Journal of Information Security, 2012, 3, 272-280
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jis.2012.34034 Published Online October 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/jis)
C3SM: Information Assurance Based on Cryptographic
Checksum with Clustering Security Management Protocol
Moad Mowafi1, Lo’ai Tawalbeh2, Walid Aljoby1, Mohammad Al-Rousan1
1Department of Network Engineering and Security, Jordan University of Science and Technology, Irbid, Jordan
2Department of Computer Engineering, Jordan University of Science and Te chn olo gy, Irbid, Jordan
Received March 25, 2012; revised April 26, 2012; accepted May 20, 2012
ABSTRACT
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are resource-constrained networks in which sensor nodes operate in an aggressive
and uncontrolled environment and interact with sensitive data. Traffic aggregated by sensor nodes is susceptible to attacks and,
due to the nature of WSNs, security mechanisms used in wired networks and other types of wireless networks are not
suitable for WSNs. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to assure information security against security attacks and
particularly node capturing attacks. We propose a cluster security management protocol, called Cryptographic Check-
sum Clustering Security Management (C3SM), to provide an efficient decentralized security management for hierarchal
networks. In C3SM, every cluster selects dynamically and alternately a node as a Cluster Security Manager (CSM)
which distributes a periodic shared secrete key for all nodes in the cluster. The cluster head, then , authenticates identity
of the nodes and der ive a unique pa irwise key for each node in the cluster. C3SM provides suff icient secur ity regard less
how many nodes are compromised, and achieves high connectivity with low memory cost and low energy consumption.
Compared to existing protocols, our protocol provides stronger resilience against node capture with lower key storage
overhead.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks; Security; Message Authentication Code; Cryptographic; Node Capture Attack
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are highly distributed
and self-organized system that is based on collaborative
effort of a large number of nodes, where each node has
the ability of sensing, computation, and communication.
WSNs suffer from various malicious attacks because the
environment is open to the public. Thus, an enemy can
easily listen to the wireless communication and intercept
the traffic. To prevent such malicious attacks, secret keys
should be used to encrypt wireless communication and
establish data confiden tiality, integ rity and auth entication
among sensor nodes. An enemy can also capture a sensor
node and access its data and communication keys. This
type of attacks is called node capture attack, an d forms a
main challenge to develop a security mechanism for WSNs.
In wired and wireless networks, information assurance
is attained by data encryption and authentication. Many
complex security algorithms are developed such as pub-
lic-key cryptography (e.g., RSA [1] and Diffie-Hellman
[2]), digital signature and trusted third-party authentica-
tion schemes [3]. In WSNs, the sensor node does not
have sufficient memory to store a lot of keys or suppor t a
complex public key algorithm. Moreover, the computa-
tion overhead and energy consumption make traditional
security mechanisms not suitable for WSNs. Therefore, it
is necessary to develop an appropriate security mecha-
nism for WSNs to distribute secret keys among the nodes,
encrypt communication and form authentication. How-
ever, the challenge does not lie in the development of a
secure mechanism merely, but on how to efficiently create,
distribute and manage the secret keys among the nodes.
In this paper, we introduce a new security protocol
called Cryptographic Checksum Clustering Security M ana -
gement (C3SM) that operates under clustered hierar-
chical network architecture. The proposed scheme pro-
vides sufficient security regardless of how many nodes
are compromised and achieves efficient energy consump-
tion with low key storage overhead. In C3SM, every
cluster selects dynamically and alternately a node called
Cluster Security Manager (CSM) which distributes a pe-
riodic shared secrete key for all nodes in the cluster.
Then, the cluster head (CH) authenticates the identity of
the cluster nodes, and establishes a unique pairwise key
for each node in the cluster. The authentication is achieved
by cryptographic checksum or Message Authentication
Code (MAC). To enhance confidentiality between the
cluster nodes and the CH, we design a local, random,
C
opyright © 2012 SciRes. JIS

