Theoretical Economics Letters, 2013, 3, 31-39
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2013.35A2006 Published Online September 2013 (http://www.scirp.org/journal/tel)
Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a
Common Resource Experiment
Nikolaos Georgantzis1, José Santiago Arroyo-Mina2, Daniel Guerrero3
1Department of Economics, Jaume I University, Castellón, Spain
2Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia
3Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia
Received July 24, 2013; revised August 30, 2013; accepted September 9, 2013
Copyright © 2013 Nikolaos Georgantzis et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the economical behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Com-
mon-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economical experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR taking
into account the influence of economical training on the learning process of individuals regarding their decisions for
sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after
several rounds the existence of economical knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding
sustainability of CPR.
Keywords: Common-Pool Resources; Non-Cooperatives Games; Learning Processes
1. Introduction
Economic theory proposes a set of assumptions to ana-
lyze the decisions that an agent makes. These assump-
tions suggest that the agent has a set of preferences with
consistent and complete information on relevant aspects
of their environment. To understand the assumptions of
behavior of an agent, Nash [1] suggests that the agent has
unlimited skills that are used to estimate the best decision;
in other words, to achieve his highest welfare and predict
any kind of consequences that derive their decisions.
In contrast, Simon [2] noted that the agent’s decisions
are derived from conditions significantly different to the
assumptions of economic theory. These conditions are
defined as limitations in the choices of the agent. Such
limitations are focused on the principle that agents at the
moment of making decisions have incomplete knowledge
of the context about a particular situation, they have lim-
ited cognitive skills that impede them to process all
available information to make choices, nor they can an-
ticipate events that affect their decisions; these limita-
tions define the concept of bounded rationality1, such as:
1) Limited and non-perfect knowledge about the environ-
ment which the agent is into; 2) the agents face the incapa-
bility to consider every alternative to solve a problem; and
3) the available information is impossible to assimilate.
Referring to the analysis of market decision making,
Bowles [5] argues that agents are adaptive and fallow to
establish rules to minimize the costs derived from cogni-
tive limitations when facing situations of the complex
analysis, then the agents behave according to the context
to determine whether a behavior is appropriate or not in a
given scenario, referring themselves to the current state
or to the experienced by another agent, deriving a proc-
ess of transmission of information and establishing the
motivations and incentives in decision making.
From above, the baseline of this paper combines the
results of Ostrom et al. [6], and Cardenas & Ostrom [7]
according to the relevance for studying the behavior of
the logics about individual and collective rationality of
agents regarding the decisions of sustainability of CPR.
Due to this reason, an economical experiment is devel-
oped where a CPR yield is simulated allowing to analyze
dilemma that the agent is into, deciding whether to yield
the amount of CPR, which maximizes his private benefits,
or to yield the amount of CPR, which maximizes the so-
cial benefits of the group, he participates.
1The concept of bounded rationality emerges as an alternative to clas-
sical rationality prevailing in the economic theory. Simon [3] shows
that there are choice situations, explaining to encourage new develop-
ments that challenge the classical rationality in economics. For exam-
p
le, Plata & Mejia [4] show that situations of imperfect competition
(oligopoly) and the expectations and uncertainty are good examples o
f
bounded rationality.
The structure of the paper that includes this introduc-
tion is organized followed by Section 2 where is featured
C
opyright © 2013 SciRes. TEL

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 32
the theoretical model for the designed methodology and
the applied economical experiments. Next, Section 3 de-
scribes the applied of the experiments and the procedures
to conduct them. Section 4 shows the analysis and the
interpretation of the results obtained for the conduction
of the experiments. Finally, Section 5 is presented with
some final comments.
2. Theoretical Model2
The proposed model performs the social dilemma of
CPR yield, where the aggregated decisions of agents
converge to Nash-Cournot equilibrium, even so to Wal-
rasian equilibrium.3
According to Ostrom et al. [6], and Cardenas [8],
where an agent decides to assign an effort level for CPR
yield, considering also the yield decisions of the N addi-
tional CPR’s users, therefore assume a maximizer agent i
into a static scenario,4 having an objective function de-
fined by his own productive effort level xi, besides the
aggregated effort level
j
x
 from the others CPR users
who interact with him. Hereby, the private benefit func-
tion is defined as:
1
,
N
iij
j
Yxx






