Open Journal of Social Sciences
Vol.03 No.10(2015), Article ID:60790,4 pages
10.4236/jss.2015.310026
East/West Relations: A Case Study of Similar Military Patterns and Outcomes Resulting from US Involvement in
Leroy A. Binns
Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica
Email: labenz@dr.com
Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Received 23 July 2015; accepted 26 October 2015; published 30 October 2015
ABSTRACT
Wars have been portrayed by the oligarchy to be the mode by which successful political restructuring is achieved and peace is attained. An illustration such as World War II with its aftermath― the reconstruction of Europe and the resemblance of tranquility during the Cold War era, is commonly cited by advocates as a testament to that perception. Yet it is the predetermination of this commentary to counter such contention by way of an analysis of highly contentious revelations associated with the Vietnam and Afghan wars that unequivocally debunk such interpretation, define superpower limitations with regard to transformation and resolve and re-emphasize the vibrancy of nationalism. The ultimate outcome, the unification of Vietnam and the independence of Afghanistan questions, the role of conflict resolution strategies exercised by dominant nation states in the 20th century and beyond.
Keywords:
Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars, US and Soviet Foreign Policy, Political Ideologies and Constraints
1. Introduction
The Vietnam and Afghan wars are classic examples of the superpowers’ mortality. These confrontations that shared ideological rationale, strategies and conclusions also exposed a test of national will and negated many technological advantages.
2. Ideological Rationale
With a reversal of an initial low priority status, the Republican administration which is outraged by suspicions of communism overlooked the issue of nationalism and violated the Geneva Declaration of 1954 by responding in the affirmative to the French request to rescue Vietnam from Marxism. Upon analysis of victory celebrated by Mao Tse Tung’s
We do not lose sight of the fact that Ho Chi Minh has direct contact, communist connections and we do not wish to see colonial empires supplanted by philosophy and political organization emanating from, and controlled by the Kremlin [1] .
Underscoring a theme of consistency such school of thought was consequently echoed by the succeeding US leadership. A senior government official and proponent of US military action Walt Rostow following a “green light” rescue mission to Saigon reported the following as President Kennedy’s perspective.
Kennedy said that if we walk away from South East Asia the communist takeover would produce a debate greater than the loss of China to communism. The United States would also be violating a treaty commitment to the area. Such a retreat will result in the rise of the left and the right wing isolationism and the loss of confidence in the United States. Kennedy feared that Khruschev and Mao then would act to exploit the shift in the balance of power. As a result Burma might fall and China would be on the boundary of India, when the United States finally reacted there would be a world crisis and possibly a nuclear disaster.
Of corresponding significance is a Capitol Hill consensus in view of the Gulf of Tonkin cataclysm that sealed America’s engagement in the Vietnamese ordeal. In sponsorship of the 1964 right wing Republican presidential nominee Senator Barry Goldwater’s famous maxim “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice and moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue” and stance on a full scale invasion the Chief Executive sought and received carte blanche from 416 House representatives and 88 senators to discharge the war [2] .
Years later with mixed emotions inclusive of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, popular movements in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen, the reality of unfriendly neighbors on its borders, a recent ascension of Islamic leadership in Iran and the possibility of its influence on Afghanistan the Soviet Union rejected the UN charter on self determination and equally the question of social identity. Responding to the crisis on the grounds of article 4 of the Soviet/Afghan treaty she exercised the Brezhnev doctrine beyond its original Warsaw Pact context to bolster regional hegemony and prevent defection from the camp [3] .
3. Strategies
By acknowledging incompetence to adequately secure local military personnel to achieve the required results both Washington and Moscow resorted to direct foreign intervention by utilizing their respective troops in the name of bipolarity. In a “win at all cost” propaganda crusade Washington’s conclusion of the South as anarchic ignored the unlawful installation of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955 and resulted in the transfer of 1,364 soldiers in 1961 to 15,000 by the end of 1963 and with increased involvement a war budget of $2 billion per month in 1966. On another Asian front the inauguration of Soviet endorsed Babrak Karmal failed to avoid the desertion of over 45,000 troops from the Afghan army in 1979 and subsequent defections thus leading to a replacement of 642,000 Soviet troops over a ten year period.
