SO\textsubscript{X} Emissions Reduction Policy and Economic Development: A Case of Yokkaichi

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ABSTRACT

We find an inverted U-shape relationship between local income and SO\textsubscript{X} emissions, \textit{i.e.}, the so-called environmental Kuznets curve, in the Yokkaichi area. It is then shown (1) that the income level at the peak of the curve is fairly low relative to those reported for countries and/or the world in the literature, and (2) that the drastic decline in SO\textsubscript{X} emissions after the peak of the inverted U-shape was brought about by technical progress in cleaning up the environment but not by the declining output levels, despite increases in output level. It should be noted that the local residents’ campaigns moved and backed up the local governments, in contrast to the SO\textsubscript{X} reductions in developed economies in 1980 pushed by the international agreements, \textit{i.e.} Sulphur Protocols. The administrative agencies supported by local residents’ campaigns, rather than decreasing returns in production technology, played a critical role even at such a low income level.

Keywords: Environmental Kuznets Curve; Environmental Policy; Yokkaichi Area

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

Since References [1,2] found an inverted U-shape relationship between income and pollution emissions, many empirical studies have explicated such a curve, \textit{i.e.} the so-called environmental Kuznets curve. The purpose of the present paper is to observe the relationship between income and pollution emissions in the Yokkaichi area, one of the regions which had a larger-scale petrochemical complex in Japan even at the beginning of the high-growth era, and then to examine and characterize the factors for the improvement of the environmental quality even at rather low income levels in Yokkaichi. Since it is well known that SO\textsubscript{X} causes regional and local environmental problem, we will focus on pollution in the form of SO\textsubscript{X} emissions.

Reference [3] illustrated the empirical result for SO\textsubscript{X} emissions supporting the inverted U-shape of [1], although their estimated income level of the turning point was US$8000 using cross countries data, which is considerably higher than US$4053 (in 1985 U.S. dollars) in [2]. Reference [4] also obtained an inverted U-shape between income and pollution emissions for SO\textsubscript{X} whose peak was US$3670. Reference [5] showed inverted U-shape curves for Latin America, Asia and Africa, using deforestation data, but their predicted income level at the turning point was also much higher than the observed income levels. Reference [6] obtained an inverted U-shape for CO\textsubscript{2} emissions, using the world panel data, and their estimated income level at the turning point was US$8 million, which is also higher than the observed income levels. On the other hand, [7] re-examined the result of [2] by extending the estimation periods, and showed that the inverted U-shape may not be obtained robustly.\textsuperscript{1}

In order to explain the inverted U-shape, theoretical models are proposed, which may be categorized into three types.\textsuperscript{2} In the first type, although pollution emissions increase as the economy inclined toward polluting industries along with economic development, they decrease after being sufficiently developed as the industry structure changes from polluting and heavy industries to clean and service industries. See, for example, References [14,15] for this type.\textsuperscript{3} As for the second type, one assumes that there exists a threshold level of economic activity below which pollution emissions increase as the economy inclined toward polluting industries, while emissions decrease after being sufficiently developed as the industry structure changes. See also the survey by [18].

\textsuperscript{1}For a survey on SO\textsubscript{X} emissions environmental Kuznets curve studies see also [8,9]. Reference [10] suggested that the coverage of sample countries or regions affects the result, while [11] showed that the result may depend on the choice of econometric method.

\textsuperscript{2}See [12,13].

\textsuperscript{3}Reference [16] showed that the United States has imported less-polluting goods since the 1970s, that is, it has not exported pollution. Contrastingly, [17] asserted that reductions in SO\textsubscript{X} emissions in the 1980s were not a burden to the economies which export most of their pollution. See also the survey by [18].
which the economy can tolerate pollution with no controls. But after the threshold has been breached, environmental policy is implemented and starts to bind. References [19-21] showed the relationship to be inverted V-shape under such controls. Finally, Reference [12] showed that if the abatement function is increasing-to-scale in polluting activities and abatement spending, we may have an inverted U-shape, without any externalities and any policies.

