Open Journal of Philosophy
2013. Vol.3, No.1A, 146-149
Published Online February 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.31A024
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.
146
Personal Identity and “Life-Here-After Poetics”: A Critique of
Maduabuchi Dukor’s Metaphysics
Francis Offor
Department of Philosophy, Universit y of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeri a
Email: offor66@yahoo.com
Received September 24th, 2012; revised October 24th, 2012; accepted No ve mber 9th, 2012
This essay examines Maduabuchi Dukor’s perspective on the African conception of man, personal iden-
tity and “life-here-after”. This is with a view to showing that although, Dukor’s views represent what ob-
tain among some ethnic nationalities in Africa, this nevertheless does not provide a basis for generalising
across the whole of Africa, as there are countless number of ethnic groups in Africa to which Dukor’s
general claims may not be applicable. Given the varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny
in Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the inherent contradictions in some of these
conceptions, which calls into questioning, the veracity of claims made therein, it will amount to a major
logical error to make sweeping generalisations that would be representative of the whole of Africa. Such
generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial representation of the African conception of man
and human destiny.
Keywords: Metaphysics; Personal Identity; Destiny; Man; Africa
Introduction
In his Theistic humanism of African philosophy (Dukor,
2010a) and African philosophy in the global village (Dukor,
2010b), Maduabuchi Dukor takes a swoop at two fundamental
aspects of African metaphysics. These have to do with the Af-
rican conception of man and of personal identity, as well as the
issue of “life-here-after”, otherwise known as “destiny”. Among
the claims made by Dukor are that there is a monolithic con-
ception of man across the whole of Africa and that “if there
were any variation from one ethnic to another, it would be only
in nomenclature and not in substance” (Dukor, 2010a).
To demonstrate this, Dukor itemised the various elements
with which man is identified in Western ontology and gave
their corresponding equivalents in the thought systems of the
Igbo and Yoruba groups of Nigeria, the Akan and Ewa groups
of Ghana and the Kotokali language group of Togo. The aim
here is to show that the different interpretations adequately
represent the African conception of man. Dukor extends this
thesis further by presenting a generalisable position on the issue
of personal identity and of “life-here-after”. As far as Dukor is
concerned, the issues he raised, with regards to the questions of
“personal identity” and “life-here-after”, “are generalisable on
grounds that whatever obtains in two or more ethnic groups in
black Africa, roughly obtains in the whole of black Africa
(Dukor, 2010a).
This essay attempts to respond to this “Dukorian” perspec-
tive on the African conception of man and of the problem of
personal identity and “life-here-after”. This is with a view to
showing that although, Dukor’s findings corroborate what ob-
tain among some ethnic nationalities in Africa, this nevertheless
does not provide a basis for generalising across the whole of
Africa, as there are countless number of ethnic groups in Africa
to whom some of these claims may not be applicable. Given the
varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny in
Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the
inherent contradictions in some of these conceptions, which
calls into questioning the veracity of claims made therein, it
will amount to a major logical error to make sweeping gener-
alisations that would be representative of the whole of Africa.
Such generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial
representation of the African conception of man and human
destiny.
Conceptions of Person
In Western ontology, a person is conceived from both the
dualist and monist perspectives. Dualist philosophers like Des-
cartes, Malebranche and Geunilex hold that a person is made up
of two principal substances, one spiritual and the other physical
or material. Monist philosophers like Ryle, Schelling, Smart,
Hegel, Armstrong and Place, hold that a person is made of a
single substance. For some, such as the materialists, it is pure
matter, whereas for others like the idealists, the human essence
is purely immaterial. For most dualist philosophers such as
Descartes, Plato and Pythagoras, it is the soul that constitutes
the identity of a person on account of its destructible, immuta-
ble and changeless nature. But for the monists, the identity of a
man is determined by that which they hold to be the real es-
sence of the human person. Following this conception of a per-
son in Western ontology, the challenges of the problem of
“life-here-after” dissolve quickly into oblivion. This is because
if man’s identity is necessarily dependent on bodily continuity
as claimed by the materialists, then there will be no sense in
which man’s conscious self could be said to exist after the dis-
integration of the body at death. If on the other hand, we uphold
the argument of some dualist and idealist philosophers, that the
mind or soul is the real essence of the human person and that it
can continue to exist after the death of the physical body, then
the fundamental objection to the problem of “life-here-after”
F. OFFOR
becomes unsustainable.
