G. J. MORGAN
exist. Thus, he does not think that the aim of theoretical science
is to reveal truth in any realist sense, although the structure of
physical theory may “hint” at the real affinities of things (Du-
hem, 1954: p. 30). Rather, he suggests that the fundamental va-
lue of theoretical science is a beautiful orderly classification
and an economical representation of otherwise disparate expe-
rimentally discovered physical laws:
Order wherever it reigns, brings beauty with it. Theory not
only renders the group of physical laws it represents easier to
handle, more convenient, and more useful, but also more beau-
tiful.
It is impossible to follow the march of one of the great theo-
ries of physics, to see it unroll majestically its regular deduc-
tions starting from initial hypotheses, to see its consequences
represent a multitude of experimental laws down to the small
detail, without being charmed by the beauty of such a construc-
tion, without feeling keenly that such a creation of the human
mind is truly a work of art (Duhem, 1954: p. 24).
For Duhem, the orderly representation and classification that
is theoretical physics is beautiful.
We must make some interpretative moves before we can
claim that Duhem thinks that creation of beautiful theories is a
fundamental value of science, however. To see this point, con-
sider two senses of value of science. In the first sense, if X is a
value of science and Y is coextensive with X then Y is also a
value of science. In the second sense of value, if X is a value of
science and X is co-extensive with Y, it does not follow that the
value of science is also Y. Which of these two senses is more
plausible for Duhem’s conception of beauty? If Duhem thought
that there was only a contingent connection between order and
beauty, then one could argue that Duhem’s notion of the aim of
theoretical science is not to reveal beauty, necessarily, but to
articulate order. Nonetheless, it is more plausible that Duhem
took the connection between beauty and order in theoretical
science to be necessary. For example, one could argue that for
Duhem, theoretical beauty just is theoretical order. Thus on a
plausible reading of Duhem, he claims that a beautiful physical
theory realizes a fundamental value of science to a greater ex-
tent than an ugly alternative.
Thomas Kuhn: Beauty as Subjective Value
In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn claims that
“aesthetic considerations” can lead scientists to reject an old
paradigm in favor of a new one (Kuhn, 1970: p. 155). He says
little about what he means by “aesthetic considerations,” but in
his postscript, he gestures at judgments of simplicity, consis-
tency, and plausibility (Kuhn, 1970: p. 185). In a later article,
Kuhn considers aesthetics in science more directly. On the rela-
tion between art and science, Kuhn writes:
Undoubtedly, … considerations of symmetry, of simplicity and
elegance in symbolic expression, and other forms of the mathe-
matical aesthetic play important roles in [art and science]. But
in the arts, the aesthetic is itself the goal of the work. In the
sciences it is, at best, … a tool: a criterion of choice between
theories that are in other respects comparable, or a guide to the
imagination seek ing a key to th e solution o f an intr actable puzzle
(Kuhn, 1969: p. 342).
Although Kuhn probably would not have put it this way, the
quotation suggests two roles for aesthetics in science: one in the
context of justification and another in the context of discovery.
Additionally, as Margolis argues, it seems overly restrictive to
confine these two roles to revolutionary science as Kuhn does
(Margolis, 1997: p. 193). It is the former role in theory choice
that is pertinent to our current discussion—how aesthetic con-
siderations supposedly guide us to adopt one theory over another.
Kuhn’s notion of theory adoption or theory “choice” is ambigu-
ous. It can be interpreted to mean adopt-as-true or to mean
adopt-as-worthy-of-pursuit. Kuhn is usually interpreted as in-
tending the latter.
For Kuhn, some properties responsible for a theory’s beauty
are the same properties of theories or “theoretical values” that
feature in standard lists of criteria for theory choice. Kuhn
himself mentions five criteria for “evaluating the adequacy of a
theory”: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitful-
ness (Kuhn, 1973: p. 323). He acknowledges that the list is in-
complete and that there are differences in how we interpret each
one as well as further difficulties in assigning relative weights to
each criterion. Presumably, we could add further criteria such as
consilience, explanatory power, elegance, computational trac-
tability, visualizibility, etc., as well as more specific properties
of theories. Not surprisingly, there is not universal agreement
over which, if any, of these criteria for theory choice are ae-
sthetic. Further, even if a theory is beautiful because of its
simplicity say, it does not follow that all cases of simplicity are
aesthetic. Nonetheless, Kuhn’s remarks suggest that he thinks at
least some of these criteria are aesthetic, and additionally, that
the particular balance between them can be an aesthetic
choice.
For Kuhn, members of a scientific community share, among
other things, a common set of values. Some of these values are
aesthetic. For example, a specific interpretation of the meaning
of simplicity might involve an appeal to what is beautiful.
Suppose that a scientist accepts one theory TB over a competing
TU because TB is more beautiful than TU. It does not follow that
she believes TB, since for Kuhn, theory acceptance need not
involve belief. Rather it is a commitment to the theory that is
based on values that define the scientist as being a member of a
particular scientific community. Now one might worry that the
values within scientific communities are not objective but change
over time and from person to person. Kuhn is receptive to this
possibility:
… values may be shared by men who differ in their applica-
tion. Judgments of accuracy are relatively, though not entirely,
stable from one time to another and from one member to an-
other in a particular group. But judgments of simplicity, con-
sistency, plausibility, and so on often vary greatly from indi-
vidual to individual (Kuhn, 1970: p. 187).
Aesthetic values are more likely to be of the latter more
variable type of value and thus a pernicious subjectivism looms.
Kuhn replies to this potential problem with the following two
points:
First, shared values can be important determinants of group
behavior even though the members of the group do not apply
them in the same way… Men did not paint alike during the
periods where representation was a primary value, but the
developmental pattern of the plastic arts changed drastically
when that value was abandoned… Second, individual vari-
ability in the application of shared values may serve essential
functions in science… If all the members of a community re-
sponded to an anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each
new theory advanced by a colleague, science would cease
(Kuhn, 1970: p. 188).
Kuhn’s response to the problem of subjectivity invites many
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