J. Serv. Sci. & Management, 2008, 1: 165-171
Published Online August 2008 in SciRes (www.SRPublishing.org/journal/jssm)
The Relation Analysis of Equity Structure and Its
Performance on Chinese Listed Bank
Chang-jun Zheng1, Zhou Yan2 & Li Wei3
School of Management of HUST, Wuhan, Hubei, P.R. China
ABSTRACT
With the development of reform of stock system among Chinese commercial banks, more and more listed banks are
coming forth to the market, so it is important to analyze the relationship between the equity structure and its perform-
ance of Chinese listed bank. For representatives, this article selected 6 banks from the total of 14 listed banks, and then
made the demonstration analysis about the relationship between the performance and equity structure, according to
their different equity structures. The result shows the first major shareholder is significantly relative to banks’ per-
formance, by contract, there’s no notable correlation between the big five /ten and bank’s performance, but square sum
of equity by the ten big is correlate to the performance.
Keywords: equity structure, performance, listed banks
1. Introduction
As putting up shares in domestic stock market in 1997,
Shenzhen Development Bank became the first Chinese
commercial bank raising money in public, and then fol-
lowed by another 14 banks, such as SPD bank, Minsheng
bank, Huaxia bank and so on. Since 2005, the Chinese
commercial banks have sped up to issue, take three state-
owned Commercial banks as the symbol, the China ICBC,
the CCB and the Bank of China were all offered to the
public through the issuance of shares, and this fact shows
that the scale and quantity of issue has improved, and
equity structure also has a big change.
Equity structure is the proportion which the sharehold-
ers have partial ownership of the corporation. Its has two
meanings: the first is centralized degree which has many
standard, including the sum and the square sum of equity
proportion which the big five or ten shareholders has; the
second is capital structure, which means the proportion of
different kind of capital source, including state-owned
shares, corporate shares and public shares.
As different in time and various in background of be-
ing listed bank, the data information about these 14 banks
is numerous and complex. So we take 6 banks as repre-
sentatives, including the Bank of Chin a, the China ICBC,
the China Merchants Bank, the Bank of Communication,
the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and Minsheng
Bank. We want to examine the results of relationship be-
tween the equity structure and performance by utilizing
these six banks and offer a reference to other listed banks
and listing banks.
2. Literature Review
Berle & Means firstly put forward the hypothesis in their
book titled Modern Corporation and Private Property,
which shows the more decentralize, the worse perform-
ance is, Jensen & Meckling considered that corporate
value lie on the proportion of shares held by internal
shareholder, the bigger proportion is, the higher company
value is in theoretically.[1, 3]
In past 20 years, more and more scholars have studied
the relationship between equity structure and performance,
but they didn’t come to the same conclusion. Some schol-
ars said share centralized degree was related to perform-
ance. Grossman & Hart’s model [9] indicates that the
single shareholder would lack stimulant to monitor com-
pany’s management, to participate in the company’s op-
eration, or to drive company’s value to grow if equity
structure is too scattered, because the cost in supervision
is more than return. The model developed by Shleifer &
Vishny shows the wealth brought by stock price rising
causes benefit of holding shareholder and small share-
holders being consistent, so some share concentration is
necessary. [5]
Other scholars took the opposite view about the rela-
tionship between performance and share concentration.
Pound [5] proposed conflict of interest hypothesis and
strategic alignment hypothesis, which deduced the in-
verse correlation between share and performance. The
study by Qian Sun and Wilson H.S.Tong [6] indicate
state-owned shares and corporate shares make a negative
effect on company’s performance.
Also some scholars believed there has a curve relation
between the equity structure and performance. Morck,
Shleife & Vishny studied [71] large companies list in the
“Fortune”, and found that it was inverted U-shaped curve

166 Chang-jun Zheng, Zhou Yan & Li Wei
relationship between the proportion of shareholding by
company’s manager and company’s value. McConnell &
Servaes analyzed 1173 companies as sample in 1976 and
1093 company as sample in 1986, they discovered that
the Tobin's Q is relate to shares holding by interior share-
holders in curvilinear.[4,5]
Other scholars thought the performance was dependent
to shares concentration. Demsets & Lehn’s research [7]
found there was no significant correlation between shares
concentration degrees and accountant margin. Holdmess
& Sheehan [11] concluded that there is no difference be-
tween the performance in the year existing absolutely
shareholders and the year they are not existing in the
same company So they considered there was no correla-
tion between equity structure and company’s performance.
