Open Journal of Political Science
2013. Vol.3, No.4, 146-157
Published Online October 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2013.34021
146
Climate Policies and Anti-Climate Policies
Hugh Compston1, Ian Bailey2
1Cardiff School of European Languages, Translation and Politics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
2School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK
Received August 15th, 2013; revised September 16th, 2013; accepted September 29th, 2013
Copyright © 2013 Hugh Compston, Ian Bailey. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
Although there is a clear trend towards stronger climate policies across a wide range of countries, another
much less recognized but no less significant trend is the continued introduction of policies that increase
net greenhouse gas emissions. This article introduces the concept of “anti-climate policy” as a means of
focusing attention on these, and investigates their frequency in China, the US and EU, the three largest
emitters of greenhouse gases. The investigation reveals that anti-climate policies take many forms and
that most types are being extensively used by governments in China, the US and EU. This significantly
impedes progress towards bringing emissions under control. We argue that anti-climate policies need to
be recognized as an important feature of climate politics and that they need to be addressed if dangerous
climate change is to be avoided. We conclude that anti-climate policies can best be tackled by targeting
approvals of new fossil fuel power stations, efforts to extend trade liberalization, proposals to introduce
new fossil fuel subsidies, and approvals of new airports.
Keywords: Climate Policy; Carbon Pricing; Fossil-Fuel Subsidies; Trade Agreements; EU; US; China
Introduction
Scientists, economists, politicians and officials have invested
immense amounts of effort over the last couple of decades ex-
amining what needs to be done to limit climate change and how
it can be achieved. Proposals for new climate policies abound
and there is a general trend towards stronger climate policies
across a large range of countries. Since the turn of the century
the number of climate change laws passed by governments
around the world has increased steadily (Townshend et al.,
2013: 20). By 2013 renewable energy support policies, for ex-
ample, were in place in 127 countries (REN21, 2013: 14). Our
own comparison of major climate policies in the six largest
emitters of carbon dioxide found that between 2000 and 2010
climate policies were strengthened in China, the US, the EU,
Japan and India. Only in Russia was there no real progress
(Compston & Bailey, 2013).
But this is only half the story. At the same time that new cli-
mate policies are being introduced, governments are also intro-
ducing policies that have the exact opposite effect. Permits are
being issued for huge new coal mining ventures. Approval is
being given for new airports. There is a continuing push for
new agreements to facilitate trade. These are just a few exam-
ples.
Although many of these and other anti-climate policies have
attendant expert literatures which, among other things, discuss
their impact on greenhouse gas emissions (see, for example,
IEA, OECD & World Bank (2010) on fossil fuel subsidies and
Tamiotti et al., 2009 on trade), they have never been brought
together to be analysed as a group. Exactly what are these poli-
cies? How common are they? To what extent do they share
common causal dynamics? What does their incidence tell us
about the politics of climate change? We do not know the an-
swer to any of these questions.
The aim of this article is to begin to address these issues by
identifying as many different types of anti-climate policies as
possible so we can see what they are, record which types are
most common, assess the extent to which their implementation
nullifies the advances made by strengthening climate policies,
and begin the process of explaining their incidence.
In the first section the term “anti-climate policy” is defined
so that it is quite clear exactly what characteristics a policy
needs to have to be deemed an anti-climate policy. The next
section describes the main types of policies that fall into this
category. Findings on the incidence of anti-climate policies in
China, the US and EU, which between them account for over
half of global emissions of carbon dioxide, are then reported
and discussed. It is concluded that the most effective way of
minimizing the impact of anti-climate policies in future is to
target approvals of new fossil fuel power stations, efforts to
extend trade liberalization, proposals to introduce new fossil
fuel subsidies, and approvals of new airports.
Definition
Although the term “anti-climate policy” has been used as an
adjective to describe the attitudes of people such as climate
sceptics, it appears that it has never been used as a noun. For
this reason a definition is needed that will make clear what the
term refers to. By “anti-climate policy” we mean a policy
change that has the effect of increasing net greenhouse gas
emissions. We specify net emissions to exclude policies that
simply shift emissions from one location to another, for exam-
ple as a result of the relocation of manufacturing activities be-

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
tween countries. We specify policy change because we want to
focus attention on steps backwards in the fight against climate
change rather than the status quo. Existing policies that increase
emissions are termed “emissions-sustaining policies” to distin-
guish them from anti-climate policies.
Types of Anti-Climate Policies
Policy changes that increase emissions can be divided into
two types: policies that weaken or dismantle climate policies,
such as axing a carbon tax, and policies in other areas that in-
crease emissions as a side-effect, such as signing new free trade
agreements. The first we shall call “reverse climate policies”.
The second we call “side-effect anti-climate policies”.
Every climate policy has its inverse—its own abolition or
weakening—so any list of reverse climate policies maps exactly
onto a corresponding list of climate policies. They are therefore
not difficult to identify once you have a list of climate policies.
Table 1 gives some examples of how climate policies can be
put into reverse.
The focus of this paper is on the second type: policies that
are introduced for reasons unrelated to climate change but
which by their nature have the unintended effect of increasing
net emissions. This is because side-effect anti-climate policies
tend to be less obvious than reverse climate policies. We need
to bring them into the light so they can be fully taken into ac-
count in our thinking about climate change and how it can be
countered.
