Technology as a Mode and Manifestation of Being: An Assessment of Its Applications

doi:10.4236/ahs.2013.23018

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Advances in Historical Studies

2013. Vol.2, No.3, 140-149

Published Online September 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ahs) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ahs.2013.23018

140

Technology as a Mode and Manifestation of Being: An

Assessment of Its Applications

Theodore John Rivers

Independent, Forest Hills, USA

Email: trivers13@verizon.net

Received July 2nd, 2013; revised August 2nd, 2013; accepted August 10th, 2013

Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the

original work is properly cited.

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how technology’s being is revealed through its applications,

which is expressive by means of the mode and manifestation of its being. The designation of technology

as a mode of being refers to its nature, and the designation of technology as a manifestation of being re-

fers to its activity as proof of technology’s being. Both mode and manifestation indicate how the being of

technology is applied. Although distinguishable as two aspects of technology, both mode and manifesta-

tion are essential to revealing the essence of technology and its interplay with the world. Since human

culture has a technological underpinning, the applications of technology not only reveal its metaphysics,

but also indicate its importance to human culture. In addition to technology’s underlying method, these

applications also pertain to the artifacts (or objects) of invention, mathematics, the consciousness of time,

writing, alphabetization, science, and society.

Keywords: Technology

Introduction

Technology is expressive of the choices humanity makes.

Unless we encounter extraterrestrials that might be similar to us

technologically, we can say that technology is primarily associ-

ated with humans. This statement is true while knowing that

some animals possess a rudimentary technology, such as the

building of nests by birds, the constructing of dams by beavers,

and the use of simple tools by chimpanzees. Essentially, tech-

nology helps to form the basis of human culture, and it is cul-

ture, among other factors, that lies at the foundation of human

reality. Although the manner by which humans live in the

world determines the use of technology, it should be apparent

that modern technology is culturally more inclusive than pre-

modern technologies. Collectively, technology is more than

occasionally present; it is omnipresent. Technology comes into

being because humanity’s being becomes, that is, it is by means

of becoming that the being of technology is revealed. This reve-

lation indicates that technology is a dependency because it is

based on creative ingenuity, but it is also true that humans have

willingly made themselves excessively dependent on its being.

Although it is not our concern to discuss the moral implica-

tions of technology, it should be kept in mind that technology

always has moral consequences because it is the result of hu-

man choices.

The essence of technology, if it possesses one, is its presence,

which is expressive of its involvement in the world. Technol-

ogy is the embodiment of human creativity that is the result of

the upsurge of our ontological freedom. It is embedded in hu-

man choices, occupied by the decisions humanity makes, and

committed to the means intended for its projected ends. Em-

beddedness, occupation, and commitment reveal technology’s

presence that is a description of a process that is all-consuming.

Technology signifies a plan or inducement toward a course of

action. It would be a simple step to go from this thought to the

realization of the nearly endless applications of technology

throughout time. Although the past is always a victim of inter-

pretation, any hermeneutical attempt of it should be guided by

the pursuit of truth unaffected by emotion or deception. Hu-

manity’s alignment with technology should be sufficient to

continue its presence and its impact.

When expressed within this context, technology’s impor-

tance is self-evident. It is revealed in many ways, beginning

with the nature of conceptualization and its relationship to truth.

Because human reality is involved with the act of the becoming

of being, the latter is the way in which technology makes its

appearance in the world, that is, the act of becoming is the

conduit for the appearance of the being of technology (Olsen,

2009: pp. 40-61). Although the fundamental characteristics of

technology have been discussed many times before, suffice it to

say that its applications demonstrate its importance at the pre-

sent time and anticipate its continuation in the future.

Technology is also supported by the formation of concepts

and their necessity for human action. Nevertheless, there is no

immediate contact with the world unless it is affected by con-

cepts that help with comprehension. As a requirement for every-

thing we do from spatial orientation to numerical calculation,

concepts allow us to understand the world because they are part

of the essential framework on which comprehension is based.

Conceptualization is associated with the mental process that

allows humans to function in the world, and the world may be

equated with the summation of social relationships (society), or

the physical environment (nature). In addition to these two

T. J. RIVERS

distinctions, there is also the single human being, that is, the

self, from which individuality and self-consciousness are de-

rived (Fodor, 1998: pp. 23-29).

As essential as concepts are to humans, they are not extant in

the world because they exist only in our heads. A concept is a

mental representation from which identity is derived when in-

dividual human beings interact with the world or with other

individuals. Concepts are played out in the world because the

latter is the platform from which action takes place. Therefore,

without the world, there would be neither individuals nor con-

cepts. The truth of this relationship should be self-evident, and

it supports the idea that concepts and the cognitive development

that is associated with them are culturally, not biologically,

derived (Donald, 1991: pp. 119-122).

If concepts are related to culture, it should be asked how they

are created. And by culture, reference is made not to distinct

ethnicities or nationalities, but to human culture in general from

which humanity’s experiences are based, the experiences that

are grounded in the challenges of living in a changeable world,

conditioned by the longing to satisfy basic needs, and hounded

by life’s uncertainties. Human culture by means of evolution

has led to the development of concepts, that is, to the develop-

ment of mental representations that humanity needs for survival.

If human understanding reveals a greater complexity, this com-

plexity is imposed on the world. Therefore, mental representa-

tion signifies the means by which human culture laid a basis for

cognitive development that distinguished humans from other

primates.

Because a concept is a mental representation that is derived

from perceptions, the latter is not only recognition of mental

and physical stimuli, but also an interpretation of them. The

integrations of perceptions concern everything. When defined

in this way, perceptions become part of a systematic approach

to reality because a system concerns the integration of compo-

nents into a unified whole. Technology plays a key role in

helping to satisfy fundamental needs, beginning with methods

and organizations and expanding to all manner of applications.

Although wants are often confused with needs, both are de-

pendent on technology, which is true even for physiological

needs that originate biologically, but are affected technologi-

cally.

We should ask how technology becomes the result of con-

ceptualization. Although emanating from the use of ontological

freedom that results from a perception of the world, technology

is characterized eventually by its applications. Once conceived,

technology may be devised, and when devised, it may then be

used. Since applications make technology useful, it is creativity

that characterizes technology. The manner by which this is

done indicates the means by which technology is rendered real

in the world.