(1)
Focus on (1), it is assumed that when the private yield
increases, the private revenue increases too. This condi-
tion is defined for:
0
i
i
Y
x


Furthermore, it is assumed that the marginal revenues
of private effort are decreasing, therefore:
2
20
i
i
Y
x



then, due to the resource rivality condition, when the ag-
gregated yield increases, the private welfare decrees, it is
so:
0
i
j
Y
x


Following above, it can be assumed that each agent
has a maximum effort level ei, reflecting the decreasing
marginal revenues of labor:5

2
1
2
ii i
g
xax bx (2)
In (2), a and b are positive parameters of agents pro-
ductivity. Furthermore,


0,
ii
x
e. This function im-
plies that the agent can yield up to the maximum sus-
tainable yield level:
MSY a
xb 
which indicates the agent obtains positive marginal reve-
nues; nevertheless, yield amounts larger than xMSY would
provide negative marginal revenues. Considering the
aggregated yield, and what each j agent does not yield, it
is defined the private benefit objective function to maxi-
mize:

2
1
1
2
N
ii ijj
j
Yax bxex 

 


(3)
In (3), the
 parameter represents the cost assumed by
agent i caused by the externality imposed by the aggre-
gated yield of agents. If it is assumed, that every single
agent has same yield technology, and their endowments
are equal, it is proposed yield capabilities symmetry, then
e = ei, and defining (3) as:
2
1
1
2
N
ii ij
Yax bxnex 

 
j
(4)
where n is the amount of CPR user. In (4), each (player)
agent i chooses a level of yield xi, looking for maximize
his own private benefits, then:
Na
xb


 (5)
In (5), it is assumed a strictly positive yield


0,
Ni
x
e. The expression (5) is a solution that de-
pends on the parameters a and b, also on the externality
cost parameter
 . This solution, as Ostrom et al. [6] pro-
posed, does not take into count on the amount of CPR
users, also is considered as the individual competitive
solution.
On other hand, it is proposed the social optimum6 by
the expression:
22
1
2
ii i
WYaxbxnen   
2The theoretical model presented for the design of economical experi-
ments is translated from Arroyo & Guerrero [9].
3The Walrasian competitive equilibrium defines the prices such as a
mechanism that coordinate the consumer individual actions, leading
net demanded quantities to be equivalent to available supplied quanti-
ties on market (Walras [10]).
4According to Gibbons [11], and Shy [12] assumptions, the agents
have a complete information structure that allow them to have a ra-
tional decision making in a simultaneous way, ergo the agents find a
long term equilibrium where the resource yield is equal to the resource
natural growth. The interested reader can find a broader explanation on
Clark [13].
i
x

 
(6)
5Gordon [14] developed the model of open access is developed; this
model indicates that natural resources face biologic adversities, in-
cluding the extinction possibility. In this model, the effort level in-
creases will bring decreasing marginal revenues of labor, and so, when
the natural growth is exceeded, these revenues will be progressively
derived in smaller yield levels.
6A social optimum or Pareto-efficient is an allocation of resources
where every single agent enjoys his greatest welfare, given the utility
function of others (Varian, 1998).