Table 2 sets out the most significant side-effect anti-climate
policies we have come across. These were identified by exam-
ining the logic of emissions as described in the 4th Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) in conjunction with the comprehensive list of policy
types set out in the The Handbook of Public Policy in Europe
(Metz et al., 2007; Compston, 2004). The list of anti-climate
policies in Table 2 uses the same sectoral categorization as the
IPCC apart from the waste sector, for which no side-effect anti-
climate policies could be identified. There are also sections on
population policy, due to the importance of population growth
for emissions, and on macro-economic policy, due to the sig-
nificance for emissions of policies that stimulate economic
activity as a whole.
Energy
The main anti-climate policies in the energy sector are those
that lead to more fossil fuels being burnt and consist of 1) ap-
proval for fossil fuel exploration, extraction, processing, and
use in power stations, and 2) new or increased energy subsi-
dies, defined as “any government action that lowers the cost of
energy production, raises the revenues of energy producers or
lowers the price paid by energy consumers” (IEA, OECD, &
World Bank, 2010: 5). Table 3 lists the main types of energy
subsidies. Insofar as they apply to fossil fuels, these subsidies
are all anti-climate policies.
Industry
Some industries contribute more to greenhouse gas emissions
than others because they are energy-intensive and energy gen-
eration emits CO2 except to the extent that it is generated using
renewable or nuclear technologies. The most energy-intensive
industries are iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and
fertilizers, petroleum refining, cement and lime, glass and ce-
ramics, pulp and paper, and food processing (Bernstein et al.,
2007: 451). It follows that new policies to assist these industries
to expand production will also increase net emissions to the
extent that this is powered by fossil fuels, except to the extent
that expansion of production leads to production cuts elsewhere.
Anti-climate policies relating to industry therefore include the
provision to energy-intensive producers of additional grants,
cheap loans, and tax breaks; the construction, financing and
subsidization of new transport links; and new or additional
funding or provision of relevant research and development.
Buildings
As greenhouse gas emissions in China and the US relating to
buildings are mainly a side-effect of the use of energy for heat-
ing, cooling, lighting and powering electrical appliances insofar
as this energy is produced by fossil fuel combustion (Levine et
al., 2007: 393), anti-climate policies in the building sector
mainly take the form of energy subsidies. These are anti-cli-
mate policies because lower energy prices tend to lead to
greater energy use and therefore higher emissions, other things
being equal. Subsidies for householders, for example, might be
Table 1.
Examples of reverse climate policies.
Policy instrument Complete reverse Reduction in coverage of emissions Weakening of settings
Emissions trading Abolition Narrowing of coverage; creation or widening
of exemptions
Rise in permitted emissions, reduced
fines for overshooting
Carbon tax Abolition Narrowing of coverage; creation or widening
of exemptions
Reduction in tax rate or failure to index
it
Feed-in tariffs Abolition Narrowing in coverage, e.g. to wind alone;
creation or widening of exemptions Reduction in tariff level
Low carbon energy quota schemes Abolition Narrowing in coverage, e.g. to wind alone;
creation or widening of exemptions Reduction in quota
Ban on fossil fuel-fired power plants
without carbon capture and storage
(CCS), or standards with equivalent effect
Removal of ban/standardsNarrowing to one fossil fuel; creation or
widening of exemptions
Increase in maximum level of
emissions permitted
Emissions and/or fuel economy standards
for cars
Abolition of emissions
limits
Narrowing to fewer categories of vehicle;
exemptions
Increase in maximum level of
emissions permitted

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
Table 2.
Side-effect anti-climate policies.
Sector Policies
Energy
 Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil fuel infrastructure: power stations, refineries, pipelines, handling facilities,
storage
 Approval/incentives for new conventional fossil fuel exploration and extraction
 Approval/incentives for exploration for, and exploitation of, unconventional fossil fuels such as tight gas sands, fractured shales,
coal beds and methane hydrates
 State aid (tax breaks, subsidies, grants, loans, loan guarantees) for uneconomic fossil fuel extraction, for example to keep
unprofitable coal mines open
Industry  Increased support for energy-intensive industries: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and fertilizers, petroleum refining,
cement and lime, glass and ceramics, pulp and paper, food processing
Buildings  Subsidies designed to reduce householders’ energy bills
Trade  Free trade policies such as tariff cuts
Transport
 Tax breaks or subsidies for motor fuel
 Increased support for the automotive, aerospace, and shipping industries
 Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new transport infrastructure, e.g. roads, ports and airports
 Construction of, or approval/incentives for, low density urban development
Agriculture
 Increased support for meat production
 New incentives designed to expand the use of nitrogen fertilizers
 Construction of, or approval/incentives for, irrigation schemes
 Increased support for rice grown under flooded conditions
Forestry
 Action by state agencies to clear forest for farmland, settlements, infrastructure schemes, or resource extraction, or
approval/incentives for this
 Approval/incentives for unsustainable logging
Population  New pro-natalist policies such as expansion of public childcare
Macro-economy  Policies designed to stimulate the economy as a whole: wide-ranging tax cuts or spending increases, and/or cuts in interest rates
Note: Approval = authorization and/or licensing. Incentives = tax breaks, subsidies, one-off grants, cheap loans and/or loan guarantees.
Table 3.
Common types of energy subsidies.
Type Details
Trade instruments Quotas; technical restrictions; tariffs
Regulations Price controls; demand guarantees and mandated deployment rates; market-access restrictions; preferential
planning consent; preferential resource access
Tax breaks Rebates or exemptions on royalties, producer levies or income tax; tax credits and accelerated depreciation
allowances; rebates, refunds or exemptions on energy duties and CO2 taxes
Credit Low-interest or preferential rates on loans to producers
Direct financial transfer Grants to producers or consumers
Risk transfer Limitation of financial liability
Energy-related services provided by
government at below full cost Direct investment in energy infrastructure; public research and development
Note: Source: IEA, OECD and World Bank 2010: 7, Table 1.
introduced to help low income earners, or because the govern-
ment is concerned about the political impact of rising energy
prices. Examples include the imposition or tightening of energy
price controls, and the granting of new or additional energy
rebates, refunds or tax breaks.