The present study examine the relationship between residents’ per capita income and SO$_x$ emissions in the Yokkaichi area during the period from the latter half of the 1960s to 1990s, during which air pollution caused a serious health problem, which is well known as “Yokkaichi Zensoku (asthma).” Since it is also well known that sulfurous acid gases (SO$_2$) and/or sulfurous acid mists (SO$_x$) caused this Yokkaichi Zensoku, we concern ourselves with SO$_x$ emissions from the factories of the petrochemical complexes in this region. Comparing the environmental Kuznets curve in the Yokkaichi area with those discussed in the literature, the present study aims to characterize the process of improving the environmental quality in this region.

1.2. Historical Review—Operations of the Yokkaichi Petrochemical Complex

The No. 2 Navy Fuel Depot (Kaigun Dai-ni Nenryo Sho) and other private oil factories, for example, Ishihara Sangyo and Daikyo Oil (Daikyo Sekiyu), were destroyed by the heavy bombings of the Allied Forces in July of 1945. After World War II, the No. 2 Navy Fuel Depot site in the Shiohama area was first sold to Mitsubishi Petrochemical (Mitsubishi Yuka), and one of the largest petrochemical complexes in Japan was then scheduled for construction in order to realize the Petrochemical Growth Action Project (Sekiyu-kagaku Ikusei Taisaku) which was a part of the “First Stage Plan for the Petrochemical Industry (Sekiyu-kagaku Dai-ichi-ki Keikaku)” drawn up by the Hatoyama Cabinet. The oil plant of Showa-Yokkaichi Oil (Showa-Yokkaichi-Sekiyu) was built in 1956, and the ethylene production facility of Mitsubishi Petrochemical was constructed. The No. 1 complex (called the Shiohama complex) began full-scale operations in 1959. The No. 1 complex consisted of 10 main companies, which was then expanded westward beyond the former No. 2 Navy Fuel Depot site. As a consequence, factories of the complex came up against residential housing nearby.

The construction of the No. 2 petrochemical complex (which is called the Umaokoshi complex) started in 1961, and the complex went on stream in 1963. The Yokkaichi area has since developed into one of the greatest petrochemical industrial cities in Japan. The No. 3 complex (called the Kasumi complex) started operations in 1972.

On the other hand, although the sea near Yokkaichi was a good fishing spot because of the meeting of the Kiso, Nagara and Ibi Rivers, the fish caught there around 1958 reeked of petroleum. The sea range where fish smelled of petroleum then expanded to about 4 km from the coast of Yokkaichi in about 1960 when the first petrochemical complex began operations. This situation caused fishermen and other persons involved along with local residents to launch an appeal to Mie Prefectural Authorities. The Mie Prefectural Office responded by organizing the Promotional Council on Water Pollution Prevention in Ise Bay (Ise Wan Osui Taisaku Suishin Kyogikai), headed by Professor Yoshida of Mie Prefectural University (at present, Mie University). The Council concluded that the foul petroleum smell of fish was caused by their absorption of the liquid waste discharged by the petrochemical complex. In 1960, a grass roots campaign by local residents turned the pollution problem in Yokkaichi into a public issue, so-called “Yokkaichi Pollution (Yokkaichi Kogai).” As the Yokkaichi City Authority was requested to take the measures to improve the situation by the residents near the No. 1 petrochemical complex, the Authority organized an Air Pollution Prevention Council (Yokkaichi Kogai Boshi Taisaku Linkai). The Council reported that the sulfurous acid gases mainly caused the air pollution in the Yokkaichi area. In the meanwhile, malodorous sulfurous-chemical compounds from the complex became a problem in the Shiohama area.

The damage caused by asthma in the Isozu area meanwhile became serious about 1961. Moreover, the sulfur oxide air concentration and the amount of soot and dust drops began to be measured at 11 sites in Yokkaichi City. The fact that sulfurous acid gases affect the human body was proved by the Pollution Control Panel of Yokkaichi, led by Professor Yoshida at the Department of Medicine at Mie University in 1962.