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 33
In (6), it is expressed aggregated benefit of the CPR
yield to every user. Assuming the maximizer agents, it is
obtained:
San
xb


 (7)
Taking into account (7), as long as more users are in-
volved into the CPR yield the amount of xS decreases.
Therefore, it is concluded by Ostrom et al. [6] that an
amount n of users bigger than 1 (n > 1), will lead to xS <
xN, and the associated social dilemma of CPR.
3. Experimental Design
This experimental design studies the behavior of agents
towards the learning in order to accomplish the benefits
maximization considering the sustainability of CPR, ac-
cording the suggested by Ostrom et al. [6] and Cardenas
[8]. The solution presented in (8), defines the individual
yield that maximizes the private benefits, i.e.:
Na
xb


 (8)
In (8), is presented a: the revenue per yielded unit; b:
the cost that players assume for the decreasing marginal
productivity;  : the cost of the externality imposed by the
depletion of the CPR; and n: number of players. From
Cardenas [8], it is suggested that a = 60, b = 5,
 = 20.
There by, the yield that maximizes private benefit is de-
fined by:
60 208
5
Na
xb
 

Indicating that player maximizes his benefits when he
yields 8 units.
Equation (7) presents the solution that defines the in-
dividual yield that maximizes social benefit. Considering
that in each group participate, a maximum of 5 players (n
= 5), the obtained result is:
60 5(20)8
5
San
xb
 
 
Although, as pointed by Cardenas [8] the yield must
be strictly positive, thereby the minimum possible yield
is:
1
S
x
Having these two solutions, the set of possible extrac-
tion of each player is within a discrete range between 1
and 8 complete units. Hence, each player will define the
best strategy, considering the best possible strategies of
other players.
For those reasons, as a hypothesis to evaluate in this
economic experiment, it is stated that:
The level of knowledge in economic theory, and deci-
sions of previous periods affect the economical behavior
of players for sustainability of CPR. Specifically, the
more level of knowledge in economics, the better learn-
ing process regarding decision for CPR sustainability;
therefore, the average yield decision xi of each player
during rounds 6 - 10 of experiment must reduces for the
learning gained by the player during rounds 1 - 5.
The former hypothesis is funded on the changes of
teaching methodologies of economics in the last 15 years,
where it has switched from an individual training to co-
operative learning groups. According to above, Bartlett
[15] points out that this kind of methodologies is based
on a structure those incentives competences on students
to maximize their collective work in order to accomplish
common goals. Likewise, Fox [16] assures that co-opera-
tive learning obtained by students onto their basic
courses allows every single student to look for beneficial
results for the group, even so for himself.
Finally, another major change in the method of teach-
ing of economics focuses on the design and implementa-
tion of experiments in class. To Noussir & Walker [17],
the use of experiments in teaching of economics stimu-
lates interest of the student, provides demonstrations of
the principles of the subject in reality and reflects the
limitations of the models taught in undergraduate courses.
Additionally, as suggested Yandell [18], the application
of experiments in class contributes positively to the
learning experience, the interest and satisfaction of stu-
dents.
3.1. Experiment Application7
The applied economical experiments recreate a lab in
which individuals simulate the extraction of a CPR like
fishing. They were performed at the Pontificia Universi-
dad Javeriana Cali, and Universidad Santiago de Cali,
Colombia, along the months of February and September
2011.
Players observed in the experiment are: undergraduate
students of Economy, Business Administration, Ac-
counting and Finance, Law, Architecture, Psychology,
and graduate students in Environmental Management and
Sustainable Development and Environmental Education
Master from both universities.
The economical experiment includes a sample of 245
players. Experiments were conducted forming groups of
five players, each with a monitor that supported in spe-
cific situations. Before starting the game, players were
presented an exhibition of the context of the experiment,
the rules, also were explained that individual pay-offs
depended on their own yield besides the aggregate of
yield from your competitors. All pay-offs were paid in
7In Appendix A is shown the protocol, the suggested instructions to
p
layers, the individual decision making formats and the table of points
that were used in the experiment.