In many parts of Africa, a person is conceived to be made up
of two principal substances, one physical, corporeal and ex-
tended, and the other spiritual, incorporeal and unextended. Of
these substances, one survives the death of the other. According
to Dukor, “death in African theistic panpsychic universe is a
transmigration kind of transition to the world beyond … Life
therefore is a continuous process from this world to the world
beyond” (Dukor, 2010b). By this, Dukor means that life for the
African is continuous, and that the death of the physical body
does not mean the cessation of life. This assertion by Dukor is
based on his analysis of how man is conceived in some African
thought systems.
Generally, the conception of man in many parts of Africa is
such that he is said to be made up of certain constituent parts
(Dukor, 2010a). For instance, among the Yoruba of south west-
ern Nige ria, a person is believed to be made up of three i mpor-
tant parts. These are the “Ara” which is the material body, in-
cluding the internal organs of a person; the “Emi” which is the
life giving element and the “Ori” which is the individuality
element that is responsible for a person’s personality (Oladipo,
1992).
In Akan ontology, a person is also made up of three parts
namely the “Okra”, the “Sunsum” and the “Honam” or “Nipa-
dua”, representing the soul (or life giving entity), the spirit that
gives a personality its force and body respectively (Wiredu,
1983). For the Igbo of eastern Nigeria, a person is an embodi-
ment of the “Chi” (the personality soul), the “Ndu” (the ani-
mating spirit) and the “Ahu” the physical body. Among the
Bini of southern Nigeria, a person is conceived as consisting of
the “Egbe” (body), the “Ehi” (personality spirit or guardian self)
and the “Orion” (animating spirit or soul). The “Ehi” is respon-
sible for one’s personality and its fortune is not tied to what
happens to the physical body. It is the bearer and transmitter of
one’s destiny, and the one that receives the account of how one
lived while on earth, in order to ascertain whether one con-
formed to the earlier received destiny from “Osanobua” (the
Supreme Being). The “Orion” is the life principle and the ani-
mating spirit that is capable of reincarnation and of bearing the
consequences of one’s actions or inactions while on earth. The
“Orion” is the most critical constituent of the human person and
its departure signifies death for the body.
Apart from the “Orion” and the “Ehi”, there is yet another
element which plays a significant role in the Bini conception of
a person. It is called “Ekhoe”. Paradoxically, Ekhoe has both a
spiritual and a material status. As a spiritual substance, Ekhoe is
linked to the mind and it is the seat of passion. In admonishing
a person to change his disposition or character, the Bini would
say “fie ekhoe werie” which means “change your mind or think-
ing”. As a material substance, Ekhoe translates as heart (Udu)
which is part of the physical body (Egbe). This is the reason the
Bini would entreat someone who is agitated to calm the nerves
of his heart “Yo obo wie ekhoe”, which translates as “rub your
hands down your heart”. Someone who understands the Bini
language would simply respond by rubbing his hands down the
side of his chest that houses the heart. So, whereas the “Ehi”
and the “Orion” are both immaterial spiritual substances, the
Ekhoe is both spiritual and material. However, the Egbe (body)
is believed to house both the Ekhoe and the Orion which ani-
mates it.
At the level of the physical, there is hardly any serious varia-
tion among the Yoruba, Akan, Igbo and Bini conceptions, as
they all agree that a person is made up of the physical body
with all biological organs playing certain interconnected roles
to ensure the survival of the human being (Oyeshile, 2002).
Also, all the conceptions are in agreement that the material
aspect of a person is not self sufficient and self enclosed. They
all suppose a symmetrical functional relationship between the
material aspect of a person and the non-material invisible as-
pect, with complimentary implications for the human person.