Xu Xiaonian [12] is the first domestic scholar who
used the empirical method to analyze the relationship
between the company's performance and the equity struc-
ture of Chinese listed companies, he found that perform-
ance was relate to share concentration degree; the propor-
tion of corporate shares has a remarkable positive influ-
ence to the company’s performance, while the proportion
of state-owned shares has a negative influence to per-
formance, the circulation stock proportion is not remark-
able to the company performance affects, but proportion
of circulation stock had no significant impact on perform-
ance.
Similarly, other scholars have made empirical analysis
from the perspective of kind of share. Zhou Yean [14]
selected 160 samples from 745 listed companies at ran-
dom at the end of 1997, inspected the relation between
equity structure and net assets, and drew the conclusion:
the ratio of returns on net assets were significally related
to proportion of A stock, the state-owned shares and the
corporate shares, but B stock, H stock had the inverse
correlation relations with the ROA ratio. By observing
the relation between ROA and A stock, Yu Zhidong [15]
concluded that the company performance was low rala-
tive to state-owned shares and the corporate shares, by
contract, the performance was inverse correlation to A
stock, the staff share and circulation stock in foreign capi-
tal, and all kinds of shareholders didn’t play the due role
in the company development.
Some scholars did not agree with this point of view.
The study by Xu Xiaonian, Wang Yan [16] showed that
the company's profit margins declined with increasing of
proportion of state-owned shares, but increased with in-
creasing of the proportion of corporate shares, and had no
impact on public shares. Chen Xiaoyue and Xu Xiaodong
[13] took empirical study in relationship between equity
structure and performance among the listed companies
besides financial industries in Shenzhen Stock Exchange
in1996-1999 years, they deduced that in non-protection
industries (including10 industries except for petroleum
chemical industry, energy and raw material industry), the
performance was related to scale of share holding by first
major shareholder, was inverse correlate to scale of circu-
lation stock, and no significant relation to state-owned
shares or corporate shares.
Wushu Kun’s [18] Empirical analysis shows that the
relationship was significantly inverted U-shaped curve
between performance and shares concentration degrees or
internal holdings (including the staffs holding and execu-
tives manager holding), while the relationship was sig-
nificantly U-shaped curve between performance and
scales of circulation stock, state-owned shares and do-
mestic corporate shares. Yang Deyong, Cao Yongxia [23]
studied five listed banks on Chinese market, and found
bank’s performance was inversing to the biggest share-
holder, and was relate to holding scale of the top five or
the top 10 shareholders, and also inversing to circulation
stock scales.
However, not all research shows that the equity struc-
ture and the achievements are correlative. Zhang Zongyi,
Song Zengji [17] pointed out that equity structure and
scales of manager’s holding did not affect on the com-
pany's performance.
Getting a review of studies in equity structure and
company administration in recent years, you would find
following characteristic: firstly, the theory almost focus
on benefit balance in shareholders and manage operators.
Secondly, some scholars neglected the fact that different
way of administration would make different influence on
performance; also they didn’t make quantitative analysis
to situation and ch aracteristic o f Chin ese listed co mpanies.
Thirdly, more empirical analysis, but few canonical parse
analysis. Lastly, some studies neglected Chinese situation,
such as “forge”, effectiveness of Chinese stock market,
authenticity of the stock price, and so on, and precisely
was this problem leading to conflict among different stud-
ies.
3. Methods and Tools
3.1. Samples
The samples was select from annual report of six banks in
the five year when is from 2003 to 2007, including the
Bank of China (BOC for short), the China ICBC (i.e.
ICBC), the China Merchants Bank (i.e. CMB), the Bank
of Communication (i.e. BC), the Shanghai Pudong De-
velopment Bank (i.e. SPD) and the Minsheng Bank (i.e.
MB), the objects are these 6 banks, the number of sam-
ples is 30.
3.2. Selection and Difinition of Variables
z Be interpreted variable S, the composite index which
measure the perform ance of l i st ed banks.
z Interpreted variables
F1: Proportion of share holding by the biggest sharehold-
ers

The Relation Analysis of Equity Structure and Its Performance on Chinese Listed Bank 167
F5: Sum of proportion of share holding by top five share-
holders
F10: Sum of proportion of share holding by top ten share-
holders
HERF10: square sum of proportion of share holding by
top ten shareholders, measuring the degree of shares con-
centration.
CSP: Proportion of circulation stocks
LSP: Proportion of corporate shares
SOSP: Proportion of state-owned shares
In this article, variable refer to the dependent variable,
the independent variable and the controlled variable. The
dependent variable is displayed with the performance of
listed banks; the independent variable is display with CSP,
LSP, SOSP and indexes such as F1, F5, F10 and HERF10.
