Beijing Law Review, 2011, 2, 97-110
doi:10.4236/blr.2011.22010 Published Online June 2011 (
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
Klaus Schlichtmann1,2
1Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan; 2Japan Women’s University, Tokyo, Japa n.
Received March 20th, 2011; Revised April 23rd, 2011; Accepted May 18th, 2011.
UN Security Council reform has been lingering o ver the year s, since it was first seriously considered in the 1990s, after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This paper argues that enlarging the Security Council by adding new permanent and
non-permanent members, while many of the Charter provisions vital for the maintenance of international peace and
security and disarmament ar e not in effect, would be counterprodu ctive. Instead, the composition o f the Council should
be reshuffled and expanded by giving a seat to a prominent member of the Global South, i.e. India, and replacing the
seats of France and Britain with a single European representation. While there would be no increase or change in the
number of permanent and non-permanent members, the result will be a dramatic increase in the numbers of people
represented by the Permanent Five, which then will, in effect, comprise half of the worlds population projected for
2012. The underlying logic is tha t increasing the number of perm anent members (P5) would make the Security Council
not only less effective, but also prevent the realization of a fundamental purpose of the United Nations, i.e. the transi-
tion from an arm ed to an unarm ed peace. By mainta ining the number 5, the effective operation of the consensus princi-
ple required for the maintenance of international peace and security during the transition is ensured. It is maintained
that the changes proposed in this paper may be regarded as purely procedural under Article 27 paragraph 2 of the
Charter. It will be seen, however, that to trigger the process of the transition, UN Member states (other than the P5,
who bear responsibility under the Charter to guarantee safe passage during the transition) must begin, one by one, to
delegate Security Sovereignty to the Council.
Keywords: Transitional Security Arrangements/Transition Period, Collective Security, Consens us Principle/Veto, Li-
mitation/Delegation of Sovereign Powers, International Security, Disarmament
1. Introduction
In January 1992 newly elected UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, famous for his “Agenda for
Peace1 [1],” called a Security Council Summit meeting,
where fifteen heads of state for the first time after the end
of the Cold War reconfirmed their “commitment to col-
lective security” and resolved to strengthen the United
Nations, and for that purpose reform the Security Coun cil.
The UN Charter review process anticipated in Article
109, which had a similar aim, had never materialized in
the early years of the Organization as originally antici-
pated, due to the Cold War.2
In 1993, the Op en-ended Working Grou p on the Ques-
tion of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters
Related to the Security Council was established. Reform
proposals had to be in accordance with the conditions of
more “equitable representation on and increase in the
membership of the Security Council.” (GA Res. 48/26 of
December 3, 1993) On October 24, 1995, on the occa-
sion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, the
General Assembly unanimously declared the UNSC
“should inter alia be expanded and its working methods
continue to be reviewed in a way that will further streng-
then its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its repre-
sentative character, and improve its working efficiency
and transparency.” However, there has been no agree-
ment so far [2], althoug h great powers like Germany and
Japan as well as African and South-American nations
have been eager to be included as permanent members in
an expanded Council.
2Article 109 foresaw a “General Conference” to be held “before the
tenth annual session of the General Assembly” following the adoption
of the Charter, for the purpose of review and possible amendments o
the Charter under Article 108.The supposed intention was to put the
Transitional Security Arrangements into effect. If so, the status of the
ermanent members of the Security Council was in fact not considered
1UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111 of 17 June 1992, An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. According to
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “during the whole cold war period, the question
centered around the need to shore up the weak authority of the Council ..
Today, the question has been turned on its head.”
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
The question is: Does the wording necessarily imply
that the Security Council must expand by increasing the
number of individual nation-state members, or could
“increase in the membership of the Security Council”
also be taken to mean an increase in the number of
states—like those joined in the EU—and the number of
people represented? Foremost, isn’t it “We, the Peoples
of the United Nations” who are to be equitably repre-
sented, and who have a role to see that the principles of
the United Nations are upheld and its purposes accom-
plished? The most important item on the agenda “Right
of Peoples to Peace” [3-6] may be to see that the System
of Collective Security, which the founders of the United
Nations had envisioned, and which could guarantee that
right, will put into effect. To achieve this, the composi-
tion of the Security Council needs to be only changed
slightly, by reducing the two European seats to one and
admitting a prominent member from the hitherto unrep-
resented Globa l Sout h, i.e. India3 [7].
Because it is required for the transition from an armed
to an unarmed peace [8], the consensus principle must be
upheld. There is no other way to achieve disarmament
and a stable peace4 [9-11], save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, steer clear of the insecurity
brought about by the global arms trade and international
organized crime, and avert the effects of financial crises
and environmental degradation. In addition, the provi-
sions in peace constitutions corresponding to the UN
Charter, required to fulfill the high Purposes of the
United Nations, must be implemented [12], and the pro-
visions in the UN Charter, which have not yet been im-
plemented, vital to maintaining international peace and
security, be put into operation.
2. The Case for UNSC Reform
The United Nations Charter is the result of the meticu-
lous, continuous efforts of lawyers, diplomats, govern-
ments and the peace movement since the Hague Peace
Conferences first aimed at an organized, global peace.
The Charter incorporated into international law an en-
tirely new concept, i.e. the “transitional period.” Already
before and during World War I the Australian-German
pacifist and 1911 Nobel Peace laureate Alfred Hermann
Fried emphasized that it was necessary after war had
ended not to return to an armed peace that merely per-
petuates international anarchy but to an organized state
subject to the rule of law. Fried rightly observed that
while nation-states were
not nominally at war, and they appeared to be at
peace … in reality the condition was one of latent war,
differing from acute war, where the guns are actually
fired, only in degree and not in kind … What we are ex-
periencing with horror to-day [i.e. WWI] is only the
conclusion of a process to which the present generation
had become accustomed, the inevitable outcome of that
condition of latent war which grew out of the lack of
human adjustment to the natural course of evolution, and
made anarchy dominant [13-15].