As a corrective measure the US at first introduced the unpersuasive 1966 mandatory draft policy and later Vietnamization in her quest for victory. According to President Richard Nixon in his
In previous administrations we americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration we are vietnamizing the search for peace. Under the Vietnamization plan I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces [4] .
Considerable damage inflicted upon the Soviet intruders particularly in Bamiyan Province and a civil strike that ravaged Khost and Urgun also produced an identical reaction ? the abandonment of an initiation of scores of Russian troops in lieu of Kabul’s adoption of obligatory conscription for males and an overture for public sympathy by President Yuri Andropov.
Our plans for political settlement of the Afghan problem are no secret. We have repeatedly stated them publicly. Leonid Brezhnev spoke about that. Our troops are staying in that country at the request of the lawful Afghan government and they continue staying there at the request of the lawful government headed by Babrak Karmal. We responded to the request for assistance from a friendly neighboring country. It is however far from being a matter of indifference to us what is happening directly on our southern border [5] .
Confronted with a sense of urgency amidst moments of unbearable embarrassment in the form of the Pleiku American air base incident of 1965 and the guerilla attack in Jallalabad in 1979 both world powers adopted a “by any means necessary” approach to fulfill their objectives. True to form and in accordance with President Lyndon Johnson who once said he would not be “the president” who saw “South East
A scorch the earth policy was yet another desperate attempt to alter the nature of these debacles. Published accounts reference Strategic Helmet and its aftermath ? the systematic destruction of rural economies and subsistence status of country dwellers along with paralleled consequences associated with the Logar resistance. Consequently the aforementioned as well as random shooting of civilians and bombing of towns such as Hue following the 1968 Tet Offensive and Bagram influenced by rebel attacks and relocation transformed Vietnamese and Afghan country-sides and the peripheries of Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan and Iran. In 1981 an ongoing Afghan/Soviet partnership resulted in 170,000 refugees in Pakistan and 400,000 in Iran with numbers skyrocketing in 1984 to 3,500,000 and 1,500,000 in both locations at a cost of over $500 million to the United Nations [7] .
The defining moments of the superpowers’ vulnerability also encompassed international dimensions that were largely accountable for the magnitude of the quagmires. On the subject of
An extension of foreign intrusion translates beyond the transportation of military hardware. In relation to
We consider that as soon as outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan has been terminated and non resumption of such interference guaranteed we shall withdraw troops [9] .
Amid controversial and unpredictable circumstances enticements were utilized to appease the disadvantaged populations. Seeking redemption subsequent to one of the nation’s closest presidential elections, President Nixon during his second term offered economic assistance through the lend lease program to revitalize peasant communities of lost properties and displacements and later re-emphasized his commitment through the Vietnamization agenda as did the Kremlin with land reforms that promised an opportunity to access farm land at the expense of land owners. Nonetheless a combination of chaos, distrust and a lack of cohesion necessary for a desired result stymied the realization of an economic revival [10] .
A misinterpretation of the tangled web of ethnicity and religious sectors within Vietnam namely the Buddhists, Catholics, Chinese, Chams, Kmers, and Montagnards and Afghanistan (e.g., Sholeh Javid, Settem-E-Melli, Parcham and Khailqi) forged suicidal agendas. Both civil strives displayed a sense of community that overshadowed technological prowess and ignited miscalculations on the part of foreign foes. As time progressed the locals’ fortitudes and resolve to withstand the atrocities of warfare magnified their status as the superpowers’ rampage of destruction and unwavering objection to international mediation alienated elements of society deemed necessary for their success [11] .
Aside from neighborly assistance familiarity with the terrain and the opposition’s flawed tactics and despondence the Viet Cong and Mujahadeen gained confidence through support of local villagers and intelligence and armory from defectors. Furthermore public outrage within the
In the end increasing signs of gloom spelt the cessation of the protracted encounters that terminated over 70,000 American and Soviet lives, wounded an extra 500,000 and cost in excess of $200 billion collectively.
