World Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 2012, 2, 89-105
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/wjnst.2012.23015 Published Online July 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/wjnst)
High-Level Nuclear Wastes and the Environment: Analyses
of Challenges and Engineering Strategies
Mukhtar Ahmed Rana
Physics Division, Directorate of Science, PINSTECH, Islamabad, Pakistan
Email: marana@pinstech.org.pk, rana@alumni.nus.edu.sg
Received February 11, 2012; revised April 2, 2012; accepted April 19, 2012
ABSTRACT
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the current status of high-level nuclear waste disposal along with presen-
tation of practical perspectives about the environmental issues involved. Present disposal designs and concepts are ana-
lyzed on a scientific basis and modifications to existing designs are proposed from the perspective of environmental
safety. A new concept of a chemical heat sink is introduced for the removal of heat emitted due to radioactive decay in
the spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste, and thermal spikes produced by radiation in containment materi-
als. Mainly, UO2 and metallic U are used as fuels in nuclear reactors. Spent nuclear fuel contains fission products and
transuranium elements which would remain radioactive for 104 to 108 years. Essential concepts and engineering strate-
gies for spent nuclear fuel disposal are described. Conceptual designs are described and discussed considering the
long-term radiation and thermal activity of spent nuclear fuel. Notions of physical and chemical barriers to contain nu-
clear waste are highlighted. A timeframe for nuclear waste disposal is proposed and time-line nuclear waste disposal
plan or policy is described and discussed.
Keywords: High-Level Nuclear Waste; Nuclear Waste Containment and Disposal; Environment; Conceptual Model
Designs; Radioactivity Damage; Chemical Heat Sink
1. Introduction
The issue of disposal of high-level radioactive nuclear
waste, e.g., spent nuclear fuel (SNF), is not new and
needs urgent attention due to its increasing volume
worldwide. It is now one of the most important but con-
troversial problems of nuclear technology. Only safe and
successful solutions to this problem would guarantee the
long-term future of nuclear power. It is extremely diffi-
cult for policy-makers worldwide to develop a consensus
on final disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The dis-
posal of high-level nuclear waste [1-3] is gaining a new
momentum [4] due to the need for more electricity with
minimal emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases to
limit global warming.
Apart from disposal of safely produced SNF or high-
level radioactive waste, the possibility of nuclear reactor
accidents [5-8] also requires deep understanding of this
issue from the perspective of failure. Forward planning
[9] is the only solution of this extremely sensitive issue.
The following three-pronged criterion can potentially
play a significant role in achieving safety assurance on
this important and near- and far-future humanity related
issue. First, nuclear test [10] and accident sites can be
helpful in forward planning [11,12]. Second important
point which can be helpful in finding out the safe solu-
tion of this issue, is sharing of knowledge from various
nuclear workplaces worldwide [13-17]. Strict critical re-
view of policies, principles and implementation proce-
dure for high-level radioactive waste disposal should be
mandatory.
Safety of the nuclear waste containment and disposal
can be assured by making the effective use of science in
policy making. A policy is a set of guiding principles for
making procedures of implementation of a scheme. A
public policy is quite different in nature from a private
policy and is complex subject. It requires the optimiza-
tion of a number of technical as well as well as social
parameters. Policy for the high level nuclear wastes
(HLW) disposal is a multifaceted issue and it requires to
resolve a number of inter-related problems. In situations
like disposal of HLW, comprehensive evaluation of pol-
icy success is extremely important as implications of a
failure can be smashingly serious for the present and fu-
ture life at earth. Risk informed changes to the technical
requirements of a HLW disposal policy is a natural solu-
tion, but stringent complications in assessment of the
risks involved due to unpredictability of future geophysi-
cal events over a long time scale of more than 100,000
years are the major worries.
C
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Main objective of this paper is to present/analyze the
current status of high-level nuclear waste and/or spent
nuclear fuel disposal along with practical scientific
thoughts about the issue. Present disposal designs and
concepts are analyzed on scientific bases and modifica-
tions to the existing designs are proposed. Next section
describes an assessment of the nuclear waste disposal
problem and its implementation plan. Section 4 presents
analysis of current nuclear waste disposal procedures and
a brief summary of a method for monitoring the radiation
damage in nuclear waste containers. Section 5 is com-
posed of status comments on different aspects of nuclear
waste disposal along with a modified burial design. Paper
ends with conclusions of the investigation.
2. Climate Change and Nuclear Energy
One of the biggest questions of the time is how to meet
the challenges caused by escalating climate change and
growing energy demand around the globe. Nuclear en-
ergy can play a central role in mitigating the global cli-
mate change by minimizing the emission of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases in commercial energy supply [18].
Public acceptance to nuclear energy is very low due to
Chernobyl [9,11,19] and Three Mile Island [20] acci-
dents. It is being realized that factual public awareness of
nuclear energy and related issues, especially security and
environmental safety of nuclear engineering designs needs
to be raised. Table 1 shows a foresight of energy con-
sumption scenarios in 2050 keeping fossil-fuel carbon
emissions same as at present to keep a hold on the cli-
mate change [21]. If the level of nuclear energy expected
in the above mentioned scenario is considered, thought-
ful and coherent research efforts around a few central
themes would be needed. Nuclear reactor safety and so-
lution to the problems associated with spent nuclear fuel
Table 1. Energy consumption scenario (Sailor et al. 2000).
1997
World
1997
USA
1997
France 2050
Population (millions) 5857 268 59 9000
Total primary energy (EJ/year) 400 99 10.3 900
Fossil fuel (EJ/year) 343 85 6.2 300
Renewable (EJ/year) 30 5.2 0.7 300
Nuclear (EJ/year) 25 7.1 4.1 300
Total per capita (EJ/year) 68 371 175 100
Fossil fuel fraction (%) 86 85 61 33
Nuclear energy
Generation (GW-year/year)
Per capita (kW-year/year)
Fraction of electricity (%)
259
0.04
17
72
0.27
18
43
0.73
79
3300
0.36
>50
CO2 emission (MTC) 6232 1489 102 5500
(SNF) or HLW are major concerns.
Apart from Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, safety
record of nuclear reactors has been extremely good.
More than 8500 nuclear reactors built outside former
Soviet Union, there has been no major radioactivity re-
lease accident. There have been considerable improve-
ments in reactor designs after above mentioned nuclear
accidents [21]. Continued commitment to the best sci-
ence for improvements in safety aspects of nuclear tech-
nology, keeping the economic build low, is essentially
needed. Upcoming nuclear reactors will have considera-
bly better safety perspective compared with present. The
possibility of core damage in Advanced Boiling Water
Reactor (ABWR), a US design, is estimated to be 2 ×
10–7 per reactor per year [22] SNF or HLW is a compli-
cated issue. Some of nuclear countries deem SNF as a
disposable waste while others as an asset which associ-
ates a kind of paradox with it. Problems associated with
this paradox issue and possible solutions are discussed in
the next section.
3. Problem Assessment and Implementation
Plan
3.1. Composition of SNF, A Representative
Radioactive Waste
Although composition of SNF is reactor, fuel and burn-up
specific, a general dependence of its composition on sto-
rage time is described in this section. Spent nuclear fuel
shows almost a complete spectrum of radioactivity. Some
of elements in SNF will remain radioactive for hours to a
few years whereas others for thousands to millions of
years. Rate of change of any of radioactive nuclei in SNF
can be represented by the following equation,
form decay
dd d
dd d
ii i
NN N
tt t
 (1)
whereas concentration or number of a specific specie of
nuclei at any time are given by the following equation,