This idea did not materialize until it was incorporated
in the UN Charter, which envisaged—as evinced in the
analysis of the 1942 American Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace planning for the future interna-
tional organization—that, as political scientist Quincy
Wright put it, “[a]fter the fighting is over and aggression
has been suppressed, a period of reconstruction will be
necessary to establish an order more adequate than the
‘peace’ which preceded and produced the hostilities. The
problem is not to restore to an earlier situation but to
build a more adequate world order.” [16] However, this
also has remained on paper only, so far5 [17]
Politicians and intern ational lawyers have don e little to
explicate the issue. One reason may be, as Mohammed
Bedjaoui ha s pointed out, that the West has used interna-
tional law to its own advantage, and tabooed objectives
that would curtail state sovereignty. “Disguised as indif-
ference or neutrality, it is in effect a permissive law in-
tended for a liberal or neo-liberal world economy based
on certain peoples’ freedom to exploit others.” [18]
However, the institution of the veto is not part of a
‘neo-colonial conspiracy’, as some people believe, but an
essential ingredient required for the transition. Not sur-
prisingly the great powers which had twice, in World
War I and II, combined to suppress aggression and who
created the League of Nations and the UN, were also put
in charge of managing th e proposed transition.
Evidently, the veto power, which became a tool of
power politics during the Cold War,6 [19] is the reverse
side of the consensus principle, requ ired for th e tran sition,
an issue closely related to Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
5British author and pacifist H.G. Wells talked abou t a wor ld au thor ity o r
“Peace Council” which would “also be a permanent Disarmament
Committee” that could “pool the military, naval, and air establishments
of the federated nations into one international force, and proceed to
reduce that force to the dimensions of a world police”.
6Yet, it may also not be too far-fetched to say that the veto has contrib-
uted to averting a military showdown between the United States and
Soviet Russia in the past half-century, perhaps as much as, if not more
than, the policy of nuclear deterrence. “There is no direct evidence that
nuclear weapons prevented a world war. Conversely, it is known that
they nearly caused one... As for the assertion that nuclear weapons pre-
vent wars, how many wars are needed to refute this argument?”
3It could be argued that the UN Charter set up some of the colonial
owers as quasi-proxies, e.g. for a country like India. “When the UN
was founded, few envisaged complete decolonization even in this cen-
4Among principles recognized as indispensable already in the Interwar
Period are the following “three distinct sets of policies: the regulation o
armaments, the pacific settlement of disputes, and collective action,”
which need to be put into practice.
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform 99
i.e. enforcement action.7 [20] This will work only if the
UN Security Council has no more than five permanent
members. Apart from the fact that the number five is
important for the effective functioning of their deci-
sion-making process, this arrangement ensures that the
P5 will not war among themselves. It would not be de-
sirable to “enforce peace” (Chapter VII of the Charter)
by a majority vote.8 [21]
The main problem is how to trigger the process of the
transition, so that the permanent members, plus, “as oc-
casion requires … other Members of the United Na-
tions,” (Article 106)9 [22] will be able to effectively
guard the organized passage from “latent war” (Fried) to
sustainable, perpetual peace10. To this effect the peace
constitutions for empowering the United Nations are a key
instrument. It is one of the disturbing aspects of power
politics, supported by a military-industrial-academic com-
plex, that this issue has been notoriously neglected, while
the question of founding a global authority with en-
forcement powers to “transcend” and eventually abolish
the institution of war remains the most important single
issue that needs to be addressed by lawmakers, nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), academics, peace re-
searchers and activists.
Under the present circumstances, if the institution of
war is not abolished and replaced by an equally powerful
and persuasive system, it is unlikely that the world’s po-
litical, social and econ omic problems will be solved. It is
reasonable, therefore, to assume that the United Nations
should obtain a monopoly of power and operate an in-
ternational police force11 [23] to enforce international
law and order and monitor disarmament. From the
point-of-view of the transition, the composition of the
permanent members, which reflected the political envi-
ronment after the Second World War and rewarded the
victorious powers, was never planned to be permanent,
just as it was also not planned that the UNSC was to be
above the law, “a law unto itself,” as Mohammed Bed-
jaoui has written, with “no principles of law... laid down
to guide it,”12 [24] lacking full legitimacy.
Since the United Nations has no sovereignty of its own,
the comprehensive “system for the regulation of arma-
ments” (Article 26, UN Charter), an essential ingredient
in a system of collective security, has also so far re-
mained on paper only [25]. An effectively functioning
UN security system requires that member states “confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.” (Arti-
cle 24, UN Charter) So far, however, UN member states
have not conferred onto the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security
7A consensus is required with respect to “military” enforcement action.
“When I joined the United Nations in 1945, Chapter VII was the
show8piece of the Charter. It was called the ‘teeth’ of the Charter.”
This problem was clearly realized by some authors early on. Every
Reves wrote: “If in a given situation, three of the major powers voted
for a certain military intervention, while the other two voted agains
such a measure, these two powers could scarcely be pictured taking up
arms and undertaking military action contrary to what they regard as
their own national interests, and contrary to their votes. So the whole
debate on unanimous vote versus majority vote... is irrelevant.” Emery
Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, London and Toronto, Cassell, 1950, p,
9Article 106 of the UN Charter states:“Pending the coming into force o
such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the
Security Council ena
le it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities
under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at
Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the
rovisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one anothe
and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with
a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and secu-
rity.” Interestingly, at the time of the Korean crisis in 1950, the Russians
refused to sanction the actions of the United Nations in Korea, insisting
on an “invocation or implementation” of Article 106. On 11 Octobe
1950, the representative of the USSR submitted this resolution for the
last time: “The General Assembly, Taking into account the particular
importance of concerted action by the five permanent members of the
Security Council in defending and strengthening peace and security
among nations, Recommends that before armed forces are placed at the
disposal of the Security Council under appropriate agreements con-
cluded in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter, the five permanent
members of the Security Council … should take steps to ensure the
necessary implementation of Article 106 of the Charter for the purpose
of taking such joint action on behalf of the organization as may prove to
be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
10The McCloy-Zorin Agreement, unanimously adopted by the UN General
Assembly on 20 December 1961, was such a plan for an organized pas-
sage from war to peace. Online:
in the sense of a sovereignty transfer. Something like
that would presume that in that respect the states had
positively removed a competence they had exercised up
to now from within their own area of competence, and
handed it over to the UN … The Charter of the United
Nations … does not change the competence structure of
nation-states, no more than any other international
But that is precisely what is required under the UN
Charter. Pretending that there is already a System of
Collective Security in place, while nation-states continu e
to maintain individual militaries, is counterproductive,
and ultimately leads to war. So, in order to give effect to
the provision, national lawmakers must pass legislation,
giving the Security Council a much wanted code of con-
duct14 and the power to be able to act promptly and ef-
fectively in order to maintain international peace and
security, by delegating sovereign powers to it—apart
from making available to the Security Council, under
11For early plans which eventually took shape in the UN Charter, see
David Davies.