Trade
A joint analysis of trade and climate change by the UN En-
vironment Programme and the WTO reports that there are at
least three ways in which trade opening can affect greenhouse
gas emissions (Tamiotti et al., 2009: 47-60; also Grossman &
Krueger, 1993; Cole & Elliott, 2003; Managi, Hibiki, & Tsu-
rumi, 2009; Ghani, 2012).
First, trade opening increases greenhouse gas emissions via
the scale effect: expanding economic activity and increasing the
use of cross-border transportation services. It is generally
agreed that trade liberalization bolsters economic growth even
though this has not been conclusively proven, and higher pro-
duction means higher levels of energy use and carbon emis-
sions except to the extent that the additional energy used is
generated by low carbon sources. More goods being moved
means greater use of fossil fuel-powered land, air and sea
transport.
Second, trade opening can influence the emissions of a liber-
alizing country by changing the relative size of industrial sec-
tors. If it results in emissions-intensive sectors expanding, then
emissions rise. If it results in these sectors contracting, for ex-
148

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
ample due to intensified competition from companies located in
other countries, emissions fall. This is the composition effect.
On a global basis, however, if one country produces fewer
emissions-intensive goods as a result of trade opening, then if
demand doesn’t fall, other countries are likely to produce more
of these goods. Composition effects therefore have a tendency
to cancel each other out. If trade opening results in one country
producing less steel due to price competition, for example, this
shortfall is likely to be balanced by increased steel production
elsewhere by those firms that have proved more competitive.
Trade opening can also increase emissions by making emis-
sions-intensive industries more vulnerable to price competition
from countries with weak climate policies, leading them to
relocate to these countries. If these migrant industries expand
production as a consequence, net global emissions will increase.
If steel producers relocate, the laxer regulation may permit
them to produce steel at a lower price and thereby enable them
to sell more, so that their emissions are higher than if they
stayed in their home country.
Third, trade opening may reduce emissions either by in-
creasing the availability and reducing the cost of climate-
friendly goods and services, or by raising incomes. Cutting
tariffs on wind turbines, for example, should lead to more of
them being sold in a wider range of countries. Raising incomes
is thought to lead to greater public demand for lower emissions
on the basis that higher incomes give people more freedom to
be concerned about non-monetary aspects of their wellbeing
such as environmental quality.
A number of attempts have been made to test the strength of
these and other possible effects. The UN-WTO study reports
that most come to the conclusion that the scale effect dominates:
trade opening mostly increases emissions. For this reason poli-
cies to expand trade, such as the implementation of new trade
agreements, count as anti-climate policies.
Transport
The transport sector is where global emissions are rising
fastest due to growth in the use of transport plus the fact that
almost all land, sea and air transport is powered by fossil fuel
combustion (Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2007), so policy initiatives
that expand transport generally count as anti-climate policies.
Fuel subsidies encourage transport use by reducing its cost.
Measures to assist the automotive, aerospace and shipping in-
dustries, if successful, increase their sales and transport use
except to the extent that the higher sales in one place are at the
expense of lower sales elsewhere. Providing new transport
infrastructure, or encouraging its provision by the private sector,
is likely to increase transport use by making travel quicker,
easier or cheaper. Allowing, encouraging or constructing low
density urban development increases the distances that resi-
dents and users have to travel and thereby increases trans-
port-related carbon emissions except to the extent that low car-
bon transport is integral.
Agriculture
Some agricultural practices emit greater amounts of green-
house gases than others. Methane is produced in abundance by
ruminant livestock, cultivating rice in flooded conditions, and
irrigation. Nitrous oxide is produced by animal manures and
nitrogen-based fertilizers where these are over-used (Smith et
al., 2007: 501-504). To the extent that these practices are pro-
moted by new policies, intentionally or as a side-effect, the new
initiatives are anti-climate policies. Anti-climate policies in
agriculture therefore include incentives for farmers to expand
meat production, incentives to expand the area of rice grown in
flooded conditions, provision of subsidies for nitrogenous fer-
tilizers, and the provision, financing or encouragement of irri-
gation schemes.
Forestry
Because forest clearing reduces CO2 uptake from the atmos-
phere, anti-climate policies in the forestry sector are those that
permit, encourage or carry out clearing of forests for farmland,
settlements, roads, mines, or non-sustainable timber production.
Population
More people mean higher emissions, other things being equal,
especially in developed countries where per capita carbon
emissions are high. Policy initiatives designed to encourage
people to have more children, or which can reasonably be ex-
pected to have this effect, therefore count as anti-climate poli-
cies. These include policies that make it easier for women to
combine paid work and caring for children, such as the provi-
sion or financing of affordable childcare. Other policies that
may increase birthrates include cash payments to families with
children; tax breaks for families with children; maternity, pa-
ternity and parental leaves; assistance for lone parents; and
establishing legal rights to flexible working (Daly, 2004;
Kilkey, 2004). Placing new restrictions on contraception, IVF
or abortion would also be expected to result in more children
being born, so would also count as anti-climate policies.
