K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH
Open Access
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collected in the current study supports this hypothesis.
In addition, it is important to note that the age range of our
participants (6 - 10 years old) may have influenced participants’
judgments of the actions in question. As demonstrated by ear-
lier researchers (i.e., Maas & Abbedutio, 2001; Mant & Perner,
1988), mature comprehension of made-, kept- and broken-
promises emerges around age 7 but remains somewhat fragile
until later adolescence. Perhaps the vacillation in our proce-
dures between traditional moral-domain judgments and broken
commitment judgments is a symptom of this maturation. Future
research could also determine if the aforementioned results are
replicated with older children (i.e., 11 - 12 years old) or if var-
ied judgments towards broken commitments stabilizes with
age.
In the end, this study has generated some unique and inter-
esting results. It initially appeared that young children were
differentially rating commitment scenarios (e.g., judging those
broken commitments that result in physical or psychological
harm towards others more severely than those broken commit-
ments that result in a disruption to the social order). However,
when the promise scenario is decoupled from its related event,
the opposite may actually be true: young children judge broken
commitments to moral transgressions less severely than broken
commitments to personal choices. The message presented seems
to be one of caliber: when one breaks a promise not to engage
in a moral transgression, the broken promise is superseded by
the moral transgression itself and, accordingly, is not judged
harshly (e.g., “S/he should have known better.”). Conversely,
when one breaks a promise not to engage in a personal choice,
the broken promise is the only true transgression and, accord-
ingly, is judged somewhat severely (e.g., “Why did s/he say it if
s/he didn’t mean it?”). This concept implies children are sensi-
tive to personal commitments, particularly broken personal
commitments. As such, our findings suggest that educators and
other professionals working with young children may need to
mitigate the judgments children are likely to bestow on others
when personal commitments are broken (e.g., dropping out of a
school club; quitting a sports team; canceling a scheduled social
activity).
Therefore, with regards to our research question, children do
consider the initial basis for which a commitment was made in
determining the severity of their judgment of the broken com-
mitment in question. However, their judgments appear to be
more sophisticated that initially theorized. The more severely
an initial action is judged, the less severely its concurrent com-
mitment will be judged. Accordingly, the less severely an initial
action is judged, the more severely its concurrent commitment
condition will be judged. Although certainly suggested by our
data, we believe this “inverse commitment” theory should be
confirmed through future research that includes a more sensi-
tive judgment scale as well as a wider age range of participants.
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