12That the Security Council was not intended to b e “a law unto itself” was
articulated by John Foster Dulles, War or Peace, New York, Macmillan,
1950, p. 194.
13Eminent Professor of international law Knut Ips en in a wr itten stat emen
to the author (Letter of 13 April 1999).
14See Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council.
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
Article 43, “armed forces, assistance, and facilities.”15
Consistent with the international law concept of the
transition period the Transitional Security Arrangements
provide for—besides the P5—co-opting “other Members
of the United Nations with a view to … joint action”
(Article 106) [26] during the passage from the present
state of an armed to an unarmed peace. This well
thought-out sch eme would make countries like Germany,
Japan and other troop-contributing countries eligible to
take up key functions during the transition.
Assessing the situation, though somewhat late in the
day, since the Russians under Mikhail Gorbachev had
already in 1987 and later also in connection with the Gulf
War in 1990 recommended deploying a common fleet
under the United Nations flag and activating the UN
Military Staff Committee [27]—objectives France and
others had shared—former UN General-Secretary
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, stated:
11. We have entered a time of global transition
marked by contradictory trends. Regional and continen-
tal associations of States are evolving ways to deepen
cooperation and ease some of the uniquely contentious
characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries.
National boundaries are blurred by advanced communi-
cations and global commerce, and by the decisions of
States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger,
common political associations. At the same time, how-
ever, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sover-
eignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened
by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic
strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new
assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the
other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolu-
tion and change through democratic means.
However, legally, and in actual fact, the transitional
period has not even started.
Finally, the history and performance of ad-hoc UN
peace-keeping operations (PKO) sanctioned by the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is evidence of
the usefulness and feasibility of international policing.16
[20] However, since PKO are based on special arrange-
ments outside the Charter, this provision unwittingly
supports the maintenance of national militaries, and is
not supportive of attaining an unarmed, positive peace, as
envisaged in the UN Charter. Considering the premise of
a disarmed and organized world under the rule of law,
UN Members have so far failed to take the necessary
steps toward achieving this goal. As a consequence the
UN is losing credibility, the arms trade and war continue
unabated and disillusionment has set in among the “Peo-
ples of the United Nations.”
A Chance Was Missed after the Fall of the USSR
Due to European Intransigence
At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of proposals
were put forward to strengthen the United Nations and
put the UN System of Collective Security into effect. For
the first time the USA and Russia, the two allies in
World War II, were reconciled. US President George
Herbert Walker Bush in an address to the UN General
Assembly on 1 October 1990 envisaged a United Nations
“fulfilling its promise as the world’s parliament of
peace.”17 [28] Russia, traditionally in favor of collective
security, was upfron t [27,29]. Ger many announ ced it wa s
aiming at a permanent representation for a “single Euro-
pean Union”, but subsequently did nothing to bring it
about, in spite of French President François Mitterrand’s
broad hint in January 1992 that France was willing to
share nuclear responsibility in Europe [30,31], implicitly
agreeing to a European permanent representation in the
UNSC. In a complementary pr oposal on 31 January 1992 ,
at the already mentioned “first-ever” UN Security Coun-
cil summit in New York, France offered 1000 French
troops for a rapid deployment force at the Council’s dis-
posal, as a start [32], and, like Russia before, suggested
“revitalizing the Military Staff Committee18 [33,34].”
Nothing came of it, because already on 1 March 1993,
former German Foreign Minister Dr. Klaus Kinkel
maintained that “it would be unrealistic to imagine the
European Community taking a seat on behalf of Europe
17“This is a new and different world. Not since 1945 have we seen the
real possibility of using the United Nations as it was designed—as a
center for international collective security. The changes in the Soviet
Union have been critical to the emergence of a stronger United Na-
tions.” “And, for the first time,” Bush said, “the UN Security Council is
beginning to work as it was designed to work.”
18The Military Staff Committee in charge of the police function is
laced at the disposal of the executive council, to “advise and assist” it,
and to take on responsibility “for the strategic direction of any armed
forces” under the authority ofthe Security Council. (UN Charter, Article
47, (1) and (3)) Shortly before the rift between the powers in 1947, it
“submitted … estimates of the overall strength required by the United
ations.” In these, “the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China
were all thinking in terms of a land army consisting of not more than 12
divisions; the highest estimate, that of the United States, was for 20
divisions. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China
would have been satisfied with an international air force totaling not
more than 1200 aircraft; the corresponding figures in the French and
American estimates were 1275 and 3800. As regards naval forces, none
of the five delegations proposed more than 3 battleships, 6 aircraft car-
riers, 15 cruisers, 84 destroyers and 90 submarines; the majority of them
roposed a much smaller force.” UN Document S/394; see also Year-
book of the United Nations, 1947-1948, p. 495. “The United States
subsequently revised its estimates downwards.” However, whether the
armed forces which are “to be ‘placed at the disposal’ of the Security
Council can be properly described as an ‘international police force’
depends on the meaning” we give it. Politically it would mean “a per-
manent army of an international nature over and above national armies
or even replacing them.” Statement by the Rapporteur of Committee
III/3 of the San Francisco Conference at the opening meeting; UNCIO
Document 134, III/3/3.
15A binding Disarmament Treaty or regulation under Article 26 of the
UN Charter should take care of the problem of a peacekeeping organi-
zation turning into a warmaking enterprise.
16Somewhat overassertive Brian Urquhart, “After the Cold War: Learn-
ing from the Gulf”, p. 9: “We are c elebrating ... th e actual app lication o
the principle of collective security against aggression.”
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform 101
on the Council.”19 The rationale for blocking these initia-
tives by Germany is not clear, especially since the Euro-
pean Union was created “with a view to the achievement
of political union.” The Treaty on European Union
(Treaty of Maastricht) and similarly th e Treaty of Lisbon
unequivocally stipulate that the European Union shall
“define and implement a common foreign and security
policy … to preserve peace and strengthen international
security, in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter.”20Although the Eu ropean Union is no t a
“state”, it is a supranational organization with consider-
able powers of direct enforcement in the member States.
