Wireless Sensor Network, 2012, 4, 84-90
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/wsn.2012.43012 Published Online March 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/wsn)
A Malicious and Malfunctioning Node Detection Scheme
for Wireless Sensor Networks
Seo Hyun Oh, Chan O. Hong, Yoon-Hwa Choi
Department of Computer Engineering, Hongik University, Seoul, Korea
Received December 15, 2011; revised January 30, 2012; accepted February 10, 2012
Wireless sensor networks are often used to monitor physical and environmental conditions in various regions where
human access is limited. Due to limited resources and deployment in hostile environment, they are vulnerable to faults
and malicious attacks. The sensor nodes affected or compromised can send erroneous data or misleading reports to base
station. Hence identifying malicious and faulty nodes in an accurate and timely manner is important to provide reliable
functioning of the networks. In this paper, we present a malicious and malfunctioning node detection scheme using
dual-weighted trust evaluation in a hierarchical sensor network. Malicious nodes are effectively detected in the presence
of natural faults and noise without sacrificing fault-free nodes. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme out-
performs some existing schemes in terms of mis-detection rate and event detection accuracy, while maintaining compa-
rable performance in malicious node detection rate and false alarm rate.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks; Fault Detection; Malicious Node Detection
Wireless sensor networks are often deployed in an unat-
tended area of interest for the purpose of remote moni-
toring in a homogeneous or heterogeneous environment
. Sensor nodes comprising the networks, in practice,
have limited power, memory, and computational capabi-
lities. Such networks are vulnerable to faults and mali-
cious attacks. Hence it is important to detect faulty or
malicious nodes in the networks to make correct deci-
sions in the monitoring applications.
Several fault detection and tolerance schemes for wi-
reless sensor networks have been proposed in the litera-
ture [2-9]. They are developed based on centralized, dis-
tributed, and hierarchical models. Due to the importance
of energy efficiency, most schemes employ a distributed
model, using either neighbor coordination or clustering.
These fault detection schemes mainly deal with noise
with a certain distribution or randomly and independently
generated faults. Malicious nodes, however, have not
been deeply investigated, although they are likely to exist
in wireless sensor networks due to resource constraints,
unreliable communications, and unattended operation.
There are a number of attacks that an attacker can
launch against wireless sensor networks once a certain
number of sensor nodes have been compromised . In
the network and routing layer, the attacks include selec-
tive forwarding, sinkholes , Sybil , wormholes ,
HELLO flood attacks , black hole attack , and
DDOS attacks , etc. In application layer, attackers
may compromise sensor nodes and inject false data to
fool data aggregators. To cope with the attacks both pre-
vention-based and detection schemes have been investi-
Curiac et al.  proposed a malicious node detection
scheme using an autoregression technique. It uses time
series of measured data provided by each sensor node
and relies on autoregressive predictor placed in base sta-
tions. Signal strength is used to detect malicious nodes in
, where a message transmission is considered suspi-
cious if the strength is incompatible with the originator’s
geographical position. Several trust management schemes
have been proposed primarily in routing and communi-
cation. Various efforts have also been made to combine
communication and data trusts .
A special type of attack where the compromised nodes
behave normally but report false readings to lead to an
incorrect decision has recently been investigated in [19,
20]. Atakli et al.  proposed a novel scheme for dete-
cting malicious nodes reporting false data in a hierar-
chical sensor network. They employed a weighted trust
evaluation (WTE in this paper) to make a decision on the
correctness of the reports. The weights assigned to sensor
nodes are updated after each cycle by reflecting the ratio
of the number of incorrectly reporting nodes to the total
number of nodes. Ju et al.  proposed an improved
opyright © 2012 SciRes. WSN
S. H. OH ET AL. 85
scheme based on WTE, named weighted-trust application
(WTA). The weight of each sensor node is updated based
on the behavior of the node itself.
Both WTE and WTA reduce the weights and norma-
lize them after each cycle to keep the values in the range
from 0 to 1. In the worst case, however, malicious nodes
are likely to be detected with sacrificing some normal
nodes. The loss of normal nodes might be problematic
due to the resulting lack of network connectivity and
sensing coverage. In addition, faults are only partially ta-
ken into account in detecting malicious nodes. Consequ-
ently, both schemes might not achieve the expected per-
formance in a sensor network where noise, natural faults,
and malicious nodes coexist.
In this paper, we propose a dual weighted trust evalua-
tion (DWE) scheme to detect malicious nodes in the face
of faults in a hierarchical sensor network, where sensor
nodes report their readings to a forwarding node for
aggregation. Each sensor node is assigned two trust va-
lues. They are increased or decreased depending on its
reading and the aggregation result at the forwarding node.