form decay
dd
dd
oo
tt
ii
iio
tt
NN
Nt Nttt
 

(2)
where o is the starting time whereas t is any time
afterwards. It is clear from above equations that compo-
sition of SNF will continue changing, but in a quite de-
terministic way assuming initial composition of SNF is
known. It is an important point to be considered while
selecting containment materials and disposal site.
t
3.2. High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal
Implementation Plan or Policy
The conceptual model of a reliable scientific investiga-
ion is shown in Figure 1(a). Analysis and execution of t
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91
Observation Idea/Problem ConceptionComparison/Analysis
Result Testing Conclusion Outlook
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. Conceptual model of a reliable scientific investigation (a) and high-level radioactive waste disposal plan.
close-circle coherent activities are necessary at small scale
before fixing the implementation methods and techniques
for a practical large scale final disposal of SNF or high-
level nuclear waste. Considering millions-year long ra-
dioactive and thermal life of SNF, at least 40 - 50 years
are required to start large scale disposal. Considering
great difficulties and extremely high cost of retrieval of
disposed nuclear waste, political and social impacts also
need to be analyzed carefully [11]. Figure 1(b) shows
implementation plan or policy proposing small scale low
activity sample disposal for studies of hydrology and
seismic effects on disposed nuclear waste. Suitable sites
with considerable hydrology and seismic activities need
to be selected for these test disposals in order to under-
stand impacts of failures due to lack of scientific under-
standing about hydrology and seismic history and future
evolution. Figure 1(b) also describes how analysis of
observations of test disposals can help in refining current
repository design to achieve final practical disposal re-
pository design and implementation plan.
Urgency for solution of final disposal of high-level
nuclear waste is due to complications involved and mul-
tidisciplinary nature of the issue which will take long
time 40 - 50 years to reach the stage of final disposal
even after the practical selection of the final disposal site.
Figure 2(a) shows the spent fuel cycle which is the ma-
jor high-level nuclear waste. This simple schematic is
based on the well-known facts and details are given by a
number of authors, for example, [23-25]. Figure 2(b)
shows general composition and forms of fission products
and transuranium elements which are the most important
for evaluation of a disposal activity. This figure is based
on results by Buck et al. [26]. It is clear from Figure 2(b)
hat SNF is a very special type of waste due to high per- t
M. A. RANA
92
(a) (b)
Figure 2. (a) Spent nuc lear fuel cy c le, and (b) Gener al composition and forms of fission produc ts and trans- uranium e lem ents,
which are most important in evaluation of disposal activity. Presentation is based on results by Buck et al. (2004).
centage of rare earth elements in it along with a quite
considerable percentage of radioactive gases. These are
very different characteristics from those of human safe
environment. Major chemical alterations in SNF are gas-
eous and thermal evaporation, oxidation and dissolution
of fuel pellets, and precipitation of secondary phases in
changing spent fuel. These changes, based on well-known
facts and results from Ref. [27] are represented by a sche-
matic in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Thermal, structural and compositional alterations
in SNF, which can cause signific ant conseque nc es over long-
time scale. This figure is based on generally known infor-
mation in the field of nuclear engineering and that from
Poinssot et al. (2005) and Ewing (2006).
3.3. Proof of Safety: Global Hand to Hand Policy
Can anyone on earth come up with a policy for HLW
assuring a comprehensive safety of the global environ-
ment over a minimum time scale of 100,000 years? Pre-
sent answer is “No”. But, on the whole safe function of
nuclear energy technology over a half century, despite
the initial doubts about safety of nuclear technology,
gives a hope. A three pronged strategy may be consid-
ered to build a trust in present and future safety of any
HLW disposal policy. One is scientific basis of the dis-
posal management policy; second the IAEA regulations
for the disposal policy to assure global safety with mini-
mum interference in any state’s internal matters and third
knowledge sharing among nuclear and related countries.
Above mentioned strategy could provide a safety assur-
ance with providing a chance of participation to anyone
with legitimate capacity. Implementation of the above
mentioned global hand to hand policy may find difficul-
ties due to strategic nature of the issue and safety impli-
cations. This major inconvenience needs to be addressed
on human grounds.
Fuel
Rod
Possible Thermal Alterations
Responsibility of a failure of an HLW disposal policy
and procedures, and first responders need to be defined
with clarity. A comprehensive analysis is required to sort
out the link between capacity and responsibility which
may vary case to case and need to be carried out in the
local context. But, common features of the issue of the
link between capacity and responsibility should be dealt
with at a global level to achieve legitimate general guide-
lines. Geological disposal of HLW is the best available
choice. Figure 4 shows a guidance triangle for geologi-
cal disposal of HLW. The most important aspects are the
ailure assessment of HLW containers and hydrology f
Fuel
Pellet
UO2
Evaporation
Oxidation
Dissolution
New-Phases
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Documentation for Present and Future
Figure 4. Guidance triangle to assure the keeping up of system for HLW geological disposal for more than 100,000 years.
around the repository site. Clear documentation of above
mentioned activities, for present and possibly future, is
also essentially needed. Method of lucid documentation
is also an important issue.
4. Disposal of Nuclear Waste
The issue of disposal of SNF or high-level nuclear waste
has been evaluated for decades now by nuclear scientists
worldwide [21,25]. Ewing Considered options for SNF
disposal include burial in ocean floor polar or ice hills,
space disposal, keeping in interim storage facilities and
more importantly, deep underground burial in special
geological formations. Deep underground burial is being
considered as safest in available options. Research areas
involved in geological nuclear waste disposal are Materi-
als Science & Engineering, Nuclear Geology and hy-
drology. Despite the investigations cited above on mate-
rials and geology, correlated research activities are re-
quired for successful geological nuclear waste disposal,
especially coupled investigations on underground geo-
logical formations, seismology and hydrology. Effects of
radiations on confinement materials in final disposal are
very important.
It is aimed here to highlight the major problems in the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste like processed or un-
processed spent nuclear fuel. Problems involved are ex-
tremely complicated and requires conceptual, materials
and other technical developments. Feared by complica-
tions, it is sometimes treated as un-solvable problem,
which has imposed dark shadows on the future of nuclear
power. To keep nuclear technology in work in future,
related scientific community is working very hard to
cope with the problems. Solution of this problem will
bring conceptual and material developments, which will
help in overall development of science and technology.
Geological disposal of SNF can only be successful by
implementing multiple barrier strategy to confine the
disposed waste and its effects far from safe environment
to which living being have or may need to have contact
in future. Figure 5(a) gives an overview of possible bar-
riers to confine the disposed high level waste. Most im-
portant of natural barriers is a solid stable crystalline rock
far from earth quake related fault lines. Engineered bar-
riers include corrosion-resistant containers possibly of
copper alloys and disposal architecture. Recently, a new
method has proposed by Rana [17] for monitoring the
radiation damage in nuclear waste containers using ion
channeling. Ion channeling measurements are possible at
ion beam facilities worldwide. A 1 - 3 MeV helium ion
beam can be employed to measure radiation damage in
test crystalline samples placed in a section of a container
wall as shown in Figure 5(b). Mathematical method for
determination of structure collapse rate in container wall
using ion channeling measurements is given by Rana
([17] 2008a). This method can be used to monitor the
radiation damage in nuclear waste containers and to pre-
dict containment failures in near and far-future. Nature of