In addition, we selected ratio of debt to assets and asset
size, etc., as control variables in order to control other
characteristics which would make influence to perform-
ance.
4. Qualitative Analysis and Assumptions
4.1. About Degree of Share Concentration
Generally, there are 3 methods to measure equity concen-
tration .The first is CR index, which is the sum of propor-
tion of share holding by top N shareholders, and we
choose F1, F5, and F10 to represent it. The second is her-
findahl index, which is the square sum of proportion of
share holding by top N shareholders, and we choose ten
to instead of N. The th ird is Z index, which is th e ratio of
proportion of the share holding by the biggest shareholder
and the second one. The bigger the ratio, the wider the
gap between the top two shareholders, which means the
biggest one has remarkable predominance. In our study,
we use first two indexes to measure equity concentration
degree.
The larger F1, the stronger monitoring of the company,
which would lead to continuing drive function and the
corresponding restriction mechanism to the agent. There-
fore, the bigger of first major stockholder's superiority is,
the more helpful this will be in decision-making and co-
ordination in bank it will. However, there are differences
among the first major shareholders, such as their charac-
teristics, ability of acting, which would then have a sig-
nificant impact on performance of commercial banks.
Only when holding shareholder is good at making correct
decisions, bank performance would be improved; other-
wise, it will reduce the performance. So we can make
hypothesis as follows:
H1. Bank’s performance is not related to proportion of
share holding by first major shareholder
If shares are concentrated in some independent share-
holders, not only in one shareholder, it will keep the
benefits and rights in balance, which will improve on the
shortcoming taken by the fact that there is only one con-
trol stockholder. However, when the proportion of these
shareholders is not big enough, their own benefits may
not be coherence to the banks. The bank performances
should be U-shape curve relation to the equity concentra-
tion degree, and the equity concentration degree should
have a best sector theoretically. So we can make hypothe-
sis as follows:
H2. Performance of bank is related to the sum of propor-
tion of the top five shareholders’ holding, and so as to the
top ten, but is U-shape curve relation to the square sum of
proportion of top ten shareholders’ holding.
4.2. About Property of Shares
In the perspective of property of shares, equity can be
divided into state-owned shares, corporate shares and
circulation shares. We select state-owned shares and cir-
culation shares to measure property of shares in this arti-
cle. As a major shareholder, the state is in a special status
differ from other major shareholders. This is mainly be-
cause performance largely depends on the behaviors of
governing by agents of the state. When proportion of the
state-owned shares is low, there must be lack of effective
monitoring to the bank as lacking impetus, however, if
that proportion rose to a certain degree, which could
make government’s attention to improving in monitoring
to banks, it will help to improve the performance of banks.
Thus we make hypothesis as follows:
H3. The proportion of state-owned shares is related to
performance in curve relation. The performance is inverse
correlate to this proportion when the proportion is low,
but performance is related to this proportion when the
proportion is high.
Investors of circulation stocks and corporate stocks all
concern about bank’s performances, because they take
maximum profit as the only goal. Compared to corporate
stocks, investors of circulation stocks are in inferior posi-
tion, but they can vote with “feet” if cannot with hands,
that means they can influence the banks’ performance by
buying or selling stocks of banks in the stock market. So
we make hypothesis as follows:
H4. Sum of proportion of the corporate shares is related
to the banks’ performance; and the sum of proportion of
circulation stock is also related with the banks’ perform-
ance.
5. Empirical Study on Relationship between
Performance and Equity Sructure
5.1. The Data We Collect about the Chinese
Listed Banks
We get the data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks
and the Chinese finance yearbooks between 2003 and
2007, and some missing data from the listed banks’ an-

168 Chang-jun Zheng, Zhou Yan & Li Wei
nual reports .(see the table 1).