An efficient updating policy is developed to keep mis-de-
tection rate low while achieving high malicious node
detection rate for a wide range of fault and related pro-
babilities. Moreover, event detection accuracy and false
alarm rate are also taken into account to be practically
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the network model and fault model to be used
throughout the paper. Our dual weighted trust evaluation
scheme is presented in Section 3. Experimental results
are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Network Model and Fault Model
2.1. Network Architecture
The proposed scheme is also based on a three-layer hier-
archical network architecture shown in Figure 1 ,
Figure 1. A hierarchical sensor network.
only for comparison purposes, where SN, FN, and BS
represent the corresponding layers, respectively. Sensor
nodes in SN (sensor node) layer are grouped, and the
member nodes in each group directly communicate with
the corresponding forwarding node in FN (forwarding
node) layer to provide their sensor readings.
Sensor nodes in SN layer are densely deployed to
monitor the network area. They have limited power, me-
mory, and computational capabilities. Sensor readings are
assumed to be binary, 0 and 1 (alarm), and reported to
the FN node. Nodes in FN layer are assumed to be more
powerful as far as resources are concerned, and thus
2.2. Modeling Malicious Nodes
In this paper, malicious nodes in a sensor network are
assumed to behave normally but send wrong data to the
forwarding node. Such sensor nodes can also be modeled
as faulty nodes behaving differently from normal nodes,
although the fault model becomes more complicated. In
 malicious nodes are assumed to keep reporting the
opposite information after being compromised. In ,
the ratio of sending wrong information is defined in the
simulation. If the ratio is 80%, for example, malicious
nodes report correctly 20% of the time to hide them to
stay undetected. In reality, sensor readings will be affected
by noise, faults, and malicious nodes. Hence malicious
nodes have to be detected in the presence of faults and
Both transient and permanent faults are included in the
fault model. Transient faults are assumed to occur ran-
domly and independently with the same probability pt.
Permanent faults are also assumed to occur with the same
probability pp for all the nodes in SN layer. In the case of
permanent faults, both stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 (alarm)
are assumed to occur with the same probability. Mali-
cious nodes, although treated as faulty nodes, are as-
sumed to behave more intelligently not to be detected. In
the simulation later, they are assumed to report opposite
to the sensor readings with probability pinv. For conven-
ience we list in Table 1 the notation to be used through-
out the paper.
3. Dual Weighted Trust Evaluation
In detecting malicious nodes, we employ trust values of
sensor nodes to reflect their track records in decision
making process. Each forwarding node maintains trust
values of its associated sensor nodes in SN layer as
shown in Figure 2, where Un represents the binary sen-
sor reading of the sensor node SNn. Here Un = 1 indicates
an alarm to the FN. FN will make a decision on an event
based on weighted majority voting with the trust values
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WSN
S. H. OH ET AL.
Table 1. Notation.
W0n Trust value of SNn in case of no-event
W1n Trust value of SNn in case of event
Wn min(W0n, W1n)
Un Output of sensor node SNn
E Aggregation result
r Recovery rate
M0 Weighted sum of trust values of sensor nodes with Un = 0
M1 Weighted sum of trust values of sensor nodes with Un = 1
pt Transient fault probability
pp Permanent fault probability
pm Malicious node probability
pinv Probability of reporting opposite to sensor readings
δ Tolerable variation of transient fault probability
Figure 2. Two trust values assigned to each sensor node.
Two trust values (weights), W0n and W1n, ranging be-
tween 0 and 1, and initialized to 1, are assigned to each
sensor node SNn, 1 ≤ n ≤ N. W0n represents the trust
value of SNn in case of no-events, while W1n denotes that
of SNn in case of events. Employing two weights is to
eliminate the cancelation effect due to transitions be-
tween event and no-event. The weights represent the
sensor node’s dependability. That is, the readings of a
sensor node with a higher weight are more trustworthy.
Updating the values is important to reflect the correct-
ness of the current readings in the future decision making
FN collects sensor readings of its associated sensor
nodes where “1” denotes an alarm. It then computes
weighted sums of 1’s and 0’s, respectively, as follows.
where Wn = min (W0n, W1n).
The aggregation result at the forwarding node (FN), E,
is equal to 1 (i.e., and event) if M1 > M0. It is 0 (no-event)
if M0 > M1. If M0 = M1, the decision will be delayed until
the inequality is satisfied.