Technology as a Mode an d Manif estation of Being

The metaphysics of technology is derived from the becoming

of being because technology is demonstrative of a process.

Although becoming denotes a procedure from which being

springs forth, it also denotes the modification of being that

already exists. Since becoming, as an expression of being, sup-

plements the being that is, it lies at the threshold of the en-

largement of being from which creativity originates. But this

process must not be confused with the notion of development

or evolution because the latter represents a specific type of be-

ing. To develop or evolve usually means to bring something

forth from latency, as a way of improving or elaborating some-

thing. To come into being means to appear where previously

there was no appearance or presence, as a way of springing

forth or coming into existence. For example, the materials used

in a book already exist in trees for paper or resin for ink, but

they do not constitute the being of a book until a book comes

into being. Likewise, when a book is destroyed, it will cease to

be. The being of a book concerns its presence, and it is through

its presence or the projection of its presence that it comes into

being.

This process is demonstrated in two ways, that when com-

bined, reveal the nature of technology. First, and more essen-

tially, technology is a mode of being that refers to the nature or

the underlying basis to its being. It concerns the means of doing

something as a way of positing its existence. Since mode is the

medium through which existence appears, it is the way in

which technology shows the underlying mechanism of its pres-

ence. A mode of being is indicative of the presence of being in

general, just as technology’s mode of being reveals its presence,

that is, its bearing on the world. The second part of this process

concerns technology as a manifestation of being. Since mani-

festation is indicative of the presence of something as proof of

it’s being, it indicates that the doing of anything, even the doing

of technology, is the result of its presence. The mode and mani-

festation of technology reveal it’s being, which is the being that

we give it.

Of these two attempts to understand the being of technology,

we may conclude that although mode and manifestation are

related, one of them may be more fundamental than the other.

Since a presence presupposes an essence, we might conclude

that a mode of being is antecedent to its manifestation, but it is

difficult to separate them. Logically, we might say that if mani-

festation is an effect of being, then mode is its cause; but meta-

physically, they are inseparable. Therefore, for all practical

purposes, we should regard the mode and manifestation of the

being of technology to be conterminous.

These thoughts are merely preparatory to a discussion of

technology’s applications. Although other applications could

have been selected, the ones that are discussed below are fun-

damental to human culture.

Method

An analysis of technology should begin with the concept of

method. Although not necessarily progressive, technology’s

method is developmental. It is no understatement to say that its

method expresses more than what is supposedly evident by the

nature of any means to its corresponding end. Although means

and ends are reciprocal to each other by the very nature of their

being, technology’s method is much more fundamental because

it lies at the core of their relationships. Just as it is inconceiv-

able to think of technology without making reference to process,

it is also inconceivable to think of technology without consid-

ering its method. Since the latter intensifies the idea of in-

volvement, it is a feature that is fundamental to technology. But

it is not redundant to describe method as methodic when the

latter signifies a procedural turn of events. If technology’s me-

thod is not procedural, it cannot be methodic.

Technology’s method is not to be confused with methodol-

ogy. A method is the description of how to do something, but it

is not a description of the underlying principles on which it is

T. J. RIVERS

142

based. Nevertheless, how method is perpetuated indicates a

great deal about it. It may be perpetuated by all types of means,

by those expressed directly from the context to which they are

derived, but technology may also be expressed indirectly by a

motley of seemingly lesser means, such as custom, environ-

mental considerations, or economics. Overall, method is most

meaningful not with any means, but with a means that is useful,

purposeful, and manipulative. We might say that method is a

form of perception, but it is not the equivalent of invention.

Nevertheless, method is the result or product of invention (Buch-

ler, 1961: pp. 12-13).

Because method is an artifice that presupposes the comple-

tion of its tasks, it may be perceived as an agent that allows its

tasks to be actualized. Since technology is the effect of its

characteristics (notably, rationality, materiality, accumulation,

and process), it is also distinguished by a process that accom-

panies these characteristics and projects them onto the world.

Technology’s method is twofold: it is a characteristic of tech-

nology, and the medium or conveyance of technology itself. If

this condition were not true, then technology would not be

linked to processes, procedures, and all manner of organization.

An understanding of method in general and its relationship to

technology in particular must not be confused with the idea that

technology is little more than a matrix or framework, which is

proposed by Heidegger as the principle feature of technology

(Heidegger, 1977: pp. 11-16, 25-33)1. We should emphasize

that technology is multilayered, made up of several interde-

pendent characteristics, none of which is more important than

another. Nevertheless, technology’s method is variable because

the circumstances that help to define it are not static, but subject

to change. Although circumstances may appear that could lead

to new methods, essentially method concerns the improvement

of those procedures that already exist. It is repeatable, but not

necessarily predictable.

Because technology’s method is associated with its essential

characteristics, one type may serve as a paradigm for others, but

technology does not innately possess any method. If a paradigm

is a pattern in the sense of a composite of features or a repre-

sentative sample that is based on concepts or practices that

depicts a way or manner of doing something, even if this is a

way of perceiving reality, then a paradigm is a method. It is a

structure around which reality revolves at a particular time and

place and from which rules may be derived (Kuhn, 1996: pp.

42-44).

Similarly, method is not a model because a model serves

merely as a representation of something, as a plastic miniature

can represent a model of an airplane. Although method may be

explained as a conceptual model, this relationship is true only

in so far that there is an underlying reality to method. Otherwise,

a conceptual model would exist theoretically, but not actually.

Therefore, we should conclude that method presupposes some

type of practical application, since it constitutes more than a

mental construction. When method becomes standardized, it is

standardization that allows us to speak of the completion of

tasks. It is similar to the function of society, in which its indi-

vidual parts, when applied, are integrated into a whole because

society in general manifests a particular conception of reality.

In its affiliation with technology, method reveals the effective-

ness of its being. It is for this reason that the indefinite article

“a” is not used with the noun “method” to fix its identity. Thus,

we may speak of method, but not a method because the identity

of technology’s method is not known.