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 34
monetary form.8
3.2. Experiment Instructions
Each player was given a sheet where he should indicate
each round, the number of individual CPR’s yield (e.g.,
number of fish caught) which player considered optimal.
Additionally, it was given to each player a sheet where it
was compiled individual and aggregated yielded amount
of the group. Being a simultaneous non-cooperative
game, only monitor knew the individual amount of each
group member, therefore announcing the yielded aggre-
gated amount within the group at the end of each round.
Finally, it was provided to each player a table with
pay-offs they would receive once the yielded amount by
the group was announced.
Each session of experiments was performed in 10
rounds. In each round each player simultaneously chose a
yield level of xi CPR among 1 and 8. Therefore, the ag-
gregated level
j
x
 had a minimum of 5, and a maxi-
mum of 40 units.
The pay-off received for each player in each round, as
suggested by Ostrom et al. [6], and Cardenas (2010a),
can be expressed by:

ij
wf xx


i
(9)
where wi is the individual pay-off in each round, which
included a minimum of 198 points, where xi = 1, and
, which is the maximum possible amount of
aggregated yield of competitors when every single
yielded 8 units. Also, the maximum individual score of
880 points, obtained when xi = 8, , when each
competitor yielded only 1 unit.
32
j
x

4
j
x

4. Results
As already explained, the applied economical experiment
studies the behavior of agents regarding the decision in
favor of the sustainability of CPR, considering that a
higher level of knowledge in economics reflects a better
learning process for this kind of decisions. Particularly,
experiment analyzes whether average yield decisions xi
of each player during rounds 6 - 10 decreases due to the
learning gained by the player during rounds 1 - 5.
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
This economic experiment includes sample of 245 play-
ers, who were asked their level of knowledge in eco-
nomic theory, sex, age and years of schooling. The sam-
ple includes 132 men, and 113 women players. Table 1
summarizes the information of the sample.
Before showing the econometric analysis of the ex-
perimental results, a chart is presented below in Figure 1
with the average extraction of players during rounds 1 - 5
(stage 1) and 6 - 10 (stage 2).
The results suggest that average yield decisions of
players are influenced by their initial periods as sug-
gested by the work of Huck et al. [19], Rassenti et al.
[20], and Fajfar [21]. Particularly, the results show that
the average decrease from 4.94 units extraction during
rounds 1 - 5 (formation of knowledge), to 4.91 units dur-
ing rounds 6 - 10 (learning for sustainable yield deci-
sions).
4.2. Economics Knowledge and Sustainability
Decisions of CPR
To analyze the behavior of the players based on the
learning obtained in the experiment during rounds 1 -
5considering that more knowledge in economics theory
reflects a greater commitment to sustainable yield deci-
sions for CPR, it is defined that the average extraction xi
obtained by each player for rounds 6 - 10 of the experi-
ment, was less than or equal to the average extraction
obtained during rounds 1 - 5. Thereby, each participant
with his profile (other academic training than economics)
will recognize extraction levels that allow him to get the
highest scores in the experiment considering the sustain-
ability of a CPR, as seen in Table 2.
The results reported in Table 2 stands out two situa-
tions:
Table 1. Summary of information from fishermen.
Average Min Max
Years of Schooling 13.2 5 18
Age 26.5 16 65
Source: Proper estimations from applied experiments.
Figure 1. Average yield: Rounds 1 - 5 vs. Rounds 6 - 10.
Source: Proper estimations from applied experiments. The
change from stage 1 to stage 2 is statistically significant at
5%.
8The accumulated score in the experiment was converted to a monetary
figure in Colombian pesos, which is paid once the experiment ended.
The average paid was $6.60 per player.