single radiation damage in bulk and surface-layer of a
typical solid is recently discussed by Rana [17,18]. Total
radiation damage is accumulated effect of all radiations
penetrated in to a target or containment materials, with
different radiations causing different magnitude and type
of damage. Thermal and chemical stability [19,21] of
containment materials is an important in selection of ma-
terials to be used in containment of nuclear wastes.
Status comments on major aspects of final disposal are
described below in the form of a few points. 1) Initial
radiation strength per unit spent nuclear fuel depends on
burn-up the fuel, but extremely high for any living being
without best available shielding arrangements [28]; 2)
adioactivity decay time scale for SNF of the order of R
Hydrology around Repository Failure Assessment of HLW Containers
The Guidance Triangle
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Figure 5. (a) Radiation effects on containment materials and environment; (b) Migration barriers in repository design; and (c)
Section of the nuclear waste container wall for installation of radiation damage test crystal samples.
geological time scale, which is up to millions of years; 3)
Forms of radiations from SNF include charged and neu-
tral particle rays, and electromagnetic radiations; 4) De-
cay of radioactive elements in SNF is accompanied with
the release of energy, most of which is transformed into
heat. SNF is a heat source, which can harm integrity of
its disposed packages; 5) Gaseous nature of radioactive
products is of great concern. Thirteen percent of fission
products and trans-uranium elements are gases, which
has higher danger of leakage and mobility to the objec-
tively safe environment; 6) Direct disposal of SNF will
be cheaper [29], but it is like wasting potential source of
energy; 7) Transmutation decreases the danger level of
SNF, but does not solve the problem completely. Final
disposal will still be needed [28]; 8) Ideally, retrievabli-
lity after disposal is required. But, its assurance is diffi-
cult due to involvement of unexpected natural happen-
ings like earth-quakes.
Figure 6(a) shows the outline of the rock-integration
nuclear waste burial design by Maki and Ohnuma [15].
Figure 6(b) shows present modifications to the design
shown in Figure 6(a) with objective to achieve improve-
ment regarding pressure build up due to complete block-
age of underground water flow. Leaving open channels
or tunnels for controlled water flow through buried waste.
This water flow through open channels or tunnels will
also serve as monitoring test about any leakage from
waste packages. These channels will avoid water pres-
sure build up beyond a critical limit and if a considerable
leakage is observed in water through these channels, nu-
clear waste burial design should allow the blockage of
these water channels. Another notion of chemical heat
sink (Figure 6(b)) is introduced, which if incorporated in
burial design, can keep the temperature of nuclear waste
under limit. This chemical heat sink is a compound che-
mical material, which will decompose by absorbing heat
emitted by nuclear waste. Water flow through proposed
channels in the buried waste will also cool nuclear waste.
5. Radiation Effects
5.1. Radiation Damage
Degradation of spent fuel itself and containment materi-
als due to radiation effects is a very considerable concern.
Intensive radiation exposure causes dramatic degradation
n structural and strength related properties of materials i
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(a)
Controlled Water Flow Channels
Waste Package
Chemical Heat Sink
(b)
Figure 6. (a) Design of rock integration nuclear waste burial facility by Maki and Ohnuma (1992) and (b) Modifications to
the above-mentioned design to assure integrity of buried waste.
leading to their failure when damage exceeds a certain
limit. A number of aspects of radiation damage have
been recognized and being studied over more than 60
years. Radiation damage leaves four types of effects on
any material, i.e. electronic and optical which are not
significant in nuclear waste containment, physical and
chemical. Physical and chemical effects need to be con-
sidered. A variety of radiations continue penetrating waste
containment and the aggregated effects over decades thus
are important for determination of containment failure. A
single radiation, especially energetic charged particle,
causes a compound spike [30] in the target material. This
compound spike arises as a consequence of a Coulomb
explosion and a thermal spike, and decays very quickly
within 10–12 s. These physical impacts result in the form
of heat emitting out into the neighbouring material of the
cylindrical zone through which radiation passes. The in-
creased temperature, due to continuous radiation spikes,
produce chemical changes like formation of new material
phases. Figure 7 shows the generalized view of expected
radiation effects on containment materials to be used in
nuclear waste disposal.
Here, a very brief account of basic physics of radiation
damage is being given which may help in implementa-
tion of the method for the radiation damage monitoring
described above and interpretation of experimental ob-
servations of the method. A charged particle or radiation
traveling in a solid creates a superheated cylindrical zone
with a modified structure containing defects of various
types and size. In the inner dotted cylindrical zone in
Figure 8, bulk atomic flow takes place whereas in the
outer shell only individual atomic flow is occurred. A
fresh radiation damaged zone in a solid is highly un-
steady in time and after reaching thermodynamic equilib-
rium it becomes an inhomogeneous structure. The energy
deposited by the incident radiation in a cylindrical vol-
ume around the path is non uniform. It decreases expo-
nentially along radial direction whereas distribution along
axis of the cylinder depends on energy of the particle.
or an MeV/u ion, it has a maximum at a depth into the F
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96
Figure 7. Radiation effects on containment materials and environment.
x
r
Bulk atomic flow Individual atomic flow
Figure 8. Radiation damage produced by a charged radia-
tion in a typical solid, showing cylindric al zones of bulk and
individual atomic flows. Parameters are defined/shown in
this figure for the purpose of mathematical description of
the problem.
target.
Interaction of a radiation with a solid target can be
treated as a compound spike including partial roles of
both thermal and Coulomb explosion spikes. Fractional
roles of both spikes depend on atomic and electronic
structure of the target and density of deposited energy in
it by the incident radiation. An incident radiation is scat-
tered by the atoms in the target as it interacts with them
and deposits energy. Weak scattering of incident radia-
tions by light target atoms does not significantly deviate
incident particles from their straight trajectories while the
target atoms recoil considerably, damaging the detector.
Heavier atoms scatter incident particles through wide
angles, significantly deviating them from their straight
paths while the target atoms recoil weakly, producing
less damage. So, it is important to notice that radiation
damage mechanism in a target composed of light atomic
species is different from that composed of heavier atoms.
Compound impacts of a number of radiations in a target,
incident within a specific distance, superimpose with one
another in both constructive and destructive manners.
Part of the damage produced by one radiation is extended
due to the damage produced by another radiation within a
few hundred nanometers. Nuclear waste containers and
related materials are exposed to radiations with a wide
spectrum of ionizing power including fission fragments
of very high ionizing power and gamma rays of com-
paratively very low ionizing power.
5.2. Measurement of Radiation Damage
5.2.1. Brief Description of the Single Scattering
Method
Radiation damage in a piece of a crystal (a test sample
say Si, Ge, Zr or Zircon) exposed to radiations will carry
information about total radiation exposure of the crystal.
So, proton or helium ion channelling measurement of
radiation damage in the test sample, placed in the crystal-
line or amorphous immobilizing containment, can in prin-
ciple yield considerably complete information about total
radiation exposure. A calibration between structure col-
lapse rates of test sample and container wall material will
provide the structure collapse rate of the containment
material. Figure 9 is the schematic showing components
on an initially channelled proton/ion beam in a crystal.
This figure is modified from the original [31]. The total
random fraction of the beam
T
x
is the sum of the
random fraction of the beam in the crystal,
R
x
, reach-
ing depth x and fraction of the beam randomized by the
defects in the depth step
dx
,

