F. STEINBERG ET AL.
F(1(22) = .58; p > .05) and detour (R2 = .07; F(1(22) = .32; p
> .05) didn’t change over time.
However, QCM scores differed substantially between groups
(z(24) = −2.90; p < .01). Figure 2 illustrates that self-assessed
motivation to engage in the “Tower of Hanoi” game was higher
in subjects primed with high-motivation words than in those
primed with low-motivation words.
Discussion
We evaluated whether conceptual priming of the motivation
level is a neglected research topic, or rather failed to produce
significance and thus suffered the “file-drawer effect”. To find
out, words denoting a high or a low motivation level were sub-
liminally presented during a manual-pointing task, and subjects
were subsequently questioned about their motivation to engage
in a cognitively demanding task, the “Tower of Hanoi” game.
Our data document higher QCM scores for subjects primed for
high rather than for low motivation, from which we conclude
that our priming procedure was successful. In other words, con-
textual priming can effectively modify not only the direction
(Radel et al., 2009; Steinberg & Bock, under review), but also
the magnitude of the motivational drive. Since the primes were
forward and backward masked and were presented for only 30
ms, they could not be consciously perceived; indeed subjects
reported retrospectively that they had been unaware of them.
Our data therefore contradict the view that motivation is a pure-
ly conscious process (Weiner, 1992), and rather support the al-
ternative notion that motivation can influence behavior without
the actor’s explicit knowledge (Custers & Aarts, 2010 motiva-
tion can escape awareness).
It is interesting to note that contextual priming changed sub-
jects’ attitude towards the “Tower of Hanoi” game, but didn’t
reliably modify their performance in the pointing task. One pos-
sible explanation is that the motivation level changed gradually,
such that a substantial change was only achieved by the end of
the pointing task. However, regression analysis of pointing pa-
rameters does not support this assumption. The other, more
likely explanation is that the pointing was stereotyped, auto-
mated, unrewarded and thus was insensitive to the subjects’ le-
vel of motivation.
Figure 2.
QCM scores for subjects primed with high- and
with low-motivation words, respectively. Blocks
represent group means and error bars the per-
tinent standard deviations. **represents p < .01.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to Judith Horch for data analysis and Marlon
Drescher for technical support and software development. This
work was supported by a Grant from the German Ministry for
Economy and Technology, administered through the German
Space Agency DLR (50WB1224).
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