Psychology
2013. Vol.4, No.6, 541-546
Published Online June 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/psych) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.46077
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. 541
Human Susceptibility to Framing Effect in Decisions Can Be
Reflected in Scalp Potentials
Jianmin Zeng1, Fenghua Zhang2, Ying Wang3,
Qinglin Zhang1*, Hong Yuan1, Lei Jia1, Jiang Qiu1
1Ministry of Education’s Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality, Faculty of Psychology,
Southwest University, Chongqing, China
2Department of Psychology, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
3Xiangshan High School, Hancheng, China
Email: *james_002@126.com
Received March 11th, 2013; revised April 13th, 2013; accepted May 12th, 2013
Copyright © 2013 Jianmin Zeng et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
Humans are susceptible to a famous decision bias named framing effect, which refers that people make
different decisions in two decision questions that are intrinsically the same but described in different ways.
This intriguing phenomenon has been widely studied with behavioral methods, animal models, and fMRI
technique. To date, it’s still unknown whether human susceptibility to this intriguing decision bias can be
reflected in scalp potentials. We recorded subjects’ scalp potentials when they decided between risky op-
tions and sure options, which were described in positive or negative way. We found that subjects’ brain
potential significantly differed between when their choices were consistent with framing effect and when
not. More significantly, we found that their susceptibility to framing effect could be reflected in their
scalp potentials. Further research in this line can possibly help minimize framing effect bias.
Keywords: Framing Effect; Risky Decision Making; Prospect Theory; Event-Related Potentials
Introduction
Framing effect refers that two different descriptions of the
intrinsically same decision question lead to different decisions.
A famous example of such came from Tversky and Kahneman
(1981). Suppose a disease is coming to attack US, which will
kill 600 people according to accurate scientific estimation. Two
alternative programs to deal with this disease are proposed. In a
positive frame, you need to choose between 200 people will be
saved for sure, and all people will be saved with a probability
of 1/3 or nobody will be saved with a probability of 2/3. In a
negative frame, you need to choose between 400 people will
die for sure, and all people will die with a probability of 1/3 or
nobody will die with a probability of 2/3. Although the two
decision questions in the two frames are intrinsically the same,
most of people chose the sure option in the positive frame but
the risky option in the negative frame. This phenomenon is so
intriguing that many studies have been devoted into investigat-
ing it (Druckman, 2001a, 2001b; Frisch, 1993; Levin, Gaeth,
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998;
Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Smith
& Levin, 1996).
Even non-human animals are also susceptible to the framing
effect. Lakshminarayanan, Chen, and Santos (2011) revealed
that even monkeys exhibited framing effect: they were risk
seeking in negative frames and risk averse in positive frames.
Marsh and Kacelnik (2002) found that even birds like starlings
exhibited more risk seeking in negative frames than in positive
frames. In their experiment, the gain and loss were represented
by the value higher or lower than the starlings’ expectation.
These studies suggested that framing effect may have ancient
evolutionary root.
With functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), De
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) found that the
susceptibility to the framing effect can be reflected in the activ-
ity of orbital and medial prefrontal cortex across subjects.
Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, and Just (2005) revealed that the
framing effect was associated with the activity of the prefrontal
and parietal cortices. Deppe et al. (2005) revealed that indi-
viduals’ susceptibility to framing effect correlated with the
activity of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Deppe et al.
(2007) revealed that individuals’ susceptibility to framing effect
correlated with the activity of the anterior cingulated cortex. All
studies mentioned in this paragraph used fMRI technique.
So far, there are only two ERP studies on the framing effect.
Ma, Feng, Xu, Bian, and Tang (2012) examined the framing
effect in outcome processing and found that outcomes in nega-
tive frames induced stronger feedback-related negativity than
outcomes in positive frames. This study did not study framing
effect in decisions. Zhang, Zeng, and Zhang (2010) examined
the scalp potentials induced by different frames. However, this
study did not examine the scalp potentials related to framing
effect (the interaction between frames and choices). It also did
not examine the relationship between susceptibility to framing
effect and scalp potentials.
*Corresponding author.
J. M. ZENG ET AL.
To date, no ERP study has been published to examine
whether scalp potentials can reflect human susceptibility to
framing effect in decisions. Therefore we conducted this study.
