T. W. SMYTHE
But what can you be saying then? If what you say is neither a
bizarre and pointless tautology (this body is its own owner, or
something like that) nor the claim that you are an immaterial
soul or ghost puppeteer who owns and operates this body the
way you own and operate your car, what else could you mean?
(Dennett, 1991: p . 418).
I shall argue that the relation between me and my body can
be specified in several ways, most of which do not refute mate-
rialism. Some of them are ontologically neutral in the sense that
they do not imply either that some form of dualism is true, or
that some form of materialism is true. Therefore, they do not
present a difficulty or threat to materialism. I will also present
some ways that I seem to be related to my body that are not
genuine.
But first I will briefly discuss Dennett’s solution to this puz-
zle. Dennett, if I am interpreting him correctly, says that I do
not own my body because there is nothing to own the body.
The “self” is an abstraction or fiction (Dennett, 1991: pp. 420,
428). It is like the equator or lines of latitude or longitude. It is
not a concrete existing thing that has a body. However, I think
that his view has some shortcomings. I will briefly state why I
think that this is a mistake.
First, in common sense we think of the self (myself) as being
a causal agent that is responsible for its actions. An abstraction
cannot fill that role. Second, we think of the self as a mental
thing that has mental states. Third, we think of the self as uni-
fied both synchronically and diachronically. Fourth, we ordi-
narily think of the self as being a subject of experience, and as
occupying a point of view. None of these deeper-lying aspects
of the self can be happily construed as an abstraction (Strawson,
1997).
I only wanted to mention these difficulties with Dennett’s
positive view of the self to indicate that this is not the path I
think a materialist should take on the supposed owner of one’s
body. Before I return to the main topic of the paper, I need to
make some further clarifications.
In this paper I talk a lot about the self. This is not a paper
about the metaphysics of the self. By “self” I just mean “per-
son” although the exact nature of each is the subject of some
controversy. My main concern is with the implications of the
way I am related to my body for the mind-body problem. I talk
about the self when discussing substance dualism, because for
the dualist the self or person is a mind or soul that is capable of
existing in a disembodied state. For the materialist, the self or
person is just a material thing. I also bring in points about per-
sonal identity in order to trash one of the putative ways that I
seem to be related to my body. This paper is not about personal
identity, however. I am concerned to defend materialism vis-à-
vis possible dualistic conclusions that can be drawn from con-
siderations about my relation to my body. I now turn to some
ways in which we seem to be related to our bodies, but are not
so related when examined critically.
One way it might be thought that I can be related to my body
can be stated in terms of exclusivity and uniqueness. There is a
sense in which this body that I trundle around in is exclusively
and uniquely mine. It is my body and no one else’s. Ed Fink
has suggested to me that this may seem to be a legitimate way
that I am related to my body. But the notion that this body is
uniquely and exclusively mine needs further explanation. First,
William P. Alston has told me that I need to distinguish be-
tween necessary and contingent exclusivity. I will discuss the
former. What does it mean to say my body is exclusively mine?
One thing it can mean is that no one else can share my body
with me. No one else can have my body. I cannot think of any-
thing else that can be meant by saying my body is uniquely and
exclusively mine.
If this is what it means to say I am related to my body, it is
clear from the philosophical literature on personal identity that I
am not related to my body in this way. Dualists are fond of
imagining cases where people change bodies by having their
soul move to another body. Materialists do not think that such
an exchange of bodies is possible as a matter of fact, although it
may be logically possible. Some materialists even deny that
such an exchange of bodies is even logically possible or intelli-
gible.
Materialists and dualists both think that brain transplants are
logically possible where one acquires a completely new body
while remaining the same person. In fission cases, where two
brain hemispheres are allotted to different persons, two people
seem to occupy one body. Then there are cases of multiple
personality disorders where several selves are manifested in one
body. As a result, there does not seem to be a case of ownership
where this body of mine is unshareable with anyone else. I
conclude that this alleged way of being related to my body is
bogus. We will have to look elsewhere to find a way in which I
am genuinely related to my body.
A second way we are not related to our bodies is one in
which I can be said to be related to my mental states as their
subject. As a subject of experience I possess or own my
thoughts and sensations. This is my pain and it is had by me.
Similarly, I can be said to have a body.
Owning my mental states as their subject does not make me
the owner of my body. So there is no relation in that sense. But
there might be an analogy between my owning my mental
states and my owning my body. The difficulty is one of speci-
fying what “own” means in this comparison. In what sense, if
any, do I “own” my mental states? This has to be specified, and
I do not see how to do it.
A third way that I seem to be related to my body but am not
comes from the fact that my body has a causal relation to the
subject of my mental states. In other words, my body is a causal
factor, it causes my mental states and my being the subject of
those mental states.
According to William Alston in correspondence this way of
being related to my body is bogus. Light waves in my envi-
ronment are causal factors for my consciously seeing things.
Yet I don’t have them in any way. The same goes for the ob-
jects I see. They cause my seeing them, but I don’t have them. I
now turn to ways that we are genuinely related to our bodie s .
The first way in which I am related to my body is that my
brain and body are related to me, as subject, as parts to a whole,
as when we say that the chair possesses a seat and legs. Here
one might think that if my having a body involves a part-whole
relationship, yet it does not follow that I am something different
from my brain and body, any more than it foll ows from the fact
that a chair has a seat and frame that the chair is something
different from the sum of its parts.
However, this would be too facile. We can say things about a
chair, such that it is a portable seat for one, which we cannot
say about the legs or other parts. The chair has a function as a
whole that is not shared by the sum of its parts. Similarly, it is
because people acknowledge real wholes that they come the
think of an “I” that is separate from one’s body and mental
states. I will argue that this does not impugn materialism, which
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