D
x
,

TRD
x
x

x (3)
The component
D
x
may be written as,
 
1D
DR
f
nx
xx
n



(4)
where
D
nx is atomic concentration of defects, the
total atomic concentration,
n
f
the defect scattering fac-
tor. The factor
f
accounts for the fact that all defects
do not contribute equally and may have different number
f scattering centres [31]. For randomly displaced atoms o
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA 97
ion beam
crystal plane
atom at a lattice site
displaced atom
1 – χ
R
χ
R
χ
D
Figure 9. Dechannelling of channelled beam due to defects present at an arbitrary depth. χR and 1 – χR are random and cha n-
nelled fractions of the beam reaching the considered defect layer.
(called isolated interstitials), the value of
f
is 1. The
quantity

R
x
is not a measurable quantity. It is the
sum of random fraction in the perfect crystal
V
x
and the random fraction resulted from the dechanneling
by all defects along the depth 0
x
.
With single scattering approximation,

R
x
is given
by
 

0
1
1expd
RV V
x
ii
DD
i
xx x
nx x
 





 




(5)
For the case of very small defect concentration,
R
x
is given by,
 
0
1
x
ii
RV VDD
i
d
x
xx nx
 

 


x
(6)
where D
is the dechannelling factor of a certain type
of defects along the beam path 0
x
. The quantities
T
x
and
V
x
are measurable quantities in back-
scattering channelling experiments and yield the quantity
D
x
needed to determine defect density at depth
x
in a crystal using Equations (2) and (3). The above for-
mulation with single scattering dechanneling approxima-
tion is only valid for small defect densities (less than
~10% of lattice sites constitute defects) [31]. For higher
defect densities, the possibility of multiple scattering
dechanneling needs to be incorporated.
5.2.2. Incorporation of Multiple Scattering
For multiple scattering only, the quantity
R
x
takes
the following shape,


1
0
1
expd
RV V
x
ii
DD
i
xx x
nx x
 





(7)
Following the recent work by [32], combining both
single and multiple scattering mechanisms,
R
x
be-
comes (see Equation (8))
where
g
is an attenuation function and

0
d
x
D
nxx
is the areal density of defects.
ln1.29
n
L
and
is reduced energy used in cal-
culations of nuclear stopping power (Lindhard, 1964).
The attenuation function
g
is given by [32],
 
1
0
1exp 2d
x
ii
DnD
i
gLn

xx


 