And it is through effectiveness by which method is most

meaningful. Wherever we look, we are likely to discover a

heartfelt means by which technology is put into effect. Indeed,

what would be the effect of tools, devices, machines, and prod-

ucts, without some manner in which they have an influence on

the world? And the same may be said of techniques, which are

subordinate parts of method, that is, specialized approaches to

completing something. Although these technological effects

could be used in ways different from their original intent, nev-

ertheless, they were invented for specific goals, as a chisel was

invented to chip and form rock, or the sport of golf was devel-

oped based on the mastery of techniques with different clubs.

Artifacts as Tools, Devices, Machines, and Products

An analysis of technology’s applications must also empha-

size its material artifacts, which began with the first tools.

Given that the first tools were most likely unaltered stones util-

ized by hominids, all other technologies, except for a few that

are genuinely original, are directly related to their predecessors.

Anything that humans have produced also incorporates some

type of technique, such as the technique of cultivating plants, or

making clay pots, or extracting metal from ores. And when

anything is made, techniques are created, beginning with a

simple procedure and evolving into more elaborate ones. Tech-

nology is based on the accumulation of its results, evolving

from the simplest to the more complex (Arthur, 2009). Be-

cause technology is made up of several interrelated characteris-

tics that are used, elaborated, extended, modified, or reinvented,

it is the result of many factors, only one of which is accumula-

tion. And since accumulation is related to technological effi-

ciency, the latter indicates that the best possible means should

be selected when completing a task. If no means exist, then one

can be invented.

A distinction should also be noted about the artifacts of

technology, particularly, the definition of a tool as a device, and

a device as a tool. We should not be confused about the recip-

rocal relationship because tools and devices since both are uni-

versal descriptions of the artifacts of technology. A device is an

invention designed for a specific purpose, but this definition is

1According to Heidegger, technology is a mode or manner of revealing

truth in which something unknown, such as an object or technique, is

rought forth into the world, or to use Heidegger’s terminology of this

revelation: a “challenging, setting-upon revealing”. Because technology is

associated with truth, it is hidden (to use an ancient Greek concept) and

must be revealed through human ingenuity. Therefore, technology is situ-

ated somewhere, waiting to be discovered by humans. But Heidegger’s

interpretation ignores non-being, the description for those things that do not

exist. Do es technology resid e somewhere waiting to be revealed by h uman

ingenuity, or does it not exist at all until invented by humans? An answer to

this question is fundamental to an understanding of technology. Heideg-

ger’s interpretation makes humans important, but in a subordinate role.

More importantly, Heidegger ignores the becoming of being in relationship

to technology. Since becoming concerns a process for the realization o

being, as discussed in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, 2 (994a34-994b2), this

process is never complete. Even when inhibited or isolated, technology

should continue indefinitely into the future.

Heidegger also contends that we are provoked by technology, and im-

plies that as a result, we are determined by it. Behind this understanding,

Heidegger identifies a framework (Gestell in German) that compel s h uman s

to respond to technology. It is this framework that makes technology com-

pelling, but this interpretation leaves little room for human responsibility.

Heidegger’s interpretation of Gestell should not be equated with method

because although technology acquires a method, the latter is only one fea-

ture of technology’s application.

T. J. RIVERS

applicable as well to tools that are devices that work manually

or mechanically. Therefore, tools and devices may have eq-

uivalent descriptions, but the definition of a machine is also

relevant in so far that it is a more elaborate device. To say that a

machine deals with fixed and movable parts would designate

even a shaduf as a machine because it has a fixed weight at one

end that is moved to counterweight a basket at the other end to

scoop up water for irrigation. If a shaduf is a simple machine,

then many other devices associated with antiquity are also, such

as the lever, pulley, inclined plane, or wedge (McNeil, 1990: pp.

17-18).

As already noted, technology in large part concerns artifacts

of invention, which evolved from the simplest techniques of

scavenging for meat from dead animals by hominids and early

humans to hunting them with weapons of wood and stone.

Eventually, humans become nomads who hunted animals and

gathered fruits, nuts, and roots. A comparison of the rudimen-

tary technology, for example, of Paleolithic humans during the

Ice Age and our own technology leaves much to be desired, in

fact, almost everything. Having no domestic implements except

for the needle used to sew animal skins together to make

clothes and boots, even lacking the bow and arrow, Paleolithic

humans survived because they had fire, and could use it to cook

food and stay warm. As primitive as the technology was for

Paleolithic humans, the fact that they had technology that aided

their existence is proof of their innovative ability as an essential

characteristic of their being.

Eventually, the hunter-gatherer became a herder of animals,

and later, a cultivator of plants. In addition to food, animals

were also used for other purposes: clothing (derived from their

skins), transportation, physical power, and protection. Because

a settled way of life became the predominant life style for many

people and led to civilization, permanent agricultural settle-

ments gave rise to dietary changes whose techniques were in-

cluded in the so-called Neolithic revolution that began in the

fourth millennium BCE. These techniques involved the devel-

opment of procedures, beginning with the identification of po-

tentially useful plants that could be cultivated, and ending with

the preservation of seeds for the next growing season. By trial

and error, agriculture entailed the invention of special tools for

working the land, and techniques for maximizing the likelihood

of successful cultivation.

Similarly, other technologies were also affected, such as the

making of clothing (the loom), pottery (the p otter’s wh eel) , and

metal utensils and weapons (metallurgy). Apart from the use of

various minerals found lying on the ground, metallurgy became

a specialty because it entails the substitution of one component

of metallic ores with another (usually sulfur) through the appli-

cation of high temperatures, a procedure that took several cen-

turies to perfect.

The tools and machines that were developed in prehistory

and antiquity, and that served as an introduction to the sophis-

ticated counterparts of later generations include all major cate-

gories of technological innovation. From the hoe to the plow,

the water mill to the windmill, the abacus to the computer, the

water clock (clepsydra) to the mechanical clock, the telegraph

to the telephone, the cannon to the automobile, the motor to the

generator, the technologies of the past have influenced the

technologies of later generations. It is impossible to think of

technology without making reference to its artifacts, as enu-

merated above, and its artifacts are expressive of the being of

technology, a revelation of humanity’s continuous application

of the need to assist human existence by modifying nature. And

the effects of this need are everywhere and in every aspect of

our lives. Because inventive ability is emphasized through tools

and machines that indicate how society acts and reacts, inven-

tion is indicative of the being of technology as a force in his-

tory. When applied, invention is transformed into innovation.