At the end of the aggregation at FN, all the weights as-
signed to the member nodes are updated as follows:
If E = 1, then
If E = 0, then
where θ is a penalty ranging between 0 and 1. If Un is not
equal to E, the corresponding weight of SNn is reduced
by θ. Otherwise, it is increased by θ × r, where r, named
here the recovery rate of the lost weight due to a transient
fault, is assigned based on the transient fault probability
pt. The reason for not simply choosing r = 1 is that a ma-
licious node reporting 0 and 1 at almost the same rate, for
example, keeps the weight close to 1, and the node is
likely to remain in the network without being detected.
To lower the weights of malicious nodes while main-
taining the weights of normal nodes close to 1, even in
the face of transient faults, an appropriate value of r
needs to be chosen. For a given transient fault probability,
pt, we set r to be
where δ is proportional to the variance of pt. If pt = 0.1
and δ = 0.05, for example, normal sensor nodes with
transient faults up to 15% for a certain period of time,
can maintain the weights close to 1. In that case,
r . A normal node with 15% of incorrect
readings due to transient faults for a certain period of
time loses its weight by θ each time it reports incorrectly,
but gains it by 0.176×θ each time it reports correctly.
Eventually, nodes with Wn (=min (W0n, W1n)) less than
or equal to a specified threshold value Wlow will be de-
termined as faulty (including malicious). For the weight
ranging from 0 to 1 the value Wlow is expected to be 0
unless otherwise stated.
4. Performance Evaluation
4.1. Simulation Setups
Computer simulation is conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed malicious node detection scheme
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WSN
S. H. OH ET AL. 87
in a hierarchical sensor network, where 20 sensor nodes
are under the control of a single forwarding node. Faults
and malicious nodes are generated in accordance with
predefined probabilities, pt (transient fault), pp (perma-
nent fault), and pm (malicious node). In the case of per-
manent faults, both stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 are assumed
to occur with the same probability. If pt = 0.2, for exam-
ple, normal nodes are expected to report incorrect read-
ings with a probability of 0.2. If pp = 0.1, both stuck-at-1
and stuck-at-0 occur with probability of 0.05 each. Mali-
cious nodes are randomly generated with probability pm.
They are assumed to report opposite to the sensor read-
ings with probability pinv.
Four metrics, malicious node detection rate (MDR),
misdetection rate (MR), false alarm rate (FAR), and event
detection accuracy (EDA), are defined to show the effec-
tiveness of our scheme compared to the existing WTA
and WTE, although they focus only on malicious node
detection. MDR is defined to be the ratio between the
number of detected malicious nodes and the total number
of existing malicious nodes. MR is defined to be the ratio
between the number of normal nodes determined to be
faulty and the total number of normal nodes. FAR is de-
fined as the ratio of the number of no-event cycles with E
= 1 to the total number of no-event cycles. Lastly, EDA
is the ratio of the number of event cycles with E = 1 to
the total number of event cycles.
In our scheme, if necessary, each sensor node can be
logically removed from the network when its weight is
less than or equal to Wlow. Sensor nodes excluded may
optionally join the aggregation process later if their
weights reach Whigh. If Wlow = 0 and Whigh = 1, for exam-
ple, suspicious nodes are detected when their weights
reach 0. Sensor nodes can be reinstated if their weights
increase up to 1 (i.e., Whigh).
4.2. Experimental Results
Malicious node detection schemes have to achieve high
MDR while maintaining low MR. In addition, they need
to guarantee high EDA while keeping FAR low. MDR
and MR for various values of pinv for the proposed DWE
when pt = 0.2, pp = 0.2, pm = 0.2, θ = 0.05, and δ = 0.05,
are shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Simulation
results after 200 cycles of operation with Wlow = 0.4 are
used for comparison since WTA and WTE stop simula-
tion after a short period of time with the threshold. All
the three schemes achieve almost perfect MDR for pinv >
pt. WTA and WTE perform better in terms of MDR for
pinv ≤ pt. They, however, achieved a higher MDR by sac-
rificing normal nodes, as can be seen in Figure 4, where
mis-detection rate (MR) for WTA and WTE are higher
than that for the proposed DWE. MR for DWE is only
about 0.01 for the entire range of pinv. More importantly,
malicious nodes behaving normally and reporting
Figure 3. MDR for various values of pinv.
Figure 4. MR for various values of pinv.
similar to normal nodes (i.e., pinv ≤ pt) do not cause a
significant problem even if they stay in the network.