We hypothesized that behaving according to framing effect
(choosing sure options in positive frame and risky options in
negative frame) recruited more intuition, which are correspond-
ing to the medial prefrontal cortex or anterior cingulate cortex
(Kuo, Sjostrom, Chen, Wang, & Huang, 2009), and so in-
creased electrical potentials on the medial prefrontal scalp. In
contrast, behaving according to reversal framing effect (choos-
ing risky options in positive frame and sure options in negative
frame) recruited more deliberation, which are corresponding to
the parietal cortex (Kuo et al., 2009), and so increased electrical
potentials on the parietal scalp. These scalp potentials might
reflect the participants’ susceptibility to the framing effect.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduates (10 females and 10 males) aged 19 -
24 years (mean age 21.6 years), with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, from our university participated in the experi-
ment as paid volunteers. All participants were right-handed and
healthy, without a history of neurological or psychiatric illness.
All participants gave written informed consent to participate,
and this study was approved by the Administrative Committee
of Psychological Research in our university.
Procedure
Figure 1 illustrates the procedure in a typical trial. It was ex-
plained to the participants as a part of instruction. The first
screen, assuming the subject received ¥900, lasted 2 seconds.
Then came a blank screen, lasting 1 second. The 3rd screen
displayed two options. One option was to surely keep ¥720
(sure option). The other option was to keep all the money men-
tioned in the 1st screen (¥900 in this example) with a probability
of 4/5 or to lose all the money with a probability of 1/5 (risky
option). Note the expected values (money × probability) of two
options were equal. The subject had to make his choice within 4
seconds. After that, a blank screen appeared again for 1 second.
Two frames were used: positive and negative ones. The
above example used a positive frame: the sure option took a
form of “keeping”. A negative-frame question corresponding to
the above example is same as the example, except that the sure
option was adapted into “Lose ¥180 for sure”. Four probabili-
ties were used: 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5. Eight initial money amounts
were used, from ¥200 to ¥900, with a step of ¥100. Therefore
we had 2 (frames) × 4 (probabilities) × 8 (initial money
amounts) = 64 combinations, which made 64 trials. In each of
them, the expected values of the two options were equal. How-
ever, to make subjects stay clear-headed, 32 fill-in trials, in
which the expected values of two options were distinct, were
mixed into the focused trials. Therefore, we made 96 trials: 32
in positive frames, 32 in negative frames, and 32 as fill-in trials.
We had four repetitions so that we had 384 trials in total for the
formal experiment.
These trials were presented in a random order for each sub-
ject. These trials were divided into 4 sessions, each of which
contained 96 trials. The subject had a rest between two succes-
sive sessions. Before the formal experiment, the subject also
received instructions and 30 practice trials. The positions of
You receive
900
Keep
720
for sure
Bet
Keep all Lose all
Figure 1.
The experimental procedure in a typical trial.
sure and risky options were balanced both between sessions and
between subjects. The fill-in trials were excluded from data
analysis. The first 10 trials of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th sessions, were
taken as practice, and thus excluded from data analysis; this
kind of exclusion was not applied to the 1st session because
there had been 30 practice trials immediately before the 1st
session.
The participants were seated at approximately 80 cm away
from the computer screen with maximum visual angles for the
stimuli being 8.2˚ (horizontal) × 3.9˚ (vertical). They were in-
structed to keep their eyes fixated on the center of the screen
and avoid eye blinking and body movement while performing
the tasks. They were instructed to press a corresponding key to
indicate their choice, with their right forefinger and middle
finger.
