J. P. Yao et al.
the legal members’ secret feature key is calculated by group manager, and then sent to members confidentially.
2) The deleted membe r s cannot obtain the formula to update his secret feature key, even if conspiring with
other members, it is impossible to forge signature that can be admitted.
3) It inher its the fin e features of the Camenisch Stadler’s scheme; furthermore, it can delete group members
effectively.
4) It needs to calculate the new value of k when deleting or adding member, especially when we determine
the formula of new member’s secret feature key according to the current value of k when adding a new member.
These lower the signature and verification efficiency, but the zero-knowledge proof process is eliminated com-
pared to Bresson-Stern scheme [3]. In other words, the improvement sche me is safe, reliable, and high efficient.
4. Conclusion
The scheme of deleting members proposed by Wang Shangping is proved that it cannot actually delete members.
And for solving this problem, this paper changes secret feature key update factor into confidential in the member
register and deleting process, and the update work for group members’ secret feature key is executed by group
manager instead of members, in this way, an improvement of secret feature key update algorithm is proposed,
and group members’ secret feature key does not change with deleting or adding members.
References
[1] Chaum, D. and Van Heyst, E. (1991) Group Signatures. In: Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’91. LNCS 547,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 257-265.
[2] Camenisch, J. and Stadler, M. (1997) Effient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups. Proceedings of CRYPT’97,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 410-424.
[3] Bresson, E. and Stern, J. (1999) Efficient Revocation in Group Signature. In: Kim, K., Ed., PKC2001, LNCS1992,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 190-206.
[4] Wang, S.P., Wang, Y.M. and Wang, X. (2003) A New Solution Scheme for the Member Deletion Problem in Group
Signature by Use of Renew Operator. Journal of Software, 14, 1911-1917.
[5] Li, X.S. and Hu, Y.P. (2008) Analysis and Improvement for a Group Signature Member Deletion Scheme. Journal of
Xidian University, 35, 478-482.
[6] Huang, Z.J. and Lin, X.Z. (2005) A Group Member Deletion Scheme Cryptanalysis. Journal of Software, 16.
[7] Ateniese, G. and Medeiros, B.D. (2003) Efficient Group Signatures without Trapdoors. In: Advances of ASIACRYPT’03.
LNCS2894, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 246-268.
[8] Chow, S.S.M. (2009) Blind Signature and Ring Signature Schemes: Rehabilitation and Attack. Computer Standards &
Interfaces, 31, 707-712.
[9] Zhang, J.H., Chen, H. and Qin, G. (2009) Cryptoanalysis of Certificateless Partially Blind Signature and Proxy Blind
Signature Scheme. Proceedings of the 2009 2nd International Congress on Image and Signal Processing (CISP), 5.
[10] Zhao, W., Lin, C. and Ye, D.F. (2009) Provably Secure Convertible Nominative Signature Scheme. Information Secu-
rity and Cryptology 4th International Conference, Revised Selected Papers, 23-40.
[11] Zhang, J.H. and Qin, G. (2008) On the Security of Group Signature Scheme and Designated Verifier Signature Scheme.
2008 International Conference on Networking, Architecture, and Storage (NAS), June 2008, 351-358.