Natural Science Vol.07 No.03(2015), Article ID:54398,13 pages
10.4236/ns.2015.73012
Equilibrium Allele Distribution in Trading Populations
Gilles Saint-Paul
Paris School of Economics, New York University, Abu Dhabi, UAE
Email: gstpaulmail@gmail.com
Copyright © 2015 by author and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/



Received 13 February 2015; accepted 3 March 2015; published 4 March 2015
ABSTRACT
This paper extends the results of Saint-Paul (2007) regarding the long-run survival rates of alleles in trading populations, to a more general context where the number of loci is arbitrarily large under general assumptions about sexual reproduction. The central result is that fitness-reducing alleles can survive in a trading population, provided their frequency is not too large. However, the greater the number of loci that matter for fitness, the more stringent the conditions under which these alleles can survive.
Keywords:
Gene-Culture Coevolution, Markets, Division of Labor, Population Genetics

1. Introduction
Can culture affect the genetic makeup of a population? While this question has been dealt with some detail regarding cultural institutions such as cooperation and social norms,1 there is much less work dealing with a key component of culture: markets.2 Do we expect populations who trade for long enough to develop a different distribution of alleles compared with population where individuals remain in relative autarky?
In Saint-Paul [8] ,3 I consider the evolution of the gene pool in a population under alternative economic institutions, and show that alleles that cannot survive natural selection under autarky can survive under trade, because individuals can specialize in activities so as to avoid the fitness disadvantages associated with these alleles. The results are based on a very simplified representation of sexual reproduction, with only one chromo- some (instead of pairs of chromosomes), and only two loci that determine the individual’s productivity at two activities that affect fitness.
This paper generalizes these results for a more general system of sexual reproduction, with an arbitrary number of chromosomes and loci. Its contribution is twofold. First, it provides a set of assumptions under which one can meaningfully state that some alleles dominate their alternatives and eventually eliminate them in the long run. Second, it extends the results in Saint-Paul [8] by characterizing the distribution of alleles for a trading population in a long-run equilibrium (LRE), defined as a stationary distribution of alleles which is also an equilibrium in an economic sense.
The central result is that fitness-reducing alleles can survive in a trading population, provided their frequency is not too large. However, the greater the number of loci that matter for fitness, the more stringent the conditions under which these alleles can survive. That means that in the long run, we expect low alleles to survive only at a relatively small number of loci. Knowing more about the long-run distribution of alleles when their initial distribution does not satisfy the conditions for an LRE would involve analyzing the dynamics, which I do not do here but is an interesting topic for further research.
2. Notations and Genetic Properties of Stationary Populations
A genotype consists of an
-tuple
, where
denotes a particular locus, and
is interpreted as the number of alleles of the “high type” at locus
(in the actual world where chromosomes come by pairs, one has
). Therefore, there are
alleles of the “low type” at locus
. The set of possible genotypes is denoted by
. We will also denote by
the
th element
of
.
2.1. The Survival Function
The survival rate of an individual only depends on its genotype, and is denoted
by
. Note that
the
function is not independent of culture. The opportunity to trade and specialize
will dramatically change the
mapping. It
is useful to introduce the genetic improvement operators
, which, for any genotype







The survival function is monotonic at locus


Thus, having more of a high allele at locus

We will say that a locus


2.2. The Distribution of Offsprings
We assume a quite general process for transmitting genes to offsprings, which in
particular is compatible with real-world genetics. When genotypes




1. Gene conservation

This says that on average, the number of high alleles at locus






2. Allele independence

This assumption tells us that, among offsprings with the same parental genotypes,
the distribution of other genes among those who have the same number of high alleles
at locus
3. Mixing
For any




there exists





The RHS of (5) is the maximum number of H-alleles at locus




4. Symmetry

5. Monotonicity
For any






This assumption says that if instead of












2.3. Demographics
These assumptions allow to write down the demographic evolution equations of each
genotype. We denote by




There are








Adding all these equations across all possible genotypes we get that
It is also useful to define the population frequency of high alleles at locus
Note that if the gene conservation law holds, then one also has

3. Elimination of Less Fit Alleles
In this section, I provide the basic results regarding the elimination of less fit
alleles. A first lemma, which derives from the random mating and mixing properties,
states that if a genotype exists and if a high allele exists in the population at
locus


LEMMA 1―Assume the mixing property holds. Assume there exists a steady state, a
locus






PROOF―First note that because of random mating there exists a positive measure of matches between two arbitrary genotypes, provided these genotypes are in positive measure in the parent population.
If
















the mixing property at locus

















At that stage
The following key result tells us that genes which increase mortality eventually disappear:
PROPOSITION 1―Assume that one of these two conditions holds:
(i) locus

(ii)