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 35
Table 2. Average yield by groups.
Groups of Students Rounds 1 - 5 Rounds 6 - 10
Economics 5.33 5.32
Accounting 5.13 4.83
Environmental* 4.58 4.54
Business Admin 5.11 5.06
Psychology 4.70 5.60
Architecture 4.07 3.80
Law 4.55 4.18
Source: Proper estimations from applied experiments. *Student of post-
graduate programs with orientation to natural resource sustainability.
1) All participants in the experiment except the group
of psychology students follow the same trend of de-
creasing in the average extraction xi obtained during
rounds 6 - 10, compared to the rounds 1 - 5. Additionally,
the performance of the group of law students turns out
particular. The average extraction decisions of this group
during rounds 6 - 10, rounds compared to 1 - 5 decreases
8.24%, showing a greater learning process with relation
to their sustainable yield decisions CPR. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis formulated for the expe-
riment, due to the curriculum of law program includes
courses in economics, which could facilitate the learning
process in the experiment because the elements, instru-
ments and methods of analysis that provides the training
in economics.9
2) The group of psychology students did not follow the
suggested behavior on the formulated hypothesis for ex-
perimental design: the average yield decisions increased
19.15% in rounds 6 - 10 compared to rounds 1 - 5. In
other words, the behavior of psychology students did not
adjust towards sustainable yield decisions of CPR in
rounds 6 - 10 of the experiment as the other participants
did. This situation could be the result of the schooling
curriculum of psychology, inasmuch as excludes assign-
ments of economics theory, bounding the learning proc-
ess in the experiment.
Besides from the above results, it is interesting to ex-
amine the behavior of players when is involved the
schooling years variable in the analysis of learning proc-
ess regarding sustainable decisions of CPR as is shown in
Figure 2.
This result suggests that in experiment, after 13.2
years of average schooling, extraction decisions will de-
crease as years of schooling increase. Particularly, and as
suggested by Becker [22], and Brock & Durlauf [23], the
processes of human capital formation reward the agent
Figure 2. Average yield and schooling years. Source: Proper
estimations from applied experiments. The change from
stage 1 to stage 2 is statistically significant at 5%.
who decides to participate in them, and society as a
whole. Thus, the experiment evidenced that the higher
level of education of participants, the better learning
process regarding sustainable decisions of CPR (6 - 10
rounds during extraction average reaches 4.13 if 18 years
of education).
4.3. Empirical Analysis
Considering that applied economical experiment has
transverse cutting units (players) with information that is
observed during periods Ti (10 rounds of the experi-
ment), a static model of panel data with conjoint regres-
sion10 is presented:
',1,,,1
it ititi
y
xeiNt  T (10)
As suggested by Baltagui [24], and Hsiao [25], this
model identify the specific individual effects that are not
included in the estimation, i.e., this model points out the
effect that determinants appointed above might influence
on the sustainability decisions of CPR.
4.4. Interpretation of Results
The estimations of econometric model contrast the aver-
age yield decisions of each player during rounds 6 - 10,
with those obtained in rounds 1 - 5, considering the de-
terminants already mentioned, focusing on the existence
of economics theory training as shown in Table 3.11
The results show that the signs of the estimated pa-
rameters in the model behave as expected. Thus, to vali-
10With the encouragement that the model consider all the assumptions
that allow to prove empirically the theoretical hypothesis already men-
tioned, it captures the non-observed effect in the model, from the in-
clusion of a parameter for each individual in the regression as sug-
gested by Baltagui [24], and Hsiao [25].
11For convenience in the edition of the table is not displayed the infor-
mation of each estimation by group of participants, however, each o
f
the estimated models has a R-squared between 0.90 and 0.98, i.e. the
estimations are correct.
9This result is consistent to suggested by Bartlett [15] due to the stu-
dents of disciplines related to economics have within their curriculum
courses of Microeconomics and Game Theory, which are based on
environments of cooperative learning that allow individuals to learn
more and more efficiently.