5.2. The Model of Equity Structure Attributing to
Banks’ Performance
Theoretical analysis shows that the equity structure will
ultimately affect the bank's profitability and performance
in the market, but the relationship between them also
needs empirical analysis. In order to get the function rela-
tion between the equity attributes and the banks’ per-
Table1.The banks’ performance index and the variables. S—the composite index which measure the performance of
listed banks, we get it by the weighted average between PE and the net assets returns ratio; F1—Proportion of share
holding by the biggest shareholders; F5—Sum of proportion of share holding by top five shareholders; F10—Sum of
proportion of share holding by top ten shareholders; HERF10—square sum of proportion of share holding by top ten
shareholders, measuring the degree of shares concentration; CSP—Proportion of circulation stocks; LSP—Proportion
of corporate shares; SOSP—Proportion of state-owned shares
S F1 F5 F10 HERF10 CSP(%) LSP(%) SOSP(%)
19.54 35.30 92.80 95.66 2709.32 100.00 0.00 0.00
12.72 35.30 92.60 95.50 2704.13 100.00 0.00 0.00
14.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
63.21 17.88 43.23 51.89 547.46 100.00 0.00 0.00
33.94 17.79 43.09 51.75 544.01 100.00 0.00 0.00
26.97 17.78 37.61 47.06 454.86 27.00 63.90 3.70
30.53 17.95 37.98 47.14 462.22 26.30 69.90 3.80
25.61 17.95 37.98 47.03 458.68 26.30 72.00 1.80
28.99 22.02 69.11 72.68 1289.49 100.00 0.00 0.00
21.15 21.78 62.49 65.62 1067.13 50.40 27.90 21.80
16.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17.62 67.49 95.32 97.26 4800.41 100.00 0.00 0.00
13.90 67.49 95.09 97.07 4794.88 100.00 0.00 0.00
12.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
72.72 23.57 41.01 47.40 652.20 100.00 0.00 0.00
45.29 23.57 41.37 47.11 653.43 100.00 0.00 0.00
39.76 7.01 26.08 37.32 170.28 27.60 63.30 9.10
31.80 7.01 26.08 37.06 168.50 27.70 62.50 9.80
26.52 6.44 24.80 33.27 140.74 27.70 65.20 7.10
28.19 5.90 25.57 44.35 202.45 100.00 0.00 0.00
25.43 5.98 25.97 42.00 190.26 100.00 0.00 0.00
27.24 5.99 25.98 42.06 190.59 100.00 0.00 0.00
27.40 6.98 29.46 48.40 251.61 30.10 69.90 0.00
26.21 7.40 32.61 53.27 303.54 26.00 74.00 0.00

The Relation Analysis of Equity Structure and Its Performance on Chinese Listed Bank 169
Table 2. the regression analysis between the banks’ performance and the equity attribution
Coefficients Std. Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 12.469 4.37929 2.8473 0.0085 3.467373 21.4709118
CSP(%) 0.1979 0.05791 3.4164 0.0021 0.0788103 0.31689295
LSP(%) 0.1635 0.09333 1.7514 0.0917 -0.028383 0.35528582
SOSP(%) -0.011 0.58503 -0.02 0.9845 -1.214039 1.19104615
Table 3. The regression analysis between the banks’ performance and the equity attribution. A De pe ndent Variable: S
model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coeffi-
it
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error
1 (Constant) 12.469 4.379 2.847 0.008
CSP 0.198 0.058 0.577 3.416 0.637
LSP 0.163 0.093 0.327 1.751 0.984
SOSP -0.011 0.585 -0.004 -0.020 0.276
Table 4. The relation between the banks’ performance and the proportion of CSP. Model Summary and Parameter Esti-
mates. Dependent Variable: S; the induced variable is the banks’ performance index S,the independent variable is the pro-
portion of CSP. The independe nt variable is proportion of circulation stocks
Model Summary Parameter Estimates
Equation R Square F df1 df2 Sig Constant b1
Linear .229 8.335 1 28 .007 17.188 .164
Table 5. The relation between the banks’ performance and the concentration ratio of t he equity. A Depende nt Var i able : S
model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error
1 (Constant) 12.772 3.299 3.871 0.001
F1 2.020 0.457 2.376 4.421 0.000
F5 -.182 0.435 -0.370 -0.418 0.680
F10 0.294 0.341 0.621 0.862 0.397
HERF10 -0.030 0.006 -2.563 -5.31 0.000
formance, we have done the regression analysis by using
the tools Excel and SPSS based on the related data of the
listed banks. The results which get from Excel are
showed in table 2.
The results which get from SPSS are showed in Table 3.
From the analysis of P-value and the coefficient of sig-
nificant level (sig), we get the conclusions: The P-value
and the sig about CSP is 0.02 (smaller than 0.05), which
means there is a linear relation between the proportion of
circulation stocks and the banks’ performance; The re-
lated coefficients about LSP and SOSP are bigger than
0.05, which means there is no linear relation between the
proportion of corporate shares (the proportion of state-
owned shares) and the banks’ performance.
In the following we have done specific research about
the linear relation between the proportion of circulation
stocks and the banks’ performance, assume S=0 b+1 b*
CSP+e, we did the linear regression by SPSS, the result is
showed in Table 4.