Two points should be noted about the Yokkaichi experience: First, both research and investigation of malodorous fish and measurement of air pollution and the amount of soot and dust drops had never been done, at least, in Japan before; second, in response to the damage outcry by its residents, Yokkaichi City investigated the problem at an earlier stage and Mie Prefecture took measures to improve the situation (i.e. The Regulations on Total Discharge Amount (Soryo Kisei) in 1972). In Japan as a whole, the public sector embraced an industrialization policy aimed to expand national production and income, and due care might not be given to preserving the nation’s living environment. Even in such a situation, it

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6See also [22-24]. For an empirical and theoretical survey, see, for example, [25].

7Factories of the petrochemical complex are considered as the factories (e.g. Mitsubishi Petrochemical) which are supplied fuel oil by oil refining companies (e.g. Showa-Yokkaichi Oil).

8We are greatly indebted to [26] for this and the next subsections.
should not be overlooked that Yokkaichi City and the Mie Prefectural Authority adopted aggressive measures against pollution emissions and/or medical damage, which were reflected in the basis for the measures later taken by the Japanese government. In 1964, before the rest of the country, Yokkaichi City started to publicly bear the medical costs of patients who suffered from the pollution. It was 5 years after Yokkaichi acted alone that the central government enforced the Law Concerning Special Measure for the Relief of Pollution Victims (Pollution Victims Relief Law) in 1970 (see [26, p. 52]), while The Regulations on Total Discharge Amount, adopted initially by the Mie Prefectural Authority, was also introduced into the Air-Pollution Prevention Act by the central government of Japan in 1974.8

2. SOX Emissions and per Capita Income in the Yokkaichi Area—Environmental Kuznets Curve

2.1. Growth and Environmental Problem—Environmental Kuznets Curve

Now we examine the relationship between SOX emissions and per capita income in Yokkaichi City from the second half of the 1960s to the 1990s.9 The Environmental Conservation Division of Yokkaichi City has published data for SOX in the Yokkaichi area since 1972, while per capita income in Yokkaichi has been published by the Mie Prefectural Office.10 First, making use of the data on fuel-oil inputs in naphtha production available since 1972 and the Survey on the Evaluation of Development and Environment (1994), we can estimate SOX emissions before 1971, and using the data on per capita income since 1972, we can also estimate the relevant data before 1971.11

The relationship between per capita income and per capita SOX emissions in Yokkaichi is illustrated in Figure 1. In this study we are interested in the period from the mid-1960s (when pollution caused by SOX emissions was recognized as an environmental problem) to the beginning of the 1990s (when the SOX emission intensity of SOX became fairly low).12

Per capita income in Yokkaichi increased for most of the period from 1964 to 1991, i.e. just before the so-called ‘bubble’ burst, while SOX emissions almost monotonically decreased except for 1966. However, the decreases in SOX emissions were not brought about by reductions in the activity level of the petrochemical complex. The magnitude of fuel input reflects the activity level of the complex and corresponds to the production level of naphtha and other products. In fact, Figure 2 illustrates that though fuel-oil inputs increased, the amount of SOX emissions decreased from 1967 to 1973. However, Table 1 shows that the fuel-oil inputs (and therefore the activity level of the complex) increased at higher rates than GDP during the period from 1965 to 1972 except for 1971. Thus, the fuel-oil production in this area did not plausibly decrease relative to those in other regions of Japan. In this sense, Yokkaichi did not export pollution.13 In fact, the No. 3 complex began full-scale operations in 1972. As anecdotal evidence, a construction plan of Mishima-Numazu petrochemical complex was subject to vigorous residents’ campaigns, influenced by those in Yokkaichi, and eventually the plan was halted.

\[\text{SOX emissions} \rightarrow \text{per capita income} \]

Figure 1. Real per capita income and SOX emissions.