Also, if it has been considered possible to have regional
representation on a rotational basis for other regions,
there is no reason to assume that a similar arrangement
would not be feasible for Europe. Until Europe becomes
a political union—and ev en if it does not21—a legal con-
struction should be found.22
In spite of their constitutional commitment to interna-
tional organization (see Appendix), the Europeans have
so far not been able to put their act together and answer
the universal plea for outlawing war, disarmament and
empowering the United Nations.23
3. The Question of National Sovereignty
Every year that the Security Council continues with its
present structure, the UN suffers because the increas-
ingly apparent lack of representativeness of the council
membership diminishes its credibility and weakens its
capacity for conflict prevention.” (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace [35])
Already in 1955, the Russell-Einstein-Manifest, the
starting point for the Pugwash movement, declared that
the “abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations
of national sovereignty…”24 Yet Nation states are reluc-
tant to give up any part of their national sovereignty for
fear of becoming vulnerable and appearing weak. Nev-
ertheless, “restriction of nation state sovereignty … (re-
mains an) ind ispensable ite m on any reform agenda … I t
is also the most important item, since without this restric-
tion no other reforms designed to make the UN more
effective in realizing its professed goals can be mean-
ingful.” [36]
The realization was not confined to the West. The late
Indian president and philosopher, Professor Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan, expressed the same idea:
We must surrender a part of our sovereignty, work to-
gether for the elimination of every kind of injustice ... The
United Nations is the first step towards the creation of an
authoritative world order. It has not got the power to
enforce the rule of law ... Military solutions to political
problems are good fo r nothing . Ultimately they will lea ve
bitterness behind ... The challenge that is open to us is
survival or annihilation ... but what are we doing to
bring about that survival? Are we prepared to surrender
a fraction of our national sovereignty for the sake of a
world order? Are we prepared to submit our disputes and
quarrels to arbitration, to negotiation and settlement by
peaceful methods? Have we set up a machinery by which
peaceful changes could be easily brought about in this
world? So long as we do not have it, it is no use merely
talking [37].
In neighboring Pakistan as well a similar sentiment
had been expressed. At the Conference of the Interpar-
liamentary Union (IPU) in 1952, the Pakistani diplomat
Ahmed E.H. Jaffer stated:
The evils of the sovereign state and its incapacity to
maintain peace are increasingly felt ... In my opinion
time is ripe for beginning to plan and shape organiza-
tions which will ultimately form the nucleus of world
federation ... in connection with the question of limits to
state sovereignty discussed at this conference it has been
made amply clear that one of the greatest impediments to
real political and economic cooperation between the
states is the sovereignty of states and that the remedy for
the sufferings of mankind lies in curtailing and limiting
that sovereignty [38].
19‘Germany to push for UNSC Seat’, The Japan Times, March 1, 1993.
According to the paper, Foreign Minister Kinkel enigmatically declared
that in that case “Germany would have to amend its constitution.”
20Treaty on European Union of January 1, 1993, Final Act and Title I,
Common Provisions, Article B. Similarly, the German Constitution, in
its Preamble, stipulates the purpose “to serve the peace of the world as
an equal part in a unified Europe.” However, the more recent Treaty o
isbon does not mention collective security, and disarmament only
21A very good idea would be to have a rotating European representation
shared by France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Poland for example.
22As a step in this direction, recently, the EU has been given the privi-
lege of a single representation in the UN General Assembly. GA/11079/
Rev. 1, vote of 3 May 2011.
23On the history of the war outlawry movement in the interwar period
that resulted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact see for example Hans Wehberg,
The Outlawry of War, a series of lectures delivered before the Academy
of International Law at The Hague and in the Institut Universitaire de
Hautes Etudes Internationales at Geneva, Washington, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1931.
24However, if nation-states agree to limitations of their national sover-
eignty, according to the Manifest, “there lies before us, if we choose,
continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we in-
stead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels?” For the
Russell/Einstein Manifesto, commonly known as the Pugwash Mani-
festo, see
Even a realist such as Robert Strausz-Hupe, founding
member of the U.S. Foreign Policy Research Institute, in
1992 made the following statement before a U.S. Com-
mission on Improvement of the Effectiveness of the
United Nations:
What is needed first and foremost in order to make the
United Nations more effective and viable is candor. The
peoples of the world need to be told that a more effective
United Nations comes at a pr ice and that this price is the
delegation of national sovereignty; in the beginning, not
all of it, but as the process continues, more and more of
it [39].
China, too, has not been averse to this kind of organ-
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
izational pacifism. H.G. Wells the pacifist early on called
for China to become “a pillar of … world civilization
equivalent to the … English-speaking world,” and con-
tribute to the peace and order of the world. [40] Indeed,
Mozi (about 470-391 BCE), the pacifist philosopher in
the early period of the Warring States, who called for
restrictions of the sovereign power to fight aggressive
war, is held in high esteem even among the Communist
leadership. And whether present-day mainland Chinese
like it or not, Madame Chiang Kai-shek for one had a
good understanding concerning the purposes and princi-
ples of the future United Nations, when she stated: “The
term ‘hands and feet’ is often used in China to signify the
relationship between brothers. Since international in-
ter-dependence is now so universally recognized, can we
not also say that all nations should become members of
one corporate body?”25 [41,42] Some similar statements,
favoring international organization, have also been as-
cribed to Mao Zedong.
Not surprisingly, more recently, at the UN Summit
meeting in New York in September 2005, Chinese
President Hu Jintao stressed the necessity to “strengthen
Collective Security Mechanism[s]” and “improve the
Council’s efficiency so as to respond to threats more ef-
fectively,” as well as “improve the Council's decision
making by giving greater expression to democratic prin-
ciples.”26 Hu emphasized that the “Security Council
needs a capability of rapid response,”27 an allusion, no
doubt, to Article 43 of the UN Charter.
However, the rapidly changing security environment
and continuing reluctance of the European nations to
agree to limitations of their national sovereignty in favor
of the international rule of law, poses obvious dangers.
Old-timer Henry Kissinger, in a keynote address on 10
September 2010, at the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies in Geneva, warned that Collective Security as
an ideal to be realized any time soon was losing ground,
because the support “to organize an effective global col-
lective security system on many key issues, including
nuclear proliferation,” was lacking.28
The issue was highlighted by UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan in his 2004 Report of the High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world:
Our shared responsibility: “The United Nations was
never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to
be a collective security system that worked.” (p. 4)
Though the Report mentions “collective security” more
than a hundred times, it did not address the problem of
limiting nation-state sovereignty, although it did point
out that “[w]hatever perceptions may have prevailed
when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion
of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the
obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own
peoples and meet its obligations to the wider interna-
tional community.” (p. 17)
The famous “war-abolishing” clause in the Japanese
Constitution, Article 9, limiting state sovereignty, pro-
fesses to achieve this purpose, i.e. an “international peace
based on justice and order.” Article 9 reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force a s a means fo r settling interna tion al d ispu tes.
