Psychology
2013. Vol.4, No.12, 1046-1050
Published Online December 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/psych) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.412152
Open Access
1046
But You Promised: Children’s Judgments of Broken Promises
Karen Hussar, Jared Horvath
Fisher College, Boston, USA
Email: khussar@fisher .edu, jch155@mail.harvard.edu
Received May 1st, 2013; revised June 3rd, 2013; accepted July 2nd, 2013
Copyright © 2013 Karen Hussar, Jared Horvath. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited. In accordance of the Creative Commons Attribution License all
Copyrights © 2013 are reserved for SCIRP and the owner of the intellectual property Karen Hussar, Jared
Horvath. All Copyright © 2 01 3 a re guarded by law and by SCIRP as a guardian.
Current conceptions regarding children’s understanding of promises (and promise breaking) rely upon
absolute distinction: namely, a promise versus a non-promise. The current study expands the understand-
ing of children’s judgments of broken promises to include more nuanced, refined descriptions. Utilizing a
four-point rating scale—ranging from “OK” to “very bad”—forty children aged 6 to 10 judged story cards
depicting characters breaking commitments not to engage in specific behaviors across three different do-
mains (moral, social-conventional, and personal). Analyses indicated that children judge broken promises
in the moral domain more severely than those in the social-conventional domain and broken promises in
the social-conventional domain more severely than those in the personal domain. Therefore, children ap-
pear to judge broken commitments on a sliding scale in much the same way they judge actions from the
moral, social-conventional and personal domains. Results from the current study also suggest an inverse
pattern of judgment with regards to broken commitments. Specifically, it appears that the more severely
an initial action is judged, the less severely its concurrent commitment condition is judged; and vice versa.
These findings help refine our understanding of childhood interpretations of broken promises and engen-
der several unique ideas for future research in this field.
Keywords: Commitment; Promises; Morality; Social Domain Theory
Introduction
A hallmark of childhood psychological research is the pro-
gression from diametric classification to a more detailed spec-
trum of designation. For instance, Piaget and Kohlberg, pio-
neers in the field of moral development, focused on a near ab-
solute emergent moral distinction between right and wrong.
Subsequent social domain theorists expanded this perception
and developed a more nuanced prescriptivity scale that allowed
children to judge various actions according to a spectrum, typi-
cally ranging between “OK” and “very bad”. The introduction
of this refined rating system advanced research in the field of
moral development by revealing the ability of young children to
reliably distinguish between moral transgressions, social-con-
ventional transgressions, and personal choices (Nucci & Turiel,
1978; Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990).
Similarly, early research examining lying among young chil-
dren focused on the ability of these children to distinguish be-
tween lies and truth. Only when these initial boundaries were
delineated were researchers able to examine children’s refined
distinctions between different types of lying. Presently, there is
strong evidence to support the idea that children as young as 7
can readily distinguish between antisocial lies (lies intended to
conceal or mislead—“It was like that when I got here.”), proso-
cial lies (lies intended to be polite—“I love your new haircut.”),
and trick lies (lies intended to elicit joy or laughter—“Got your
nose!”). By age 9, children often judge “antisocial” lies more
severely than “prosocial lies” and “prosocial lies” more se-
verely than “trick lies” (Bussey, 1999; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Hey-
man, & Lee, 2007; Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, & Chen, 2001; Xu,
Boa, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).
The present study continues this progression from dichoto-
mous classification to nuanced designation with regards to
children’s understandings of promises. Through the use of a
sliding rating scale—similar to one employed by social domain
theorists—we expand the current understanding of children’s
judgments of broken promises.
Promises and Children
Philosopher John Searle (1969) outlined a series of condi-
tions that must be met in order for a successful “promise” to be
made. These conditions include obligation (a “promiser” makes
a commitment to undertake a certain action), controllability (a
promise must be physically and/or mentally possible to per-
form), and advantage (a promise must prove advantageous or
beneficial to the “promisee”—promise to harm is no longer a
promise; it is a threat). Perhaps the most important aspect of
Searle’s description of promising is the nugatory nature of out-
come. Whether fulfilled or not, the very act of saying “I prom-
ise” engenders an expectation in the listener. Accordingly, the
“promiser” is held accountable and the promise remains valid
regardless of the outcome. For example, a mother’s failure to
appear at a class play she promised to attend does not negate
the previously made promise. The claim that individuals view a
promise as valid irrespective of outcome has been confirmed in
K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH
several studies using adult subjects (Astington, 1988, 1990;
Gibbs & Delaney, 1987).