8Reference [30] stated that it overcame the pollution problem through reducing SOX intensity below the national standard in 1976, whereupon the city received the Global 500 Award from the UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) in 1995. Reference [27] also mentioned that the “Yokkaichi Kogai (pollution)” was nearing a solution in the second half of the 1970s. The incidence rate of new asthma patients in the polluted area became as low as those in other areas in 1981, and the difference in mortality from chronic bronchitis between the two areas disappeared in 1980 (see [27, p. 201]). Reference [31], on the other hand, asserted that the problem has still not been resolved, as can be seen from the problem of stock pollution such as ferro-silt buried by Ishihara Sangyo.

9Population in the coastal area had decreased by 20 thousand during the period from 1965 to 1975 (see [27, p. 95, 31, p. 39]). Residents mostly moved to the hilly areas on the west side of the city or other cities and towns. In this sense people were crowded out of the area.
had to be abandoned around 1964 (see [27,32]). This fact implies the difficulty of relocating petrochemical production elsewhere in Japan even in the early 1960s.

Next, we look at the relationship between SO\textsubscript{X} emissions and per capita income. Since pollution by SO\textsubscript{X} emissions has strong local characteristics, and the pollution prevention measures were undertaken in this area by the local government, we take per capita income as a proxy reflecting the economic condition in the Yokkaichi area. Per capita income in terms of the 1985 US dollar is measured on the abscissa. Per capita income in 1985 dollars is calculated as follows: Per capita income in each year is deflated nominal per capita income by the GDP deflator in the US (based on 2005 prices). Thus, we obtain the relation between per capita income and per capita SO\textsubscript{X} emissions, i.e. the environmental Kuznets curve in Yokkaichi. The relationship is depicted in Figure 3, where, following the literature, the ordinate measures per capita emissions of SO\textsubscript{X}, and per capita real income in the 1985 dollars is measured on the abscissa.

Although we cannot see the inverted U-shape because of the data availability, one can expect that the emission level is on the abscissa at zero output and that the level increases as income rises. If so, the peak of the inverted U-shape curve seems to lie at a rather low per capita income level in 1967 or earlier. If the peak is 1967, the per capita income level was US$2729.3 at the 1985 price. This level of per capita income is fairly low relative to US $4000 and accounted for only about 70% of it, although [2] showed that the income level turning point for SO\textsubscript{X} emissions for the United States and Canada was about US$4035 at 1985 PPP prices. Reference [33] suggested from various empirical studies that the income level of turning-point ranged from $3000 to $10,000 at 1985 PPP prices, while [8] summarized that the turning points in the SO\textsubscript{X} emission studies for sample dominated by OECD countries ranged from $8200 to $10,600 at 1990 PPP prices. It should be noted that the per capita SO\textsubscript{X} emissions level had already passed the peak of the environmental Kuznets curve in Yokkaichi at US $4000 and that per capita SO\textsubscript{X} emissions became only 60% of the 1967 level at the income level of $4015 in 1985 US dollars in 1969. The literature concluded that the inclusion of no-urban regions and/or developing countries leads to a much higher estimated income level (and often levels above the observed incomes) at the peaks of the inverted U-shape curves (e.g. [3,4,6,8,33, 16]).

Most of the empirical literature found an inverted U-shape or a monotonically increasing curve. Reference [7], for example, showed the possibility of the inverted U-shape, while mentioning that a U shape is impossible since pollution emissions are zero when the income and production level are zero. Although the datum of per capita income and emissions for the period from the end of World War II to the date of the operation of the No.1 petrochemical complex, the production facilities are destroyed and the production level was plausibly expected to be near zero at the end of the War. In fact, the output of ethylene in Japan during 1963-1974 were as follow:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>715,551</td>
<td>722,910</td>
<td>735,932</td>
<td>748,800</td>
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Real GDP: 63SNAA (Ministry of International Affairs and Communication “Long-term Statistics Series in Japan”)

14The exchange rate in each year is the simple average over the monthly rates.

Figure 2. Fuel input and SO\textsubscript{X} emissions.