And the accumulation of innovations represents a process of

ingenuity, exerting an influence on humanity much greater than

its original purpose.

Mathematics

Formal schooling usually includes an introduction to mathe-

matics. Even when this introduction is limited to arithmetic, it

is accompanied by the idea that numbers and mathematical

functions are natural, that is, they are not fabricated. Since the

study of mathematics concerns the idea that numbers in par-

ticular and mathematical entities in general exist independently

of human beings, this idea has little significance for anyone

who is not concerned about the origin of mathematics, but

much significance for anyone who thinks that numbers are a

valid topic for reflection. Hence, it is to philosophy of mathe-

matics where the notion of mathematical concepts is pertinent.

It is within this context that mathematics is perceived either to

exist apart from human reality or remains dependent on it, that

is, mathematics is either innate within itself or created.

Of course, numbers would have no bearing if they could not

be understood. Some animals, such as pigeons and chimpanzees,

may be assumed to possess a rudimentary numerical ability

(Honig, 1993: p. 62; Thompson, 1995: pp. 199-200), but the

latter must be differentiated from the symbolization associated

with numbers. We may conclude, to which science gives sup-

port, that numbers reflect a mental identification that is the

result of the perception of physical objects. They are not de-

scriptions of what are naturally in the world, but enumerations

of how objects are perceived (Russell, 1956: p. 529). A number

is an idea with its corresponding meaning of enumeration that

we impose on the world. Indeed, we may find many things in

the world, but nowhere will we find numbers. Although consti-

tuting an important part of human reality, numbers are real as

concepts, but not real as things (Carnap, 1983: p. 42). To write

a number on a piece of paper does not confer reality. A number

is a concept represented by a numeral, as the Arabic numeral 4

(or the Roman numeral IV) stands for the number that immedi-

ately follows the numeral 3 (or III) in a progression of symbols.

Despite being used in association with objects, numbers lack

factual content and are not verifiable empirically, since they are

merely mental representations of things.

Arithmetic, as the simplest area of mathematics, is an exten-

sion of object identification. Like many other things we do,

arithmetic is a reflection of everydayness, but it is also a reflec-

tion of the need to modify its conditions. Therefore, every per-

son should have a fundamental understanding of mathematics

because of the human capability of counting and identifying

objects. It is from object identification that humans are able to

add and subtract, multiply and divide (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000:

pp. 77-78). All other areas of mathematics from algebra and

geometry to trigonometry and calculus are artificialities. They

are expressions of human consciousness imposed on the being

of the world.

Why would we need higher forms of mathematics? Although

algebra originated in antiquity, it later concerned the substitu-

T. J. RIVERS

144

tion of letters for numbers in arithmetical equations, a substitu-

tion that was expanded in the sixteenth century by the French

mathematician François Viète (Hazewinkel, 1988: p. 73). We

should ask why there would be a need for a branch of mathe-

matics that seems to make the latter deliberately complex. Al-

though algebra was invented as a tool to discover unknown

quantities in mathematical equations, the use of letters for num-

bers attempted to uncover universal formulas when applicable

to similar examples.

As is widely known, geometry concerns uncovering the ma-

thematical relationships between points, lines, angles, and sol-

ids. We can refer to the first known historical reference to ge-

ometry in The Histories, written by Herodotus in the fifth cen-

tury BCE that describes the desire to measure land in Egypt

after the annual flooding of the Nile (Herodotus, 1998: pp.

135-136). The practicality of geometry is evident as a means of

reassessing land measurements that in turn is applied to many

other occasions when referring to space and distance. Geometry

became a simple tool for the practical application of mathemat-

ics.

Similarly, trigonometry concerns the mathematical relation-

ships of the sides and angles of triangles. It was developed,

most likely, as an extension of geometry, particularly, for the

use of surveying land in the determination of boundaries, and

the construction of roads and buildings. It was developed as an

applied science, and fulfilled a rudimentary step in the study of

mathematical functions when no quantitative value is known,

which mathematically is described as a variable.

The branch of mathematics that expands trigonometry and

that deals with the differentiation and integration of functions

of one or more variables is known as calculus. It concerns ana-

lyzing one set of numbers in relationship to another. Differen-

tial calculus concerns finding the rate of change between these

two sets. The opposite operation to differentiation is integral

calculus in which change as a factor is already known, but the

result of change is not. As introduced independently by Isaac

Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in the seventeenth

century, differential and integral calculus are essential to under-

standing the movement of objects in space. Apart from the

calculation of gravity, the invention of calculus had a techni-

cal application because ballistics (the study of missiles and tra-

jectories) was directly related to astronomy. Once the science of

ballistics was developed, aeronautics was rendered possible as

well.

We must conclude that if arithmetic is innately conceptual,

then all other branches of mathematics must be extensions of

elementary mathematics. Because of the way these extensions

are utilized, they may be described as technological modifica-

tions of basic mathematics, since they are organizational ap-

proaches to reality. They are used, for example, to construct

buildings, to measure canals for irrigation, to erect aqueducts or

roads, to calculate the trajectory of satellites into the atmos-

phere, to create all types of devices, to formulate images in

pixels—all of which, whether ancient or modern, are the result

of applied mathematics, an application that would be unneces-

sary or undesirable in a society in which the being of technol-

ogy has lesser importance. As we said above, mathematics is

the technological effect of a numbering system derived from

the identification of objects. Although mathematics evolved

into the systematic study of the symbolic relationship between

quantities, it remains at heart the result of a self-expression that

has been technologized into a highly skilled scientific discipline.

It is a revelation of how the world, itself the result of human

activity, can be explained as an extension of humanity’s mental

positing of the world. Because mathematics is an example of

the workings of human ingenuity, it is one way in which hu-

manity gives meaning to the world.

Writing and Alphabetization

Whether humans can speak or are mute, and they are not

paralyzed, they all communicate in some way, but the most

useful form of communication is writing. In non-literate cul-

tures in which traditions are past down orally to succeeding

generations, the inability to commit traditions to writing, or to

record new discoveries, relegate their cultures to an inferior

position. Nevertheless, speech offers only a partial conception

of language, which is supplemented by the practicality of writ-

ing.

But writing is dependent on texts. Is a text defined solely by

the fact that it is written down, or does it transcend its medium?