M. MOWAFI ET AL. 273
dynamic, periodic and unique pairwise key for each path
between the CH and sensor node. These key properties
make the security in WSNs stronger, and attain high
connectivity with low memory cost and low energy con-
sumption. To enhance integrity and authenticity among
nodes, we use cryptographic checksum (variable tiny
segment of code) appended to control messages. More-
over, the proposed scheme has strong resilience against
node capture because it has an alternating CSM that dis-
tributes keys at regular period of times in normal (safety)
mode, monitors the cluster nodes for attack, and changes
keys directly in case of an attack occurs (threat mode).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide a review of related work in key mana-
gement for WSNs. In Section 3, we describe the pro-
posed system architecture. In Section 4, we present and
analyze the system model. In Section 5, we evaluate the
system performance and present simulation results. Fi-
nally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Related Work
The existing approaches for solving the key distribution
problem in WSNs can be classified into four categories
[4]: Network-wide keys schemes, full pairwise key schemes,
matrix-based schemes, polynomial-based schemes, and
probabilistic schemes.
In the network-wide keys scheme, a single master key
is loaded into all sensor nodes. This scheme provides
perfect connectivity since all deployed nodes share the
same key, and also new added nodes can be loaded with
the same master key and connect simply. Several s che mes
have adopted this approach [5-7]. The shortcoming of the
network-wide scheme is that a capturing of a single node
will comprise all the nodes and their communication.
Moreover, malicious nodes can be easily injected into the
network.
In the full pairwise key scheme, each node from n
nodes stores n-1 pairwise keys in order to communicate
with every other node. This scheme provides a high level
of security but its main drawback is its demand for very
large memory sto rage.
Matrix-based schemes are originally created for estab-
lishing a pairwise key by Blom [8]. In Blom’s scheme,
each node i has the ith row and the ith column of secret
and public matrices, respectively. By exchanging their
columns, any two nodes i and j can create their pairwise
key Kij = Kji. In this scheme, if no more than t nodes are
compromised, no more keys are compromised. Increas-
ing t can improve the scheme resilience; however more
secret information needs to be stored. Extensions of
Blom’s scheme have been proposed in [9,10].
The polynomial-based key management schemes are
originally initiated by Blundo [11] as a special case of
Blom’s scheme. In Blundo’s scheme, each node i has a
polynomial f (x,y) over a finite filed. By evaluating their
polynomials, any two nodes i and j can create their pair-
wise key f (i,j) = f (j,i). Several schemes have adopted
Blundo’s scheme [12-14]. The main drawbacks of the
polynomial-based approach are its demand for large
memory to store the polynomials, and the computational
power of the multiplication and exponentiation opera-
tions [4].
In the probabilistic approaches, the security services
are divided into phases in order to offer high security as
the pairwise key approach and lower storage as the net-
work-wide key approach, and to find suitable tradeoff
between security and overhead. In general, the probabil-
istic approaches pass through three phases [4]: Key pre-
distribution, shared-key discovery, and path-key estab-
lishment. Our work belongs to such approaches and pre-
sents a security mechanism for each phase, aiming at
attaining effective security, efficiency, and flexibility.
Several schemes, related to our work, have been pro-
posed [15-20]. In [15], a random key pre-distribution
scheme is proposed. It prepares a very large size key pool,
chooses randomly a subset of keys, and then stores them
in the node’s memory before deployment. After the dis-
covery process performed between the nodes that intend
to communicate, the nodes can establish a connection if
they share one or more of the common keys stored in
their memories. The common key then becomes a shared
key for the link between the nodes. Nodes that cannot
find a shared key with each other can generate a path key
through what so-called a connected secure graph. This
scheme requires a large key storage in large scale net-
works. Moreover it does not support nod e authentication,
and its resilience to node capture attacks is weak since
any captured node can compromise other nodes keys.
In [16], a scheme called efficient pairwise key estab-
lishment and management (EPKEM) is proposed. In this
scheme, each node stores randomly a row and column
from a key matrix, and any two nodes create a distinct
pairwise key by combining their common keys and node
identities. If a node is compromised, the communication
between non-compromised nodes remains secure. How-
ever, this scheme has high communication overhead in
large scale networks, needs large key storage, and con-
sumes energy when adding nodes.
A scheme for large-scale hierarchical WSNs is pre-
sented in [17]. It uses polynomial key calculations to
create a distinct pairwise key between any two nodes.
This approach assumes three phases for key management:
key pre-distribution, inter-cluster pairwise key establish-
ment, and intra-cluster pairwise key establishment. The
scheme shows good security mechanism against node
capture attacks, but the establishment of one pairwise key
for each node needs the cluster head to communicate