It does sound odd to characterize policies such as increased
spending on childcare as anti-climate policies. The expert lit-
erature in this area has little if anything to say about climate
change, it would be surprising if greenhouse gas emissions are
a factor in the formulation of childcare or similar policies, and
potential and actual clients are most unlikely to think of such
policies as adding to emissions. In addition, the academic and
expert literature is divided on whether policies designed to
make it easier for women to combine paid work and caring for
children actually result in significant numbers of additional
children being born (see, for example, Kalwij, 2010; Del Boca
et al., 2008). Nevertheless the logic is clear: insofar as they do
increase birthrates, family policies must be counted as anti-
climate policies.
Macro-Economy
The causal connection between economic growth and carbon
emissions means that any policy that increases economic activ-
ity in general will also increase emissions except to the extent
that economic activity is “decoupled” from emissions growth
and the additional activity is carbon neutral. Although there is
some evidence that growth is becoming decoupled from emis-
sions, this remains patchy (see Porter & van der Linde (1995)
for an early discussion of decoupling; Jackson (2009) for a
useful critique; and van den Bergh (2011) for a mid-way per-
spective). The main policies used to stimulate the economy as a
whole are expansionary fiscal policies (tax cuts and/or spending
increases) and cuts in interest rates. These are therefore anti-
climate policies.

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
150
Anti-Climate Policies in the US, EU and China,
2000-2010
We have now identified a number of policies that, when im-
plemented, increase net greenhouse gas emissions and therefore
count as side-effect anti-climate policies. The next step is to
measure their incidence in China, the US and EU over the pe-
riod 2000-2010. This time frame is chosen because it is a recent
period that is long enough for anti-climate policies to show up
if they exist. China, the US and EU are examined because they
have by far the highest carbon emissions, accounting between
them for over half of global carbon dioxide emissions in 2011:
China emitted 29 per cent, the United States 16 per cent, and
the EU 11 per cent. The next three accounted for just 15 percent
of global emissions: India emitted 6 per cent, Russia 5 per cent,
and Japan 4 per cent (Olivier et al., 2012: 10). As data limita-
tions mean that it is not possible to measure the incidence of all
the side-effect anti-climate policies identified, a subset was
selected for examination. While not representative of the full
range of side-effect anti-climate policies, the policies selected
cover all sectors in which we have found anti-climate policies
(Table 4).
The item “new or increased fossil fuel subsidies” includes
within its remit a number of items previously listed separately
in Table 2: approval/incentives for new conventional and un-
conventional fossil fuel exploration and extraction, state aid for
uneconomic fossil fuel extraction, subsidies for householders’
energy bills, and tax breaks or subsidies for motor fuel. Other-
wise selections were made from among the items listed for each
sector.
New Fossil Fuel Power Stations
If a country’s total installed capacity for electricity genera-
tion by fossil-fuel power stations increases by more than a little,
then logically one or more new such power stations must have
been approved and come into operation. For this reason we can
use trends in total installed capacity for electricity generation
by fossil fuel combustion as an indicator of the issuing of li-
censes for new fossil fuel-fired plants. What we find is that
between 2000 and 2010 fossil fuel electricity generation capac-
ity in the US increased from 599 million to 782 million kilo-
watts, a rise of 31 per cent, in the EU-27 from 399 million to
450 million kilowatts (13 per cent), and in China from 238
million to 707 million kilowatts: a 197 per cent rise (US Energy
Information Administration (US EIA), 2013). We conclude that
anti-climate policies in the form of licenses for new fossil
fuel-fired power stations were frequent and significant in China,
the US and EU over the period 2000-2010, especially China.
Fossil-Fuel Subsidies
To measure these we used OECD data on direct budgetary
support and tax expenditures supporting the production or con-
sumption of fossil fuels (OECD, 2011: 17). Direct budgetary
expenditures include support for energy purchases by low in-
come households; government spending on research, develop-
ment and demonstration projects; and transfers to help redeploy
resources in the coal industry. Tax expenditures (tax breaks)
relating to final consumption of fossil fuels mainly consist of
lower rates, exemptions and rebates relating to VAT and excise
taxes. Tax expenditures relating to fossil fuels as inputs to pro-
duction include exemptions from excise taxes and reductions in
energy taxes. Those relating to the extraction, refining and
transport of fossil fuels include accelerated depreciation allow-
ances for capital, investment tax credits, deductions for explo-
ration and production, and preferential capital gains treatment
for particular fields (OECD, 2011). We focus on subsidies that
are introduced or increased but not abolished or reduced later in
the period.
Table 5 summarizes the OECD data for the US at federal
level, the three American states for which data was collected,
and, since in the EU energy subsidies are a matter for member
states, the three biggest EU member states: Britain, France and
Germany. Unfortunately China had to be omitted because rele-
vant data is not readily available.
Western governments may favor phasing out fossil fuel
subsidies in theory, but Table 5 shows that they frequently
introduce them in practice. Analyses of further American states
and EU member states may well reveal many more. We con-
clude that anti-climate policies in the form of new or enhanced
subsidies for fossil fuels were frequent and significant in the
US and EU between 2000 and 2010.
Energy-Intensive Industry
The rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibit 1)
subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export tar-
Table 4.
Side-effect anti-climate policies to be compared.
Sector Policies
Energy Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil fuel power stations
New or increased fossil fuel subsidies
Industry New or increased subsidies for energy-intensive industries: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and fertilizers, petro-
leum refining, cement and lime, glass and ceramics, pulp and paper, food processing
Trade New trade liberalization agreements
Transport New or increased subsidies for the automotive, aerospace or shipping industries
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new airports
Agriculture Increased support for meat production
Forestry Action by state agencies to clear forests for farmland, or approval/incentives for this
Population Provision or financing of major expansion of affordable childcare
Macro-economy Fiscal stimulus: tax cuts and/or spending increases
Note: Approval = authorization and/or licensing. Incentives = tax breaks, subsidies, one-off grants, cheap loans and/or loan guarantees.