Searle’s notion of an explicit obligation points to an impor-
tant distinction between lying and promise breaking. Lying is
an act of verbal and/or emotional deception meant to engender
a false belief. Conversely, a broken promise reneges on a prior
commitment. Whether or not a promise is kept, the initial inten-
tion to perform the promised act (obligation) is inherently dif-
ferent from the initial intent to deceive by lying. We highlight
this point because, although there is a long tradition of research
exploring children’s understanding of lying, research exploring
children’s understanding of promises and their ensuing com-
mitments did not emerge until quite recently—and, even today,
the literature is q u ite sparse and diametri c.
In one of the first looks at promissory understanding, Ast-
ington (1988), through the use of utterances embedded in oral
narratives, determined that children between the ages of 5 - 7
were unable to grasp the concept of obligation. As a result, the
children classified a statement as a promise only if the promised
event occurred. More specifically, participants in this study
considered the statement, “I will take you [to the store], I prom-
ise,” as a valid promise only if the characters went to the store.
Astington concluded that the ability to recognize that a promise
remains valid regardless of outcome does not begin to emerge
until age seven.
While ultimately confirming Astington’s findings, several
researchers have demonstrated that the distinction between
promise and outcome is somewhat tenuous even beyond the age
of 7. For instance, using stories that featured characters making
and breaking promises to one another, Maas and Abbeduto
(2001) found that 9-year-olds, although able to assign respon-
sibility to the “promiser” for the outcome, often acknowledged
obligation only if a clear and involuntary obstacle impeded the
said “promiser” from fulfilling the promise. For example, when
Nevin did not show up to play on the swings with Corrinda
after he had promised he would do so, many 9-year-old partici-
pants saw this as a broken promise even when it was explained
Nevin failed to show up due to illness. However, when Nevin
simply went home to play alone, these same participants did not
view this act as a broken promise. Similarly, Mant and Perner
(1988), using oral narratives featuring characters breaking
promises for various reasons (both intentionally and uninten-
tionally in much the same manner as the Nevin character de-
scribed above), concluded that the ability to consistently and
accurately assign obligation to the “promiser” does not emerge
until the age of 9 or 10.
In order to further define the boundaries of young children’s
understanding of promises, Maas (2008) used videotaped sto-
ries employing thought bubbles to reveal the inner-thoughts of
characters. Utilizing this methodology, Maas examined the
impact of “promiser” sincerity and intention on 4- to 6-year-
olds’ ability to correctly identify promises. As an example, after
promising to help rake leaves, a “sincere” character’s thought
bubble might say, “I DO want to help—I ALWAYS like to
help,” while an insincere character’s thought bubble might say,
“I DO NOT want to help—I will NEVER want to help.” Mass
determined that although children as young as 4 can—and
do—successfully identify promises made with sincere inten-
tions, the ability to identify promises regardless of intention
begins to emerge by age 6. In her conclusion, Maas argued that
childhood understanding of promises progresses from a focus
on outcome to a focus on the belief promises create in the lis-
tener.
When combined with Maas’s earlier work, it appears prom-
issory comprehension evolves from responsibility to obligation
and ends with expectation. Unfortunately, as noted above, due
to the dearth of research examining this topic, such syntheses
can only be hypothesized. In addition, it is important to note
that each of the aforementioned studies utilized a diametric
scale rather than a more nuanced “sliding” scale. More specifi-
cally, participants were asked to categorize each scenario as a
broken promise or not.
Synthesizing Moral D e v elopment and U nderstandin g
of Promises
Piaget and Kohlberg’s foundational research in the field of
moral reasoning focused on stage-like moral development;
however, succeeding developmental psychologists—namely
Turiel, Nucci and Smetana—investigated the reasoning behind
children’s moralistic categorization of specific actions. Based
on a series of studies (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1981;
Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; Smetana, 1981;
Smetana, 1985; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, 2002), these domain theo-
rists concluded that children as young as three years old can
readily differentiate between moral transgressions (actions that
cause physical or psychological harm to others, such as hitting
or teasing), social-conventional transgressions (actions that
violate the social order, such as not sitting in an assigned seat or
cutting in line), and personal choices (actions that reflect per-
sonal preference, such as wearing a certain brand of clothing or
participating in a particular sport).