M. MOWAFI ET AL.
274
with other cluster heads to authenticate node connec-
tivity.
In [18], a rekey-boosted security protocol in hierar-
chical WSNs is proposed. In this approach, clusters are
formed based on LEACH, and random key pre-distribu-
tion is used to establish node-to-node security and au-
thentication. A cluster key is used to secure the cluster
head-to-node communication, and a key created by the
cluster head is used to protect the cluster head-to-base
station communication. In this scheme, the cluster head
carries much overhead because it is used for both routing
and security.
In [19], the proposed scheme stores a master key and
random vector in each node, and any two nodes create a
pairwise key by combining their random vector with the
stored master key. In addition, each node stores a cluster
key to communicate with the cluster head. The cluster
key is derived from the preloaded master key and identi-
fication number of the cluster head. Hence, an enemy
that knows the master key and the identification number
of the cluster head can extract the cluster key and easily
attack the cluster.
A protocol for securing the paths among the nodes in
WSNs is proposed in [20]. In this protocol, the network
area is partitioned into a virtual grid with identical cells.
It is assumed that each node stores four keys: individual
key to communicate with the base station, cell key to
communicate with nodes inside the cell, eight pairwise
keys to communicate with other cells, and broadcast keys.
By capturing any of the cell nodes, the adversary can
extract the key and then easily attack all the nodes inside
the cell.
3. System Architecture
The system is organized in a multi-tier architecture ac-
cording to the recourses and functionality. The resources
variability divides the system into two-tier architecture.
One tier represents the base station (BS) and another tier
represents the deployed sensor nodes. The BS is assumed
to have no computational, storage and communication
limitations and is located far from the sensor field. The
sensor nodes are assumed to be resource-constrained in
energy, processing, and storage. The sensor nodes are
homogenous, have the same resources, and start with the
same level of energy. The sensors nodes are capable of
control their power to vary their functionality.
From the functionality viewpoint, the system is di-
vided into four-tier architecture as shown in Figure 1.
The first tier represents the BS that will be considered as
a powerful data processing unit that performs heavily
operations, a storage center that collects data, and a key
distribution center before deployment. The BS is as-
sumed to be trusted and temper resistant. The second tier
represents the CH that will be considered as a collector
for sensed data from other members in the cluster, an
aggregator for the collected data, and a sender for the
fused data to the BS in a single-hop path, as depicted in
Figure 2. The third tier represents the sensor nodes that
sense data and report the target field states to the CH as
depicted in Figure 2. The fourth tier, the lower layer of
our proposed stack model, represents the contribution of
what we target in this research that is the clustering secu-
rity management layer. This layer appears dynamically in
each cluster by targeting one of the sensor nodes other
than the CHs that is the CSM as depicted in Figure 2.
The CSM will manage the cluster security because it
works as a key distribution center and as a guard for
cluster sensor nodes against an adversary. The CSM pe-
riodically constructs a key and distributes it to its cluster
members and to the CH.
4. System Model and Analysis
The C3SM scheme consists of two parts: The first part
deals with key distribution and managing methodologies
while the second one deals with network monitoring and
resilience against the node capture attack and its implica-
tions.
4.1. Key Distribution and Managing Model
Before deploying the nodes in the target field, each sen-
sor node will be assigned two types of key. One key to
Base Station (BS)
Cluster Head (CH)
Sensor node (non –CH)
Cluster Security Manager (CSM)
Figure 1. Four-tier clustering security model for WSNs.
Figure 2. A clustering security architecture for WSNs.

M. MOWAFI ET AL. 275
encrypt and authenticate aggregated sensing data from a
CH to the BS. And the other one used for a period of
time after the deployment to encrypt and authenticate
exchanged data between the CH and its sensor node
members. After the deployment of sensor nodes and for-
mation of clusters, each cluster will candidate one node
to become a CSM that will protect the cluster against an
adversary attacks, and distribute (re-keying) keys for the
nodes in the cluster including the CHs. This procedure
will constitute a distributed cluster among all clusters in
the network with cluster members called CSMs. The key
management scheme consists of two phases: key setup
phase and path key establishment phase.
Figure 3. CH-to-node message authentication.
4.1.1. Key Setup Phase
When the nodes are deployed, each node is preloaded
with an initial shared key (Kp) which assumed to be a
large number symmetric key assigned for all nodes in the
network. The preloaded key can be used by any sensor
node to generate its master key as a function of the node
ID. An authenticator MAC function (C-function) is used
to generate the keys. For example, node i uses Kp and its
ID to generate its master key (Ki) as follows:

,
ipi
K
CK ID (1)
The symmetric key Kp is just used after the sensor
nodes deployment for a short period of time between the
CH and cluster members to create a master key. This key
is changed periodically by the CSM, thus, any attack to
any node in the cluster does not affect its secu rity.
After formation of clusters, the CH will broadcast its
ID (IDCH) and an advertisement message (Adv) en-
crypted by the preloaded key Kp to the cluster members.
It is assumed that every node can know the Adv message.


