, Article 320 of the Civil Code could apply in
principle to this kind of bilateral contract. Considering only the
debt characteristics of the labor relationship, we could say that
such a relationship is based on the idea of an unlimited realiza-
tion of self-determination (Idee der Selbstbestimmung) and the
basic theory of freedom. Thus, it could be further concluded
that the manners that balance private interests could be applied
to balancing the intense relationships within a society to boost
the development of the public interest (Reinhardt Rudolf,
1957)22. The self-balanced subject of a social system is built on
a compound comprising contracts and the market, and the State
acts only as a guarantor of the conditions for the market mecha-
nism framework (Garant der Rahmenbedingungen des Markt-
mechanismus) (Hart Dieter, 1984)23.
Because employers’ sufficient freedom to dismiss employees
is founded on this idea, restricting such a freedom has been
considered unnecessary.
b) The Characteristic of Lex Personalis
Heinz Potthoff (Potthoff, 1922)24 holds that an employer’s
payment activity on property is merely one form of personal
relationship and should be absolutely distinguished from the
property (Tilmann Tobias, 1965)25. Potthoff prefers considering
the legal labor relationship as a kind of “organizational rela-
tionship of social law” (“sozialrechtliches Organisationsver-
hältnis”) (Potthoff, 1922)26. As a kind of “social legal organiza-
tional relationship” or “personal relationship” (“personenrecht-
liche Verhältnis”), it cannot be founded on the relationship of
debt exchange. Potthoff further holds that this kind of personal
relationship relates (Korrelat) more with the employee’s rights
and the employer’s duty of care (Fürsorgepflicht), and that for
this reason the latter’s freedom to dismiss must inevitably be
c) Concurrence of Debt and Personal Relationships
Otto v. Gierke reveals that within the labor relationship, the
employee must affiliate part of his personality with that of the
employer’s. That is why he considers the service contract as a
contract with personal content (Dienstvertrag mit personen-
rechtlichem Inhalt), and believes that the “personal legal rela-
tionship” (“personenbezogenen Rechtsverhältnis”) necessitates
the contract exceeding the pure debt contract with a property
20Vgl. V. Gierke, Otto, Dauernde Schuldverhältnisse, in: JherJb 1964, S.
355 ff.
21Vgl. Nikisch, Arthur, Arbeitsrecht, Bd. 1, Allgemeine Leh ren und Ar-
beitsvertragsrecht, 3. Aufl. Tübingen 1961, § 19 IV 2, S. 174; Müller, Gerd,
Der Leistungs begriff im Arbeitsverhältnis, Diss. Würzburg 1973 , S. 315
22Vgl. Reinhardt, Rudolf, Die Vereinigung subjektiver und objektiver
Gestaltungsrechte im Vertrag, inFS für Walter Schmidt-Rimpler,
Krlsruhe 1957, S. 115 ff. (S.124).
23Vgl. Hart, Dieter, Zur Konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts,
AG 1984, S. 66 ff. (S. 70).
24Vgl. Potthoff, Heinz, Ist das Arbeitsverhältnis ein Schuldverhältnis?
PArbR IX Sp, 267 ff.; ders., Das Ringen um werde nd es Recht, S. 24 f.
25Vgl. Tobias, Tilmann, Die Anfechtung des Arbeitsvertrags, Diss. Bonn
1965, S. 48 ff.
26Vgl. Potthoff, Heinz, Ist das Arbeitsverhältnis ein Schuldverhältnis?
Arbeitsrecht 1 922, S. 275 ff.
16Vgl. Hueck-Nipperdey, Grundriß, § 50 IV 1, S. 224). Soel lner, ArbR, § 33
IV 3b, S. 224.
17Vgl. Parsons, Talcott/Smelser, Neil, Economy and Society, London 1957,
S. 104.
18Bötticher, Eduard, Gestaltungsrecht und Unterwerfung im Privatrecht
1964, S. 2 f., auch Besinnung auf das Gestal tungsrecht und das Gestal
tungsklagere cht, in: Festschrift für Hans Doelle, Bd. 1, 1963 , S. 43.
19Vgl. die Ideen der §§ 227, 228 BGB.
Open Access
exchange characteristic (Gierke Otto von, 1914)27. In Farth-
mann’s (Farthmann Friedhelm, 1960)28 view, one of the labor
relationship’s decisive essences is that it includes not only
property as its object, but also the employee’s personality.