Materially, a text is commonly defined by a clay tablet, stone

stele, papyrus, vellum, paper, or electronic transmission that it

depends on, but a physically related medium portrays a text

(even when electronically devised) from only one perspective.

In a sense, texts are transcendent, although they are tied to their

medium, as they are tied historically to the age in which they

are produced2. Therein lies a major difference between literate

and non-literate cultures.

Naturally, a textual transcendence is dependent on future

generations. Although countless original texts have been lost in

the past, they may continue to exert an influence because copi-

es had been produced, such as those texts laboriously copied by

monks in European monasteries during the Middle Ages, or

reprinted for modern use by the printing press. Since texts pre-

suppose the existence of writing, conversely we can say that

writing presupposes the existence of texts, or at least the as-

sumption that somehow they must exist. If writing and texts are

associated with literacy, then their absence is associated with

illiteracy (Stock, 1983: pp. 3-4, 8).One can be taught to read

and write without a dependency on texts, but it may be presup-

posed that reading and writing are somehow related to them.

We should also ask if texts exert an influence on our collective

memory, but it is not our task to assess whether or not this in-

fluence is long lasting. It is possible that a tradition, idea, or

remembrance may be lost because conditions, either deliberate

or accidental, may have been set in place that have allowed for

forgetfulness.

These thoughts, however, are merely preparatory to an un-

derstanding of writing. Although language is phonetic because

it depends on sounds as a means of communication, writing

also intensifies it. This relationship is evident when we reflect

that language is based on distinct sounds, each represented by a

sign, which when written may be preserved indefinitely. Lan-

guage, of course, is more than just sounds because it is derived

from conceptualizations that are the result of human interaction

with the world. Despite being adversely criticized for attribut-

ing signs as the only requirement for language, Ferdinand de

Saussure in the early twentieth century concluded that language

begins with representation of signs through concepts (Saussure,

2Texts bring to mind their importance to religions, from the Vedas to the

Quran, from the Old Testament to the New Testament of the Bible. Even

for Martin Luther, faith in the Bible guaranteed salvation, but this conclu-

sion presupposed the t echnology of writing.

T. J. RIVERS

1983: pp. 28-29, 98, 146).

Because a written language presupposes the existence of

signs, either logographic, pictographic, or alphabetic, signs

would be non-existent without a written language. Although it

may be concluded that writing began in Mesopotamia in the

late fourth millennium BCE, no alphabet existed at that time.

The development of writing represents a slow, laborious proc-

ess, and reflects the increasingly complex nature of human

culture, especially, as a result of urbanization. The earliest

writing emphasized consonants only, although the sound of

vowels was included in the pronunciation of words. Because

writing originally addressed practical matters that served as

descriptions of commodities used in trade or donations made to

local temples, it heightened the preservation of data without

relying on memory. In Mesopotamia, cuneiform fulfilled this

function, and in Egypt, hieroglyphics. Writing also acquired

importance because it became the means that distinguished

history from prehistory. And by writing we are not referring to

casual markings or signs on objects for a specific purpose, but a

system of preservation of cultural significance for a general

purpose. Essentially, writing denotes a system of communica-

tion, not a conglomerate of isolated signs.

The simplification of writing was accompanied by the inven-

tion of the alphabet. Although the Phoenicians may be attrib-

uted with modifying the alphabet, they were not its innovators.

The alphabet in a most rudimentary form is attributed to the

Canaanites when they lived and worked in the Sinai Peninsula,

although assigning their writing to a precise date is difficult.

This earliest alphabet evolved as a simplification of hiero-

glyphics, which itself is a highly sophisticated and stylized

system of pictographs that originally represent an object or a

sound (Gardiner, 1957: p. 8). The alphabet is based on letters,

not pictures, and above all, it is not based on objects. In this

sense, writing is not natural, but artificial. The alphabet gave

rise to letters as representations of sounds. It is an example not

only of a technological application that transcends the natural

world, but it is also an indication of technological civilization

itself.

The alphabet associated with the Sinai Peninsula and later

with Palestine, respectively known as Proto-Sinaitic and Proto-

Canaanite, must be distinguished from a cuneiform alphabet

that developed at Ugarit in western Syria in the fourteenth or

thirteenth century BCE (Puech, 1986: pp. 197-198). The Proto-

Sinaitic alphabet is considered to have been developed between

the seventeenth or sixteenth centuries BCE (Naveh, 1987: pp.

26-27). It later influenced the alphabets associated with the

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans. Although the introduction of

letters for vowels is accredited to the Greeks, the Phoenician

alphabet, emphasizing consonants only, had an influence on the

Aramaic alphabet from which Hebrew and Arabic developed.

Writing is a way of recording information so that it may be

preserved. It is a way in which other people, who may or may

not be directly involved in writing themselves, may benefit

from it. Because writing appeals to a much larger audience than

the audience immediately intended by authors of particular

works, it has an influence far greater than many other human

endeavors, which is now augmented by the internet. Even when

attempting to understand an ancient people, the preservation

and decipherment of their writing give insights into their cul-

ture. Although these thoughts may explain why writing is im-

portant, they do not explain why alphabetization was invented.

Actually, we should not ask why any one alphabet was invented.

Instead, we should ask why alphabets in general, some earlier

and some later, were invented.

Nevertheless, there have been several explanations for the

origin of the alphabet, such as an attempt to preserve a people’s

literature, or an effort to leave a mark of one’s presence, or an

intensification of writing that serves as a substitution for speech,

or a proposal to develop a national script, but none of these

explanations seem to address the fundamental reason why an

alphabet was invented. Although these explanations hold some

practicality, they do not seem to reveal its underlying necessity.

Of course, after its invention, the alphabet was adopted by

many cultures for different purposes over vast expanses of time.

The fact that there were the proto-Sinaitic and cuneiform alpha-

bets should lead to the conclusion that alphabets facilitate and

simplify the technology of writing, and illustrate their impor-

tance to human culture (Coe & Van Stone, 2001: p. 20)3. More

important than any one alphabetic script is the idea of alpha-

betization itself as the means for the increased importance of

the technology of writing that communicates with a present

generation and preserves information for future generations.