Table 1. Rates of changes in fuel inputs and GDP (FY1965-FY1972).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Rate of Changes in Fuel Inputs</th>
<th>Growth Rate of GDP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>28.24</td>
<td>11.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>29.39</td>
<td>11.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>27.98</td>
<td>12.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>30.07</td>
<td>12.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>35.90</td>
<td>8.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>5.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Real GDP: 63SNAA (Ministry of International Affairs and Communication “Long-term Statistics Series in Japan”)

15Most of the empirical literature found an inverted U-shape or a monotonically increasing curve. Reference [7], for example, showed the possibility of the inverted U-shape, while mentioning that a U shape is impossible since pollution emissions are zero when the income and production level are zero. Although the datum of per capita income and emissions for the period from the end of World War II to the date of the operation of the No.1 petrochemical complex, the production facilities are destroyed and the production level was plausibly expected to be near zero at the end of the War. In fact, the output of ethylene in Japan during 1963-1974 were as follow:

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Real GDP: 63SNAA (Ministry of International Affairs and Communication “Long-term Statistics Series in Japan”)

16Reference [7] also reported that SO\textsubscript{2} concentrations in Canada and the United States have declined over time at ever decreasing rates. Reference [10] derived a linear relationship from the sulphur emissions data of a world sample of 73 countries and the inverted U-shape from samples of high-income economies for 1960 to 1990. Reference [26] reported that both the ratios of areas polluted by 0.5 mg/day and 0.1 mg/day of SO\textsubscript{2} in the Yokkaichi region were the highest in 1971, since the polluted area expanded to the west regions, for example, by taller chimney.

18Most of the empirical literature derived the income levels in terms of 1985 PPP's, so we cannot precisely compare our level with those in the literature. We translate the current-dollar income levels to those in dollars in 1985 prices in a rather loose way, since it would be difficult to obtain the exact income levels in Yokkaichi in 1985 U. S. PPP dollar terms. It should be noted that although the data in the most forgoing literature are panel data, we compare the time-series income levels in Yokkaichi with those in the literature.
In light of these results, it is surprising that well before pollution problems had been seriously confronted worldwide, Yokkaichi City and the Mie Prefectural Office had already undertaken pollution emissions control measures and/or controlled SOX emissions even with such a low income level.

It should be noted that the local residents’ campaigns pushed the authorities to take the plunge by directly appealing to authority and/or appealing to the courts indirectly and that the “pollution patrol” organized by Yokkaichi City in 1963, for example, exerted pressure on the factories to change their attitudes (e.g. [27, p. 58]). Furthermore, it should be also noted that the speed of decline in SOX emissions was considerably high. Such a rapid decline may well have been affected by the fact that the complex factories were contiguous to residents’ houses. In fact, the resident’s houses, a primary school and the complex factories stand across a municipal road, and more than 30,000 people reside within about 2 km of the complex. On the other hand, per capita SOX at the peak in the Yokkaichi area was 0.983 tons in 1967, which was quite high, for example, in comparison to the peak of 0.1453 tons per capita SO2 emissions in the United States in 1973 (see [35]).

Given the heavy emissions together with the high population density, the damage to the inhabitants of the areas must have been very severe, thus requiring swift, sure measures. In fact, Reference [26] reported that many companies had also continued to “strive to prevent the environment of Yokkaichi from becoming worse” even before 1966. This contrasts with the case referred to by [33] that significant declines in SOX emissions in the developed economies in the 1980s were induced only by the drastic policies backed up by the international agreements.