EEG Recording and Preprocessing
An elastic cap with electrodes of 64 scalp sites according to
10 - 20 system was used to record subjects’ brain electrical
activity (Brain Product, Munchen, Germany), with the refer-
ences placed on the left mastoid. The vertical electrooculogram
(VEOG) generated from blinks and vertical eye movements
was also recorded by using miniature electrodes placed ap-
proximately 1cm above and below the subject’s right eye, and
the horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) by the outside rims of
their eyes. All electrode impedances were maintained below 10
k. The EEG, VEOG, and HEOG signals were amplified and
digitized with a sampling rate of 500 Hz and a bandpass of .1 -
100 Hz.
The EEGs went through the following steps of offline pre-
processing. They were rereferenced to an averaged mastoid
reference. Eye movement artifacts (eye blinks and movements)
were corrected with the Gratton & Coles method. The EEGs
was then filtered with a high cutoff of 16 Hz, 12 dB/oct. They
were then segmented and baseline-corrected. Segments whose
peak voltages exceeded ±80 μV after correction were excluded
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
542
J. M. ZENG ET AL.
before averaging. All these steps were performed with the Brain
Vision Analyser software (Brain Products). The ERP wave-
forms were time-locked at the onset of the stimuli in the deci-
sion screen of Figure 1. The averaged epochs for ERP were
1700 ms including 1500 ms post-stimulus waveform and 200
ms pre-stimulus baseline.
Results
Behavioral Results
Firstly, we examined whether framing effect occurred for
each probability. We compared the counts of trials in which the
subjects’ choices were consistent with framing effect (choosing
sure options in positive frame or risky options in negative
frame) and those inconsistent (choosing risky options in posi-
tive frame or sure options in negative frame) for each probabil-
ity. We found that framing effect did not appear for the prob-
ability of 1/5. This is understandable because prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) stated people are generally risk-
neutral for some probability between small and middle, and
thus people’s choices might not be affected by frames for these
probabilities. Therefore the data of this probability (1/5) were
excluded from the following behavioral and neural analysis.
We then compared the counts of trials in which the subjects’
choices were consistent with framing effect (mean ± se =
139.20 ± 5.569) and those inconsistent (mean ± se = 96.85 ±
5.672), as shown in Figure 2. A paired t-test revealed a signifi-
cant difference: t(19) = 3.772, p = .001. This result suggested
our subjects were generally susceptible to framing effect.
Electrophysiological Results
We firstly compared the scalp potentials between framing
effect and reversal framing effect. According to the waveforms
and topographic maps, we chose two time windows and some
electrode sites for analysis.
In the time window of 1100 - 1200 ms, the following elec-
trode sites were selected for analysis: Fpz, Fp1, AF3, AF4, F4.
Figure 2.
Framing effect and reversal framing effect reflected in averaged counts.
Framing effect: trials in which the subjects chose sure options in posi-
tive frame or risky options in negative frame. Reversal framing effect:
trials in which the subjects chose risky options in positive frame or sure
options in negative frame.
A 5 (electrode) × 2 (effect: framing effect vs reversal framing
effect) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyzed the
scalp potentials. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was ap-
plied to p-values whenever necessary. We found the potentials
related to framing effect differed from those to reversal framing
effect significantly: F(1, 19) = 6.635, p = .019, ηp
2 = .259. Fig-
ure 3 illustrated this contrast.
In the time window of 1300 - 1500 ms, the following elec-
trode sites were selected for analysis: Pz, P1, P3, POz, PO3. A
5 (electrode) × 2 (effect: framing effect vs reversal framing
effect) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyzed the
scalp potentials. We found the potentials related to framing
effect differed from those to reversal framing effect signifi-
cantly: F(1, 19) = 4.483, p = .048, ηp
2 = .191. Figure 4 illus-
trated this contrast.
An intriguing question is, whether the subjects’ susceptibility
to framing effect can be reflected in their scalp potentials. For
this purpose, we calculated three indices. Behavioral index of
framing effect = count of trials in which a subject’s choice was
consistent with framing effect—that of inconsistent. Scalp po-
tential index of framing effect = averaged scalp potential of
trials in which a subject’s choice was consistent with framing
effect—that of inconsistent. Scalp potential index of framing
effect has two kinds: one for the medial prefrontal scalp during
1100 - 1200 ms, and the other for the parietal scalp during 1300
- 1500 ms.
Figure 5 depicts the co-variation relationship between be-
havioral index of framing effect and scalp potential index of
framing effect in 1100 - 1200 ms on the medial prefrontal scalp.
With a linear regression, scalp potential index of framing effect
can positively reflect behavioral index of framing effect sig-
nificantly: p = .011. This result means, the more a subject’s
electrical potential on the medial prefrontal scalp was influ-
enced by the framing effect, the more a subject’s choice was
influenced by the framing effect.