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 36
Table 3. Economics know ledge and learning re garding CPR
sustainability.
Players Coef. p-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Economics 0.15933 0.000 0.134146 0.184527
Accounting 0.11399 0.000 0.095092 0.132889
Environmental* 0.09709 0.000 0.091509 0.102688
Business Admin 0.12552 0.000 0.116807 0.134247
Psychology 0.12683 0.000 0.112492 0.141174
Architecture 0.10927 0.000 0.087832 0.130724
Law 0.12225 0.000 0.097773 0.146742
Source: Proper estimations from applied experiments. *Student of post-
graduate programs with orientation to natural resource sustainability.
date the hypothesis that behavior of players in the ex-
periment regarding sustainable decisions of CPR is in-
fluenced by the level of knowledge in economics theory
of participants. Particularly, it is accepted that the aver-
age extraction xi during rounds 6 - 10 decreases due to
learning gained by the player during rounds 1 - 5 consid-
ering the level of knowledge in economics theory of the
participants.
Particularly, the result of economics student group
(increase in 15.93% during rounds 6 - 10 of the experi-
ment) confirms that more knowledge and training in this
discipline influences the sustainable decisions of CPR
learning process because the methods of teaching of the
discipline enhance the criteria for judging the suitability
of these sustainable choices.12
Additionally, the other groups of students who parti-
cipated in the experiment reflect a similar behavior as a
function of the effect of the level of knowledge in eco-
nomics on its preservation decisions by CPR. Specifi-
cally, their sustainability decisions for CPR during
rounds 6 - 10 experiment 12.05% increase on average.
Regarding the performance of the players when con-
sidering their ages, education and sex, a table is pre-
sented summarizing the results of the estimated model
according to econometric methodology described above.
Table 4 shows that the signs of the estimated parame-
ters for the selected econometric model behave as ex-
pected. Regarding the educational level, the result shows
that for each additional year in the level of schooling of
participants compared to the average schooling years of
the sample (13.2), extraction decisions for the sustain-
ability of RUC increased 8.4%, confirming that recorded
in Becker [22], and Brock & Durlauf [23] for the proc-
esses of human capital formation.
Table 4. Panel data model with conjoint regression.
Lyield13 Coef. p-value [95% Coef. Interval]
Age 0.0012188 0.061* −0.003519 −0.006956
Schooling0.0847114 0.000 0.0707961 0.0986267
Sex 0.2579147 0.000 0.1739859 0.3418438
Source: Proper estimations from applied experiments. *Statistically signifi-
cant at 10%. The others at 5%.
Furthermore, although the age variable turns out to be
statistically significant, it can be noticed that having
more or less years compared to the average age of the
participants, only influences a 0.12% on sustainable de-
cisions of CPR. In other words, if a player is 1 year older
than the average age of the sample (26.5 years), he is not
guaranteed that learning process for sustainability deci-
sions of RUC is actually more significant. Therefore, this
result suggests that the processes of teaching and training
in environmental education could focus on all age groups
of society.
Regarding the results of the sex variable, the result
shows that men learned faster than women in rounds 1 -
5 in 25.8%, and therefore they adjust their sustainable
decisions of CPR faster than women.
5. Concluding Remarks
The objective of this paper is to study the behavior of
agents when makeing decisions related to the sustainabil-
ity of Common Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose,
an economical laboratory was recreated where agents
simulated the extraction of CPR as fishing. The results
presented in this study are a product of economical ex-
periments applied to 245 undergraduate students in eco-
nomics, accounting, business administration, architecture,
psychology, law and graduate students in environmental
management and master in environmental education,
belonging to two universities in the city of Santiago de
Cali, Colombia.
Based on a non-cooperative game with complete in-
formation and simultaneous choices, the results of the
experiment show that after several rounds the agents
have some kinds of learning abilities for sustainable deci-
sion of CPR as suggested by Ostrom et al. [6], and Clark
[13]. Specifically, the theoretical hypothesis proposed re-
garding the influence of economics and teaching and
training on sustainability decisions of RUC is accepted.
Particularly, it is validated that the existence of a
higher level of knowledge of economic theory reflects a
better learning process for sustainable decisions of CPR.
Thereby, it is demonstrated that average yield xi decision
of the group of students with higher levels of knowledge
in economic theory, decreased during rounds 6 - 10 of
12This kind of behavior suggests that the level of expectations of play-
ers combined with their expected choice error, behavior of CPR sus-
tainability are formed: “If people give importance to a particular value
associated with the conservation, one can expect a positive assessment
to the activities that promote conservation. Economists say that indi-
viduals gain greater utility” (Lynne et al. [26]). 13The model contains a sample n = 245, R2 = 0.9433, F = 0.000.