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
Table 5.
New or increased fossil fuel subsidies in the US and EU, 2000-2010.
Emitter Subsidy
US
2000: subsidy for Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve stored in private facilities
2005: tax deduction for small business refiners for costs of complying with Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control requirements
2006: 50% expensing for advanced safety equipment in coal mining; introduction of amortization of geological expenditure for
non-integrated oil and gas producers; increase in amortization period for integrated producers; accelerated depreciation of gas pipelines;
investment tax credit for advanced coal-based electricity generation
Alaska
2007: tax credits for oil and gas companies for capital expenditures and certain exploration expenditures, and for oil and gas produced by
certain categories of oil and gas companies
2008: heating grants for low-income householders (provided via energy supplier)
2009: matching funds for construction of a gas pipeline through Alaska and Canada
Texas 2001: tax exemptions for specified equipment for oil and gas exploration or production, certain types of oil wells, off-road gasoline, and certain uses of gas and electricity including processing a product for sale, exploring for or producing and transporting extracted materials, and
use by an electricity utility, residences or timber operations
West Virginia 2008: tax exemptions for low-production oil and gas wells, coal-bed methane wells, aviation fuel, dyed diesel, propane, certain off-highway motor fuel uses, and sales of motor fuels to education boards and certain public administrations; tax cut for thin seamed coal; tax credit for
electricity producers, almost all coal-fired
EU: Not applicable
Britain Temporary measures only
France
2000: tax exemption for domestic aviation fuel
2001: partial refund for diesel used in public road transportation
2006: tax refund for fuel oil used in agriculture
2007: tax exemptions for energy products used as process energy in the course of natural gas extraction and production, household
consumption of gas, natural gas when used as a transport fuel, liquefied petroleum gas, certain machines using diesel-fired engines; VAT
reduction for petroleum products consumed in Corsica
Germany
2000: reduction in fuel tax levied on public passenger transportation
2001: refund on company energy tax bills where a cut in pension contributions designed to offset the impact of the eco-tax of 1999 does not
completely do so
2006: energy tax exemption for energy-intensive processes, especially in steel and chemical industries
Note: Source: OECD 2011: 321-341 (US); 307-314 (UK); 95-105 (France); 113-126 (Germany).
gets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods, and 2)
subsidies that a complainant country has shown to have an ad-
verse effect on a) a domestic industry in an importing country,
such as export subsidies in the exporting country; b) rival ex-
porters from another country when the two compete in third
markets, again such as export subsidies; or c) exporters trying
to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market, for
example subsidies for home firms (WTO, 2013). What this
means is that governments are not likely to produce good data
on the subsidies they provide for industry. It is therefore not
surprising that good data on the incidence of industrial subsi-
dies does not appear to be available. For this reason we use data
on subsidies that WTO members have claimed are being ap-
plied by other WTO members. Although this is likely to under-
estimate the actual incidence of subsidies for energy-intensive
industries, as subsidies don’t necessarily affect imports or ex-
ports and, even if they do, may not be the subject of a claim
under the WTO disputes procedure, this procedure should iden-
tify any really significant ones.
No relevant subsidies for energy-intensive industries can be
identified: although the WTO lists numerous disputes over
subsidies, there are none in which the US, EU or China are
alleged to have provided subsidies for any energy-intensive
industry (WTO, 2013b). If we look at Table 5 on fossil fuel
subsidies, however, we find that the last entry lists an energy
tax exemption in Germany for certain energy-intensive proc-
esses and techniques, especially in the steel and chemical in-
dustries. This may be indicative of the existence of a wider
range of energy or other subsidies in EU member states. For the
moment, however, we have no information on other subsidies.
For this reason we conclude that anti-climate policies in the
form of subsidies for energy-intensive industry were not sig-
nificant in China, the US or EU during the period 2000-2010.
New Trade Liberalization Agreements
The US, EU and (since 2001) China all belong to the WTO,
which was established in 1994 with the explicit mission to open
trade. Membership involves adherence to wide-ranging trade
liberalization agreements. The US, EU and a number of other
WTO members are currently seeking to liberalize trade further
with the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations.
In addition to the trade opening required by its accession to
the WTO, new bilateral free trade agreements were imple-
mented by China every year from 2005 to 2011; by the US in
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012; and by the EU
in 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2011 and 2013. All three are
currently trying to negotiate further bilateral free trade agree-
ments, including a free trade agreement between the US and
EU (China FTA Network, 2013; Office of the US Trade Rep-
resentative, 2013; European Commission, 2013). We conclude
that anti-climate policies in the form of trade liberalization
agreements were frequent in China, the US and EU between
2000 and 2010. The most significant was China’s accession to
the WTO in 2001.
New or In creased Sub sidies for the Automotive,
Aerospace or Shipping Industries
Once again the lack of good data on industrial subsidies leads

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
us to rely on data on subsidies that have been the subject of
disputes between WTO members.