(9)
Figure 10 shows selected results of 2 MeV He ions
channelling along a <100> axis [33]. It is clear from this
plot that single scattering dominates for low values of
areal defect density
(named here Regime I) and starts
losing significance after
increases beyond a certain
value at the cost of increase in multiple scattering (Re-
gime II). In Regime III, only multiple scattering takes
place. Equation (6) would be valid in all three regimes of
.
5.2.3. Physic al Realization of Channelin g Met ho d
Depending upon the radiation flux and temperature of the
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Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
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Figure 10. Dechanneling probability due to single scattering
and multiple scattering for 2 MeV He ions in silicon along
<100> axis (Shao, 2008).
containment wall, any crystal fulfilling certain conditions
can be used. These crystals (Si, Ge, GaAs and GaN) are
available in the market. Diamond has high melting tem-
perature, but can not be used due to lower channeling
yield. Information about these commercially available
crystals is easily available (Website, University Wafers,
http://www.universitywafer.com). Specific dimensions of
the test crystal depend on channeling measurement facil-
ity and design of the container. Typical dimensions of a
test crystal sample are shown in Figure 11(a). If the con-
tainer material is crystalline and a sample of the same
material is used as a test sample, radiation damage in the
test sample will be same as in the container material.
Details about channeling measurements of defects in
GaN crystals produced high temperature exposure are
given by Rana et al. [19,21]. The same defect quantifica-
tion procedure can be used for measurement of radiation
damage in the test crystal sample. If container material is
amorphous or a crystal on which channeling measure-
ments are not possible, a relationship or a calibration
between structure collapse rate of the test crystal and
damage in amorphous containment material is required.
Both test crystal and container material will undergo ir-
radiation in the same environment, then channeling meas-
urements will be performed on crystal, whereas some
other method like X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy or
XPS will be used on amorphous container material to
determine the concentration of broken bonds. The rela-
tionship between concentrations of atoms displaced from
lattice sites in the test crystal is determined using chan-
neling and the broken atomic bonds in the container
amorphous material will serve as a calibration. At present
ion beam facilities worldwide, 1 - 3 MeV helium ion
beams are available, crystal layer up to a couple of mi-
crons depth can be investigated for defect measurement
using ion channeling. If it is required to determine radia-
(a)
(b)
Figure 11. (a) Dimensions of the test crystal sample; (b)
Section of the nuclear waste container wall for installation
of radiation damage test crystal samples.
tion damage at 3 different sites in the container wall, five
identical test crystal samples will be placed at objective
sites as shown in Figure 11(b). After exposure, defect
concentration in surface layer of thickness 1 - 3 μm in all
test samples will be measured using ion channeling and
measurements will give intensity of radiation damage at
crystal sample sites in the containment material. Nature
of single radiation damage in bulk and surface-layer of a
typical solid is recently discussed [17]. Total radiation
damage is accumulated effect of all radiations penetrated
in to a target, with different radiations causing different
magnitude and type of damage.
5.3. Co-Use of Channeling with Other
Techniques
This paper discusses which techniques can be co-used
with channeling to increase the accuracy of the meas-
urement of the radiation damage in nuclear waste con-
tainers. Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is an attrac-
tive technique for radiation damage measurement as it is
element specific and is sensitive to both structures in
crystalline and amorphous domains in a sample [32].
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA 99
Using ion channeling and NMR together will make a
dual radiation damage detection and measurement sys-
tem. The displacement of low Z atomic species (like hy-
drogen) in the test crystal (which can not be measured or
can only be measured with low detection efficiency using
backscattering ion channeling) can be measured using
NMR. Another scheme for short and long term meas-
urement of radiation damage in nuclear waste containers
is presented here. In this scheme, ion channeling and
nuclear track detection technique are used as two inde-
pendent techniques for radiation damage measurement. A
wide spectrum of radiations (
,
,
and fission
fragments etc.) enter the container wall from the HL nu-
clear waste. These defects diffuse in the material of the
wall, coalesce and make extended defect structures. Pro-
duction of defects and their reaction continue as radia-
tions enter the material continuously. A typical defect
structure of the container wall is three fold: A part of the
material is severely damaged, another part gently dam-
aged and the remaining undamaged. Figure 11(a) shows
a section of the nuclear waste container wall. Channeling
and nuclear track detectors can be installed in the wall as
shown in Figure 11(b). Both nuclear track detectors (like
CR-39) and channeling detectors (test crystals like Si and
Ge) will provide short term radiation damage monitor.
These measurements will also provide an inter-calibra-
tion of two techniques, which would help in reliable
quantification of defects in the container material at dif-
ferent points in time. Long term (days to years) monitor-
ing of the radiation damage will be carried out by chan-
neling method only.
6. Thermodynamic Equilibrium and
Multi-Barrier Isolation
Thermodynamic equilibrium is a state of a system related
to the minimum of the thermodynamic potential. Ther-
modynamic potential is the Helmholtz free energy (U -
TS) for systems at constant temperature and volume
whereas the Gibbs free energy (H - TS) for systems at
constant pressure and temperature. U, T, H and S are,
respectively, internal energy, absolute temperature, en-
thalpy and entropy. Minimum of thermodynamic poten-
tial is characterized by states of thermal equilibrium,
mechanical equilibrium and chemical equilibrium of the
system. Ideally, nuclear waste should be disposed in a
way that it becomes in thermodynamic equilibrium with
the environment and remains the same for almost forever
without losing its original integrity.
Success probability of SNF disposal would increase by
implementing multiple barrier strategy to confine the
disposed waste and its effects far from safe environment
to which living being have or may need to have contact
in future. The definition of human vulnerability in such a
case is given in Figure 12. Most important of natural
barriers is a solid stable crystalline rock far from seismic
zones. Engineered barriers include corrosion-resistant con-
tainers possibly of copper alloys (containing mainly