Hereafter, the labor relationship represents the legal theory of
social protection for an employee. Dismissal restriction could
be accepted conditionally, as legally restricting an employer’s
freedom to dismiss an employee is a protection manner that
complies with the foregoing legal theory.
d) Community Relationship of Lex Personalis
During the establishment of a labor relationship, an em-
ployer/employee relationship also emerges in which the former
performs the duty of care while the latter undertakes the duty of
fidelity. Because a labor contract represents a kind of commu-
nity relationship of lex personalis (ein personenrechtliches Ge-
meinschaftsverhältnis), it is therefore a jointly established con-
tract (ein gemeinschaftsbegründeter Vertrag) that while not a
business contract is like an agreement under company law
(Hueck-Nipperdey, 1963)29. Nikisch agrees with this opinion,
and supplements it by observing that such a labor relationship
is a status relationship (Statusverhältnis) that every community
possesses and one that reflects care and fidelity (Nikisch Arthur,
1961)30. It is necessary to restrict an employer’s freedom of
dismissal because the notion of duty of care exceeds the con-
sideration of labor devotion as purely a means of input produc-
tion (Jobs Friedhelm, 1972)31.
e) Critical Assessment
The aforementioned theory, which declares that the legal la-
bor relationship is characterized by debt, has a defect in that it
neglects the continuity of the labor relationship and the particu-
larity that employees affiliate themselves with enterprises. In
particular, it does not take into account that inequity between an
employer and employee prevents the functions of the contrac-
tual freedom principle from operating efficiently. Otto v.
Gierke reveals the faulty viewpoint that legislators adopt to
solve this social problem, and attributes the mistake to the Civil
Code legislators’ unitary and Roman-law-style orientation
(Menger, 1980; Kindermann, 1981)32. Consequently, the idea
that an employer could dismiss employees freely without any
limitation is not acceptable.
It is positive and respectful to human dignity to position the
labor relationship as a legal relationship between humans, even
under family and official law. However, this kind of attribution
and its rules have thus far not obtained any support33. If this
category of lex personalis is to be introduced to the labor rela-
tionship, it is necessary to study the value standard of the con-
stitution more deeply. Wolf (Wolf, 197034); and Wiedermann
(Wiedemann Herbert, 1966)35 object to this viewpoint. Wolf
holds that the objective of a contract is neither a thing nor a
person, but always the payment activity conducted by a person.
As a matter of fact, the theory of starting completely from per-
sonal dignity is not always successful in every legal relation-
ship. The “dignity is inviolable” principle is unfortunately not
effective for every legal relationship in a market economy
(Petra Kässer, 1979)36. In a context where lex personalis and
the legal principles of a labor relationship have not specifically
excluded labor contracts, a hypothetical decision does not make
much sense in terms of its legal application. Because there is no
such available personal law, the restriction of employers’ free-
dom of dismissal is one remaining option.
Although the idea of a community of personal law would be
very meaningful in promoting people’s community-related
tendencies, it does not prove that the opponent “division the-
ory” (Eingliederungstheorie) is false. The “division theory”
holds that the interests of employers and employees cannot
match perfectly in the development of economic and ownership
reforms. Therefore, the idea of viewing the labor relationship as
a community relationship cannot be established in a specifically
empirical sense. For instance, it not only disobeys the elements
of community relations under Article 741 of the Civil Code, but
also conflicts with the elements of cooperation under Article
741 (Söllner Alfred, 1990; Zöllner Wolfgang, 1983; Hanau
Peter & Adomeit Klaus, 1986; Tobias Tilmann, 1965)37. For
this reason, the labor relationship is a type of continuous legal
relationship with personal characteristics, and it must consider
the duty of care and fidelity to limit employers’ freedom of
The following conclusion can be made on the legal labor re-
lationship. If one person receives orders from another, he is
handing over his financial independence to an employer
(Wiedemann Herbert, 1966)38, and even gives up his own pro-
fessional skills. He then takes his labor, abilities, imagination
and wisdom into an enterprise, and establishes a living accord-
ing to the rules made by a master. At the same time, the em-
ployee must constantly acquire the abilities and knowledge
required by the enterprise to cater to the master’s scope of eco-
nomic activities (Aktionsradius des Arbeitgebers). Therefore,
the protection of employers is somewhat equal to the domina-
tion of labor (Äquibalenz für die Verfügung der Arbeitskraft)
(Wiedemann Herbert, 1966; Schwerdtner, 1970)39. The need to
limit employers’ freedom of dismissal arrives not only from the
personal community (personenrechtlichen Gemeinschaft) the-
ory, but also from personal characteristics (Personenbezogen-
2) Justifications Derived from Articles 20, 28 and 3 of the
Basic Law
27Vgl. Gierke, Otto von, Die Wurzeln des Dienstvertrags, in: FS für
Heinrich Brunner, München-Leipzig 1914, S. 68. chen-Leipzig 1914, S. 68.