,Adv
p CH
ID:
CH
CHNIDC K (2)
After the above formatted message is broadcasted,
each authorized sensor node receives the message and
performs the same function,

,Adv
Figure 4. Node-to-CH message authentication.
Equ , and
Equation (5)
ase ill be established
(6)
This technique can alleviate the trad
pair
nction a cryptographic checksum function
p
CH , as the
CH and compares with the received MAC, as depicted in
Figure 3. Then, each member of th e cluster will respond
with its ID (IDN), and a message contains a join signal
(Ack), the CH’s Adv and the node ID (IDN), encrypted
by its preloaded key Kp, as shown in Figure 4.
CK ID

AdvAck
N
ID

,
p CH
KCKID

,
:,
Np
NCHIDCK (3)
When the CH receives a reply from its cluster mem-
bers, all of them can generate a secure master key as
shown by the following equations:
CH  (4)
N
ation (4) represents the master key of the CH
represents theaster key of any member
node N. After each node in the cluster generates its mas-
ter key, the cluster will translate into next phase, which is
called the path key establishment.
4.1.2. Path Ke y Est abl i shment Ph
m
In this phase the pairwise key KCH–N w
between the CH and each cluster member node N. The
pairwise key maintains a unique key for a path between
the CH and each node in the cluster. Hence, it provides a
sufficient security against node capture attacks since any
compromised node will not affect the secure communi-
cation among non-compromised nodes. Moreover, this
approach does not require a large storage for each node
to store the whole pairwise keys in the network because
the CH node just stores the pairwise keys of its cluster
members. The pairwise key is derived as follows:

,
CH NNCH
KCKID

eoff between the
wise key supported security and the key storage
overhead.
4.1.3. C- F u
The C-function is
that is usually called message authentication code or
MAC. However, the domain of C-function consists of a
message of some arbitrary length, whereas the range
consists of all possible MACs and all possible keys [21].
There are three types of MACs in our proposed system,
as shown in Equations (4)-(6). The left hand side of each
equation represents the generated fixed length authenti-
cator that can be exploited to perform the following
functionalities: authentication to assure that received
messages are from alleged nodes, confidentiality to pro-
tect the traffic as long as the generated authenticator used
as a unique pairwise key between the CH and its cluster
members, and resiliency against node capturing because
the key for each path is unique and is managed periodi-
cally by the CSM. On the other hand, the right hand
pN
K
CK ID (5) 

M. MOWAFI ET AL.
276
ing Security Management
ch cluster in
n order to
2. In
th
arries out three
ta
side of the equation represents the variable length mes-
sage which is the ID of the node and either the secret
shared key between all nodes in the cluster such as Kp or
the unique key between the CH and its cluster members
such as KN.
4.2. Cluster
After completing the formation phase for ea
the network, the role of security is triggered i
protect the network against malicious attacks. The secu-
rity of the network is managed by distributed nodes
throughout the network, forming a security cluster.
The security cluster is a distributed cluster through all
the data clusters in the network, as shown in Figure
e safe mode, the construction of the cluster is assumed
to take place at the beginning of the second half of the
current data cluster cycle and remain to the ending of the
first half of the next data cluster cycle.
The CH in each data cluster can candidate one of its
cluster members to be a CSM which c
sks. First, the first CSM creates a schedule in which
order the cluster member nodes are elected as CSM and
repeats the same process after the member nodes in the
cluster are already pass the turn. The CSM checks its
energy and if it is less than a threshold, the CSM will
broadcast a release message to its cluster nodes. The
node in schedule will take the turn and become a CSM.
By this property the CSM guarantees the fairness in en-
ergy consumption among the cluster nodes. Second, the
CSM can work as a key distribution center to construct
and distribute periodically a shared master key for each
node inside the cluster and also to the CH in order to
re-keying them. By the master key, all the nodes in the
cluster can use this key as a secrete key for establishing a
new pairwise key (re-keying) between the CH and each
sensor node in the cluster. Third, the CSM carries out
monitoring and controlling the cluster member nodes
against any attack. The CSM will exchange periodic mes-
sages with the cluster member nodes, and if one of the
nodes does not reply, the CSM assumes an adversary
captures the node, and then it will change all the keys in
the cluster. In case that any CSM are captured, the nodes
can tell through the disapp earance of the contr ol message
sent by the captured CSM, and consequently the turn for
the next appointed CSM arises to work for a period of
time equals to the time of the data cluster. Figure 5
summarizes the C3SM algorithm.
4.3. Malicious Attack and Threat Model
The malicious attacks can be divided into passive and
active modes. In the passive mode, the enemy listens to
the communication among the nodes to seize private data,
while in the active mode it captures nodes in the network.
When a node is compromised, the stored secret keys or
information are revealed and, hence, false messages can
be injected or the transmitted messages can be modified
or dropped.
Next, we analyze the system security under node ca p t u r e
attacks, considering three types of sensor nodes: a cluster
member, the CH, and the CSM.
Figure 5. C3SM algorithm.