copper along with Al: 5% to 9%; Ni: 0.5% to 4%; Fe:
0.5% to 4%; MN: 0.1% to 3%; Ti: 0.001% to 1%, Co:
0.001% to 1%; and B: 0.001% to 0.1%) [34] and disposal
architecture. Regular drilled-hole monitoring in the buffer
zone and sampling the leached activity before and after
earthquake can establish underground faults produced
due to earthquake. Nuclear waste containment and the
over-all repository environment should ideally be as
close as possible to thermodynamic equilibrium, meaning
unlimited stability, similar to natural metal deposits
within Earth’s crust [35].
7. Environment Ethics
Some of major considerations in evaluation of ethical
issues related to safety of nuclear waste disposal are clar-
ity of the policies, policy awareness of individuals in-
volved, natural response to nuclear fear/risk factor and
valid legal system to sue charges. Central specific ethical
issues are summarized as a set of disposal activity start-up
questions [3,4]: 1) Have the persons employed/involved
been given the free informed consent to the risk involved?
2) Who bear major responsibilities in waste disposal and
who is responsible for what? 3) Are the distributions of
risks and benefits equitable? 4) Have individuals been
informed about control over the risk? 5) Are assessment
about reliability of materials and methods involved are
made? 6) What are the third parties who can be held re-
sponsible for bringing in risk? 7) Evaluation of costs and
benefits of intervention measures? 8) Are the plans of
compensation for exposure to risk justified? 9) How will
an emergency be handled? Generalizing theme build up
by above questions, it may be said that issues like con-
sent, equity, control and responsibility are essential ethi-
cal considerations for radiological protection policy [36].
It would be interesting to know how above issues or
questions about nuclear waste disposal are incorporated
in policy making and its implementation. Only thought-
fully critical and multiply reviewed process of policy
Vulnerability
Exposure Risk
Coping Inability
Figure 12. Definition of human vulnerability.
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
100
analysis can achieve this. Ethical issues are closely linked
with scientific or technical know how about procedures
involved. So, a trustworthy research is needed to finalize
ethical aspects of high level nuclear waste disposal.
Evaluation of risk faced by far-future generations due to
present disposal of high level nuclear waste is also of
great importance and equally valid ethical issue as for the
case of present generation. Real problems are associated
with predictions about level and nature of risks faced by
future generations and their response to this problem,
especially in case of disposal failures.
It would not be wise to dispense with highly radioac-
tive material and to hope that either nature or future gen-
erations of humans will not bring it into the biosphere
somehow. In principle, we should ensure that even if
detail of nuclear waste disposal is lost and does not reach
future generations, still they or their environment is not
exposed to disposed waste at all. Nuclear waste disposal
in one country can quite possibly affect biosphere in the
neighbouring countries. Pakistan’s two neighbouring
countries are among the countries seeking sizeable future
nuclear energy programs [37] whereas Russia has offered
its land for a multinational nuclear waste repository [38].
These activities may pose questions of nuclear security
and environmental justice which Pakistan would need to
address. Nuclear waste disposal is not a solely internal
matter of any country. Activity of nuclear waste disposal
may have strong local, regional and even global implica-
tions. Regional and global implications would become
considerable for the cases of severe failures of disposal
scheme.
8. Conclusions, Final Remarks and
Perspective
Present status of different aspects of spent nuclear fuel
disposal is overviewed briefly, but comprehensively.
Time framework and time-line plan or policy for high-
level radioactive waste disposal are described and dis-
cussed. A new concept of chemical heat sink is intro-
duced to consume the heat emitted by spent nuclear fuel
without affecting the integrity of waste containment.
Conceptual model description of major issues of spent
nuclear fuel disposal is given along with scientific dis-
cussion and comments with focuses of materials, geology,
seismic and hydrology aspects. Modifications to a pro-
posed geological disposal of nuclear waste are proposed
with scientifically supported arguments.
Paradox of HLW casts shadows on nuclear future. Best
science with highest functionality can help solving this
problem. Need of ultimate disposal of HLW is an incon-
venient truth facing the humanity. This multi-tiered pro-
blem should be dealt with IAEA coordination among
nuclear states to sort out short and long-term aspects of
the HLW disposal. IAEA coordination would be aimed at
sharing of the cutting edge knowledge to assure safety of
the global environment. Environment is indivisible and
the long-term radiological obligations require a global
solution and makes it natural.
Although no repository around the globe is ready for
geological disposal of nuclear wastes, some developments,
mainly in conceptual and plan domains, were made in
last couple of decades. Table 2 summarizes the present
plans for high-level nuclear waste repositories. Tabulated
details show the sensitivity of the subject and require-
ment of the decades-long considerations before start up
of implementation of any disposal policy. In nuclear waste
disposal matters, four considerations are very important
which are radiation strength, mean life, environment con-
tamination and traditional ethical values.
Ethical values here refer to rightness or wrongness of
our actions. Considering above discussion about high-level
nuclear waste disposal, a long time in decades would be
needed in evaluation of repository location, design and
precautions before start up of disposal. Careful record
Table 2. Plans for high-level nuclear waste repositories (Andersen et al., 2004).
Country Geological medium Estimated openingStatus
Belgium Clay 2035 or later Searching for site
Canada Granite 2035 or later Reviewing repository concept
Finland Crystalline bedrock 2020 Site selected (Olkiluoto)
France Granite or clay 2020 or later Developing repository concept
Germany Salt Unknown Moratorium on development
Japan Granite or sedimentary rock2030 or later Searching for site
Russia Not selected Unknown Searching for site
Sweden Crystalline rock 2020 Searching for site
Switzerland Crystalline rock or clay 2020 or later Searching for site
United KingdomNot selected After 2040 Delaying decision until 2040
United States Welded tuff 2010 Site selected (Yucca Mountain)
M. A. RANA 101
keeping (including details of professionals involved) of
all nuclear waste disposal evaluations should be practiced
so that investigation of possible accident/emergency could
be carried out with transparency.
(a)
Clear demonstration about safety aspects of nuclear
waste management would help in gaining public and