Writing is a learned experience that promotes factual infor-

mation for practical purposes, which then may be applied to

other endeavors, such as literature. Although many literary

works, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Iliad and the Odys-

sey, or Beowulf were originally oral, they were subsequently

committed to writing, which increased their importance to their

respective cultures. The same phenomenon is also applicable to

the legal customs or laws of a primitive people. Writing is the

means by which the influence of the past may be extended into

the future. Therefore, the past acquired new meanings when

preserved in writing because writing allowed memory to be

projected indefinitely into the future. Like mathematics, the

invention of writing has lent itself to humanity’s innovative

accumulation and indicates that the metaphysics of technology

is demonstrative of a process of becoming.

Science

The definition of science has changed over the ages, but for

the present age, science is far more specialized in its analysis of

reality when compared with the more general applications of

science in the past. Although many topics that qualified as sci-

ence in antiquity would be categorized in the modern age as

pseudoscience, it is not our intention to pass judgment on what

legitimately was science in a former age. Nevertheless, regard-

less of the age in which it appears, we should ask how science

is related to technology. Although there may be some confusion

about the influence of science on technology, there should be

no confusion about the influence of technology on science.

Science and technology evolved with distinct objectives. Sci-

ence concerns an understanding of the manner in which knowl-

edge about reality is acquired, no matter how far reaching that

may be, but technology concerns the practical applications of

that knowledge. As a result, a distinction evolved between the-

ory and practice. But as technology invaded the exclusive areas

of science, the latter lost its purely theoretical basis and was

rendered technical instead. We should speak of science’s tech-

nologization more than technology’s scientification. Since tech-

nology dominates everything we do, it could just as easily

3The Landa or Mayan alphabet is not an authentic alphabet, but an artific-

alitycreated by Diego da Landa, a sixteenth century Catholic bishop, who

wanted to convert the Ma

a to Christianit

T. J. RIVERS

146

function without regard for usefulness. This is to say that

method takes precedence over practicality (Habermas, 1974: pp.

253-256). In this sense, practicality loses its importance be-

cause the bulk of our emphasis revolves around technology’s

performance to the exclusion of everything else which is mani-

fested through technolog y’s prolific ubiquity.

In some way, science has always been associated with tech-

nology, at least in so far as technical applications are concerned.

But in the modern age, technological apparatus, instruments,

devices, and procedures commandeer science. No longer inde-

pendent and no longer superior, science has been rendered sub-

ordinate to technology, since the triumphs of science are ren-

dered possible only because of benefits made available by

technology. For example, chemistry has advanced considerably

because of the refinement of laboratory equipment, and without

it, chemistry would have progressed little since the time of

Lavoisier. If science has become more technical, its technicality

is attributable to its technologization, which would seem to be

true in both western and non-Western cultures (McGinn, 1990:

pp. 22-27).

The displacement of science by technology, or at least the

accelerated influence of technology on science, occurred with

greater intensity in the nineteenth century when the industrial

revolution took place (Pollard, 1981: pp. 85-87, 142-148). At

that time, the techniques of technology were greatly aligned

with the methods of science. No longer could science proceed

without the benefit of technology, although technology does

benefit from the discoveries of science that, for example, a llow

for the invention of better tools and machines. The alignment of

science with technology occurred by a gradual process that

resulted in the manifested presence of technology in all aspects

and in all places of the world. Consequently, we may describe

the technologization of society more as a process of degree

rather than kind.

The advancement of modern technology, and therefore its

relationship with science, is essentially twofold. First, technol-

ogy has benefited from the past because of its hist oric evolution,

to which initially it made a minor contribution, but from which

eventually it was the principal beneficiary. And this past is

attributed to the European Middle Ages, which gave to tech-

nology its dynamic forward directedness that was acquired

from Christianity and a Christian culture (Benz, 1966: pp.

121-142). Second, the method of science had changed at the

end of the Middle Ages that initiated not only a new way of

looking at reality, that is, a new science, but also a new way of

applying this knowledge that facilitated a new technology. This

new method formed the basis of the scientific revolution, in

which technology was “implied as a possibility in the meta-

physics” of the new science (Jonas, 1974: pp. 47-48).

But more than its implication and its Christian underpinning,

technology came to represent metaphysics itself. It surpassed

the science that resulted from the scientific revolution and re-

placed the metaphysics of the Middle Ages, that is, technology

superseded Christianity as the foundation of the metaphysics of

Western civilization. Ultimately, technology became expressive

of the metaphysics of the world at large. More than being in the

world, technology is expressive of the being of the world. It

owes a debt, in part, to the past for the impetus in accomplish-

ing this goal. To express these thoughts in other words, we

might say that humanity’s being is reflected unto technology. It

demonstrates that technology’s mode of being is revealed as a

manifestation of ourselves.

Time-Consciousness

Because of sundials, water clocks, and mechanical clocks

(and by extension, quartz digital clocks and watches), time

reckoning has evolved as a consequence of time’s computation.

But more than time reckoning, it is time-consciousness that

concerns us. In fact, time-consciousness—itself an effect of

technology—is rendered possible primarily because of the

reckoning of time. Of these three different inventions described

above, it was the mechanical clock, conceived and developed in

the late Middle Ages, that led to time’s mechanization, in which

time is not only compartmentalized into smaller and smaller

units, but also rendered into a commodity that could be regu-

lated, manipulated, and projected. Above all, time-conscious-

ness exerts an influence on daily life as to transform completely

an undefined understanding of time into a motif that penetrates

everything. If time was not an important feature of the human

psyche before the invention of the mechanical clock, it certainly

has become one since its invention, whose ticking manifests a

presence of time’s fragmentation. Everything from birth to

death is now adjusted or tempered by time-consciousness. The

vehicle for making money or pursuing pleasure, for devotion to

one’s family or the pursuit of idleness occurs by means of the

consciousness of time, which inevitably is followed at some

point by the fear of wasting it. Consciousness of the passing of

time dominates all aspects of life. Because the telling of time in

many languages relates to a description of time derived from

the clock, the latter has acquired a meaning far beyond its

original intent (Rivers, 2000: pp. 225-226).