At the non physical level also, all the conceptions share a be-
lief in some animating spirit called the “Emi” in Yoruba, “Sun-
sum” in Akan, “Ndu” in Igbo and “Orion” in Bini. The Yoruba,
Akan, Igbo and Bini also believe in the inner head or personal-
ity soul which derives from God or the Supreme Being. This
inner head is largely responsible for human destiny (Oyeshile,
2002) and it is called “Ori” in Yoruba, “Okra” in Akan, “Chi”
in Igbo and “Ehi” in Bini.
On the strength of the foregoing apparent overlaps, one be-
gins to see the point in Dukor’s generalisation “that whatever
obtains in two or more ethnic groups in black Africa obtains in
the whole of black Africa” and that if there were any variation
from one ethnic group to another, it would be only in nomen-
clature and not in substance (Dukor, 2010a).
Personal Identity and “Life-Here-After”
There is a truism in science that all the cells in a person’s
body are completely replaced after every seven years and that
the human body is continually changing through the process of
nutriment and waste, to the extent that no individual may be
said to possess the same body after seven years. In the same
way, it is believed that a person’s mind, that is, mode of think-
ing, changes continually with the passage of time (Omoregbe,
2001).
So, whether from the materialist or idealist perspective, a
person changes with the passage of time, for as Copi once re-
marked, “… the mind grows old as well as the body” (Copi,
1982). Maduabuchi Dukor alluded to this, when he stated that:
There is no such thing as a person or a proper part of a
person, her ego, self or mind’s “I” that is exactly the same
overtime (Dukor, 2010b).
If therefore man is continually changing, what then is it that
constitutes a person’s individuality and identity, such that in
spite of a lapse of time and the changes the person may have
gone through, the person in question still remains the same as
we knew before? This question describes what has come to be
known in philosophy as the problem of personal identity. Phi-
losophers of Western extraction have responded to this problem
in several ways.
In his “theory of matter and form”, Aristotle postulated that
everything is composed of two elements-substance and acci-
dents. Whereas “accidents” or “matter” undergo change, the
“substance” or “form” does not, and this for Aristotle is what
constitutes the identity of a thing. When we covet this theory to
explain the position of dualist philosophers with regards to the
human person, the “matter” then becomes the body while the
“form” is the soul. Whereas the body changes, the soul does not
change but remains the same in spite of tremendous changes in
the body from birth to old age. Hence, the soul or mind is the
real essence of the human person.
For some others like Hume and Russell however, there is
nothing like the soul or mind conceived as an unchanging entity,
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. 147
F. OFFOR
apart from series of inner perceptions or observable psycho-
logical experiences, which are themselves distinct and dis-
jointed. These different perceptions, which are usually in suc-
cession, cannot be brought together to form one continuous
perception. What we have instead is a mere succession of per-
ceptions which is now being mistaken for continuity and per-
sonal identity (Omoregbe, 2001).
The various conceptions of person in many African thought
systems not only provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept
of man but of his destination as well. So destiny remains a
common feature in the various conceptions of persons among
the African peoples (Oyeshile, 2002). But an account of man’s
destination would remain vacuous, unless the problem of per-
sonal identity has been adequately addressed. This is the reason
the various conceptions of man in Africa are in agreement that
“man possesses a kind of transcendental self, which though
invisible, (yet) is real” (Oyeshile, 2002). In this respect, Dukor
also concurs that:
Death in Africa theistic panpsychic animistic universe is a
transmigration kind of transition to the world beyond [and
that] life therefore is a continuous process from this world
to the world within or beyond (Dukor, 2010b).
Dukor’s claim that life for the African is a continuous proc-
ess from this world to the world within or beyond finds expres-
sion in the thought systems of most groups in Africa, but this
same generalisation cannot be extended to his claim that “death
in Africa … is a transmigration kind of transition”. Elaborating
further on what he meant by this, Dukor writes:
Man in panpsychic animistic universe in African meta-
physics is undergirded and circumscribed by panpsychic
forces, as it were, he is convertible or transmigratable into
any of the forms of panpsychic force, spirits and powers,
which are also symbolic of man, animals, snakes, lions,
bulls, leopards, cattle, lizards etc. Death as a transmigra-
tion could also mean a man dying to enter the animals or
big trees like iroko as the animating spirit (Dukor, 2010b).