Defining the emission intensity as the ratio of SOX emissions/fuel-oil inputs, and setting it in 1965 as equal to 100, the time path of the pollution intensity is depicted in Figure 4. Before the public counter measures were undertaken, and more importantly, even at the peak of the environmental Kuznets curve in 1967, the pollution intensity continued to be on the downward trend. Therefore, we may say that private companies adopted some environmental measures before the peak of the environmental Kuznets curve. This downward trend in pollution intensity is consistent with the illustration of the US data in [35], who argue that, given a constant rate of environmental technology progress, large increases in output due to the decreasing marginal productivity may cause the inverted U-shape at earlier stages of development at low income levels (and eventually technical progress will dominate the output effect). However, Figure 2 shows that the pollution intensity did not rise even when output levels evidenced a large increase, for example, in the 1970s and the 1990s; and Figure 4 shows that the pollution intensity decreased rapidly, especially around 1970. Thus, the argument by [35] falls to fact.

This point may be explained as follows. An Environmental Pollution Control Department (Kogai Taisakushitsu) was established in the Mie Prefectural Office in 1963, and then The Smoke and Soot Regulation Law was enacted in 1965, and then The Smoke and Soot Regulation Law was enacted.
passed. The policy authorities thereby tightened the pollution controls for the complex companies. However, decisive technologies to reduce SO\(_x\) emissions had not been developed at that stage. Therefore, companies could only make chimneys higher at most, thus diffusing and diluting polluting gases, or reduce their operation levels as their pollution prevention measures. Around 1967, the heavy-oil desulfurization equipment went on stream, and, together with the higher chimneys, the SO\(_x\) levels were drastically reduced in the area surrounding the complex. Some companies converted to low sulfide oil imported from Indonesia or Southeast Asian countries, or input naphtha as a fuel. Then, flue-gas desulfurization technology, which removes sulfur from flue gases, was developed and went into practical use around 1974. Production facilities with that technology began operations the following year. With equipment in full-scale operation, the total SO\(_x\) emissions were decisively reduced far below the level called for by the 1976 standard. Such equipment served to reduce 25125 tons of SO\(_x\) emissions per year. The amount emitted into air was 2290 tons, one-tenth the level before the equipment came into use. The important point is that the development of emissions-reducing technologies was triggered by the public environmental measures vociferously demanded by local residents’ campaigns.

### 2.2. Environmental Measures and Pollution Prevention Investment

Needless to say, environmental quality does not automatically improve as the income level rises. As explained in the previous section, public pollution prevention control measures forcefully promoted by local residents’ campaigns played a key role. The Regulations on Total Discharge Amount were adopted on August 15, 1972, six months ahead of the scheduled date in response to plaintiff citizens’ win in the civil suit. These regulations were decisive in reducing SO\(_x\) emissions in Yokkaichi. The regulations are as follows: 1) By 1975, the SO\(_x\) pollution density in Yokkaichi should be reduced to 0.025 ppm from 0.05 ppm of the national standard, and eventually reduced to 0.017 ppm as the final goal, i.e. the annual average density which achieves 99% of the threshold intensity set by the City Life Council of Yokkaichi. The regulations are as follows: 1) By 1975, the SO\(_x\) pollution density in Yokkaichi should be reduced to 0.025 ppm from 0.05 ppm of the national standard, and eventually reduced to 0.017 ppm as the final goal, i.e. the annual average density which achieves 99% of the threshold intensity set by the City Life Council of Yokkaichi. The regulations are as follows: 2) The allowable total emissions in each region are to be determined, and the outlet of each factory should be controlled correspondingly. This regulation is expected to reduce 38.5 million tons of total fuels and about 70% of 0.1 million tons of SO\(_x\) emissions, respectively, annually: 3) Sulfide in fuel gases should be controlled more strictly as the fuel inputs increases.