The augmentation of time by means of technology is not to

be confused with natural cycles or so-called economic cycles

representative of the effects of prosperity (or its lack) because

they do not obliterate technology’s progressive momentum. The

fact that there is a cycle of anything does not preclude the line-

arity of time, which is the result of the Christian conception of

time (and its biblical background) that helped with technologi-

cal progress. Likewise, the difference between time internally

experienced, which is ontological (a natural metaphysical phe-

nomenon), and time externally given, which is artificial (an

unnatural metaphysical phenomenon), is exaggerated by tech-

nology. This exaggeration plays a part in the distortion between

the future and its absorption by the present, so that the possibil-

ity of the future seems to be consumed by an ever-present pre-

sent, a characteristic that is attributable to the clock. Conse-

quently, the perception of time is variable, ranging from man-

datory obligations to free time, from an emphasis of time as a

quality to its emphasis as a quantity. In fact, time acquires a

power hereto non-existent because its quantity enables it to be-

come the means of accomplishing anything (Blumenberg, 1986:

p. 223).

Nevertheless, how would society be made aware of time

reckoning if there was no way to be informed of it, if there was

no clock in the town square, or if there were no watches? If

time were not tied to specific hours of the day, what use is time-

consciousness? Since the invention of the mechanical clock,

which itself had a slow and localized influence in medieval

monasteries before it had an influence on society in general,

time-consciousness took much time to be perfected. Likewise,

other changes in the past have also taken considerable time,

even centuries, to have an impact, such as the use of the wheel,

T. J. RIVERS

domestication of plants and animals, or writing. Even as late as

the eighteenth century, time-consciousness had no influence on

people who had little need for it (Landes, 1983: pp. 227-228).

Time-consciousness is not inherent in the being of being

human, but it is a mode or manner of an awareness of temporal-

ity as a characteristic of being. Time-consciousness is a tech-

nological artificiality, but temporality is an ontological reality.

There is no being without time, and no time without being.

Since temporality is a characteristic of being, it may be sup-

plemented by time-consciousness that is artificially induced by

technology. Whether or not human reality has benefited by this

relationship is not the issue. Calculating the time of day by

noticing the rising and setting of the sun, or by reading the stars

after the sun has set gave the first glimpses of the passing of

time that goes back to time immemorial; but these simple hap-

penings lacked the precision of time-consciousness with its

positive or negative connotations. Like so many other happen-

ings, once a threshold has been crossed, it is impossible and an-

achronistic to go back. As in other endeavors, technology is the

result of an accumulative process. It is based on the choices of

the past that help to set the conditions of the future.

How much has time-consciousness changed human culture?

How m uc h ha s it altered foreve r the way the world is perceived?

If time-consciousness can be ignored and the world can con-

tinue without time’s overbearingness, then time-consciousness

is irrelevant, but the world has changed because it has been

compartmentalized. Even when time awareness is rejected and

people move to a remote island somewhere, this desire is cho-

sen most likely because they are conscious of time. This rejec-

tion of time-consciousness is the immediate result of the cog-

nizance of time’s ubiquitous presence (Griffiths, 1999: pp. 11-

15).

Society

Human society is a social structure definable by networks of

interaction among its members who generally demonstrate a

willingness to work cooperatively, and who often show a sense

of fairness, or at least mutuality. Although society may also

refer to chimpanzees, baboons, bees, and ants, for our purposes

we will limit the use of this term to humans only. Because the

societal relationships manifested by these other animals are the

result of evolution, the benefits of cooperation among members

of one’s own species, human or non-human, should outweigh

any advantages supportive of individuality. As far as humans

are concerned, the social structure associated with cooperation

originates between two or more people, and most commonly

within a family, even if the latter consists of a husband and wife

cohabiting without children.

Related to the idea of association is the notion that society

denotes a type of organization, and it is organization that is

particularly important. How an individual reacts to another lays

the basis for society, whether expressive of identity that is

based on ethnicity, culture, social solidarity, or patterns of au-

thority. Like the system introduced into Chinese society by

Confucius whose goal was the maintenance of stability in an

uncertain time, society in general deals with relationships be-

tween and among individuals, families, communities, countries,

cultures, and b y extension, civilizations.

One should ask if social mechanisms associated with society

are derived from interactions between people that require more

than one person, or derived from the human brain that is indi-

vidually based and not initially tied to other people. Regardless

of its derivation, it is the interaction between people that is the

basis for society because if humanity were reduced to only one

individual, there would be no need for (and no benefit derived

from) other people. Society does not exist when humanity is

reduced to a sole survivor.

Indeed, what need would there be for society unless it

achieved something that individuals could not achieve alone. In

some sense, when compared to politics, we may say that society

is similar to a confederal system in which a central government

has the power to do something that individual state govern-

ments cannot do efficiently for themselves and from which

central governments derive their power. Similarly, if the pur-

pose of society is the attainment of social goals, these goals are

variable. They would differ among societies, but they would

also differ within them, as if each enclave within a community

or country denotes a distinct society with noticeable differences,

such as the associations of a crime family, a religious commu-

nity, an ethnic neighborhood, personal affiliations within a

profession, or any subdivision of a culture. Societies regulate

some type of social order, but they become more complex when

they reveal elaborate patterns of control. Nevertheless, we are

not concerned with the alleged stages of social evolution that

impact the development of society, but with the importance of

society in general.

Society comes into existence from the interaction of at least

two people, and therefore, it is as old as humanity itself. The

question for us to ask, therefore, is self-evident: If society is

natural, to what extent is it influenced by technology? Or we

may rephrase the question: How have different technologies

given rise to different societies? Since culture determines what

makes us human, we are defined by willful human choices. It is

a common conclusion within anthropology that humanity is

defined culturally, not biologically. It is this distinction that

separates humans from other life forms. If society could be

defined solely by biology, then it would hardly be subject to

technology.

Anthropologically, culture may be defined as a configuration

of the natural order. Because the relationship of the natural

order with an alleged “human nature” is determined by biology,

we must conclude that human nature is a distortion because it

supposedly is a description of qualities that all humans share.

An accurate definition of human nature should include physio-

logical traits because humans are mammals. Non-physiological

traits that would more accurately define the nature of humans

are traditionally excluded because these traits are variable. It is

variability that indicates that culture, not biology, is what de-

fines us. Therefore, the designation of human nature from any

other perspective as a definition of culture is a misnomer.