In order to give strength to his claim, Dukor cited some be-
liefs among Africans supported mainly by mythologies, that “in
African theistic panpsychic animism, there are animals or trees
that are held sacred and untouchable because they have human
but animistic spirit, consequent upon transmigration from
earthly life to life after death” (Dukor, 2010b).
It is true that we have sacred animals and trees believed to
have been inhabited by human spirits in many parts of Africa.
But the question Dukor left unattended to, is whether humans
actually inhabited such trees or animals after their physical
death, or whether as suggested by most African mythologies,
they do such while alive in order to gain immortality in the
present world. In any case, reducing the metaphysical issue of
man’s destination after death to “a transmigratable kind of tran-
sition” would betray an attempt to super impose the Pythago-
rean category on the Africa thought system, and this would
have both logical and ontological consequences.
Conclusion: The Onto-Logical Implications of
Dukor’s Generalisations
Dukor’s generalisations may indeed by supported on the
strength of the logical principles of Existential and Universal
Generalisation, and the interchange between them, made possi-
ble by the principle of Quantifier Exchange. According to the
principle of Existential Generalisation, what is required to gen-
eralise a position to cover a few more instances is the occur-
rence of a single instance of that phenomenon. According to
this principle, from a statement containing the occurrence of a
single instance of a phenomenon, we can obtain a general prin-
ciple whose form is derived by replacing the “constant” with a
“variable” that will be representative of some of the occur-
rences of the “constant” or phenomenon to be generalised.
Schematically, the principle is represented thus:

Pa
xPx
where “a” is the individual occurrence or constant, “x” is the
variable that serves to indicate where individual occurrences
can be slotted to produce a kind of generalisation describing the
occurrence of the phenomenon, “p” is the predicate term and
(x) is the Existential Quantifier sign (Offor, 2010).
The principle of universal generalisation on the other hand is
to the effect that one can come up with a general statement that
will be representative of all occurrences of a phenomenon in an
entire class merely from a statement describing an individual
occurrence of that phenomenon. The schematic representation
of this principle is as stated below:

Oa
xOx
where “a” is the individual occurrence (constant), “x” is the
variable, “O” is the predicate term and “(x)” is the Universal
Quantifier sign.
The transition from generalisations about part of a class to
the whol e cl a ss is a c hie ve d t hr oug h t he i nte r c hang e be tw ee n th e
principles of Existential Generalisation and that of Universal
Generalisation, made possible by the rule of Quantifier Ex-
change. This rule merely serves to develop some relationships
among general statements by replacing statements that general-
ise about part of a class with their equivalents that generalise
about an entire class. For example, “some things are composed
of matter” is a statement that generalise about part of a class
and is symbolised as (x)Cx. However, to say that “some things
are composed of matter” is logically the same as saying “it is
not the case that all things are not composed of matter”, sym-
bolised as ~(x)~Cx.
Given the benefits of hindsight from the foregoing logical
principles, one begins to see the point in Dukor’s generalisable
assertions on the metaphysical conception of man and human
destiny in Africa. However, a closely knitted survey of the
various African conceptions would show that the overlaps that
prompted Dukor’s generalisation are not as simplistic as he
presented them. In fact, there are rigid variations among these
conceptions that would make their generalisation as African
conception logic ally faulty.
Olatunji Oyeshile, in his comparative study of the concept of
person in Yoruba, Akan and Igbo thoughts noted such rigid
variations when he pointed to the very “many … overlaps in
Akan conception of a person which are not so common in
Yoruba and Igbo conception, and the fact that “both Igbo and
Akan have a conception of soul in the manner of Western phi-
losophy, whereas the Yoruba have no such conception of soul”
(Oyeshile, 2002).