By the result we can get S=17.188+0.164CSP+e, that
means there is a positive linear relation between the
banks’ performance and the proportion of circulation
stocks.
5.3. The Model of the Equity Concentrative
Degree’s Effect to Banks’ Performance
To test the relationship between the equity concentrative
degree and banks’ performance we take banks’ perform-
ance as the result of the equity concentrative degree, fi-
nancial leverage and the company's assets complicated
action, as the corporation’s data shows, the explanatory
ability and the fitting degree which independent variable
to dependent variable is the strongest, the relationship
between them is shown below:
eHERF10aFaFaFaaS 410352110 +++++= (1)

170 Chang-jun Zheng, Zhou Yan & Li Wei
Figure 1. Fitting char t of r e al S and pr edict S used by F1
Figure 2. Fitting char t of r e al S and pr e dict S used by HERF10
In which the variable S is the banks’ performance,
measured by earnings per share and net assets yield, a0 is
a virtual variable delegates the intercept, F1 is the stock
proportions that the first major shareholder holds, F5 is
the stock proportions that the top five shareholders hold,
F10 is the stock proportions that the top ten shareholders
hold, HERF10 is the square sum of the top ten sharehold-
ers’ proportions. Regression results are as follows:
The results: coefficient of significant level (sig) o f pro-
portion of shareholding by the biggest shareholders (F1)
is 0.000, far less than 0.05, and the same to the square
sum of proportion of share holding by top ten sharehold-
ers (HERF10) , which explains proportion of sharehold-
ing by the biggest shareholders (F1) and the square sum
of proportion of share holding by top ten shareholders
(HERF10) can interpret the variables S significantly. But
coefficient of significant level (sig) of Sum of proportion
of share holding by top five shareholders (F5) and pro-
portion of share holding by top ten shareholders (F10) are
far more than 0.05, which means F5 and F10 is not suit-
able for interpreting the v ariables S.
Actually, from the picture drew by SPSS, we can find
the performance (S) predicted by F1 and HERF10 is
highest fitting to real performance, which means a sig-
nificant interpreting to the variables S. pictures drew by
SPSS are as follows:
6. Conclusions and Suggestions
In summary, through the qualitative analysis and the em-
pirical research of listed banks in China, we obtain some
conclusions below:
First, choose the net asset yield and per share yield, we
have constructed an Index S to reflect the particularity of
banks’ performance. However, because it is difficult to
acquire relevant data, the construction of the index is not
perfect; it is just an idea of reference, to make the indica-
tors used to measure the banks’ performance more rea-
sonable.
Second, between the proportions of the first major
shareholders in commercial bank and the performance of
banks there is a significant correlation. As we have de-
scribed in the qualitative analysis, the largest shareholder
of governance will have a direct effect on performance of
the bank, and to strengthen the shareholding ratio of the
top five and the top 10 shareholders, forming a certain
degree of control over checks and balances will help im-
prove the listed Banks operating performance.
Third, the "multiple checks and balances" is a better
equity structure. Decentralization and lower the largest
shareholder’s equity proportions can avoid the major
shareholder controlling the bank effectively, and improv-
ing the structure of the bank's corporate management.
Fourth, changing the constitute of the circulation share
that the shareholders hold, introducing a treatment capac-
ity of institutional investors, one hand it is helpful of in-
troducing and making use of foreign capital, the other
hand it is helpful of introducing the advanced experience
of foreign country. It is better for our country to optimize
the combination of capital ,and to drive the fund flow to
HERF10 Line Fit Plot
0.00
50.00
100.00
0.00 2000.00 4000.00 6000.00
HERF10
S
S
predict S
F1 Line Fit Plot
0.00
50.00
100.00
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00
F1
S 9
predict S

The Relation Analysis of Equity Structure and Its Performance on Chinese Listed Bank 171
the shareholders more reasonable, to improve the unsuit-
able structure of equity , further to improve corporate
governance structure of China's listed companies and also
it is helpful to enhance China's listed banks operating
performance.
In conclusion because the banks in China is special,
and in some state-owned commercial banks, the special
performance is even more obvious, the interest rate is still
controlled by the government, information disclosure is
not entirely, but because the stock market is a bull market
in 2007, Listed bank's annual report data generally higher,
so the data’s reliability remains to be improved. It can be
said that the relationship between shareholding structure
and listed banks’ performance cannot be fully reflected
from data of the listed banks’ e annual report, but we can
get some e enlightenments from this research, as a refer-
ence for the just listed and the forthcoming listed com-
mercial banks in China.
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