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random set of estimates; but, that did not occur. There was a
consistent trend toward overestimation, indeed, even extreme
overestimation. Further, the estimates roughly follow a pattern
with estimates for the least prevalent disorder being estimated
as having the least incidence. The idea that they just are not
aware of prescription drug-use and, therefore, are just making
unfounded guesses is not supported by the survey of moods.
The descriptions were straightforward and simple and students
readily judged their own mood. They, however, were far from
accurate in guessing the percent of other students’ ratings of
themselves. The students’ estimates are not unfounded in the
sense of being random, but seem to be founded in something
similar to prejudice; other students are just judged to be less
healthy, less happy than they are.
The data were collected during a period of extremely diffi-
cult economic circumstances. One wonders if the pessimistic
prevailing view of their fellow students’ mental health reflects a
prevailing pessimistic view of the extant circumstances in the
USA. The survey done 6 years before this one found the same
degree of overestimation, yet it was during better economic
times.
In some games of trust, it is profitable to trust that ot hers will
be equitable and seemingly fair. Most persons do respond equi-
tably. When, however, asked to estimate the percent of persons
that can be trusted to be equitable, they underestimated the
level of trust, i.e., they seemingly believe that they are more
generous and trustworthy than their fellows (Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2010). Students’ estimates of trust and their estimates
of the mental health of their fellow students might be a mani-
festation of a similar process.
Among those studying the relationship between cognitions
(e.g., beliefs or memories) associated with depression, there is
considerable support for the idea that those who are depressed
have a bias that colors their beliefs and memories (e.g., Hertel
& Brozovich, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In situations
reported here, we asked people to estimate the prevalence of
being prescribed medicines for mental disorders and the preva-
lence of moods (including depression). Presumably, those esti-
mates reflect cognitive habits (beliefs, attitudes, biases that
become manifest in situations of ambiguity). These data add to
that literature. The data support the notion that depressed peo-
ple have a negative bias whereas happy people have less of a
negative bias. Further, the data indicate that the relationship has
a “dose-response” characteristic, the greater the severity of
depression the greater the bias toward negative opinions. Inter-
estingly, however, even the happiest severely overestimated the
prevalence of depression. The generalization is that students
generally think poorly of their contemporaries (a negative bias
toward persons not exactly strangers but not their closest asso-
ciates either). Being happy does not eliminate the general ten-
dency to overestimate the prevalence of depression, but it does
seem to prevent the estimates from being extremely off of the
mark.
The idea of “a false consensus effect” was not supported by
the estimates of the very happy as they estimated the rates of all
students’ happiness. Rather than concluding that persons tend
to overestimate their own circumstance, it seems more correct
to say that persons tend to estimate that others are less mentally
healthy, less trustworthy, more likely to use drugs and exten-
sive use of alcoholic beverages and probably a number of less
favorable characteristics.
The research started with a simple question: do more than a
few students on one college campus have a markedly distorted
few of the use of prescription-drugs for mental health? The
answer is yes. Because similar surveys were given six years
apart, the results do not seem to be peculiar to one specific time.
The next question was: were the distorted views observed on
one campus peculiar to that campus? The answer is no. The
next question was: were the distorted views related to the
American practice, which is rare in the World, of advertising
for prescription drugs. The answer is probably not. The next
question was: was the distorted view, the bias, peculiar to
drug-use? The answer is no, students distort the incidence of
depression as well as the incidence of use of prescription-drugs.
The data support the idea that there is a pervasive cognitive
bias. The bias is similar to the superiority bias that has attracted
considerable attention among social psychologists. The superi-
ority bias, however, is a conclusion (derived from some rather
simple experiments but bolstered by confirmatory data) that
people have an almost inherent bias that distorts their view
toward believing that they are better than average.
Garrison Keillor’s characterization of the folks in his fic-
tional home town (Lake Wobegon) as “all the women are
strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are
above average” has provided a colorful label, the Lake Wobe-
gon Effect, for what social psychologists have called illusory
superiority, superiority bias or a sense of relative superiority.
The illusory superiority is a pervasive tendency to overestimate
one’s achievement, characteristics and capabilities in relation to
others or to overestimate the better qualities of one’s own group.
This cognitive bias is, indeed, pervasive and can be demon-
strated in a wide range of circumstances (Illusory superiority,
2011) or as Harris (2010) said “there is nothing more common
than the belief that one is above average in intelligence, wis-
dom, honesty, etc.” (p. 188). Because a superiority bias is rarely
founded in fact, there is cognitive dissonance associated with
sustaining it. Flattery might support the idea of superiority,
hence be welcome a nd also b e a potential reason why flattery is
remarkably effect in influencing people even when it is an ob-
vious ploy.
The students made prejudicial judgments that are unflattering
and often grossly wrong. One might surmise that such judg-
ments follow from the Lake Wobegon Effect hence might be
labeled Lake Wobegon Effect prejudice or merely Wobegon
Prejudice. Wobegon Prejudice is the tendency to attribute nega-
tive attributes to others supposedly to sustain the belief that “I
and mine are superior.” Wobegon Prejudice has its own kind of
logic: “If I am better than the average person (i.e., most others),
most of them must be worse than me.”
If the superiority bias in nearly universal, and many believe
that it is, and it is accompanied by Wobegon Prejudice, the
tendencies inherent to such a cognitive bias helps explain why
someone would denigrate persons or groups that they have
never interacted with or never met. It is not about the others, it
is about a threat to illusory superiority. The superiority bias
makes problematic prejudices, such as racism, likely. The idea
of a Lake Wobegon Prejudice seems to be somewhat different
than the kinds of prejudice enumerated by the classic discussion
of the sources of prejudice (Duckitt, 1992). The students’ re-
sponses are not overtly prejudicial; they seem to be more akin
to an implicit social cognition in support of their own
self-esteem or a superiority bias (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