—In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding para-
graph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential will never be maintained. The right of belliger-
ency of the state will not be recognized. (Constitution of
3 May 1947 [43,44])
The reason why the end of the Cold War had not more
quickly “opened th e way to a cooperativ e secu rity syste m
that would minimize the role of armed force in interna-
tional affairs” [45] is to be found in the inability of na-
tion-states to pool their interests in this vital area. Natu-
rally, this step requires a break from traditional military
security and a bold leap over the national shadow. Frie-
drich Nietzsche, in his Human, All too Human, in the
Chapter “The Wanderer and his Shadow,” pointed out
“the means to real peace” more than a hundred years ago:
25On 18 February 1943. Chiang Kaishek himself, “a friend of Indian
self-determination,” and Mahatma Gandhi agreed on many points when
they met in Calcutta in February 1942.
262005 Position Paper of the People
Republic of China on the Unite
ations Reforms, calling for a “reformed UN with a bigger role to play
that will serve the common interests of humanity” and the establishment
of “an effective, efficient and fair collective security mechanism.”
htm. The UN Permanent Five Summit Document issued on 15 Novem-
er 2000, proclaiming the P5’s “commitment to ensuring that the UN is
stronger, more effective and more efficient than ever before as it enters
the 21st century.”
27Most recently there has been a move both by China and the USA to
cooperate with the Russian Commonwealth’s Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), e.g. in Kyrgyzstan. Similar statements, calling for
“strengthening collective security” have come from disarmament nego-
tiator Hu Xiaodi. “The international community should give up the idea,
to try to obtain security superiority by military means,” he said. Website
of the Peoples Republic of China in Vienna, statement of 6 October
b (translated from the
German; statement no longer available online!)
No government nowadays admits that it maintains an
army so as to satisfy occasional thirsts for conquest; the
army is supposed to be for defence. That morality which
sanctions self-protection is called upon to be its advocate.
But that means to reserve morality to oneself and to ac-
cuse ones neighbour of immorality... This is how all
states now confront one another: they presuppose an evil
28“The drift regarding proliferation will, within a measurable point,
oblige the international system to choose whether to take decisive
measures—however defined—or to live in a proliferated world.” Online
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform 103
disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent disposi-
tion in themselves. This presupposition, however, is a
piece of inhumanity as bad as, if not worse than, a war
would be; indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an
invitation to and cause of wars... The doctrine of the
army as a means of self-defence must be renounced just
as completely as the thirst for conquest...—As is well
known, our liberal representatives of the people lack the
time to reflect on the nature of man: otherwise they
would know that they labour in vain when they work for
a gradual reduction of the military burden [46].
Limitation of national sovereignty with regards to the
right to go to war addr esses the root cause of th e problem.
If war is to be abolished,29 nation states must delegate
sovereign powers to the United Nations Security Council,
to give the United Nations proper executive powers.30
[47] The international community is duty-bound to give
the Council a basic law. A “Bill” in the Parliament of
some able nation transferring “security sovereignty”
(Professor Ian Tinbergen31) would initiate the process of
defining the Security Council’s powers, and at the same
time trigger the transition from an armed to an unarmed
peace. In Germany, parliament may pass such bill with
simple majority under Article 24 of the Federal Republic
of Germany’s Basic Law.32 (See APPENDIX) [48]
The Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 points a way out
of the dilemma, aiming as it does at th e abolition of war;
seen as a motion to be seconded it wou ld open the deb ate
on the issue, e.g. in the UN General Assembly. Nations
do not have to simultaneously pool sovereign powers
with the United Nations, to bring about an effective sys-
tem of collective security; if only one adept and well
endowed UN Member state starts the process, owing to
the principle of reciprocity, an obligation erga omnes
arises, [49,50] and all others are bound to follow.
Article 9—a wa y to ban ish war?
The abolition or outlawry of war had become a major
foreign policy objective with and after the First World
War. The Japanese diplomat Shidehara Kijûrô (1872-
1951), who had been following a conciliatory policy to-
ward China and the other powers as Foreign Minister
between 1924 and 1932, was a chief player in the inter-
national political aren a. He was known as an internation-
alist and a pacifist, had been on the list of judges to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague from
1918-24, negotiated disarmament at the Washington Na-
val Conference in 1921-1922, and prior to that had
closely monitored the Hague Peace Conferences. There
is sufficient evidence to believe that Shidehara as one of
the first post-World War II Prime Ministers suggested
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (JC) to General
Douglas MacArthur on January 24, 1946 [51-53].
In fact, the origin of Article 9 and other constitutional
provisions limiting state sovereignty in favor of interna-
tional organization can be traced, if not to The Hague, to
a Resolution by the 22nd Conference of the Interparlia-
mentary Union (IPU) he ld in Bern in 1924:
The XXIInd Inter-Parliamentary Conference endorses
the stipulation ... voted at the Fourth Assembly of the
League of Nations, by the terms of which war of aggres-
sion is described as an international crime, and recom-
mends that proposals be submitted ... to ... parliaments
for amendments to th e Constitution, such proposals a) to
forbid resort to war ... [and] b) to make arbitration or
other amicable or judicial means obligatory [54].
As the German parliamentarian professor Walther
Schücking pointed out at the IPU Conference, “wars
could then only be declared , if the constitution is revised
at the same time.”33 [54,55]
International lawyers and national lawmakers were
working together to “harmonize” domestic law with the
evolving international law of peace. The above proposal
engaged lawmakers around the world, when Shidehara,
Aristide Briand, Frank Kellogg and Gustav Stresemann
were foreign ministers. Subsequently, progressive inter-
national lawyers and some governments continued to
envisage the outlawing of war in national constitution s.34
[55,56] H ans Wehberg, renow ned internation al jurist and
editor of the famous journal “Die Friedens-Warte” (The
Peace Watchtower) until 1962 (still in existence), had
already pointed out during the interwar period, in a series
of lectures delivered before the Academy of International
Law at The Hague and in the Institut Universitaire de
Hautes Etudes Internationales at Geneva that “it seems
desirable to outlaw war in the con stitution s of the various
states as soon as possible and without awaiting the ela-
boration of an ideal international pact … The provision,
whereby wars of aggression are constitutionally prohib-
ited and wars of defense and of sanction can be decided
upon only by a qualified majority of the legislative or-
gans, would be of immense importance.” [57]
29This is the aim of the Hague movement, “Appeal for Peace 1999,” and
of Pugwash: “The only way to prevent it (the ultimate nuclear catastro-
he) is to abolish war altogether.” Joseph Rotblat in his speech on the
occasion of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of Pugwash.