In contrast to the situation with energy-intensive industries,
subsidies for transport industries were the subject of a number
of claims under the WTO disputes procedure. In 2003 Korea
claimed that the EU was subsidizing shipbuilding by means
such as grants, export credits, guarantees, tax breaks, restruc-
turing aid, regional or other investment aid, research and de-
velopment aid, environmental protection aid, and insolvency
and closure aid (WTO, 2013b: DS301, DS307). In 2004 and
2006 the US claimed that the EU was subsidizing Airbus by
means such as financing for design and development, grants,
provision of goods and services, loans on preferential terms,
forgiveness of debt, and equity infusions and grants (WTO,
2013b: DS316, DS347). At the same time the EU claimed that
the US was subsidizing Boeing and other aerospace companies
by means such as state and local subsidies, research and devel-
opment subsidies, tax credits, and procurement contracts (WTO,
2013b: DS317, DS353). In 2013 the US claimed that China was
providing its automobile industry with subsidies in the form of
grants, loans, foregone government revenue, and provision of
goods and services (WTO, 2013b: DS450). While WTO find-
ings on these claims were mixed, rejections were generally on
the grounds that the subsidies were compatible with WTO rules
rather than because they didn’t exist. We conclude that anti-
climate policies in the form of major new subsidies for trans-
port industries were implemented in China, the US and EU
between 2000 and 2010. The extent of more minor subsidies
remains unclear due to lack of good data.
Construction of, or Appr oval/Incentives for,
New Airports
As with power stations, the construction and opening of new
airports allows us to infer that official approval has been given.
In the absence of time-series data on airport numbers weighted
by capacity, we use statistics on airports with paved runways.
This reveals that between 2005 and 2010, the only period for
which comparable time-series data is available, the number of
airports with paved runways increased in China from 389 to
442, in the US from 5120 to 5194, and in the EU-27 from 1982
to 1992 (CIA, 2003-2011). This is consistent with Eurostat
figures showing that in the EU-27 the number of airports with
more than 15,000 passenger movements per year—a different
category of airports—rose from 518 in 2003, the first year for
which figures are available for all member states, to 567 in
2010 (Eurostat, 2013), and with evidence that between 2005
and 2010 33 new airports (not further defined) were constructed
in China (UK Trade and Investment, undated), but conflicts
with official US figures showing that the number of airports
authorized to service aircraft seating more than 9 passengers—a
different category again—fell from 651 in 2000 to 551 in 2010
(US Department of Transportation, 2013). This may not be a
direct contradiction, as it is possible that the number of airports
authorized to service aircraft seating more than 9 passengers
could fall even though the total number of paved airports is
rising, but it is a problem because it is not clear which indicator
is the most appropriate. Our provisional conclusion is that
anti-climate policies in the form of approvals for new airports
were significant between 2000 and 2010 in China, the US and
EU. It remains provisional due to the clash between the two sets
of US figures.
Support for Meat Production
Despite the fact that both the US and EU have extensive sup-
port programs for agriculture, very little support is aimed at
meat production in particular, and between 2000 and 2010 there
were no moves to increase targeted support for meat producers.
In China, where historically farmers have been a source of state
revenue rather than recipients of support, the abolition of the
agricultural tax in 2004 was accompanied by the introduction
for the first time of subsidies for breeding sows and for large-
scale breeding farms for pigs, dairy cattle and poultry (Euro-
pean Commission, 2013a, US Department of Agriculture
(USDA), 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). We conclude that between
2000 and 2010 only one anti-climate policy relating to meat
production was implemented, in China.
Clearing of Forests
We have not identified any policy initiatives in the US, EU
or China between 2000 and 2010 designed to facilitate forest
clearing for farmland or other purposes, or which had this effect.
In fact forest cover increased in all three jurisdictions during the
period (FAO, 2010: 19-21). We conclude that anti-climate poli-
cies in forestry were absent between 2000 and 2010.
Childcare
Major expansion of publicly-funded childcare by its nature
requires major increases in public spending. At the same time
preschool is to a considerable extent a functional equivalent of
childcare from the point of view of working parents. Public
spending on childcare and preschool is therefore a reasonable
indicator of changes in the provision of publicly-funded child-
care.
In the US total public expenditure on childcare and pre-
school remained at 0.4 per cent of GDP for the period 2000-
2009. Public spending on childcare and pre-school over this
period in EU member states either rose as a percentage of GDP
or remained steady (aggregate figures for the EU are not avail-
able) (OECD, 2013b). Developments in China are unclear due
to lack of data but in any case are irrelevant due to the contin-
ued existence of the one-child policy, which was maintained
throughout the period 2000-2010 by monetary incentives for
long-term contraception and sterilization backed up with fines
for unauthorized births (Wang, 2012). We conclude that anti-
climate policies in the form of expansion in public funding of
childcare were significant in the EU but not in the US or China.
Fiscal Stimulus
By “anti-climate policy” we mean a policy change that has
the effect of increasing net greenhouse gas emissions, in this
case by using fiscal policy to stimulate economic activity.
While this could encompass cuts in budget surpluses and move-
ments from surpluses to deficits, as well as increases in deficits,
we restrict the category of anti-climate policies in this area to
increases in existing deficits on the grounds that it cannot be
doubted that these do constitute policy changes which, if they
work as intended, increase economic activity.
The most relevant measure that covers China, the US and EU
member states (though not the EU-27 as a whole) for the period
2000-2010 is general government net lending as a percentage of
GDP. By general government is meant all levels of government:
152

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
it is the combined policy of all relevant levels of government
that we are measuring. Deficits appear as negative net lending,
or net borrowing. This measure shows that during this period
anti-climate policies in the form of increases in existing deficits
the following year were common in the US and EU but rare in
China: in China an existing deficit increased in just one of the
11 years covered (2000-2011) but in four of these years in Brit-
ain and Germany, five in the Euro area, and six in France and
the US (OECD, 2013c).