M. MOWAFI ET AL. 277
4.3.1. Sensor Node Capture Attack
In our scheme, after nodes deployment and cluster for-
mations, in a short period of time, each CH will establish
a unique pairwise key (KCH–N) for each link with a cluster
member node. In addition, after the CSM distributes a
shared secrete key for the nodes in each cluster, the CH
can also establish a unique pairwise key (KCH–N) for each
link with a cluster member node, and so forth. Thus, if
adversaries deploy their own malicious nodes, these ma-
licious nodes cannot be connected to the cluster because
the communication with the CH requests from the node
to know its master key (KN) which is a cryptographic
checksum or MAC from the node ID and the shared key
Kp as shown in Equation (5). In case that a sensor node is
physically captured, the adversary can read the contents
of the node memory and discover its pairwise key with
the CH, however it cannot compromise other non-cap-
tured nodes because the pairwise key is unique for each
pair of two communicating parties. On the other hand,
the CSM will lose the communication with the captured
node, and distributes a new master key for the attacked
cluster.
will take the turn to become a CSM.
lows. A deployment region of 100  100 m2 is consi-
dered. The frequency of key refreshment is 5 time units,
and the frequency of control messages is 1 time unit. The
control message size is 50 bytes.
5.1. Communication and Computation Overhead
The communication per bit in WSNs is more costly than
computation [22]. In C3SM, communication is performed
inside a cluster, which means there is no longer transmis-
sion. In addition, the computational operations of key
management are simple and performed locally (inside the
cluster). A network of 10 clusters with 12 nodes per
cluster was used. The Friis free-space model was used to
estimate the communication energy consumption [23].
Figures 6 and 7 show the energy consumed by the CSM,
CH, and data sensor node (non-CH) of a randomly chosen
cluster, for performing key management operations: key
setup, re-keying and nodes monitoring. Figure 6 shows
the accumulated dissipated energy after completing 100
rounds, while Figure 7 shows the dissipated energy dr-
ing one round. As shown in both figures, the CSM cn-
energy compared to CH and non-CH nodes
cumulated dissipated energy dur-
ing each phase at a random cluster after completing 100
s the energy dissipated for
re-keying
task consumes energy only when the CSM discovers an
hes a threshold. The
4.3.2. Cluster Head Capture Attack
In our scheme, the CH stores all the pairwise keys of the
member nodes in the cluster. The CSM monitors the
nodes in the cluster and exchanges periodic control mes-
sages with them. So, if the CH is captured, the CSM will
detect the capture and broadcast messages to all the
nodes in the cluster to set up a new round, and candidate
a new CH. The CSM also distributes a new shared key
for all the nodes in the cluster. Then, the new CH will
use the shared key to establish a unique pairwise key
with each node in the cluster. So, the adversary cannot
compromise any node in the cluster because all the clus-
ter node keys are changed and the communication is also
changed to a new CH.
4.3.3. CSM Capture A ttack
In our scheme, each elected CSM in a cluster can create a
schedule to determine when each node in the cluster is
elected as a CSM. In case that the CSM is captured, all
nodes in the cluster lose communication with the CSM.
After a short period of time the node in responsible in the
schedule
5. Performance Evaluation
Security algorithms for WSNs include a tradeoff between
the security level and resources consumption. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate by simulation the performance of our
proposed scheme, and compare it with current schemes
in [15,16]. The simulation was performed by a selfde-
veloped simulator using the simulation settings as fol-
because it performs monitoring and re-keying tasks fre-
quently while the CH only performs key setup and au-
thentication with its cluster nodes.
Figures 8 and 9 show the consumed energy for each
phase of key management: Setup, re-keying, and moni-
toring which are performed at randomly chosen cluster.
Figure 8 shows the ac
u
o
sumes more
rounds, while Figure 9 show
each phase during one round. As shown in both figures,
the monitoring task consumes approximately four times
energy compared to re-keying task because in the moni-
toring task the CSM exchanges periodic messages with
the cluster nodes in order to protect the network against
node capture attack. On the other hand, the
attack or its dissipated energy reac
energy consumed by the setup phase is mostly done
when the CH performs authentication with its cluster
nodes.
chosen cluster.
Figure 6. Consumed energy by cluster nodes of a randomly