30Reviewing the legality of the Council’s actions, as suggested in some.
quarters, to “help build up a body of rules concerning the question o
competence [of the UNSC], based on the opinion of the highest legal
authority under the Charter,” would be desirable.
31Professor Jan Tinbergen in a personal letter to the author on June 7,
1985: “I think it is an excellent idea to have transferred security sover-
eignty from national governments to the Security Council of the United
32It was clear at the time that this referred to the United Nations. “We
must come to such organizations, otherwise we are busted,” Carlo
33There were other events where the quest was confirmed: in 1929 in
Athens, Greece, at the XXVII. Conference of the International Peace
Bureau (IPB, Bern), following the conclusion of the Paris Peace Pact
(Kellogg-Briand), an IPB Resolution called on the signatories to “amend
their constitutions” to make recourse to the pacific settlement of dis-
utes obligatory.
34See Mirkine-Guetzevitch for the most in-depth analyses.
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
This trend was pursued after 1945. The following pro-
vision in the Danish constitution was based on recom-
mendations by another IPU Conference held in Bern
from 28 August to 2 September 1952:
Art. 20. Powers which according to this constitution
rest with the authorities of the kingdom, can, through a
bill, to a specifically defined extent, be transferred to
international authorities, which are instituted by mutual
agreement with other states to promote international
legal order and c oo per at i o n [58].
In this light, the Japanese Constitution’s Article 9,35
[59] aiming at the abolition of war and an “international
peace based on justice and order” became a cornerstone
for a future “international legal order and cooperation.”
Article 9 is a motion to abolish war among nations,
which could trigger the process of the transition, and
bring the issu e of the abolitio n of war into open deb ate, if
it is followed up.
Corresponding to the Danish Article 20 and to Article
9 of the Japanese Constitution, a number of constitutio ns
provide for limitin g national sovereignty, for th e purpose
of international cooperation and peace. (See APPENDIX)
The frequency of these provisions in the constitutions of
Europe suggests that the solution of this problem was
given high priority. Law-makers wanted to facilitate Eu-
rope’s integration into the world community, and streng-
then the international organization of peace.
We must think carefully about how to effectively
strengthen world organization, to avert another total war
in future. Regional integration and international organi-
zation must go hand in hand. In fact, regional integration
will be much enhan ced by streng thening the in ternationa l
legal order first, as some diplomats and international ju-
rists had seen clearly, early on in the twentieth century. 36
[60] At the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference in
1952 at Berne, the Indian participant rightly pointed out
The two world wars have taught Europe that national
sovereign states could not be the last word in the evolu-
tion of human civilization ... What we require now is a
world organization which will be authorized with the
rights surrendered by other states ... The civilized nations
have failed in the case of the League of Nations, and I
may not be quite wrong if I say the Locarn o Pact was the
first step leading to that failure. I have my own misgiv-
ings as to whether many of these European political or-
ganizations are not in a way neutralizing the effective-
ness of the United Nations. [61]
The Pakistani delegate concurred:
I personally feel that regional confederation of states
or the creation of regional representative assemblies
would have the effect of delaying the process of estab-
lishing a world Parliament or a world State, because
regional super-states or assemblies would in the nature
of things develop a sense of rivalry among themselves,
and instead of co-operating with each other would run
into conflict, very much like the modern sovereign state.
Divergent national and regional military establish-
ments will not be able to effectively maintain interna-
tional peace and security in the twenty-first century. If
the military establishments are not abolished, the best
scenario (short of another total war) is George Orwell’s
1984, a sincer e warning for humanity.
4. India and the “Skillful Surgeon”
A skillful surgeon will try to obtain the maximum result
with the least effort, keeping to a minimum the incisions
required to remove the affected parts or make implants
and cure the patient [62]. Since (1) Europe is overrepre-
sented, and (2) the Global South is not represented at all,
the aim must be to obtain a single European (EU) repre-
sentation37 [63] and place a capable and experienced
representative of the Global South, i.e. India, in the va-
cant seat.38 [64] This could possibly be carried out as a
procedural matter. Contesting candidates for the UNSC
would be liable to agree if it is made clear to them that
this arrangement will be for the transition period only.
The necessary global paradigm shift may be accom-
plished within the scope of the UN Charter, and with
little change either in the text of the Charter or the com-
position of the Security Council. Yet the results would be
decisive and awesome.
Since 2005 India’s bid to become a UNSC permanent
35In the 1950s discussions on constitutional revision took place on a
large scale in Japan, and the question of limitations of national sover-
eignty was carefully studied. Japanese scholars proposing to revise
Article 9 considered amendments to the Japanese Constitution, suggest-
ing that its limitation of sovereignty be based on conditions of reciproc-
ity, as in the Danish, French, Greek and Italian constitutions. The pro-
osal of the Association for Constitutional Studies (kempô kenkyû-kai),
ublished on 23 May 1956, contained the following revised Article 9
(Article 117): “Japan, under condition of reciprocity with otherstates,
agrees to limitations of its sovereignty, which are necessary for the
organization of international peace and its safeguarding.”
36 “In 1912 the German jurist Schücking was perhaps the first to empha-
size that the European powers ... had extra-European interests that were
too important to permit them to establish a union that was limited to
37A European Security Council seat had been the goal of American
foreign policy early on. See Congressional Record, April 22, 1947,
A1905, for “identical resolutions... introduced by Messrs. Fulbright and
Thomas in the Senate and Hale Boggs in the House, the substance o
which was that America favored the creation of a United States of Eu-
rope within the framework of the United Nations Charter (emphasis
added). That resolution was subsequently adopted.”
38The US administration has issued the following criteria concerning the
required qualifications for permanent members: “size of economy and
opulation, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping operations,
commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to
the United Nations, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism records, and
geographic balance.”