political confidence in any possible scheme of permanent
nuclear waste disposal. A common public desire is re-
trievability of finally disposed wastes in case repository
fails to isolate wastes from the live environment. Desire
of retrievability is in direct contradiction with the princi-
ple of final disposal and adds serious complexities to the
problem. Public resistance against nuclear waste reposi-
tory [39] at Yucca Mountain is a typical example show-
ing the complexities involved. Figure 13 shows a simpli-
fied picture of the Swedish plan for geological disposal
of nuclear wastes [40]. Different objects in the figure,
showing steps of the disposal procedure, are explained
with the inset text. The figure differentiates high radioac-
tivity wastes from low and intermediate radioactivity
wastes which require different disposal procedures.
(
b
)
Fukushima disaster (Figure 14) on March 11, 2011
and Japan’s efforts (Figure 15) in collaboration with the
whole world in dealing with it offers a knowledge and
strategic framework regarding the preparedness for the
next possible accident of this nature. Science, engineer-
ing, technology, social and political spheres from around
Figure 13. A simplified picture of the Swedish plan for geo-
logical disposal of nuclear wastes Thegerström [40].
Figure 14. (a) A picture of Fukushima disaster [41] and (b)
Japan’s immediate response to it [42].
(a)
(
b
)
(c)
Figure 15. Three pictures [42] showing Japan’s systematic
response to the Fukushima disaster during which it col-
laborated with several c o untr ies fr om ar ound the world.
the world must join together to map the response plan
and its adequate execution, possibly of spontaneous na-
ture, in facing such accident anywhere in the world. Such
a grand alliance can be a solution to happenings of “type
N” as it reduces the cost and the chance of failure. An
incident of “type N” is a nuclear event which has a very
low happening frequency but a high level of serious im-
plications. There had been dangers in air travelling and
electricity supplies, but they are technical safe and sound
now. Conscious, careful and continued efforts with the
joint wisdom could provide the concrete solution to the
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA
102
challenge of the nuclear safety by assuring the dreamlike
reality line of “no failure in the nuclear technology”. Put-
ting aside the political games, this noble cause of nuclear
safety is doable. Achieving this cause or goal will be a
truly remarkable and historical pride for the humanity.
Fukushima disaster and responding efforts have revealed
strengths, weaknesses and the improvement road map for
the nuclear safety.
9. Acknowledgements
Discussions with and help by colleagues Prof. E. U.
Khan, Rahman Blocks, International Islamic University,
Misri Water Lanes, KASHMIR Highways, H-11/4, Is-
lamabad, Mr. Farooq Jan, Mr. Muhammad Ayub, Mr.
Muhammad Ramazan, Dr. Noor Muhammad Butt, Mr.
Abdul Ghani, Mr. Neik Emmal, Dr. Parveen Akhter, Mr.
Muhammad Akhtar, Ms. Naila Siddique, Ms. Sana Malik,
Dr. Mati, Dr. Usman Rajput, Mr. Qamar Abbas and oth-
ers (Drafts-Men), Mr. Raja A. Ghaffar, the recently de-
ceased colleague Nazir Maseeh, Mr. Yusuf, PIEAS, Is-
lamabad, Dr. H. R. Hoorani, Shahdara GAP Valley, NCP,
Islamabad, Mr. Muhammad Zulfiqar, NESCOM, Is-
lamabad, Mr. M. Asad, KRL, Rawalpindi, Dr.
Rakhshanda Bilal, SUPARCO, Islamabad, Ms. Bushra
Elyas, O-Lab, Islamabad, Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a re-
tired theoretical physicist, QAU, Islamabad, LUMS, La-
hore, and MIT, USA, Prof. Mark Breese, Ms. Ren Min-
qin, Ms. Debbie Seng, Dr. A. A. Bettiol, Dr. Markus
Zmeck, National University of Singapore, Dr. Karl-
Heinz Schmidt, GSI, Germany, Dr. Dietrich Hermsdorf,
Dresden, Germany, Prof. Tony Peaker, University of
Manchester, UK, and Miss Raaz, The National Institute
of the Rehabilitation, PIMS, Islamabad, are appreciated
and gratefully acknowledged. I am thankful to Mr. Paul
Murray from AREVA Federal Services LLC, 7207 IBM
Drive, Charlotte, NC 28262, for his comments on the
manuscript and grateful to Dr. Lin Shao, from Texas A &
M University, USA, for permission to adopt his plot as a
figure in this manuscript. Many thanks to Prof. Faleh
Abu-Jarad, Energy Research laboratory/Research Insti-
tute King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
Dhahran-31261, Saudi Arabia, Dr. Yajing Fu, Shanghai
Institute of Applied Physics, Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, Shanghai 201800, China, Prof. Hideo Nakajima,
The Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research, Osaka
University, Ibaraki, Osaka, Japan, Prof. Harry J. Whitlow,
Lund University and Institute of Technology, Lund, Swe-
den, and University of Jyväskylä, Finland, Dr. Walter
Scandale, CERN, Switzerland, Prof. Walter Greiner,
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies, Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt, Germany, Dr. San-
dro Scandolo, AS-ICTP, Trieste, Italy, Dr. M. S. AlSalhi
& Dr. M. R. Baig, Dept. of Phys. & Astron., King Saud
University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for useful exchange of
views. I appreciate the inspirations from Okara & Swiss
Cheese, Hamd/Naat khawan/show mediators/singers/ac-
tors, Qari Khushi Mu-hammad, Umm-e-Habibah, Qari
Waheed Zafar Qasmi, Naheed Akheter, Hadiqa Kiani,
Anwar Maqsood, Moeen Akhter, Bushra Ansari, Allan
Fakir, Muhammad Ali Shahki, Khayal Muhammad,
Musarrat Shaheen, Ghazanfer Ali, Pathaney Khan, Jamal
Shah, Mah Noor Balauch, Faryal Gohar, Tahir Naeem,
Sher Khan Auditorium, Shankyari Cantt. I dedicate this
article to Ms. Zubaida Jalal, an educationist from Kech,
Balochistan for her efforts to raise literacy in Pakistani
women, Urdu poets Amjad Islam Amjad & Iftikhaar Arif
due to their heartfelt poetry, Charles Dickenson, the au-
thor of the serial novel the “Great Expectations,” my
teachers Mr. Ahmed Tallat Fatami, Pakistan Land-Air-
Water Nuclear Safety Methodologies’ Initiative (PAK-
LAW-NSMI), PAEC, Islamabad, Prof. Frank Watt, Na-
tional University of Singapore, and Dr. S. Bashir, Dr.
Fawaad & Mr. Faizan-ul-Haq (CASP, GCU, Lahore),
and Singers/Actors Noor Jahan, Nabeel Bulbula, Arif
Lohar, Salman Khan & Shakira.“Mr. Syed Qamar Has-
nain, KANNUP/KINPOE, Karachi, Ms. Sabiha Bakhti-
yar, INNUP, Islamabad, Dr. Sabiha Mansoor Sahiba,
LCWL. Professional efforts by the personals from the
National Nuclear Security System (NSS) which includes
selections from PAEC, KRL, NESCOM, SUPARCO,
PNRA, SPD, Pakistan Burri Fauj, Pakistan Fizaea, Paki-
stan Navy and Pakistan Services agencies are heartedly
realized/appreciated. Very special thanks to the Security
Guards and the Cleaning Examination Staff of NSS for
help in organizing a small experiment on the safety check
of a security container/box. Support from UN/IAEA in
the provision of the Literature and related matters are
acknowledged. Continued support from my parents (Mr.
Master Saeed Ahmed & Ms. Sughra), Parents in Law
(Mr. Subaidar Nazir Ahmed & Ms. Khaleida), my wife
Ms. Shamila & her close friend Naurina and Dr.
Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti is also heartly appreciated. Dis-