Figure 6 depicts the co-variation relationship between be-
havioral index of framing effect and scalp potential index of
framing effect in 1300 - 1500 ms on the parietal scalp. With a
linear regression, scalp potential index of framing effect can
negatively reflect behavioral index of framing effect signifi-
cantly: p = .005. This result means, the more a subject’s elec-
trical potential on the parietal scalp was influenced by the
framing effect, the less a subject’s choice was influenced by the
framing effect.
Discussion
In our study, the participants exhibited framing effect in all
probabilities (4/5, 3/5, 2/5) except the too small probability
(1/5). This result was consistent with prospect theory (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979). Choices consistent with framing effect
(choosing sure options in positive frame and risky options in
negative frame) were preceded by relatively stronger electrical
potentials on the medial prefrontal scalp during 1100 - 1200 ms.
Choices consistent with reversal framing effect (choosing risky
options in positive frame and sure options in negative frame)
were preceded by relatively stronger electrical potentials on the
parietal scalp during 1300 - 1500 ms. Most importantly, the
electrical potentials on these two scalp areas could respectively
reflect subjects’ susceptibility to the framing effect.
Previous fMRI studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Deppe et al.,
2005; Deppe et al., 2007; Gonzalez et al., 2005; Kuo et al.,
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. 543
J. M. ZENG ET AL.
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
544
Figure 3.
Waveforms at the electrode sites of AF4, Fpz and Fp1; Topographical map of the difference potential between framing effect and reversal framing
effect in the time window of 1100 - 1200 ms.
Figure 4.
Waveforms at the electrode sites of P3, P1 and POz; Topographical map of the difference potential between framing effect and reversal framing effect
in the time window of 1300 - 1500 ms.
2009) have related framing effect or intuition to medial pre-
frontal or anterior cingulate cortices. Therefore we expected that
stronger electrical potentials on medial prefrontal scalp would
precede choices consistent with framing effect. As revealed
above, they did. Choosing consistently with framing effect is a
dominant choice pattern, which possibly represents a default
decision pattern and so relies more on intuition. That is why the
fMRI studies and our ERP study had the above observations.
J. M. ZENG ET AL.
Figure 5.
Subjects’ susceptibility to framing effect can be reflected by electrical
potentials on the medial prefrontal scalp during 1100 - 1200 ms.
Figure 6.
Subjects’ susceptibility to framing effect can be negatively reflected by
the electrical potentials on the parietal scalp during 1300 - 1500 ms.
Previous fMRI research (Kuo et al., 2009) has related delib-
eration with the activity of the parietal cortex. We speculated
that choosing according to reversal framing effect (behaving
opposite to the dominant choice pattern) might need more de-
liberation, and so relied more on the parietal cortex, and thus
were preceded by stronger electrical potential on the parietal
scalp. Our observation in the experiment verified this expecta-
tion.
Most importantly, we found that both the electrical potentials
on the medial prefrontal scalp and those on the parietal scalp
could respectively reflect subjects’ susceptibility to the framing
effect. A previous fMRI study (Deppe et al., 2007) found that
the susceptibility to framing during attractiveness evaluation
could be reflected in the activity of anterior cingulated cortex.
Our study is distinct from that fMRI study in two important
aspects. Firstly, the research fields are distinct: our study fo-
cused on decision making, while that study focused on attract-
tiveness evaluation. Secondly, the research techniques are dis-
tinct: our study used ERP technique while that study used fMRI
technique.
This study is probably the first study that finds correlation
between susceptibility to framing effect in decisions and scalp
potentials. Future further research on this topic can possibly
develop into such degree that people can predict and decrease
human susceptibility to framing effect in decisions by measure-
ing and modulating scalp potentials.
Acknowledgements
This study was supported by National Natural Science
Foundation of China (a grant awarded to Jianmin Zeng in 2013),
Southwest University’s Program in Reform of Education and
Teaching (2012JY216), Doctoral Foundation of Southwest
University (20710930), The Sponsored Program for Cultivating
Youths of Outstanding Ability in Jiangxi Normal University,
and Project for Excellent Postdoctoral Researchers in Jiangxi
Province.
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