Hussar and Harris (2009) utilized this non-diametric moral
domain-theory framework to examine children’s understanding
of personal “promiser” commitment. More specifically, this
research examined whether children viewed a failed promise
made to one’s self (in this case, “I will not eat meat.”) as a
binding commitment. Using story cards in which characters
made and broke promises not to eat meat for moral reasons
(e.g., “Animals are my friends and I don’t want to hurt them.”)
and personal reasons (e.g., “I just don’t like the taste.”), they
found that both vegetarian and non-vegetarian participants did
indeed judge failure to adhere to a commitment to vegetarian-
ism as wrong. However, participants judged the breaking of a
commitment more severely if it was made for moral as opposed
to personal reasons. Thus children varied in their judgments of
this broken commitment depending on whether the person’s
initial motive for making it fell into the moral domain or the
personal domain.
The Current Study
The current study aimed to expand Hussar and Harris’s re-
search (2009). Participants in the current study were asked to
judge individuals who broke commitments across various do-
mains. Specifically, participants were asked to judge individu-
als who broke personal commitments (e.g., a commitment to be
physically active), social-conventional commitments (e.g., a
commitment to be tidy) and moral commitments (e.g., a com-
mitment to stop bullying classmates) using a scale comparable
to the one utilized by social domain theorists. The authors hy-
pothesized that children would judge broken commitments in
the same manner they judge actions from the moral, social-
conventional and personal domains. Specifically, participants
would judge broken commitments from the moral domain more
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K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH
severely than broken commitments from the social-conventional
domain and broken commitments from the social-conventional
domain more severely than broken commitments from the per-
sonal domain. By establishing children’s judgments toward
various broken commitments, we hope to determine if children
judge the breaking of a commitment in terms of the initial
grounds for making it.
Method
Participants
Participants were 40 middle-class children ranging from 6 to
10 years of age (M = 7 years 7 months, SD =1.37). There were
an equal number of boy and girl participants; all were Cauca-
sian. Participants were recruited in suburban neighborhoods
surrounding two major northeast metropolitan areas in the
United States.
Design and Procedure
The first author conducted all interviews individually with
each participant during a single visit to either the participant’s
home or school. Before the interview began, participants were
told that the researcher was “talking with kids like you to find
out what things different children think are OK to do and what
things children think are bad to do.” Each interview lasted be-
tween 30 - 45 minutes and was audio-taped and subsequently
transcribed.
To provide an initial assessment of children’s evaluation of
actions falling into the moral, social-conventional, and personal
domains, children were presented in a random order with
twelve story cards depicting four moral transgressions (stealing
a quarter from a classmate; pushing a classmate out of the way
so as to be first in line; grabbing a toy from a classmate; hitting
a classmate); four social-conventional transgressions (eating
salad with fingers; not pushing in a chair upon dismissal from
class; leaving a dirty wrapper on the table after a snack; not
sitting in an assigned seat in class); and four personal choices
(reading during recess; coloring a drawing with a purple crayon;
eating junk food; sleeping in on a Saturday morning). The gen-
der of the story card character matched the gender of the par-
ticipant (Susan for girls, Sam for boys). Children were asked to
judge each depicted action as “OK”, “a little bad”, “bad”, or
“very bad”. Initially, the interviewer did not provide any back-
ground information about the story character. Thus, children
were left to make their own assumptions about the individual.
After this initial exercise, children were asked to judge the
twelve events again; however, this time the interviewer told
participants that the story character had made a commitment
not to engage in the action in question before performing it (e.g.,
Sam promised not to take things that did not belong to him, but
stole a quarter from his classmate’s desk; Susan promised to be
more active, but decided to read a book during recess). Once
children learned about each prior commitment, they then
judged each depicted action as “OK”, “a little bad”, “bad”, or
“very bad”.
Results
Figure 1(a) reveals that participants judged moral transgres-
sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and
rarely condemned personal choices. To analyze these results, a
repeated measures ANCOVA of Domain (moral, social- con-
ventional, personal) X Age (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) was conducted with
the participants’ gender included as a covariate. This analysis
produced a significant main effect of Domain, F(1, 34) =
229.69, p < 0.001, but no main effect of Age, F(4, 34) = 1.25, p
= 0.31. The covariate, Gender, was not a statistically significant
predictor of the outcome (p = 0.14).