Hence MDR for pinv ≤ pt does not carry much meaningful
Performance of a malicious node detection scheme par-
tially depends on the correctness of the aggregation re-
sults at the forwarding node since wrong decisions at the
node lead to inaccurate management of trust values. The
resulting false alarms might waste energy and thus shor-
ten the network lifetime. FAR for various values of pinv
when pm = pt = pp = 0.2, δ = 0.05, and θ = 0.05 are shown
in Figure 5. All the three schemes under comparison
achieve extremely low FAR, although WTA performs
the best. The proposed DWE is comparable to WTA, but
shows a slightly higher FAR. It is due to the facts that
stuck-at-0 nodes reduce the chances of having false alarms
for all the three schemes, but the weights of normal nodes
in WTA are generally lower than those of normal nodes
in DWE since DWE recovers the weight lost by transient
faults with time. In other words, an alarm from a normal
node is counted less in WTA as compared to DWE, re-
sulting in a slightly lower FAR.
The main reason that malicious nodes report false
readings might be to lead the forwarding nodes to make
an incorrect aggregation, especially in the case of an
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WSN
S. H. OH ET AL.
Figure 5. FAR for various values of pinv.
event. Malicious node detection schemes leading to a low
event detection accuracy (EDA) are not acceptable. Hen-
ce we now evaluate EDA when an event occurs after 200
non-event cycles, under the assumption that all the sensor
nodes associated with a forwarding node are in an event
region. The results for various values of pinv for pm = pt =
pp = 0.2, δ = 0.05, and θ = 0.05 are shown in Figure 6,
where our DWE outperforms WTA and WTE, for the en-
tire range of pinv, maintaining EDA of 0.95 even for rela-
tively high fault probabilities.
The same simulation is conducted to see the changes
in performance for four different values of pm. MDR is
not included since almost perfect MDR can be obtained
for the three different schemes under comparison. DWE
consistently outperforms WTA and WTE in terms of MR
and EDA as shown in Figures 7-9, respectively.
Stuck-at-1 faults are detected while there are no events.
Stuck-at-0 faults, on the other hand, can be identified
when an event occurs. After 600 non-event and event
cycles almost all of the permanent faults are logically
removed from the network, resulting in considerably
better EDAs for all the three schemes, compared to Fig-
ure 6, as shown in Figure 10.
Finally, we performed simulation to see the changes in
performance depending on the values of θ (penalty). As θ
increases, malicious nodes lose their weights more qui-
ckly, and thus be detected in a relatively short time. On
the other hand, normal nodes are more likely to be mis-
detected as faulty nodes. Hence the value of θ has to be
properly chosen to compromise between MDR and MR.
MDR and MR for four different values of θ are shown in
Table 2, where pinv = 0.2 and 0.3 are chosen to focus on
As can be seen in Table 2 , MDR for θ = 0.1 is the best
while MR increases with θ. Almost all of the malicious
nodes are detected when pinv = 0.3 regardless of the value
of θ under consideration. The loss of normal nodes due to
the increase in θ becomes problematic. The appropriate
value of θ for the cases under consideration lies between
0.05 and 0.1.
In this paper, we proposed a malicious and malfunction-
ing node detection scheme using dual weighted trust eva-
luation in a hierarchical sensor network. Malicious nodes
are detected in the face of faults and noise by using a
weighted majority voting. Trust values of sensor nodes
are used as weights at the forwarding node to reflect the
Figure 6. EDA for various values of pinv.
Figure 7. MR for various values of pm.
Figure 8. FAR for various values of pm.
Copyright © 2012 SciRes. WSN
S. H. OH ET AL. 89
Figure 9. EDA for various values of pm.
Figure 10. EDA for various values of pinv.
Table 2. MDR and MR for various values of θ when pp = pt
= 0.2. (a) pinv = 0.2; (b) pin v = 0.3.
(a) Pinv = 0.2
Θ MDR MR
0.05 0.568 0.000
0.10 0.944 0.034
0.15 0.925 0.104
0.20 0.894 0.180
(b) Pinv = 0.3
Θ MDR MR
0.05 0.971 0.000
0.10 0.999 0.033
0.15 0.993 0.103
0.20 0.982 0.178
correctness of their reports in the decision-making proc-
ess. The weights are updated in such a way that normal
nodes with some transient faults may retain their weights
close to 1, while malicious nodes behaving differently
from normal nodes gradually lose the weights to be de-
tected. Implementing the scheme does not sacrifice nor-
mal nodes even for high fault probabilities. The scheme
is presented using a simple hierarchical model for con-
venience. The simulation is also limited for comparison
with some existing schemes. It, however, is developed
for more realistic sensor networks, and can thus be ap-
plied to different structures without significant modifica-
This research was supported by the National Research
Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant funded by the Korean
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