An empirical analysis of world power politics at play as defined by the occurrences in question highlights intolerance towards foreign interference and sets in motion an opportunity for reassessment and mediation mutually beneficial to all relevant parties [12] .
4. Conclusion
Introduction
The
Vietnam
American foreign policy towards
There was a noted hypothesis that US national interest would have benefited from an acceleration of imperialism―strong political and economic affiliation with the Orient. Thus in order to achieve these objectives the White House promised the French and later the Vietnamese an economic renewal.
Lost in the illusion of capitalism in Indochina and unfulfilled expectations by SEATO, US engagement began with her refusal to sign the 1954 Geneva Accords that emphatically acknowledged the early prospect of a unified Vietnam under the Viet Minh. Moreover the violation of the UN charter in support of sovereignty and the undemocratic installation of the Diem and Thieu regimes incited a civilian encounter against America―the lone international participant in a bitterly contested saga.
Subsequently events such as Strategic Helmet and Vietnamization outlined the fact that Capitol Hill misunderstood Vietnamese history. Fearing additional defeats in the Pacific, she proceeded to ignore a people seeking national liberation and the directives from Paris championing accordance with the Geneva commitment. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were unwilling to forego the stalemate.
The call for victory was unanimous but strategies from the executive branch to the military outfit differed significantly. An occasion depicts President Johnson requesting presidential powers from Congress in place of a declaration of war, a decision highly opposed by the army’s rank and file whereas a call by General Westmoreland in 1968 for additional troops was flatly rejected by the then unpopular president. The victory cry was also fragmented by the
Could the United States of America win the Vietnam War? The popular response within the military and political circles is favorable. However, the retention of a large scale insurgency as an attempt at rectification could have faced an Asian reply of epic proportions and heightened condemnation at home and abroad.
In short a possible alternative was the adoption of moral support for the freely elected government of Vietnam with the intention of fostering socio-economic stability in Saigon and Hanoi. This act of humanity could ultimately secure an indispensable US/Vietnamese relationship.
In the eyes of the Russian leadership the commonwealth was lacking a covenant for law and order abetting prosperity instead of depredation. Hence ignoring the religious tenets of the society that favor sovereignty the invaders unlawfully became the vortex in a civil strife.
It has officially been stated by the perpetrators that regardless of vilification such conduct was of paramount importance to keep the Afghan subjects united and loyal. Yet the means which were anomalous with the end failed to achieve democracy under the pretext of the propitious Sovietization of Afghanistan.
During the mayhem the Moscovite nexus boosted political institutions in Kabul. With prospects of the exploitation of the country’s minerals deposits (e.g., limestone, chrome, iron ore and uranium) and the integration of Afghan Turkestan with Soviet Central Asia, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its affiliates, the central committee, the politburo and regional organizations were trained and heavily funded by the Kremlin.
The Russians in spite of obstacles associated with the formation of a new education curricula and the isolation of traditional and Islamic culture had other ideas. To abate American and Chinese presence in the Euroasia theater, they sought to surreptitiously use
A drive for the advancement of Soviet imperialism into East Asia could be fostered by utilization of the Southern tier. This conduit could enhance the transportation of technology while acting as a buffer for the new West/East lifeline connecting
Waterways were also sinews of political and economic strength. The
The negatives are nonetheless glaring, Egypt’s, Iran’s and Pakistan’s refusal to become the torch bearers of Soviet dogma rid Moscow of significant players in the battle for expansionism. The maritime power could also encounter the following economic hardships: all Soviet bases are located in shallow coastal waters and are subject to mining and the Trans-Siberian railway is prone to possible interruption―both of which would entail astronomical cost for protection. Nonetheless the dismantling of the
Conclusion
In time history will judge if lessons learnt courtesy of the underdogs―Vietnam and Afghanistan have set a precedent for future conflicts.
Cite this paper
Leroy A.Binns, (2015) East/West Relations: A Case Study of Similar Military Patterns and Outcomes Resulting from US Involvement in Vietnam and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. Open Journal of Social Sciences,03,205-209. doi: 10.4236/jss.2015.310026
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