Also, some of the generalisa tions made by Dukor not only do
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148
F. OFFOR
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. 149
not hold for many groups in Africa, some of these claims have
deeper ontological meanings which when properly explored
would render Dukor’s generalisations about them baseless. For
instance, the claim by Dukor that in African thought system, the
human shadow will cease to exist the moment the personality
soul disappears at death and that consequently, corpses can cast
no shadow, not only fails the litmus test of science, it also does
not accord with the belief of the Bini people. The claim that
dead bodies don’t cast shadow is indefensible, going by the
experiment of rarefaction in Physics. All bodies are opaque,
whether death or alive! By the experiment of rarefaction, light
particles travelling on a straight line and hitting the bodies that
are opaque, cause rarefaction and consequently, the shadow.
Certainly, if a man commits suicide by hanging himself on a
tree, he will surely cast shadows, for the simple fact that the
body is opaque and depending also on the direction of the sun.
This expression, “that dead bodies don’t cast shadow” has
deeper ontological meanings in the various African thought
systems which Dukor failed to explore.
Again, Dukor’s claim that “that circle of life in Africa com-
mences from the conception of a child and ends at death” (Du-
kor, 2010a), does not align with the idea of life circle among
the Bini people. For the Bini people, the circle of life predates
biological conception, starting from the world beyond, con-
tinuing through the processes of birth, puberty, marriage, death
and then back to the world beyond. These adjoining processes
are mere episodes in one’s life circle. The circle is only com-
pleted, according to the Bini, after a man has gone round it
fourteen times.
Finally, Dukor’s general claim that “the soul and the guard-
ian self severally and collectively constitute the mind in African
traditional thought system” (Dukor, 2010a) cannot be said to
accurately represent what obtains in many parts of Africa.
Among the Bini people for instance, the guardian self is “Ehi”,
the animating spirit or soul is “Orion” while the mind is “Ek-
hoe”. The “Ehi” is not housed by the physical body. It is sig-
nificated by the shadow and only disappears when the body is
interred. The “Ekhoe” (mind) and the “Orion” (animating spirit
or soul) are housed by the physical body but they perform dif-
ferent functions. The “Ekhoe” (mind) is the seat of passion and
thought, while the “Orion” is the life principle that animates the
body, hence, its departure from the body signals death. It is
clear then that the soul and guardian self do not together con-
stitute the mind in Bini and perhaps in many other thought sys-
tems in Africa.
We are not trying to insinuate here that one conception of
“life-here-after” in Africa is superior to any other, but to show
the varieties of opinions on the metaphysical conception of man
and destiny among the African peoples and how this should
moderate the attempt by any scholar to make generalisations for
the whole of Africa. The fact still remains that each thought
system has its peculiar nuances and contradictions that would
call into question, the veracity of beliefs held by the people.
The Bini for instance are ambivalent on the actual status of the
“Orion” (the life principle) and its relationship with the body.
At some point the Bini believe that whatever happens to the
“Egbe” (body) does not affect the “Orion”. In this sense, the
physical disability of a man does not tra nslate into disability of
any form, for the “Orion”. At another level however, the Bini
believe that physical deformity can impact on the “Orion”,
hence their saying that “a one-handed man is never a stranger
whenever he gets to the spirit world” (Omwen obo okpa
erorumwunyen vbe ogha se erhinmwin). The understanding
here is that the amputated arm would already be present in the
spirit world before it is joined by the remaining parts of the
man’s body at death! The apparent contradiction here results
from the fact that the Bini admit that it is the “Orion” (animat-
ing spirit) and not the “Egbe” (physical body), that survives
man and takes abode in the world of the spirit.
The point of the foregoing is not to affirm the superiority of
any one conception over another, or to dismiss any of the con-
ceptions, but to expose the varieties of conceptions on the
metaphysics of man in Africa and the sense in which this may
help protect one from the danger of over generalisation. Given
the varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny in
Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the
inherent contradictions in some of these conceptions, which call
into questioning the veracity of the claims made therein, it will
amount to a major logical error to make sweeping generalisa-
tions that would be representative of the whole of Africa. Such
generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial repre-
sentation of the African conception of man and of human des-
tiny.
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