-917c-a368b331c766.jpg width=161.78500289917 height=59.1849992752075  />, and the probability of the shipping enterprise B choosing to participate in low carbon green oil port cooperation is greater than

Figure 3. Shipping enterprise income model of cooperation coordination between oil port enterprise and shipping enterprise.

Figure 4. Replicated dynamic equation phase diagram.

, so this game converges to,

; if the initial condition falls in the III area, the probability of the oil port enterprise A choosing to participate in low carbon green oil port cooperation is less than, and the probability of the shipping enterprise B choosing to participate in low carbon green oil port cooperation less than

, so this game converges to,

; if the initial condition falls in the II area or III area, this game may converge to, , or to,. Its ultimate equilibrium state depends on the best effort of oil port enterprise and shipping enterprise in the construction of low carbon green oil port.

For, stable strategy, it means oil port enterprises and shipping companies don’t choose to participate in low carbon green oil port construction, i.e. no cooperation; for, stable strategy, it means oil port enterprise and shipping companies choose to participate in low carbon green oil port construction, i.e. cooperation. Assumed that the probability of the oil port enterprise and shipping enterprise converge to, stable strategy is p, I area, distribution density of variable x and variable y respectively and, then. Under the condition of variable distribution density unchanged, the greater area of I, the greater probability of the initial state in the I, the probability of the oil port enterprise and shipping enterprise converging to, stable strategy is also bigger. Through the calculation, conclusion is:

calculating the partial derivative of, and assumed that game cooperation total cost T, cooperation total revenue and profits K oil port enterprise and shipping enterprise got (K is a part of income ) of both game parties, are certain, i.e., , and. Through calculating, gain: the probable extreme point of is:

Therefore, when game cooperation total cost and cooperation total revenue of both game parties are certain, the contract which is most favorable to the stability of supply chain coalition should be: income distribution rate is:

, and pay cost is:.

3. Conclusion

This paper analyzes the relationship of cooperation and coordination between the oil port enterprise and other enterprises (land transportation enterprise, storage enterprise and shipping enterprise). Through the research, we know that the partnership enterprise chooses whether to cooperate is related to the size of the initial probability, when the smaller the initial probability. When the initial probability is smaller, the probability of both parties in the game tending to establish a stable cooperation is smaller, and vice versa. Therefore, the enterprise must be based on enterprise long-term interests, after much study and the careful consideration, so that it can make the decision which is beneficial to enterprise development. Research results can provide related enterprise with strong theoretical basis and decision-making reference when they choose to cooperate or not in the oil port supply chain.

4. Acknowledgements

This work was financially supported by humanities and social sciences research projects (Project number: 10YJA790045) from the Ministry of Education of P.R.C.

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