Assume (A3) and (A4) holds. Then in any steady state with

PROOF―The frequency of the high allele at

In steady state, we have that

and

The term

That can be rewritten as:
This formula rests on the fact that all the genotypes such that



Furthermore, the allele independence property implies that for



where





Hence:
Now, if locus




This inequality rests on the fact that

We now show that unless






















Thus, if



Alternatively, consider the case where













taking


















From (14), we get that

Once again, there exists a pair



where the first step derives from (13) and the second one from (12).
Inequality (15) means that the fitness of the high alleles in the gene pool of the
offsprings of






Going back to (11), we see that

where the strict inequality comes from the fact that



We now have

where we have applied gene conservation and

Observe that

Furthermore, one can write






Since












Let us now go back to (17), which we can rewrite
For a given





Consequently,
where the steady-state condition (10) has been used to derive the first term.
By virtue of (16), (3) and (6), the last term in that formula must be equal to




The last set of inequalities tell us that since parents who have a greater






4. Autarky
We now describe how an individual’s genotype

The alleles present at a given locus







where


Finally the individual’s fitness is
where





Under autarky, we have
PROPOSITION 2―Under autarky, all loci are selective. Therefore, in any steady state
such that


Proof―Type


Note that the case

5. Trade
Let us now look at the trade case. Each good



People allocate their time between the various activities so as to maximize their
income
subject to the time allocation constraint (18). Their demand vector is the one which
maximizes

Types with lower incomes must achieve lower fitness and therefore disappear in the long run.
Furthermore,





Define a long-run equilibrium (LRE), as a stationary state such that the economy is in equilibrium, i.e. each genotype sets its supply and demand as just described, and markets clear for each good. The following proposition generalizes the results derived for the two-loci case in Saint-Paul (2007).
PROPOSITION 3―(i) In any LRE such that


(ii) In any LRE such that


(iii) In any LRE, there exists a locus



Proof of (i)―Iterating the mixing property with appropriately chosen parents, one
can easily show that if








Assume there exists a genotype













Proof of (ii)―The price vector defined by (20) is the one which makes type



and




Since



supply good








The income of type













where the last inequality comes from (21). But, this cannot hold since it again
implies




iterating Lemma 1 implies that



Proof of (iii)―Suppose not; then by iterating the mixing property with appropriately
chosen parents, one can prove that
The preceding proposition tells us what properties an LRE must necessarily have,
but does not tell us whether an LRE exists and whether, as in the preceding analysis,
one can construct equilibria with a positive level of some

To do so, for any subset





genotypes such that their loci saturated with


PROPOSITION 4―Let


Then there exists an LRE with a distribution


Proof―We first prove that this condition is necessary. The RHS of (22) is the total
time supplied by genotypes in




capita (equal to the income of any genotype) must be equal to





implies that one






Let us now prove sufficiency. In order to do so, we construct a set of functions





6One can trivially check that such an allocation exists, since one


If we are able to construct such functions, then this is indeed an equilibrium,
since supply equals demand for all goods, and since the price vector in (20) implies
that a genotype is indifferent between supplying all the goods at which it has


To construct the





That is, those goods for which supply equals demand, those for which there is excess
demand, and those for which there is excess supply. Note that since



Assume therefore that it is not the case. Then neither


Case A. Assume there exists a partition


and:

That is, people who do produce goods in


For any good
Clearly, one has

This strict inequality comes from the fact that


Furthermore,
This is because if





Interverting, we get
Now, note that,






which clearly violates assumption (22). Case A is therefore ruled out.
Case B. Assume then that there exists no such partition. We can construct a chain
of


PROPERTY Q:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)


To construct such a chain, proceed as follows. We will write






Start from a set


If

If not, then




















More generally, at each iteration


























Next, we can use such a chain to construct a new allocation of labor for stage
and
Define the new allocation as follows:
The new allocation clearly still satisfies (23) (as








Finally, we note that either
(i)




(ii) Or, the chain






Thus, at each stage, the quantity


the existence of equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Clearly, conditions (22) are pretty stringent, so that it is not straightforward to construct an equilibrium.
However for







Note that the greater the number of loci, the greater the number of conditions that
must hold. Intuitively, it suggests that the equilibrium fraction of



References
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NOTES
1In this line of work, grouyp selection often plays an important role. See for example Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [1] ; Lumsden and Wilson [2] ; Gintis [3] , Boyd and Richerson [4] .
2Interesting surveys on interactions between the economic and biological spheres include Hirshleifer [5] , Robson [6] , and Seabright [7] .
3I addition to this, the most closely related paper is Horan et al. [9] . A related literature (see Hammerstein [10] , and in particular Bowles and Hammerstein [11] ), studies the rise of markets and specialization in animal societies, but does not draw this paper’s implications for the gene pool.
4If


5The only other possibility is to only have genotypes such














