cussion with friends Mr. M. Akhtar (DCS) & S. Usman,
Mr. Safdar Kayani and Mr. Tariq Azeem (IAD) are
thankfully acknowledged. Inspiration from poets Mu-
hammd Iqbal (Sialkot) & Faiz Ahmad Faiz (Narowal),
John Nash, US, Pakistani Nobel Laureate A. Salam, an
Egyptian born Nobel laureate Ahmed Hassan Zewail, the
founder of Pakistan M.A. Jinnah, Anwar (NILOPE) & Dr.
Hafiz Faisal (ICCC), Ms. Fariha Malik, Azaan N. Khan
and a close friend Mr. Abdullah (Faisalabad) is recog-
nized. Struggle/dedication by Mr. Ghulaam Ali, Nelson
Mandela, boxer Muhammad Ali, Michael Jackson,
Maddona, Singers Bismillah & Kaley Khan, my school
teachers Munir & Afzal (Zafarwali), Pir Mehar Ali Shah,
Mr. Abdul Karim, Mr. Riaz Librarian, Javed Bashir (JB),
Ms. Eva (NUS). Dr. Mariyam Giorgini, Badar Mian Qa-
waal, actor Omar Sharif, actresses Meera, Rani & Rekha
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA 103
(Ida by Mirza Ruswa), and Sir Ganga Rama is appreci-
ated. Help of the WJNST Editorial Board & Staff Mem-
bers for waving off the publication fee and the help in the
improvement of figures and composing of the manuscript
is very thankfully acknowledged. Possible discovery of
Higgs Boson (HB) and/or HG like particle at CERN is a
source of strength for long standing motivations in sci-
ence.” Useful interactions with several young/enthusias-
tic and ever-cooperative colleagues, friends Aziz, Tanwir,
Tabarak, Nisar, Ayaz, Mumtaz, Allah Ditta, Islam, Au-
rangzeb, Fozia Imran, Najamul-Haq, Asma Latif, Zahid
Munir, Atif Raza, Naveed, Dr. I. H. Bukhari, Asif Bashir,
Rafia Mir, Shazia Saeed, Ms. Wasim Yawar, Miss Ishrat
Rehan, Miss Rehana Mukhtar, Shahid Mukhtar, Tariq J.
Sulaija, Farhat Waqar, Dr. Shahid Bilal, Syeda Jan, Mr.
Shahid Riaz, Tayyab Mehmood, Tariq Mahmood, Atta
Muhammad, Waqar Murtaza, Mansoor Sheikh, Ms. Sha-
hida Waheed, Nasir Khalid, Dr. Sohaila Rahman, M. Ar-
shad, Habib-ur-Rahman, Muhammad Siddiq, Syeda Sa-
har Rizvi, Athar Saeed, Yasir Faiz, Saadia Zafar Bajwa,
Sumaira Naz, Hassan Waqas, Mudassir, Asif Shah, Zafar
Yasin, Qamar-ul-Haq, Saira Butt, Nadeem Yaqoob, Aye-
sha Yameen, Jawaria Abid, Sajjad Mirza, Sh. Hussain, S.
Hussain, Dr. N. Ali, Dr. M. I. Shahzad, Dr. N. U. Khat-
tak. Eng. M. Fayyaz, Masood Anwar, Gul Sher, Dr. Sa-
mina Roohi, Rizwana Zahoor, Saima Tariq, Jamil Tariq,
Dr. Khalid Saleem, Dr. Tabinda, Dr. Samina Gul, Farina
Kanwal, Irum Mehboob Raja, Farid Khan, Kabul Shah,
Saad Maqbool Bhatti, Dr. Shafqat Farooq, Badar Sule-
man, Dr. Khalid Jamil, Dr. Mansha Ch., Ansar Pervez,
Mirza Brothers, Arshad Zia, Bakhtiar Majid, Arshad Zia,
Munir Ahmad, Shahid Munir, Waseem Hassan, Imtiaz
Rabbani, Imtiaz Abbasi, Athar Farooq, Sajjad Malik, Ja-
vaid Irfan, Abdul hameed, M. Javed, Anwar-ul-Islam,
Jamshed Cheema, Abdul Hai, Mr. Zaka-ud-Din, Syed
Arif Ahmad, Sher Jan, Iqbal Ali Azhar, S. H. Jaffri, An-
war Habib, M. Iqbal, Zaheer Baig, M. Ali, Shahid Mal-
lick, Abdul Mannan, Gulam Nabi, Zia-ul-Hassan, Ad-
naan Kaiyani, M. M. Ashfaq, Khurshid Alam, M. Majid
Azim, Khalid Mahmood, Imran Zaka, A. A. Niazi, Faiq
Hanif, Jahangir Haider, Muhammad Naeem, Tariq Salee-
mi, Zahid Rana, Muhammad Sajid, Eng. Hashim, Qaisar
Abbas, Qamar Abbas, Waqas Masood, Zulfiqar Ali,
Shaukat Ali, Abbas Ali, Maj. Shabbir Sharif, Lance Naik
Muhammad Mahfooz, Pilot Rashid Minhaas, Maj. Tufail
Muhammad, Maj. Azeez Bhatti, Sarwar Muhammad
Hussain, Capt. Muhammad Sarwar, Maj. Muhammad A-
kram, Hawaldar alak Jan, Capt. Karnal Sher Khan, Naik
Saif Ali Janjua, Naveed Ikram Bhatti, Muhammad Ka-
shiff, Dr. Shafkat Karim, Amjad Nisar, Library, Muham-
mad Farooq, Nasrullah Khan Qazi, H. A. Khan, N. Ah-
mad, M. Jahangir, J. I. Akhter, Eng. Nisar Ahmed, Nazar
Hussain, A. H. Qureshi, Ms. Sabahat Nasir Ahmad (HP
D), Dr. Nasir Ahmad, Luqman Ahmad (NCD), SGs:
Muhammad Zahoor, Basharat Hussain, Muhammad Ak-
ram; Muhammad Saeed (Zafarwal), Manzoor Hussain
(Narowal), Sohail Ahmad (Baddo Malhi), Ms. Sabira
Manzoor, Mukkarram Shah, Shahid Mahmood, Kaleem
Haider, Tanvir Akhter, Malik Muhammad Zubair, Sartaj
Ali.
Anticipation by several people around the world and in
my home country contributed to shaping up my thoughts/
knowledge and even life in multi-disciplinary manners
(in direct contact, indirect contact and contact less, and
regular, temporary and permanent exposures of/to the
world). Some of them include King Abdullah, Yasir
Arafat, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Queen
Elizabeth, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Mao Zedong, Ma-
hateer Muhammd, Lee Kuen Yew, Zakir Naik, Mother
Treesa, Qari Abdul Basit, Umm-e-Habiba, Muniba Shei-
kh, John F. Kennedy, Michael Jackson, Jennifer Hudson/
Jennifer Lopez, Imran Khan, Jahangir Khan, Jan Sher
Khan, Shahbaaz (senior & junior), Paul O’Connell, Die-
go Maradona, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fareed Zakaria,
Zubaida Khanum, Aesam-ul-Haq. I was benefited by se-
veral people at the The Punjab University (PU): Dr.
Naseem Shahzad, Dr. Khadim Hussain, Ali Haider,
PIEAS, Zafar Iqbal the Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU),
the Govt. College University (GCU): Ms. Farzana Ashraf,
M. Arshad, Ch. Arshad, Zohra Nazir, Malik A. Ghafoor,
Kashiff Ahmad, Mr. Zafar Iqbal, Muhammad Humayun;
Dr. Shoaib Ahmad, Church Road CASP (GCU), Dr. Za-
far Iqbal, CIIT, Prof. Asghar Qadir, NUST, Col. Tanvir,
Zahid, Arshad, Talib JLA, Shankyari, Tajdar Adil (LU-
MS); National University of Singapore: Prof. S. J. Chua
(IMRE), several people at Dar-us-Salaam, Singapore, Dr.
Chammika Udalagamma, Mr. Ang Kwak Te, Ms. Yvon-
ne Seah, Prof. Thomas Osipowicz, Ms. Reshmi Rajen-
dern, Mangi, Ms. Hasma Hamza, OSA, Gillman Heights &
PGP Residences, Singapore, Prof. Ping Yuen Feng, Dr.
Leszek Lewinsky, Dr. J. van Kan, Ms Zhang Fang, Dr.
Huang Long; the University of Manchester (UMIST):
Prof. A. R. Peaker, Dr. Huda El mubarek, Dr. Frank
Podd, Dr. Leszek Majewski and several other people of
several disciplines, Mathematics, Chemistry and the UM
Central Library (Oxford Road); Manchester Museum, the
Royal Northern College of Music, Oxford Road, Man-
chester. Radiation Damage Workshop (2010), the AS-
ICTP, Trieste Italy; John Elis et al. & UA9 collaboration,
the CERN, Switzerland; Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul
2012 participants; Prof. L. J. Van Ijzendoorn, Eindhoven
University of Technology, The Netherlands, Minaal &
Saim, the National University of Ireland (NUI), Prof. W.
Ensinger, Institute of Material and Earth Science, Darm-
stadt University of Technology, Darmstadt, Germany;
Alexander M. Taratin, Joint Institute for Nuclear Re-
search, Joliot-Curie 6, 141,980, Dubna, Moscow Region,
Russia, Los Almos National Laboratory (LANL): Jorgen
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WJNST
M. A. RANA
104
Randrup, Peter Moller; Stepan G. Mashnik; University of
Colorodo (UC): Jerry Peterson, University of Aarhu,
Denmark (UAD): Prof. Soeren Pape Moeller, Prof. J. U.
Andersen; Prof, Hans Henrik Andersen, the Niels Bohr
Institute of the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. The
acknowledgements are partly to revisit myself in gather-
ing thoughts/knowledge acquired at several stages of my
life.
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