Such regulations were expected to require huge costs for countermeasures of the complex companies. Figure 5 depicts the time path of the estimated total (nominal) amount of environmental or pollution prevention investment, i.e. investment in abatement.\(^{25}\) It is notable that investment in abatement did not increase largely until 1967, but thereafter it increased rapidly toward the peak in 1974, even if the peak of the inverted U-shape was reached in 1967.\(^{26}\) This is in contrast to the features of the time-evolution in environmental or pollution prevention investment, for example, of the US illustrated in [35].\(^{27}\) As shown earlier, total SO\(_x\) emissions began to decline in Yokkaichi in spite of the technological constraints in the latter half of the 1960s. However, a huge amount was then invested in abatement. Around 1965, environmental or pollution prevention investments were mainly those of heightening chimney stacks. The Air Pollution Control Law (1968) included the K-value regulation which set the allowable volume of SO\(_x\) emissions in proportion to the square number of the height of the chimneys. Responding to the Regulations on Total Discharge Amount in 1972 and tightening them in the years to follow, desulfurization equipment was developed and installed, rapidly increasing the costs of investments and reducing SO\(_x\) emissions (see Figure 3). Following the regulation many firms introduced and installed desulfurization equipments with desulfurization rates of 90% and more in 1973 and 1974.\(^{28}\) Increases in the latter 1980s were explained as those undertaken in the name of Third and Fourth Regional Environmental Pollution Control Program for urban and city life.

\(^{24}\)The time path of the real amount of pollution investment has qualitative properties similar to those of a nominal one, although the real one was about half of the nominal one around 1990.

\(^{25}\)For calculation of investment in abatement, see the next section.

\(^{26}\)Reference [35] showed that investment in abatement increased largely around the peak of the total emissions around 1973, asserting that the return rate on capital exceeded the rate of environmental technology progress, resulting in the inverted U-shape environmental Kuznets curve and that the same situations could also be observed in Europe.

\(^{27}\)The Regulations on Total Discharge Amount, introduced by Mie Prefecture in 1972, was: the amount should be 5865 Nm\(^3\)/hour after 21 April 1972; 4789 Nm\(^3\)/hour after 15 August 1972; 3723.2 Nm\(^3\)/hour after 1 April 1973; and 2695.7 Nm\(^3\)/hour after 1 July 1974.
3. Data and Calculation

3.1. Calculation of per Capita Income in Yokkaichi

The Mie Prefectural Office estimates the municipal residents’ income from the Mie Prefectural Income Account data. Although the Mie Prefectural Income Account has been estimated since 1950, the Mie Prefectural Office published only the net municipal product (factor income) as the municipal residents’ incomes from 1955 to 1969, and both net municipal product (factor income) and municipal residents’ income (distributed income) since 1972. Thus, first estimating the correlation between net municipal product (factor income) and municipal residents’ income (distributed income), we estimated municipal residents’ incomes from the net municipal product for the period before 1971.

3.2. Calculation of SO\textsubscript{X} Emissions before 1971

Since the emission of SO\textsubscript{X} is expected to be highly related to the observed SO\textsubscript{X} pollution intensity, we estimated the average emissions in Yokkaichi before 1971 from the estimated equation of the observed SO\textsubscript{X} density in the Isogo region. The SO\textsubscript{X} pollution density in the Isogo area and the average SO\textsubscript{X} pollution density in Yokkaichi have been published in “Environmental Conservation in Yokkaichi (Yokkaichi no Kankyo-Hozen),” respectively. Since the measures for heightening chimneys to lower the SO\textsubscript{X} pollution density had been in place since 1965, a strong correlation between SO\textsubscript{X} emissions and the pollution density in the air could be expected.

Although the data on fuel inputs are available after 1972, the data of the ratio of sulphur content in the fuel input are not. So, we estimated the ratio by using the calculation of the average percentage constituent of sulphur in the “Survey on the Evaluation of Development and Environment” (1994) (data after 1959 are available). We also calculated the fuel-oil inputs before 1971 from the equation estimated by the activity level of the complex and the relative prices of fuels.

Given the restricted availability of data, the activity level of the complex is substituted by the national production level of naphtha as a proxy, which is considered to have a strong correlation, and the relative price is defined as the ratio of the import price of oil (on yen basis)/the wholesale prices of petroleum and coal products.

Making use of the estimated equation, we calculated the fuel-oil inputs before 1971 and connected to the data after 1972. Multiplying the estimated fuel inputs by the average percentage constituent of sulphur in the “Survey on the Evaluation of Development and Environment” (1994) for each year and converting to the SO\textsubscript{X} weight, we obtain the SO\textsubscript{X} weight in the fuel inputs.