Figure 1(b) indicates that when participants were told that
the story character made a commitment (promise) not to engage
in the action in question, they typically judged moral transgres-
sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and
social-conventional transgressions more severely than personal
choices. To analyze these results, a repeated measures AN-
COVA of Domain (moral, social-conventional, personal) X
Age (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) was conducted with the participants’ gender
included as a covariate. This analysis produced a significant
main effect of Domain, F(1, 34) = 288.19, p < 0.001, but no
main effect of Age, F(4, 34) = 0.93, p = 0.46. The covariate,
Gender, was not a statistically significant predictor of the out-
come (p = 0.25).
Figure 1(c) demonstrates that within each of the three do-
mains, participants’ judgments were more severe if they were
told that the story character initially made a promise not to
engage in the action in question. Contrast analyses confirm that
participants judged identical moral transgressions more se-
verely when it was made explicit that the character had prom-
ised not to transgress prior to acting, F (1, 34) = 12.49, p < 0.01,
identical social-conventional transgressions more severely when
it was made explicit that the character had promised not to
transgress prior to acting, F (1, 34) = 16.01, p < 0.001, and
identical personal choices more severely when it was made
explicit that the character promised not to transgress prior to
acting, F (1, 34) = 43.51, p < 0.001.
In summary, participants were sensitive to the domain under
consideration, both when they were given no background in-
formation on the story character’s intentions and when they
were told that the story character made a promise not to engage
in the action in question. Nevertheless, within each of the three
domains, participants consistently judged the story character
more severely for his/her actions when the story character ini-
tially made a commitment not to engage in the action in ques-
tion.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to determine if children consider
the breaking of commitments (promises) to vary in degree of
wrongness. Specifically, we asked whether children would
judge any form of failed commitment similarly or whether they
would differentially judge broken commitments according to
the initial basis for the commitment. We began our analyses by
confirming that our participants judged events within the moral,
social-conventional and personal domains in a pattern identical
to what domain theorists have established (e.g., Smetana, 2006;
Turiel, 2006). On average, participants judged moral transgres-
sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and
judged social-transgressions more severely than personal
choices. In fact, participants were reluctant to pass judgment on
personal choices in general (see Figure 1(a)).
With respect to commitments broken within each of these
three domains, our results indicate that children judged broken
promises in the moral domain more severely than those in the
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K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1.
(a) Participants’ average judgments of three domains (moral, social-
conventional, and personal) (N = 40). Responses reflect a four-point
scale where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad. (b) Partici-
pants’ average judgments of three domains (moral, social-conventional,
and personal) after learning that the story character promised not to
transgress prior to acting (N = 40). Responses reflect a four-point scale
where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad. (c) Participants’
average judgments of three domains (moral, social-conventional, and
personal) across two conditions (no background information on story
character and committed story character) (N = 40). Responses reflect a
four-point scale where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad.
social-conventional domain and broken promises in the so-
cial-conventional domain more severely than those in the per-
sonal domain (see Figure 1(b)). Therefore, it appears that chil-
dren judge broken commitments on a sliding scale in much the
same way they judge actions from the three specified domains.
Below, we consider two plausible explanations as to why chil-
dren do not judge broken commitments in a uniform manner.
A comparison of the promise/non-promise scenarios reveals
that across all three domains, participants’ judgments were
more severe when the story card character initially made a
promise not to engage in the action in question (see Figure
1(c)). On average, judgments shift by approximately one rating
on the ordinal scale: from “OK” to “a little bad” within the
personal domain; from “a little bad” to “bad” within the social-
conventional domain; and from “bad” to “very bad” within the
moral domain. Under this interpretation, participants judge the
breaking of all promises similarly. What differs is the initial
judgment of the actions in question (as evidenced in Figure
1(a)). This explanation is reinforced by several participants’
unprompted comments. For instance, in reference to the sce-
nario where Susan breaks her promise to be more active at re-
cess, one child replied, “It wouldn’t have been so bad…but she
breaks a promise so it goes down one [italics added].” Another
participant expressed a similar viewpoint: “I guess all the ones
where [Susan] promises might be one worse…because she
made a promise and broke it [italics added].” These references
to intensifying a judgment by “one” suggest a consistent judg-
ment assigned to the act of breaking a promise, regardless of
the associated behavior.