Although general government net lending is not an ideal
measure of fiscal stimulus, as deficits as indicated by this mea-
sure are influenced by economic developments as well as by
government decisions—rising unemployment, for example,
expands deficits by cutting income tax receipts while increasing
spending on unemployment benefits—these figures are cor-
roborated by the results of a more valid measure that exists for
the US and EU but not China, namely general government cy-
clically-adjusted balances. This is a more relevant measure
because adjustment to exclude the impact of cyclical factors
(such as changes in unemployment) means that the resulting
figures for surpluses and deficits “may be interpreted as indica-
tive of discretionary policy adjustments” (OECD, 2013d).
These cyclically-adjusted balances indicate that the deficit in-
creased in four of the 11 years covered in Germany, in five of
these years in the US, Britain, and the Euro area generally, and
in seven years for France (OECD, 2013a). We conclude that
anti-climate policies in the form of fiscal stimulus were com-
mon in the US and EU during the period 2000-2010. The situa-
tion is less clear for China, due to missing data, but what there
are, plus the fact that the figures for the US and EU were corre-
lated with the results of a more relevant measure, suggest that
fiscal stimuli were rare.
Discussion
Our findings on the incidence of anti-climate policies are
summarized in Table 6. In interpreting these, we need to bear
in mind that much of the data is inexact. Nevertheless, it is clear
that some types of anti-climate policies are more common than
others (Table 7).
What is striking here is the sheer extent to which anti-climate
policies were implemented in China, the US and EU over this
period. Most types were used extensively: we did not find just a
few anti-climate policy anomalies but, rather, anti-climate poli-
cies entrenched right across the policy spectrum in all three
polities. All of the common anti-climate policies are big con-
tributors to higher emissions: coal and gas power station ex-
hausts, car and truck exhausts, ship and airplane exhausts. More
economic activity means more goods and services the produc-
tion and use of which often create greenhouse gas emissions.
Anti-climate policies across policy areas and polities are quite
clearly standing in the way of efforts to bring emissions under
control.
One might expect that their incidence is declining over time
as governments re-orient public policy in more climate-friendly
directions, especially where these can be aligned with other
policy goals such as improved urban air quality and increased
employment through the expansion of new low-carbon manu-
facturing sectors. But there is little sign of this. There was no
downward trend in the construction of new fossil fuel-fired
power stations (Figure 1), the provision of new fossil fuel sub-
sidies, new trade liberalization agreements, new or increased
subsidies for transport, new airport approvals, expansion of
childcare, or (not surprisingly given the financial crisis of 2008)
the use of tax cuts or spending increases to stimulate the econ-
omy.
The degree to which anti-climate policies are integral to
economic management in China, the US and EU can be illus-
trated by the fact that combining their non-climate rationales
reveals a recipe for economic success very similar to those
commonly found in official documents: open markets (new
trade liberalization agreements), abundant energy (new fossil
fuel power stations and fossil fuel subsidies), active economic
management (fiscal stimulus), and support for leading edge
industries (major subsidies for aerospace, automotive and ship-
ping industries but not energy-intensive industries).
We can get an idea of the political dynamics of anti-climate
Table 6.
Incidence of side-effect anti-climate policies in China, the US and EU, 2000-2010.
Sector Policies Incidence
Energy Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil fuel power stations
New or increased fossil fuel subsidies
Frequent and significant, especially in China
Frequent and significant in the US at federal and state level and
in the EU at member state level
Industry New or increased subsidies for energy-intensive industries Not significant
Trade New trade liberalization agreements Frequent and significant, especially China’s accession to the
WTO in 2001
Transport New or increased subsidies for the automotive, aerospace or
shipping industries
Major subsidies for aerospace (US, EU), automotive (China,
2013) and shipping industries (EU)
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new airports Approval frequent in China, the US and EU (conflicting figures
for US)
Agriculture Increased support for meat production Absent apart from a single subsidy in China
Forestry Action by state agencies to clear forests for farmland, or
approval/incentives for this Absent
Population Provision or financing of major expansion of childcare Significant in EU only
Macro-economy Fiscal stimulus: tax cuts and/or spending increases Frequent in the US and EU; just once in China
Note: Approval = authorization and/or licensing. Incentives = tax breaks, subsidies, one-off grants, cheap loans and/or loan guarantees.

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
Table 7.
Anti-climate policy incidence compared: China, the US and EU, 2000-2010.
Incidence Policy
Frequent/significant
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil fuel power stations (especially China)
New or increased fossil fuel subsidies (no data for China)
New trade liberalization agreements (especially China accession to WTO)
New or increased subsidies for aerospace (US, EU), automotive (China 2013) and shipping industries (EU)
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new airports (conflicting data for US)
Fiscal stimulus: tax cuts and/or spending increases (US, EU; just once in China)
Infrequent/not significant
New or increased subsidies for energy-intensive industries (EU only)
Increased support for meat production (China only)
Provision or financing of major expansion of childcare (EU only)
Absent Action by state agencies to clear forests for farmland, or approval/incentives for this
Figure 1.
Fossil fuel installed capacity: China, US and EU, 2000-2010.
policies by looking at a generic model of the likely beneficiar-
ies and opponents of each type (Table 8). The actual balance of
power in any particular polity is likely to be different in at least
some respects, but it is clear even from a broad schematic view
that most anti-climate policies are likely to receive political
support from a number of quarters. In particular we often see an
alliance between multinational companies and economic minis-
tries. Opponents, by contrast, tend to be somewhat isolated. The
main exception relates to fossil fuel subsidies, where it is fossil
fuel companies that appear to be on their own. The support of
what might be called the economic establishment helps to ex-
plain why policies that increase emissions continue to be intro-
duced at the very same time as policies designed to cut emis-
sions.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to introduce the concept of
“anti-climate policy” as a means of focusing attention on public
policies that increase emissions, and to investigate the inci-
dence recently of side-effect anti-climate policies in particular,
defined as policies that are introduced for reasons unrelated to
climate change but which by their nature have the unintended
effect of increasing net emissions.