3.3. Calculation of Investment in Abatement

We estimated the total private investment in abatement as follows: The amount of investment in abatement has been published in The Regional Environmental Pollution Control Program in Yokkaichi (Yokkaichi Kogai-Boshi Keikaku) since 1971. This includes investments in abatement both by the public and the private sector in the Yokkaichi area. However, there are some reservations. First, since public investment includes not only investments against industrial pollution but also those against pollution from urban and city life, we must take away the latter for our purpose. Second, although the investment by the private companies are those in Yokkaichi, some investments by the public sector, e.g. the Mie Prefecture and local governments of surrounding districts, may be done outside of Yokkaichi. We must also take away these except for investments financed by subsidies from other governments to Yokkaichi.

Finally, there remains a problem in estimating investments in abatement before The Regional Environmental Pollution Control Program in Yokkaichi. Even before the Plan, investments such as heightening chimneys were undertaken since the Yokkaichi petrochemical complex had operated since 1957. Investments in river-basin sewerage systems; installation of public sewerage systems; installation of waste-disposal plants; investments in industrial waterworks which the Mie Prefecture alone undertook are excluded. For pollution prevention investments of private companies, we used the data from “Survey on the Evaluation of Development and Environment” (1994). Since the capturing rate of this data is about 60.9% on average for the period after the Regional Environmental Pollution Control Program in Yokkaichi (i.e. from 1971 to 1993) and is steady, we used this rate to allocate investment between Yokkaichi and other governments. We obtained the data on sundry expenses involved in pollution prevention investments from the budgets of Yokkaichi City after 1960. Since the amount of sundry expenses underestimates pollution prevention investments undertaken by Yokkaichi City, we estimated the public investment of the period from 1960 to 1970 by allocating with the average capturing rate of the sundry expenses on pollution prevention investment (15.7%) for the period of The Regional Environmental Pollution Control Program in Yokkaichi (i.e. from 1971 to 1993).

4. Conclusions

We may conclude the analysis as follows: (1) The Yokkaichi area has succeeded in reducing SO\textsubscript{X} emissions even at a relatively low income level, and (2) the inverted
U-shape was brought about by technical progress in cleaning up the environment but not by the declining output levels, despite increases in output level. The technical progress acceleration was made possible by local residents’ campaigns and administrative environmental measures backed up by the campaigns. The environmental measures of the Yokkaichi City and the Mie Prefecture government, backed up by the local residents’ campaign, played critical roles in encouraging environmental technical progress and thereby improving the quality of the environment of the area, while the national environmental regulations followed those regional policies. It should be noted that the local residents’ campaigns moved and backed up the local governments, in contrast to the X-shaped development driven by technical progress in cleaner production. This is the reason for using local income as the explanatory variable, instead of per capita GDP.30 The fact that the pollution intensity decreased before the environmental Kuznets curve reached its peak means that the environmental technology of companies could still not catch up with the regulations, not that the regulation was ineffective.31

If rapid economic development is not possible for developing economies without heavy industrial sectors as suggested in [38,39], the pressure on appropriate environmental policies will become greater. Although the situation facing developing economies may differ from that was in Yokkaichi as the pollution prevention technologies have already been developed sufficiently, the experience of Yokkaichi may have important implications for other, especially developing, economies. In fact, Reference [28] showed that three-year-earlier introduction of the total discharge amount regulation would substantially decrease human damage in Yokkaichi by a simulation analysis, while [27, p. 110] introduced the grave concern of the Japanese central government that a heavy toll of pollution victims could deal a fatal blow to the industrialization in Japan in the mid-high-growth era.

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[30] The per capita GDP of Japan in 1967 was about US$3757 at the 1985 price. The level is still less than US$4000 but only by about 6%.
[31] Whether or not the so-called Porter Hypothesis holds requires more analysis. For the Porter Hypothesis, see, for example [37].

REFERENCES