28Vgl. Farthmann, Friedhelm, Der “personenrechtliche Charakterdes”
Arbeitsverhältnisses, RdA 1960, S. 5 ff.
29Vgl. Hueck-Nipperdey, LB des Arbeitsrechts, Bd. 1, 7. Aufl. Berlin und
Frankfurt 1963.
30Vgl. Nikisch, Arthur, Arbeitsrecht, Bd. 1, Allgemeine Lehren und Ar-
beitsvertragsrecht, 3. Aufl. Tübingen 1961,§ 5 I 3, S. 32.
31Jobs, Friedhelm, Die Bedeutung Otto von Gierkes für die Kennzeichnung
des Arbeitsverhältnisses als personenrechtliches Gemeinschaftsverhältnis,
ZfA 1972, S. 305 ff. (34 0 f.).
32Vgl. Menger, A., das bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Klassen, 4.
Aufl. 1980, d azu: Kindermann , Di e An t wo r t d es BGB au f di e s o zi al e F r ag e,
Rechtstheorie 1981, 209.
33Vgl. Söllner, Alfred, A rbeitsrecht § 28 III.2.
34Vgl. Wolf, Ernst, Das Arbeitsverhältnis—Personenrechtliches Gemeins-
chaftsverhältnis oder Schuldver hältnis? Ma r burg 1970, S. 37 f.
35Vgl. Wiedemann, Herbert, Das Arbeitsverhältnis als Austausch-und
Gemeinschaftsverhä lt nis, Karlsruhe 1966, S. 25 f f. und 36 ff.
36Vgl. die Formulierung von Petra Kässer, der fehlerhafte Arbeitsvertrag,
Berlin 1979, S. 34.
37Vgl. die Formulierung von Söllner, Alfred, Grundriß des Arbeitsrechts, 10
Aufl. München 1990, § 28, S. 253; Z öllner, Wolfgang, Arbeitsrecht, 3. Aufl.
München 1983, § 11, S. 130 ff.; Hanau, Peter/Adomeit, Klaus, Arbeitsrecht,
8. Aufl. Frankfurt/M. 1986, S. 157, Fn. 22.; Tobias, Tilmann, Die Anfech-
tung des Arbeitsvertrags, Diss. Bonn 1965, S. 21 ff.; Kässer, Petra, der
fehlerhafte Arbeitsvertrag, S . 26-29.
38Vgl. Wiedemann, Herbert, Das Arbeitsverhältnis als Austausch-und Ge-
meinschaft sv erhältnis, Karlsruhe 1966, S. 16 f.
39Vgl. Wiedermann, das Arbeitsverhältnis als Austausch-und Gemein-
schaftsverhältnis,1966,S.16;Auch Schwerdtner, Fürsorgetheorie und Ent-
gelttheorie i m Recht der Ar b eitsbedingung en, 1970, S.162.
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Open Access
Grossmann/Schneider (1974). Arbeitsrecht, S . 81 ff.
The provisions under Article 20 Section 1, Article 28 Section
1 and Article 3 (equitable right) of the Basic Law lay the legal
foundation for the protection of socially and economically weak
groups. The new constitutional and administrative laws have
noted and emphasized the inseparability of industrialization
from citizens’ increasing reliance on the country’s care and
protection (Hippel E. V., 1982)40. The principle of equality in-
dicates that essential inequality requires different treatments.
This principle is meaningful in judging which party involved in
a contract should be protected better, as legal requirements
differ according to contracting parties’ different social positions
and economic circumstances. This point is embodied clearly in
the Dismissal Protection Statute.
Hanau, P., & Adom ei t, K. (1986). Arbeitsrecht, 8. Aufl. Frankfurt/M.
Hart, D. (1984). Zur Konzeptionellen Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts,
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Comparative law by far has been completely liberated from
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Universaljurisprudenz (Max Rheinstein, 1987)41. It indicates
how comparative law has its ups and downs from the philoso-
phy of its transnational character. In fact, comparative law can
help scholars and lawyers think critically, enhance their abili-
ties of problem solving, and to extend their knowledge about
the relativity of their national law (Konrad Zweigert & Hein
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law are one of the initial studies in the field of comparative
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42See Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung, Konrad Zweigert and Hein
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