Looking at anti-climate policies as a group makes it clear that
policy changes that increase net greenhouse gas emissions
come in many forms and are being extensively used in China,
the US and EU. And the policies we have investigated are just a
subset of the wider population of anti-climate policies. It is
clear that anti-climate policies have greatly impeded progress
towards bringing emissions under control.
It follows that individuals and organizations who are com-
mitted to strong action on climate change, in government, in-
dustry or the environmental movement, will have to tackle
anti-climate policies if there is to be any chance of avoiding
dangerous climate change. But how? These policies are well-
entrenched across both policy areas and countries.
The answer has to be targeting. Some types of anti-climate
policies are more vulnerable than others.
Some seem quite secure. It would be difficult politically to
argue against expansionary fiscal policies on the grounds that
increased economic activity and employment is a bad thing. It
would not be easy either to argue that childcare expansion
should be halted because making it easier for working women
to have children is a bad thing.
Other anti-climate policies are less secure. Fossil fuel subsi-
dies are routinely deplored in official reports (see, for example,
IEA, OECD and World Bank, 2010; G20, 2009) and fossil fuel
companies seem to be isolated on this issue. There would seem
to be potential for progress on this front.
The outlook for calling a halt to further trade liberalization
agreements is less promising, as the economic establishment
supports these. But further trade liberalization would create
losers as well as winners, such as American and European
farmers in the event of agricultural free trade agreements,
which means that opponents of trade agreements on emissions
grounds are likely to find allies in most if not all cases. The lack
of progress in the Doha round of trade negotiations in the first
decade of the 21st century demonstrates that multilateral trade
liberalization can be blocked. While bilateral trade agreements
are harder to block, because they are made on a country by
154

H. COMPSTON, I. BAILEY
Table 8.
Main likely beneficiaries and opponents of anti-climate policies.
Policy by incidence Beneficiaries and opponents
Frequent/significant
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil
fuel power stations
Coal, oil and gas firms; electricity firms; energy-intensive industry; economic ministries; energy
consumers versus nuclear industry, renewables industry, environmental NGOs, environmental
ministries and agencies
New or increased fossil fuel subsidies Coal, oil and gas firms versus environmental NGOs, international governmental organizations,
national governments (in theory)
New trade liberalization agreements Importers and exporters, especially multinational companies; economic ministries
versus import-competing firms
New/increased subsidies for the automotive, aerospace
and shipping industries
Automotive, aerospace and shipping industries; their locations; economic ministries versus
environmental NGOs, finance ministries
Construction of, or approval/incentives for, new airports Airlines; air travelers; importers and exporters, especially multinational companies; regions served;
economic ministries versus environmental NGOs; local residents
Fiscal stimulus: tax cuts/spending increases Voters; political right (tax cuts); political left (spending increases); incumbent governments facing
elections versus finance ministries
Infrequent/not significant
New or increased subsidies for energy-intensive industries Energy-intensive industries versus environmental NGOs, finance ministries, environmental
ministries and agencies
Increased support for meat production Meat producers versus finance ministries
Provision or finance of expansion of childcare Women, employers, economic and social ministries versus finance ministries
Absent
Action by state agencies to clear forests for farmland, or
approval/incentives for this Farmers versus environmental NGOs, environmental ministries
country basis and only require the agreement of the two coun-
tries involved, the size of their economies means that aban-
donment of trade liberalization by just one of China, the US or
EU would have a big impact on future trade volumes and
therefore on emissions.
New airports are often opposed by local residents whose
quality of life is being threatened, so again opponents on emis-
sions grounds are likely to find allies. While direct action
against construction of a new airport may not prevent it being
built, it may help deter approval of future airports.
Perhaps the biggest prize would be an end to approvals for
new fossil fuel-fired power stations. While this would be diffi-
cult to secure if it meant electricity shortages, a ban on new
coal power stations is a realistic aim, at least in the US and EU.
By 2012 emissions performance standards stringent enough to
preclude the operation of new coal power plants without CCS
were in force in five US states (C2ES, 2012), and there are
plans to introduce similar standards at federal level (Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 2013). Although such standards are
not currently operating in Europe, at the time of writing the UK
government was in the process of introducing one (Department
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), 2013). In China the
Elimination of Backward Technology Programme, which began
closing down small inefficient thermal power stations in 2008,
is to some extent a functional equivalent, although there is no
sign of any end to approvals for more efficient coal-fired power
stations (ICF, 2012).
A full political diagnosis and prescription is beyond the
scope of this article, but it is clear that analyzing anti-climate
policies as a group provides new insights into why progress on
climate change is not faster and what might be done about it.
The general lack of attention given to anti-climate policies as an
identifiable unit of analysis therefore constitutes a major defi-
ciency in current approaches to understanding the politics of
climate change. Put bluntly, without a more systematic under-
standing of the types of anti-climate policies that exist, the ex-
tent of their use in different countries, the political dynamics
contributing to their introduction, and their effects on emissions,
the prospects for phasing them out are unlikely to improve,
making it easier for them to continue to significantly undermine
national and international efforts to combat climate change.
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