M. MOWAFI ET AL.
278
Figure 7. Consumed energy by cluster nodes of a random
cluster during one r o und.
Figure 8. Consumed energy for key management phases at
randomly chosen cluster. a
Figure 9. Consumed energy for key management phases at
a random cluster dur ing one round.
5.2. Resiliency to Node Capture
Because the resources of a sensor node are very limited,
complexity of computations or long term transmission
affects the lifetime of the network. Many approaches try
to solve the problem of node capture attack. However,
most of them still suffer from overhead or compromising
nodes attack. In the random pre-distribution scheme
in [15], the same keys are used by different nodes and,
hence, if a node is captured, the secure communication
among other nodes is compromised. In EPKEM [16] and
our proposed C3SM, pairwise keys are stored in every
node and, hence, the resilience against node capture is
improved. C3SM prevents key compromise for non-
compromised nodes, even if many of the sensor nodes
key pre-distribution scheme in
[15] and the EPKEM scheme in [16]. It is shown that in
the random key pre-distribution scheme, the fraction of
compromised keys in non-captured nodes increases as
the number of captured nodes increases, while in EP-
KEM and C3SM it remains at low fraction regardless
how many nodes are captured. In C3SM, each sensor
node receives periodically a shared key from the CSM,
and then the CH uses this key to establish a pairwise key
with each node in the cluster. Pairwise keys are different
for each path and cannot easily be derived because the
MAC used is many-to-one function. Namely, there are
many keys to produce the correct MAC; consequently
the opponent has no way to know the correct key. Fur-
thermore, keys are refreshed periodically.
n,o achieve the required net-
work connectivity, each sensr node is required to store a
certain number of keys in its memory. Figure 11 shows
the number of keys stored in each node versus the net-
work size for the three schemes: C3SM, EPKEM, and the
random key pre-distribution scheme. It is shown that the
number of keys per node increases linearly in the random
key pre-distribution scheme, and increases sub-linearly in
key
are captured. Figure 10 shows the network resilience
against node capture attacks for our C3SM scheme in
addition to the random
5.3. Key Storage Overhead
In random key distributio t
o
050 100 150200250300 350 400450500
0
0.1
0.2
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Number of com
p
romised sensor nodes
Fraction of compromised keys in non-compromised nodes
Random Key Pre-distribution
C3SM
EPKEM
Figure 10. Network resilience against node capture attacks.
400 500 600700 800 900 1000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
N
etwork Size (Number of Nodes)
Number of keys per node
Random Key Pre-distribution
C3SM
EPKEM
Figure 11. Key storage overhead versus network size.

M. MOWAFI ET AL. 279
EPKEM. On the other hand, C3SM has the lowest key
storage overhead. In C3SM, each node only needs to
store a pairwise key with the CH and a key with the BS
in its memory no matter how many nodes are in the net-
work.
6. Conclusions
In this work, we propose a cluster-based security proto-
phic Checksum Cluster-
M). Our protocol uses
nectivity with low memory cost and low energy con-
sumption. Compared to existing schemes, C3SM achi eve s
better network resilience against node capture attacks
with lower key storage overhead.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Jordan University of
Science and Technology, and the Scientific Research
Support Fund at the Ministry of High Education in Jor-
dan for supporting this resear ch.
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