Although this interpretation is compelling, a closer examina-
tion of the data casts doubt on this theory. If this explanation
were correct, we would have expected to see a near identical
judgment differential (“one”) between the non- and broken-
promise scenarios across each domain. However, when nu-
merically calculated (as opposed to simply assigning an ordinal
rank), this difference appears to shift between scenarios—
reaching, on average, 1 point in the personal domain, 0.50
points in the social-conventional domain, and 0.25 points in the
moral domain. Accordingly, despite the homogenous ranking
method alluded to by several participants, it appears that, on
average, our participants differentially judged commitment
conditions according to each unique circumstance.
These numerical calculations suggest an alternative explana-
tion for our results, one we believe corresponds with the pattern
of results initially established by domain theorists. As previ-
ously noted, our participants were reluctant to assign any judg-
ment to the personal choices made by the story card characters.
However, once the character made and broke a promise not to
engage in the described personal action, participants negatively
judged their behavior (“a little bad”, on average). Accordingly,
these negative judgments can be understood to exclusively re-
flect the act of breaking the promise. Conversely, our partici-
pants, on average, initially judged moral transgressions as “very
bad”. However, when a promise condition was introduced and
broken within the moral domain, this judgment shifted only
slightly (0.25 points). This small shift in judgment suggests that
our participants viewed the breaking of a promise not to engage
in a moral transgression as almost inconsequential, particularly
as it compares to the moral transgressi on itself. In other words,
it appears that the more severely an initial action is judged, the
less severely its concurrent commitment will be judged. Ac-
cordingly, the less severely an initial action is judged, the more
severely its concurrent commitment condition will be judged.
Although certainly suggested by our data, we believe this
“inverse commitment” theory could be better tested with a
more sensitive sliding scale upon which participants judge
non-promise/promise scenarios. Whereas our scale may have
led to a ceiling effect within the moral domain, a five-point
scale ranging from “OK” to “very, very bad” would allow re-
searchers to better determine judgments toward broken moral
commitments and perhaps confirm this relationship between
original action and related commitment. Regardless, the data
Open Access 1049
K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH
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1050
collected in the current study supports this hypothesis.
In addition, it is important to note that the age range of our
participants (6 - 10 years old) may have influenced participants’
judgments of the actions in question. As demonstrated by ear-
lier researchers (i.e., Maas & Abbedutio, 2001; Mant & Perner,
1988), mature comprehension of made-, kept- and broken-
promises emerges around age 7 but remains somewhat fragile
until later adolescence. Perhaps the vacillation in our proce-
dures between traditional moral-domain judgments and broken
commitment judgments is a symptom of this maturation. Future
research could also determine if the aforementioned results are
replicated with older children (i.e., 11 - 12 years old) or if var-
ied judgments towards broken commitments stabilizes with
age.
In the end, this study has generated some unique and inter-
esting results. It initially appeared that young children were
differentially rating commitment scenarios (e.g., judging those
broken commitments that result in physical or psychological
harm towards others more severely than those broken commit-
ments that result in a disruption to the social order). However,
when the promise scenario is decoupled from its related event,
the opposite may actually be true: young children judge broken
commitments to moral transgressions less severely than broken
commitments to personal choices. The message presented seems
to be one of caliber: when one breaks a promise not to engage
in a moral transgression, the broken promise is superseded by
the moral transgression itself and, accordingly, is not judged
harshly (e.g., “S/he should have known better.”). Conversely,
when one breaks a promise not to engage in a personal choice,
the broken promise is the only true transgression and, accord-
ingly, is judged somewhat severely (e.g., “Why did s/he say it if
s/he didn’t mean it?”). This concept implies children are sensi-
tive to personal commitments, particularly broken personal
commitments. As such, our findings suggest that educators and
other professionals working with young children may need to
mitigate the judgments children are likely to bestow on others
when personal commitments are broken (e.g., dropping out of a
school club; quitting a sports team; canceling a scheduled social
activity).
Therefore, with regards to our research question, children do
consider the initial basis for which a commitment was made in
determining the severity of their judgment of the broken com-
mitment in question. However, their judgments appear to be
more sophisticated that initially theorized. The more severely
an initial action is judged, the less severely its concurrent com-
mitment will be judged. Accordingly, the less severely an initial
action is judged, the more severely its concurrent commitment
condition will be judged. Although certainly suggested by our
data, we believe this “inverse commitment” theory should be
confirmed through future research that includes a more sensi-
tive judgment scale as well as a wider age range of participants.
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