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 37
the experiment for the learning obtained by themselves
during rounds 1 - 5, guarantying the propose by Huck et
al. [19], and Fajfar [21], who claim that agents have a
learning curve for their decisions.
Finally, and as a suggestion, future designs of experi-
mental and behavioral economics related to natural re-
sources and sustainability of CPR should take into ac-
count: 1) Including different skills from those that eco-
nomic theory provides, i.e. studying the decisions of
agents based on structures unlike cost analyses and bene-
fits. 2) Studying the behavior of agents facing unex-
pected as global warming, since this type of phenomena
may affect the CPR’s.
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N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 38
Appendix A. Protocol of Experiments
The sessions of economical experiments were conducted
as follows:
Appendix A1. Information Session
This session begins with the explanation about what is a
Common-Pool Resource CPR. Following, several exam-
ples of these natural resources are presented, then it is
explained the concepts of rivalry and exclusion. There-
fore, the present is introduced and each participant de-
cided whether or not to participate. After forming groups
of 5 players the context of the game is presented, the
formats of individual choice and points are provided to
players (see Appendices B and C), the rules are ex-
plained making it clear that the game do not allow inter-
actions between players, and finally how to get individ-
ual score. In this session, the players were notified if the
pay-offs were going to be paid with money or academic
incentives. After the introduction, three rounds of prac-
tice were conducted for players to become familiar with
the dynamics of the game.
Appendix A2. Application Rounds 1 - 10
It allowed him to freely choose each player the number
of units you want to extract the resource. Each player
wrote on Individual extraction format the drives you
want to play. The monitor was collecting group at the
end of each round individual decisions of each player,
with the encouragement of total extracted total power by
the group, and then communicate them. Then each player
scored his punctuation in dot format. This procedure was
repeated until round 10.
Appendix B. Individual Decision Table
Player No
Age
Sex
Years of scholling
Rounds A: Individual Amount of Yield B: Aggregated Amount of
Yield of Group
C (B - A): Aggegated Amount of
Yield from other participants D: Score
Practice 1
Practice 2
Practice 3
1
2
3
10
Total
Appendix C. Individual Score Table
My own amount of yield
Aggregated amount of other participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 758 790 818 840 858 870 878 880
5 738 770 798 820 838 850 858 860
6 718 750 778 800 818 830 838 840
7 698 730 758 780 798 810 818 820
8 678 710 738 760 778 790 798 800
9 658 690 718 740 758 770 778 780
10 638 670 698 720 738 750 758 760
11 618 650 678 700 718 730 738 740
12 598 630 658 680 698 710 718 720
13 578 610 638 660 678 690 698 700

N. GEORGANTZIS ET AL. 39
Continued
14 558 590 618 640 658 670 678 680
15 538 570 598 620 638 650 658 660
16 518 550 578 600 618 630 638 640
17 498 530 558 580 598 610 618 620
18 478 510 538 560 578 590 598 600
19 458 490 518 540 558 570 578 580
20 438 470 498 520 538 550 558 560
21 418 450 478 500 518 530 538 540
22 398 430 458 480 498 510 518 520
23 378 410 438 460 478 490 498 500
24 358 390 418 440 458 470 478 480
25 338 370 398 420 438 450 458 460
26 318 350 378 400 418 430 438 440
27 298 330 358 380 398 410 418 420
28 278 310 338 360 378 390 398 400
29 258 290 318 340 358 370 378 380
30 238 270 298 320 338 350 358 360
31 218 250 278 300 318 330 338 340
32 198 230 258 280 298 310 318 320