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform 105
member also has also gained the support of China.39 [65]
India is the world’s most populous democracy, compris-
ing almost one sixth of the world population. Its Muslim
population also is a factor to be reckoned with. Accord-
ing to an estimate, “more than h alf of the wo rld’s citizen s
living under democratic rule are to be found in South
Asia.” [66] Historically, India has been the country cred-
ited most frequently with a tradition of non-violence and
pacifism. It has propounded universalist principles and
philosophy,40 [67] and assumed a leading role among the
developing and non-aligned countries. However, as
France and Britain will most likely agree to a single Eu-
ropean representation only, if the UN System of Collec-
tive Security is put into effect, China, too, ideally would
under the same condition agree to an Indian permanent
India, allegedly possessing the world’s third largest
army and the fifth-largest navy in terms of personnel, [68]
is a major “troop-contributing country” to the United
Nations. She is a factor of stability, because unlike Paki-
stan she is basically self-contained. While Pakistan, a
major arms exporter, poses a problem in the region, there
also seem to be a number of convergent interests and
issues between the two countries41 [69] as reflected in
SAARC. Cooperation between India and other Asian
countries, such as China and Japan, on issues of disarma-
ment, monitoring, and the abolition of war will have a
positive impact on the region, and the world. While Pa-
kistan had for a long time attempted to acquire nuclear
capability [70], and apparently possessed nuclear weap-
ons for some time before India,42 India has for a long
time been a proponent of nuclear disarmament, and has
in the past advocated a world federal authority43 [71-73]
complementing some idealistic American and European
foreign policy objectives in the twentieth century.44
There is a basic tendency in democracies to submit to
the rule of law on a global scale. But does the fact that
India has become a nuclear power mean that it has aban-
doned its basic philosophy of and disposition toward
nonviolence and UN support and is no longer eligible?
Most likely not. [74] Since India could not agree with the
argument that the commitment under Article VI of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “only requires
negotiations and not necessarily the conclusion of a trea-
ty to abolish nuclear weapons” and bring about general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective in-
ternational control, a reasonable “bargain of disarmament
and non-proliferation … continues to remain unfulfilled.”
[75] However, the above “misperception and misinter-
pretation was set at rest,” according to Jasjit Singh, for-
mer director of New Delhi’s renowned Institute for De-
fense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), by the ICJ’s 1996
ruling concerning the legality of nuclear weapons, in
which the judges unanimously agreed that “there exists
an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a con-
clusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in
all its aspects under strict and effective international con-
trol.”45 [76] Under these circumstances India’s strategy
had been “to keep the nuclear option open as long as fea-
sible, not weaponize, and work for disarmament which
would eliminate the roots of the security dilemma.”46 [75]
Eventually circumstances forced India to take action—
and also share the blame.
Cooperation with Pakistan and other neighbors could
facilitate the implementation of a practical policy of
peace and disarmament in the area and beyond. India
could greatly advance her aspirations and cause, if she
would take such responsibility upon herself, for the sake
of world peace, as a permanent representation in the
UNSC would entail.47 [77,78] As it is, still, the present
state of “warlessness simply means the indefinite post-
ponement of a nuclear war”, while “in a generic sense the
term ‘warlessness’” should refer to a “world situation in
which disarmament has been achieved, decisions of the
International Court of Justice are enforceable, an interna-
tional police force has been established effectively, and
the veto has been abolished in th e Security Council,” [79]
following the transition.
39India together with Russia and the U.K. had early on also supported
Communist China to be represented in the United Nations prior to its
admission as a permanent member in 1971.
40Amartya Sen claims that “a tendency towards unity and a broad syn-
thesizing priority are very special characteristics of Indian culture.”
41India and Pakistan at least “in the short run may be able to expand
their peacekeeping and stabilizing role in regions adjacent to South
42Apparently already in 1993 its nuclear weapons program had been
developed to the point of enabling Pakistan to assemble a nuclear wea-
43Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated in a speech broadcast in the
United States: “I have no doubt that world government must and will
come, for there is no other remedy for the world’s sickness. The ma-
chinery for it is not difficult to devise. It can be an extension of the
federal principle, a growth of the idea underlying the United Nations,
giving each national unit freedom to fashion its destiny according to its
44See the Resolution in both Houses, H.Con.Res.64 and S.Con.Res.56,
of June 7, and July 26, 1949 respectively, calling for the “development”
of the United Nations “into a world federation open to all nations with
defined and limited powers.”
The New Security Council
The “pragmatic dream” [80] of an effective global
foundation of peace requires a feasible plan. However, in
spite of the fact that already a century ago “the industrial
45In the Preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty “the cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons,” and “the liquidation ofall existing
stockpiles” are stipulated.
46“It was mostly ignored or not understood in the Western world that an
open option was a policy of restraint.”
47The mishaps of the interwar period should not happen again, e.g. when
Japan was not trusted or takenseriously, in spite of the conciliatory
Shidehara Kijûrô, who was foreign minister in the twenties. At that time
chances for cooperation and peace were squandered and missed.
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
and technical advances … made the world interdepend-
ent in a sense previously undreamt of … adjustment to
the changed conditions” has been incremental, although
“[t]he dream of romantic war … ended” long ago. [81]
The UNSC must be restructured, to include a prominent
member of the Global South. The new permanent mem-
bers should immediately take up their responsibilities to
formulate “plans for the establishment of a system for the
regulation of armaments” (Article 26, in conn ection with
Article 47, UN Charter), with a view to achieving
UN-controlled “general and complete disarmament”,48
and embark on the transition to a positive peace, based
on law, instead of military power sustained by competing
nation-states.49 The 1961 McCloy-Zorin Accords are a
formidable precedent toward this end.
Can this be achieved? French political scientist and
geo-politician Dominique Moisi has rightly observed:
“Things have to change quite radically if the interna-
tional order is not to collapse into a profound and dan-
gerous disequilibrium.” Political leaders have to under-
stand that to maintain the present “status quo is a recipe
for disaster.” To bring about peaceful change we have
“to reinvent the concept of sovereignty for the
twenty-first century.” [82]
As already stated, the Charter revision to accommo-
date India and reduce the two European seats to a single
representation could very well be dealt with as a proce-
dural matter under Article 27 paragraph 2 of the Char-
ter—similar to when the People’s Republic of China re-
placed Taiwan as a permanent member. Giving India a
permanent seat in the Security Council would not only
positively affect the regional environment, but also
strengthen the global framework for peace and security,
as well as help achieve general and comprehensive dis-
armament under strict international control,50 [83] while
bringing together more than half of the world’s popula-
tion represented by the P5 alone.
5. Acknowledgements
I thank Professor Alfred de Zayas for having read and
commented upon my manusc ri pt .