It should be apparent that society helped cognitive develop-

ment, and it is fundame ntal to the promotion of social behavior.

Given that human society is often compared with simian socie-

ties, it is more complex than the latter and entails greater or-

ganization. Any elaborate organization implies some type of

technology. When referring to society, its structure reveals that

its individual components are combined in particular ways that

form integrated wholes. Society concerns the means by which

individuals are incorporated into a framework. The process in

which this integration takes place is technological. But societies

are not passive because they develop through conflict, that is,

through deliberate actions that shape cooperation and form

complex institutions. One type of conflict concerns warfare,

T. J. RIVERS

148

and another type concerns trade. Therefore, conflict may have

negative and/or positive consequences, both of which are af-

fected by technology.

It may be impossible to uncover the conditions that led to the

first human societies, but the transition from pre-human (or

hominid) to human society most likely included the develop-

ment of spoken language because the latter is paramount for

cooperation, without which well-developed social relationships

would be impossible. Regardless how long it may have taken to

develop language with all its complexities, changes in kinship

and even the development of myth may have been important for

its evolution (Barnard, 2011: pp. 92-93, 109). The social coop-

eration that was needed for hunting and gathering helped in the

development of society, both of which evolved with an increase

in brain size, and all of which facilitated the development of

language. Experiences evolved into traditions that could be

perfected, and traditions evolved into societies that could be

expanded. As a result, cultural evolution was the beneficiary of

these events.

Since spoken language entails the designation of sounds for

distinct entities, early humans must have developed words as a

way of understanding the world. Nevertheless, we should be

mindful that to look for the origins of anything is really to seek

the causes that answer all our questions. Such a quest is both

beyond our reach and highly suspect (Bloch, 1953: pp. 29-30).

The earliest tools, which were unmodified stones, were used by

hominids, but the skills required for the flaking and chipping of

them came much later and probably were associated with the

development of speech. Thus, technology, language, and coop-

eration (or altruism) are associated with human society and

played a part is its development (Hurford, 2007: pp. 268-271).

It should go without saying that technology is a human phe-

nomenon. Although one person can invent a technology, any

social application it may acquire must be distinguished from its

invention. This idea concerns the truth that technology is more

than a human phenomenon; it is also a social one. For example,

was the wheel invented for the benefit of one person who had

wares to transport, or did several people contribute to its inven-

tion for their mutual benefit, such as its use for ceremonial rea-

sons? It is possible that the whee l could have been invented for

either purpose, but it was only after it was applied among many

people that it acquired social significance, that is, acquired an

importance to society. And we should also consider the envi-

ronmental conditions that may or may not have allowed the

wheel to be useful (Basalla, 1988: pp. 9-10). Although indi-

viduals precede society, society is followed by humanity. And

by humanity we mean the qualities of being human, which

takes place when individuals cooperate and become integrated

parts of a group and promote its well-being. It is at this point

where technology achieves its greatest impact, that is, when

inventions appear, when they are modified, even when they are

abandoned.

These thoughts lead to another. If society is a type of social

organization, then it is a type of method. But we do not have to

ask where this organization originates. It is apparent that we

create it because societies are variable based on the cultural

conditions from which they evolve. Although societies must

address the human condition to which all people are subject in

the satisfaction of basic needs, how societies deal with these

conditions vary widely. An introduction to cultural anthropol-

ogy reveals the infinite variety of human societies. It indicates

that society, for example, is characterized by the way in which

it uses technology in maintaining life, in protection from harm,

in food production, in education, in planning for the future.

These examples are expressions of social mechanisms that bind

people together and promote solidarity of the entirety of human

life. They indicate that technology’s presence is expressive of a

fundamental truth about the nature of society, a truth that indi-

cates that the social structure of society is supported and pro-

moted by means of technology, in fact in everything we doin

our lives. Without it, society would be represented by a dis-

jointed assemblage of human beings struggling to maintain

daily existence. Metaphysically, we may say that society, as the

embodiment of human reality, reveals its own being, that is, the

being of the world, by means of technology.

Conclusion

Technology is the result of human ingenuity, originating

from ontological freedom, influenced by conceptualization, and

given actuality through the manipulation of the world. Together,

these factors help to describe the essence of technology. As we

said above, technology’s involvement reveals its essence. Its

interaction with the world is embedded in our choices, occupied

by our decisions, and committed to the means that are projected

to their ends. Since the essence of technology is founded upon

its presence, the latter is fundamental to its being. Technology

is made real initially through praxis, since praxis is how tech-

nology’s engagement is played out. For example, writing is a

mode of technology. It maintains a presence through its exer-

cise of symbolization, but writing in itself is not essential to

technology. Writing may be important for communication,

society, and human progress, but it is not fundamental to tech-

nology’s essence. The technological importance of writing does

not concern what is written, but rather the process or manner of

writing. It concerns the symbolization of signs and letters, that

is, the substitution of written words for things. Whether these

words are written in Arabic, Urdu, or Greek is incidental. It is

the idea of writing, rather than its form, that makes writing

important. And technology’s being is applicable to all the cate-

gories we have discussed above. Therefore, the being of tech-

nology, regardless of the form it takes, concerns its overriding

reality, as if it possesses an aura of some distinct quality or

breadth of vision. Although any being, that is, any entity, pos-

sesses potentiality because being denotes existence, neverthe-

less, potentiality may not be actualized. It should be assumed,

however, that technology’s being would have an impact on the

world by its mere presence, which is expressed through its ap-

plications.

As we said above, the being of technology is expressed

through its applications, which begins with the nature of con-

ceptualization and its relationship to truth. Once technology is

conceptualized, it may be devised and used. Applications are

the means by which technology is made evident, from the first

tool to the last, from a simple procedure to the most complex,

from a particularized technique to a generalized method. Be-

cause it participates in human activity, technology is one link

between thought and action, that is, between thinking about the

world and creating it. It manifests the completion of tasks when

its designated means attain their ends. Like art or literature,

technology is a phenomenon that transforms humans and

changes the world. It is the means by which humans express

their being, that is, technology is the way in which humans

reveal their being to the world. And what is the world if not our

T. J. RIVERS

inheritance of the cultural conditions of the past that result from

innovative accumulation (Ogburn, 1964: pp. 24-27).

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