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48The President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, David Krieger,
has pointed out, that “the regulation of armaments [under Article 26 o
the UN Charter] is not optional for the Security Council. The Article
says unambiguously that the Security Council ‘shall’ formulate such a
lan. The members of the Security Council have breached a solemn duty
to the people of the world... the United Nations can succeed only if the
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49“The UN Charter offers a far more appropriate framework for relations
among nations … than does the doctrine of power politics.”
50Robert McNamara has pointed out some time ago, an “important ele-
ment in a global collective security system would be strengthening
existing regional organizations such as the Organization of American
States and the Organization of African Unity, as well as the creation o
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Tübingen, 1908.
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform 107
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[28] G. Bush, “The UN: World Parliament of Peace,” Address
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Current Distortion Evaluation in Traction 4Q Constant Switching Frequency Converters 109
Peace Provisions in Europea n Constitutions :
AUSTRIA: By law or by a State Treaty which must be
ratified in accordance with Article 50 (1), specific sover-
eign rights of the Bund can be transferred to intergov-
ernmental institutions and their organs and the activity of
organs of foreign status in Austria as well as the activity
of Austrian organs abroad can be regulated within the
framework of International Law. (Article 9, paragraph 2,
of the Constitution as amended July 1, 1981).
BELGIUM: The exercises of given powers may be
conferred by a pact or law on institutions coming under
international civil law. (Article 25 bis, of September 29,
DENMARK: Powers which according to this constitu-
tion rest with the author ities of the kingdom, can, throug h
a bill, to a specifically defined extent, be transferred to
international authorities, which are instituted by mutual
agreement with other states to promote international legal
order and cooperation. (Article 20, of June 5, 1953).
FRANCE: On condition of reciprocity, France accepts
the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organiza-
tion and defense of peace. (Preamble of the Constitution
of October 27, 1946, stands reconfirmed in Constitution
of 4 October 1958).
GERMANY: (1) The Federation may by legislation
transfer sovereign powers to international organiza-
tions. … (2) With a view to maintaining peace the Fed-
eration may become a party to a system of collective se-
curity; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations
upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure
a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the
nations of the world. ... (Article 24 of the Constitution of
May 23, 1949).
GREECE: To serve an important national interest and
promote cooperation with other states authorities may be
vested by a convention or agreement in agencies of an
international organization. A majority of three fifth of the
total number of members of Parliament shall be neces-
sary to vote the law sanctioning the treaty or agreement.
III. Greece shall freely proceed by law voted by the ab-
solute majority of the total number of members of Par-
liament, to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, in-
sofar as this is dictated by an important national interest,
does not infringe upon the rights of man and the founda-
tions of democratic government and is affected on the
basis of the principles of equality and under condition of
reciprocity. (Article 28 II., Constitution of June 7, 1975).
IRELAND: For the purpose of the exercise of any ex-
ecutive function of the State in or in connection with its
external relations, the Government may to such extent
and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be deter-
mined by law, avail or adopt any organ, instrument or
method of procedure used or adopted for the like purpose
by the members of any group or league of nations with
which the State is or becomes associated for the purpose
of international cooperation in matters of common con-
cern. (Article 29 IV, 20, originally of July 1, 1937).
ITALY: Italy renounces war as an instrument of of-
fense to the liberty of other peoples or as a means of set-
tlement in international disputes, and, on conditions of
equality with other states, agrees to the limitations of her
sovereignty necessary to an organization which will en-
sure peace and justice among nations, and promotes and
encourages international org anizations constituted for this
purpose. (Article 11 of Constitution of January 1, 1948).
LUXEMBOURG: The exercise of the powers res erved
by the Constitution to the legislative, executive and judi-
ciary may be temporarily vested by treaty in institutions
governed by international law. (Article 49 A., of Constitu-
tion of October 17, 1968, as amended on Jul y 10, 1973 ).
THE NETHERLANDS: The Government shall pro-
mote the development of the international rule of law.
(Article 90) ... Legislative, executive and judicial powers
may be conferred on international institutions by or pur-
suant to a treaty... (Article 92 of the Constitution of Feb-
ruary 17, 1983).
NORWAY: In order to secure international peace and
security, or in order to promote international law and
order and cooperation between nations, the Storting may,
by a three-fourth majority, consent that an international
organization, of which Norway is or becomes a member,
shall have the right, within a functionally li mited field, to
exercise powers which in accordance with this Constitu-
tion are normally vested in the Norwegian authorities,
exclusive of the power to alter this Constitution. For such
consent as provided above at least two-thirds of the
members of the Storting - the same quorum as is required
for changes in or amendments to this Constitution - shall
be present and voting... (Article 93 of the Constitu tion of
May 17, 1814 as revised on 18 September 1905) .
PORTUGAL: Portugal commends the abolition of all
forms of imperialism, colonialism and aggression; gen-
eral, simultaneous and controlled disarmament; the dis-
solution of political-military blocs and the establishment
of a system of collective security, in order to create an
international order capable of assuring peace and justice
in relations among peoples. (Article 7 II., of April 25,
SPAIN: By means of an organic law, authorization
may be established for the conclusion of treaties which
attribute to an intern ational organization or institutio n the
exercise of competencies d erived from the co nstitution . It
is the responsibility of the Cortes Generals or the Gov-
ernment, depending on the cases, to guarantee compli-
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR
An Enduring Concept for Security Council Reform
ance with these treaties and the resolutions emanating
from the international or supranational organizations who
have been entitled by this cession. (Article 93 of Consti-
tution of December 29, 1978).
SWEDEN: The right to make decisions which under
the present Instrument of Government devolves o the
Riksdag, on the Government, or on any other organ re-
ferred to in the Instrument of Government, may be en-
trusted, to a limited extent, to an international organiza-
tion for peaceful cooperation of which Sweden is to be-
come a member, or to an International Tribunal. No right
to make decisions in matters regarding the enactment,
amendment, or repeal of a fundamental law or [to restrict]
any of the freedoms and rights referred to in Chapter 2
may thus be transferred. The Riksdag shall decide on a
transfer of the right to make decisions in the manner pre-
scribed for the fundamental laws, or, if a decision in ac-
cordance with such procedure cannot be abided, by way
of a decision agreed upon by not less than five-sixth of
those present and voting and by not less than three-
fourths of the Riksdag members. (Chapter 10, Article 5,
of 1809 as amended in 1976).
SWITZERLAND: The entry into organizations of col-
lective security or supranational entities is subject to a
vote by the people and the Cantons. (Article 89 V., of
Copyright © 2011 SciRes. BLR